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ABSTRACT 
This thesis documents a study of the factors associated with Boards of Directors’ strategic 
decisions. The premise upon which such a research initiative is founded concerns the 
increased interest of academics and business practitioners in Board of Directors in the U.K 
and in U.S in part arising from recent financial scandals made in major public companies. 
Despite this increased attention to Board of Directors, it is acknowledged that Boards of 
Directors is one of the most under-researched management topics and its research is 
limited in scope and scale.  
 
An extensive review of the literature revealed that a useful contribution to knowledge 
could be derived from the investigation of the factors that influence Boards’ strategic 
decisions in quoted organisations. The research objectives is then to investigate the 
strategic decisions Boards of Directors and the organisation make by examining the 
environmental factors associated with the Board, the characteristics of the Board such as 
age, education, experience, composition, the Boards’ strategic choices in areas such as 
innovation, strategic decisions and to examine the influence the Boards have on 
performance. Despite the significant research interest in this topic, knowledge is still 
incomplete. 
 
This thesis makes a significant contribution to the strategic management literature by 
developing an integrative framework which examines strategic decisions from both content 
and process perspectives. The model developed, identifies the influence on strategic 
decisions, the environment, the characteristics of the Boards of Directors and its 
involvement has as influence on strategic decisions. The empirical study is carried out in a 
new cultural context; Greece and more specifically to listed firms on the Athens Stock 
Exchange.  
 
A theoretical model has been created and following a deductive approach, primary data 
through questionnaires was collected from 105 Greek listed organisations. Data was 
analysed according to their descriptive properties and underlying correlation structure. 
Several principal components were derived from these analyses which were used in 
hypothesis testing. Subsequently, a multiple regression and GLM analyses were conducted 
in order to examine the interrelationships between the factors associated with Boards’ 
strategic decisions. The research findings are discussed and considered in light of current 
knowledge in the area. A number of conclusions are made from the findings. Furthermore, 
implications for academics and business practitioners are drawn that indicate the relevance 
and applicability of this research to corporate governance practices. Limitations of the 
research and possible future research are set out. 
 
The thesis is organised into seven chapters which are entitled in the following order: 
literature review of Boards of Directors and development of theoretical framework; 
empirical approach and conceptualisation of the factors associated with boards’ strategic 
decisions; descriptive research findings; principal component analysis and construction of 
scale indices; multiple regression and GLM analyses; and, conclusions and implications of 
the study. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Context and Purpose of the Study 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
This thesis reports a study of this topic, the aim of which is to empirically examine Board 
of Directors’ attributes and environmental factors that are associated with strategic 
decisions in Greek listed organisations. This chapter provides an overview and the 
background of corporate governance and Boards of Directors, details the theoretical 
context, illustrates the general focus of the study, describes the aims and the objectives of 
the research, emphasises the academic interest and pragmatic significance of the study, and 
concludes with a description of the thesis structure. 
 
1.2 Research Context 
1.2.1 Introduction 
 
This section presents the context of the undertaken research which lies on strategic 
management, executive leadership and corporate governance. 
 
1.2.2 Strategic Management 
 
Strategic management is generally acknowledged as a young discipline within the broader 
management area.  Such emergent areas are typically characterized by debate, and 
challenges to existing paradigms (Kuhn, 1996). The interest of scholars in executives has 
increased over the past fifty years (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). In the strategic 
management research, executives play a dominant role in formulating corporate strategy 
and in determining the direction of the firm (Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001). The 
Harvard model (Learned, Christensen and Andrews, 1961; Andrews, 1971) focuses on the 
personal role of executives in shaping the firms.  
 
Andrews (1971) stated: “Executives in charge of company destinies do not look exclusively 
at what a company might do and can do. They sometimes seem heavily influenced by what 
they personally want to do (p. 104)………..We will be able to understand the strategic 
decisions better if we admit rather than resist the dimension of preference (p. 105)…..  
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Strategy is a human construction… (p. 107). In the Harvard model, the executives are 
regarded as pivotal for understanding what happens to the firm.  
 
Several studies in upper echelons literature demonstrate that Boards of Directors and 
mainly their experience influence firm conduct and performance by determining its overall 
strategic direction (Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001; Walsh and Seward, 1990; Davis and 
Thompson, 1994). Some scholars have considered Boards of Directors as “rubber stamps” 
(Herman, 1981) or “tools” of top management (Pfeffer, 1972, p.219) who rely on top 
management team for leadership, direction and information. The central tenet of upper 
echelons theory is that executives create a “construed reality” of the firm’s strategic 
situation based on experiences and board characteristics that lead to specific strategic 
choices (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Herrmann and Datta, 2006). Interest in the upper-
echelons perspective derived from the economic based view of strategy (Hambrick and 
Cannella, 2001). Upper echelon research on managerial elites’ demographic characteristics 
such as age, education, functional background as well as cognitive values and bases shed 
light on their effect on corporate strategy (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). In addition, Gupta 
and Govindarajan (1984), conducting an extensive study on executives concluded that 
general managers perform well when their experiences and personalities are aligned with 
business strategy.  
 
Boards can influence the strategy of the firm in two ways. Boards influence strategy 
indirectly through “decision control” activities such as evaluation of strategic decisions, 
review of strategic plans and monitoring executive and firm performance (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Furthermore, Boards can influence strategy through “decision 
management” activities such as strategic proposals, asking probing questions about 
important issues and deciding on strategic alternatives (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). 
Previous studies have shown that most of the Boards review strategy and performance 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983) but few boards have an influential role in strategic decisions 
(Mace, 1971; Vance, 1983). 
 
1.2.3 Executive Leadership 
 
Executive leadership has received increased attention from scholars in strategy and 
organisational theory. Executive leadership is crucial for achieving and maintaining 
competitive advantage in the 21stcentury. Since 1980, the nature of leadership has changed 
dramatically and there is a great awareness of communication and leadership problems 
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across contexts. Leaders are required to adjust their leadership style according to the 
society’s needs. Organisations operating globally and nationally are asked to establish 
cross divisional and cross-country networks (Hambrick and Pettigrew, 2001). They argued 
that “One of the central issues for strategic leadership in the modern corporation becomes 
the defraying of excessive complexity and ambiguity. The ability to deliver clear, simple 
and evocative messages that balance future goals with present needs seems to be a crucial 
simplifying routine in times of tension and change” (Hambrick and Pettigrew, 2001, p. 43). 
They suggested that one of the key scopes of strategic leadership is to examine executive 
characteristics and strategic outcomes instead of executive team level to the board level. 
 
Strategic leadership focuses on the executives who have the overall responsibility of an 
organisation and those characteristics have an impact on organisational outcomes. 
Executive literature focuses on composition of top management teams, executive 
succession, managerial styles, board-management relationships and the alignment of 
executives with environments and strategies (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996).  
The executives who are the subjects of strategic leadership research can be individuals 
(e.g. Chief Executive Officers or division general managers), groups (Top Management 
Teams) or other governing bodies (e.g. Boards of Directors) (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1996).  
 
1.2.4 Corporate Governance and Boards of Directors 
 
Corporate governance is an area that has grown rapidly in the last few years. In the past 
decade, corporate governance has received great interest among investors, governments, 
and the general public. The names of Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat and Global Crossing 
have become synonymous with corporate malfeasance and with some board members to 
try to deceive their own stakeholders and the public (Mallin, 2004).   The corporate 
collapses have impacted many people: shareholders who see their financial investment 
reduced to nothing, employees who have lost their jobs and in many cases the security of 
the company pension which has also evaporated overnight, suppliers of goods and services 
to failed companies, and the economic impact on local and international communities in 
which the failed companies operate (Mallin, 2004, p. 1). The corporate scandals over the 
past decade focused the attention of the general public on questions of corporate 
governance in general and of Boards of Directors in particular. They revealed the 
inefficiency of monitoring the Top Management with catastrophic effects on stakeholders 
4 
 
(Lavelle, 2002) and scholars have discussed the governance implications for Boards of 
Directors (Tricker, 2000).  
 
Significant reforms in corporate governance practices in the USA such as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002), in Europe (OECD Principles on Corporate Governance, 2004), and 
more specifically in Greece (Principles of Corporate Governance in Greece, 1999; 
Corporate Governance Law.3016/2002) attempt to enhance investors’ confidence and to 
increase transparency and accountability (Mallin, 2004). In the light of regulatory reforms, 
scholars have examined the role of Boards of Directors in corporate governance practices 
(Dalton and Dalton, 2005). These principles stressed the importance of corporate 
governance for long-term economic performance and strengthening of the international 
financial system. These principles have become signposts for corporate governance, board 
structures and practices, and are being widely endorsed by various organisations such as 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations and other 
international organisations (ICGN, 1999). After conducting an indepth-review of various 
corporate governance and codes in several countries, Carlsson (2001) stated that the 
common denominator of all these codes and principles is their emphasis on the importance 
of an independent and competent board. 
 
More specifically, they attempted to examine the structure of Boards of Directors 
(Baysigner and Butler, 1985), their executives roles (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2000) and 
most important the impact of board configuration on firm performance (Dalton, Daily, 
Johnson and Ellstrand, 1999). The empirical evidence on the relation between firm 
performance and board composition is mixed.  The inconclusiveness regarding the impact 
of the board can be explained by the fact that there is an emphasis on board structure rather 
than on the background, experiences and competences of board members. Recent research 
(Brouthers et al., 2000; Papadakis et al., 1998; Goll and Rasheed, 2005) takes into account 
a range of factors that might influence the impact of the board in firm performance. These 
include, among others, the roles of the board, the impact of board demographic 
characteristics, as well as environmental conditions and strategic decision-making 
processes. More specifically, scholars have attempted to examine the characteristics 
involved in these strategic decision-making processes and how they might in turn influence 
organisational outcomes. Nevertheless, very few studies have adopted multiple 
perspectives of the strategic decision-making processes and those that have done so, have 
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only examined these processes in the context of US or European large organisations (e.g. 
Child et al., 2003). 
 
1.3 Focus and Significance of the Study 
Since 1980, there has been an increased interest in the contribution of executives to the fate 
of the organisation (Bryman, 1992). The interest in Boards of Directors has become more 
evident in the U.K and in U.S where boards are placed in the centre of a number of 
financial scandals involving major public companies and corporations (Lorsch and 
MacIver, 1989). A basic premise in strategic management is that Boards of Directors play 
a dominant role in formulating corporate strategy. According to Gioia and Chittipeddi 
(1991, p.234), “the CEO is portrayed as someone who has primary responsibility for 
setting strategic directions and plans for the organisation, as well as responsibility for 
guiding actions that will realise those plans”. The major roles of Boards of Directors are: 
firstly, to act as boundary spanners by linking the organisation to critical resources in the 
environment and (Zald, 1969; Pfeffer, 1972) secondly, to play an administratative and 
internal control role and to be responsible for policy formulation and for monitoring 
management (Zald, 1969; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
 
Pearce and Zahra (1991) suggested that powerful boards provide useful links between the 
organisation and the external environment; which lead to the protection of shareholders’ 
rights and create a corporate identity. Also, Tricker (1978) states that: ‘the work of director 
in and out of the boardroom is rated as the most under-researched management topic’. 
There are prescriptive and descriptive writings regarding Boards of Directors, their 
composition (inside/outside director, independent/affiliated directors, and executive/non-
executives and interlocking directors), their leadership structure as well as their 
demographic characteristics (Pfeffer, 1972; Baysigner and Butler, 1985; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991). However, there are inherent difficulties in exploring the effects of 
Boards’ demographic characteristics to firms’ performance and effectiveness (Pettigrew, 
1992). Stewart (1991) argued that there is limited knowledge even on the basic similarities 
and differences of chairpersons, CEOs and Boards of Directors.  
 
Indeed, the research on Boards of Directors is limited in scale and scope and overall 
considered to be at an early stage of development (Pettigrew, 1992). Previous studies have 
attempted to examine the relationship between leadership and innovation (e.g. Halbesleben 
et al., 2003; West et al., 2003), but most of these works did not focus on actual leaders 
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which are the Boards of Directors (Yulk, 1999). Even studies that have explored the 
linkage between executives’ demographic characteristics and innovation strategy (e.g. 
Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Enns, Huff and Golden, 2003) failed to investigate the 
leadership behaviour and their effect on innovation process (Cannella and Monroe, 1997). 
Scholars (Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers, 1998; Elenkov, 2002) argued that strategic 
decisions and consequently strategic choices are influenced by top managers and external 
environment.  However, there is lack of knowledge regarding the moderating effects of the 
relationship between leadership and organisational outcomes (Antonakis, Avolio and 
Sivasubramanian, 2003).  
 
Researchers agree that predictions about the impact of board demographic characteristics 
and organisational performance are not clear. Pettigrew argued that: “Great inferential 
leaps are made from input variables such as board composition to output variables such as 
board performance with no direct evidence on the processes and mechanisms which 
presumably link the inputs to the outputs” (1992, p.171). 
 
First, recent Boards of Directors’ research failed to establish any association between 
demographic characteristics and organisational outcomes (Schwenk and Dalton, 1991; 
Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
 
Second, the assumption regarding the direct relationship between demographic 
characteristics and corporate performance seems to be unreliable. Lawrence (1997) 
conducted an extensive survey where she found that the explanations about demography 
outcome relationships are not supported by the theory. Therefore, scholars have to open the 
“black box” within Boards of Directors’ dynamics and understand the impact of the 
environment on board as well as on strategic decision -making processes and strategic 
choices and subsequently on organisational performance. There is a need for further 
studies on board members’ structure and demographic characteristics, culture and 
processes linked to theoretical traditions such as agency theory and managerial hegemony 
(Kosnik, 1987; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Davis, 1991). 
 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) have introduced the upper echelons perspective in macro-
organisational research. They suggest that “organisational outcomes-both strategies and 
effectiveness –are viewed as reflections of the values and cognitive bases of powerful 
actors in the organisation” (1984, p.193) and provided the foundations for further research 
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on an organisation’s dominant coalition. Eschewing “some important but complex 
psychological issues”, Hambrick and Mason (1984, p.193) recommend that their primary 
focus is on managerial characteristics as indicators of the given that a manager brings to an 
administrative situation.  These observable managerial givens are demographic factors 
such as age, tenure in the organisation, functional background, education, socioeconomic 
roots and financial position.  
 
This study is actually based on the work of Hambrick and Mason (1984), drawing upon 
and modifying their theoretical framework. More specifically, this research applies and 
expands the model of Hambrick and Mason (1984) on upper echelons to the study of 
Boards of Directors. This is a fruitful undertaking as the business literature focused on Top 
Management Teams is dominated by contradictory findings and neglects the role of the 
board in strategy formulation and in strategic choices. This study attempts to rectify that by 
dedicating more effort to the study of Boards of Directors. In the model developed by 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) regarding upper echelons, fundamental constructs were added 
such as: board composition, board involvement in strategic decision-making process as 
well as characteristics of strategic decision making processes, strategic choice of 
innovation and organisational performance. 
  
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives 
 
The primary aim of the study is to develop a conceptual framework that explains how 
Boards of Directors’ attributes and environmental conditions shape board level decisions. 
The study aims to determine the factors that influence Boards of Directors’ strategic 
decisions. For practitioners, this study examines the factors of effective decisions.  
 
Objectives 
 
In broad terms the research objectives can be stated as follows: “An investigation” of 
 
1. The impact of external environment on Boards of Directors’ composition, on board 
involvement in strategic decision-making, on several characteristics of the strategic 
decision-making processes and on innovation practices. 
8 
 
2. The effects of Boards of Directors’ structure and demographic characteristics on 
involvement in strategic decision-making processes and on strategic choice of 
innovation. 
3. The effect of Boards of Directors’ strategic decisions on the performance of Greek 
companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. 
 
1.5 Statement of Significance 
 
This thesis makes a significant contribution to the strategic management literature by 
developing an integrative model that combines factors associated with three perspectives 
on the strategic decision-making processes and strategic choice of innovation: (1) 
environmental dimensions, (2) board structure characteristics and (3) board members' 
demographic characteristics. This is the first study to the best of the author’s knowledge 
that develops an integrative framework that combines elements of both content and process 
of strategic decisions.  
 
Also, the proposed theoretical framework is tested for the first time empirically and 
theoretically. It uses a multi-dimensional empirically grounded representation of strategic 
decision-making processes and on strategic choice of innovation in order to test their effect 
on performance. Also, it incorporates both composition and demographic attributes of 
board members. In this study, Boards of Directors are regarded as a social construction and 
board members are understood through their attributes, working styles, and actual board 
task performance as well as their processes inside the boardrooms.  
 
Unlike other studies, that focus on top management teams, this study focuses on Boards of 
Directors using theories drawn Top Management Teams as there is little empirical work on 
them.  
 
This study is making one more novel contribution. The empirical component of this work 
refers to Greek quoted firms in the Athens Stock Exchange. It is the first study conducted 
in Greece that has valuable empirical data from Boards of Directors of listed firms. Also, 
corporate governance in Greece is at an early stage. The last couple of years have seen 
some legislation regarding corporate governance operations and practices but these 
practises have not been examined through a systematic theoretical framework before.  
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This study thus aspires to provide meaningful insights into the processes of Boards of 
Directors’ strategic decisions with important implementations to academics and business 
practitioners. It provides a comprehensive understanding on the process of strategic 
decisions and reveals the influential factors of their decisions. The study will thus enable 
Greek executives to identify key factors behind their strategic decisions and determine the 
ones that contribute to organisational performance. Therefore, this study can provide 
deeper understanding and useful suggestions for effective organisational strategy. 
 
 
1.6 Limitations of the Thesis 
 
The thesis has to be examined in the light of its limitations. The limitations reported in this 
study refer to general limitations of theoretical or conceptual issues as well as research 
design approach. The study should be interpreted under the following limitations: 
 
• Literature on Boards of Directors is not so extensive and most of the issues which 
are comparatively new to the context, in which the research was applied, might 
cause inconsistencies or drawbacks in the assumptions and findings.  
 
• The questionnaire was filled in by a single respondent of each listed in the ASE 
firms. Data was collected from a single source (e.g. Chairman, CEO or board 
member) since they are regarded as the apex of an organisation and the most 
knowledgeable respondents for this study. This methodological approach has been 
used in previous studies (e.g. Goll and Rasheed, 1997; Hart and Banbury, 1994; 
Jones et al., 1992).  It will be highly recommended in future research the use of 
multiple respondents per firm in order to minimise effects of systematic response 
bias.  
 
 
• The sample consists only of listed companies in the Athens Stock Exchange 
Market from various industries, a fact that implies that we are not be able to make 
generalisations at the industry level. The results are representative of medium and 
large sized enterprises in Greece and are not necessarily generalisable to other 
sectors and countries. Maybe, smaller firms might conclude with different results.  
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• Variety of constructs has been examined in order to give a holistic perspective 
instead of focusing on one issue.  
 
• Several researchers have examined the role of “upper echelons” in the strategic 
decision-making process (e.g. Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Miller and Toulouse, 
1986; Papadakis and Barwise, 1997; Elbanna and Child, 2007)).  
 
• Organisational performance is the outcome of environmental, structural and 
managerial factors as suggested in previous studies (Papadakis and Lioukas, 1996; 
Rajagopalan et al., 1993). Thus, the lack of a strong relationship between strategic 
decisions and firm’s performance should be interpreted with caution.  Dess (1987, 
p. 261) argued that a major limitation of current research is “…the tendency to 
disregard the heterogeneity of environments in which managers make their 
strategic decisions”. Therefore, it has to be taken into consideration that strategic 
decisions might influence organisational performance under certain environmental 
circumstances.  
 
• The explanatory variables that have been chosen with reference to strategic 
decisions are not exhaustive of those three perspectives. Therefore, the results 
derived could be the outcome of this theoretical model and other explanatory 
variables in a different model could derive different results.  
 
• The retrospective and cross-sectional nature does not allow us to draw causal 
inferences and makes impossible the examination of different variables. Of course, 
the organisational performance has been measured prior to any managerial 
decisions.  But, our results are subject to causality versus relationship. The 
answer depends on the model chosen from interpretations of results. The results of 
the study are interpreted as an effort to shed light on strategic decisions-
performance relationship.  
 
•  The variables are measured based on managerial perception and therefore, they 
have a degree of subjectivity. However, Boards of Directors have a comprehensive 
knowledge and understanding about business strategy.   
 
• The study employs quantitative methods, which emphasise the limitations of 
techniques used in order to assure reliability instead of providing explanations and 
theorisation (Robson, 2002). The generation of data was based mainly on 
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questionnaires and questionnaires are related to some key limitations such as: low 
response rate, limited volume of data capable of being generated and the 
possibility of biases being present in the sample frame, greater risk for missing 
data (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Paxson, 1992; Chawla and Nataraajan, 1994).   
 
• A lengthy questionnaire was constructed in order to capture the constructs of the 
study which required time from the executives to fill it. If the questionnaires were 
more comprehensive, we might have a higher response rate. Although, the 
response rate of our sample was 39.6% which is considered to be representative to 
the population of Greek listed organisations in the ASE. 
 
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis and Order of Presentation 
 
The study has been structured in eight chapters in order to reflect the main aim and the 
research objectives of the study. 
 
Chapter One introduces the overview and the background of the study. It presents the aim 
of the study and the research objectives and also refers to academic interest and 
significance of the study. 
 
Chapter Two examines thoroughly the existing literature in the area of corporate 
governance and Boards of Directors. It presents the main issues of the study: importance of 
corporate governance, corporate governance theories, the roles of Boards of Directors, 
environmental dimensions, Boards of Directors and their characteristics, their involvement 
in strategic decision-making process, characteristics of strategic decision-making 
processes, and the impact of Boards of Directors on the strategic choice of innovation. 
Also, a theoretical research model has been proposed and research hypotheses have been 
developed.  
 
Chapter Three presents the research method of the study explaining the epistemological 
approach, the research design, the conceptualisation and operationalisation of variables 
associated with the phenomenon of Boards of Directors; the data analysis methods as well 
as the data collection methods. 
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Chapter Four presents the descriptive research findings from the empirical survey and 
discussed on a construct by construct basis.  
 
Chapter Five presents and discusses multivariate statistical methods in order to analyse the 
data and investigate the interrelationship between the constructs and among the variables 
within each construct. It presents the findings that derived from principal component 
analysis which demonstrate the underlying dimensions of each construct. Scales indices are 
constructed from the derived factor solutions and the results of scale reliability and validity 
are presented. 
 
Chapter Six describes the correlation analysis procedure and provides an in depth 
discussion of the hypothesis testing results. It also presents the results derived from 
multiple regression and GLM analyses. It provides an insight on the key factors that 
influence the strategic decisions of Greek executives. 
 
Chapter Seven summarises the main findings of the study. It provides useful insights on 
the implications of the study relating to academic and management practice. Finally, it 
suggests avenues for future research that could provide some useful insights for upper 
echelons and how they influence firm’s strategy.  
 
1.8 Concluding Remarks 
The introductory chapter serves as a plan for the thesis. It provides a background of the 
research area; it introduces the aim and the research objectives; it underlines the novelty of 
the study and concludes with the structure of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Theoretical Framework of the Study and a Review of Boards of Directors 
Literature  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The chapter provides the basic for the following chapters in that is creates the theoretical 
ground for the research that will be constructed at this thesis. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to review current theories in the area of corporate governance and Boards of 
Directors and how they influence organisational decisions. The specific themes that have 
been analysed are: corporate governance alongside corporate governance theories, the roles 
of Boards of Directors, the environmental dimensions, the Boards of Directors along with 
their composition and demographic characteristics, their involvement in strategic decision-
making process, the characteristics of strategic decision-making processes, the strategic 
choice of innovation and finally, the organisational performance.  
 
The literature review is a critical analysis of business and management research on the 
topic that posits the research in its theoretical context, shows that the current state of the 
research topic is understood and supports any conceptual framework (theories, models, 
concepts and hypotheses) (Maylor and Blackmin, 2005, p. 117). According to Hart (1998, 
p.198), the literature review demonstrates a clear understanding of the research topic, 
identifies the major studies related to the research area, identifies the different points of the 
views on the research topic, draws clear and appropriate conclusions, clearly states a 
research problem, proposes a way to investigate the research problem and demonstrates the 
relevance and importance of the research problem.  
 
2.2 Corporate Governance  
 
In the last few years, corporate governance has received a great deal of attention among 
academics, markets’ regulators, international organisations and business practitioners 
(Keasey, Thompson and Wright, 1999; Lazarri et al, 2001). Nowadays, companies are 
facing growing demands to evaluate the performance and the effectiveness of their boards. 
The need for effective Boards of Directors has become more evident after the major 
corporate scandals in the U.S (i.e. Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, Adelphia), in Europe (i.e. 
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Parmalat), and worldwide where Boards of Directors and their strategic decisions have led 
giant corporations to disastrous collapses. Corporate scandals have resurrected public 
suspicion that there is plenty of potential for mischief inside large public companies. The 
recent corporate failures as well as poor corporate governance practices remain the main 
obstacle for investments. Corporate collapses have an impact on many people: 
shareholders who see their financial investment reduced to nothing, employees who have 
lost their jobs and in many cases the security of the company pension which has also 
evaporated overnight, suppliers of goods and services to failed companies, and the 
economic impact on local and international communities in which the failed companies 
operate (Mallin, 2004, p. 1). The financial scandals and collapses revealed the inefficiency 
of monitoring the top management with catastrophic effects to stakeholders (Lavelle, 
2002). Therefore, there is an increased awareness of investors and politicians to focus their 
attention on tightening up governance processes.  
 
The governance of companies has been an issue of increasing interest in recent years given 
the concerns expressed about the standards of accountability and financial reporting of 
firms. The pressure comes from a variety of sources, but, most obviously from regulators 
and shareholder activists. Regulatory reforms have cascaded across the world starting with 
Cadbury, 1992  in the United Kingdom and elaborating afterwards with Greenbury, 1995; 
Hampel, 1998; Combined Code, 1998;  Turnbull, 1999; Higgs, 2003, Smith, 2003; the 
revised Combined Code, 2003; Corporate Governance: A Practical Guide, 2004; Good 
Governance: The Code of Governance for Voluntary and Community Sector, 2005; 
Internal Control: Revised Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code, 2005; Good 
Practice Suggestions from the Higgs Report, 2006; Guidelines for Disclosure and 
Transparency in Private Equity, 2007; The Combined Code of Corporate Governance 
Revised June 2008), with the U.S Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in U.S, with the OECD 
Principles on Corporate Governance, 2004 and the Guidelines on Corporate Governance of 
State-Owned Enterprises, 2005 in Europe. These codes emphasise formal board structure 
and board characteristics such as board size, number of independents, executives and non 
executives, the separation of roles between CEO and Chairman and the establishment of 
board committees for listed firms. The development and implementation of corporate 
governance codes is an attempt to protect institutional investors, to rebuild their trust and 
to give them the responsibility to exercise their power and influence the companies in 
which they invest by minimising the risk for potential collapses, by guaranteeing that the 
companies are run effectively and efficiently. The codes are considered to be the pillars of 
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transparency, disclosure and accountability of investors. In their turn, institutional 
investors have to recognise their responsibilities and exercise their power in a formal and 
systematic way (Mallin, 2006). They enhance the confidence of investors, fund managers, 
insurers, capital markets and urge greater levels of evaluation and transparency of boards. 
The governance of companies has been the subject of increasing interest in recent years 
given the concerns expressed about the standards of accountability and financial reporting 
of companies. In the era of corporate governance, the new cultural and legal frameworks 
aim to establish ethical standards in an effort to protect shareholders and enhance an ethical 
economic landscape that creates the pillars for a healthy management and promotes trust 
(Gold and Dienhart, 2007). 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance in Greece 
 
In Greece, corporate governance has been a topic of increased interest in the boardrooms 
due to spectacular crises of traditional Greek firms, which revealed the passive board 
supervision as well as the allegations of fraud against corporate executives.  The collapse 
of the Athens Stock Exchange and the international pressures toward a more mature 
market status and shareholder-oriented model of governance is being directed at reforming 
the existing system. More specifically, the European Union (EU) has pressurised for 
harmonious laws and regulations and for convergence of corporate governance systems 
especially after the addition of new member states (Spanos, 2005). Corporate governance 
in Greece emphasises the protection of individual and shareholders’ interest. The concept 
of corporate governance became more evident in 1998 when the ASE published an 
introductory paper. 
 
During the period 1997–2000, the Greek economy was characterised by its attempt to 
readjust its macroeconomic indicators and achieve the Maastricht criteria to become the 
12th member of the “EURO Zone” in 1999, that is, achieving Economic and Monetary 
integration in the European Union; an accomplishment that was realised on the 1st January 
2001. By the end of 2000, the Greek economy had transformed into a “modern” economy 
with an updated structure (Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004). From 1997 until September 
1999, the Athens Stock Exchange experienced an increase of six percent and it grew faster 
than any other capital market in the developed world and it has increased the number of 
listed companies (approximately 350 companies with combined market capitalisation 10.5 
billion euros) (Mertzanis, 2001).  
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The Greek capital market has experienced a cycle of self-fulfilling expectations during the 
second and third quarters of 1999.  The massive entrance of individual and institutional 
investors in the market mainly through small and medium capitalisation led to an increase 
in stock prices and liquidity (Spanos, Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2008). In particular, in 
September 1999, the ASE suffered losses that on the average accounted for almost 70 per 
cent of its peak value. The cycle of self-fulfilling expectations ended up in a significant 
divergence between actual prices and equilibrium prices. Greece has scored very low 
regarding the quality of law enforcement and accounting standards. Since then, the 
Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) and Athens Stock Exchange have 
attempted to implement some investor protection reforms and measures in order to enhance 
the market’s transparency, protect shareholders rights, improve corporate governance 
mechanisms and eventually, to restore the public trust (Spanos, 2005; Mertzanis, 2001). 
Despite the fact that Greece has been in the EU since 1980, research in the area is still 
underdeveloped (Bourantas and Papadakis, 1996; Makridakis et al., 1997), as there is 
limited empirical evidence in the area of management in advancing countries in general. 
 
It is worth mentioning that during the last couple of years, enormous progress has been 
made on the legal framework governing the operations and behaviour of Greek 
corporations as well as the Greek legislation regarding corporate governance. The 
Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the Hellenic 
Capital Market Commission) and the Federation of Greek Industries have developed 
voluntary corporate governance codes. Since the beginning of the 20th century the major 
legal framework ruling the operations and behaviour of Greek firms was the co-called 
2190/1920. In the meantime, a number of presidential decrees have been introduced such 
as 350/1985 and 51/1992; however, there was an urgent need for updated legislation 
(Alexakis, Balios, Papagelis and Xanthakis, 2006). The first step toward the formation of a 
comprehensive framework on corporate governance has been the publication of the 
“Principles of Corporate Governance in Greece” (Committee on Corporate Governance in 
Greece, 1999), which contains the following seven main categories: the rights and 
obligations of shareholders, the equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance, transparency, disclosure of information and auditing, 
Boards of Directors, the non-executive members of Boards of Directors and executive 
management (Mertzanis, 2001). 
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The increasing maturity of capital market conditions and the gradual globalization of the 
gradual transactions laid the foundation of the structural transformation of the Greek 
economy. The unprecedented capital growth in Greece required the introduction of more 
efficient corporate governance. The first influencial report in Greece was the Principles of 
Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for the Best Corporate Governance 
Practice (1999) which suggests accountability and transparency of the actions of directors 
and managers. The effort to make more accountable the Greek listed organisations derives 
from the Anglo-Saxon model; however Greece should not be construed as the wholesale 
purchase of the Anglo-Saxon model. Greece should move towards the integration of 
Anglo-Saxon elements into the Greek system while developing national solutions to 
problems that are unique to the Greek business landscape. On a micro level, the regulatory 
forms will enable Greece to maintain its position as a competitive partner in the European 
Union (Mertzanis, 2001). 
 
Regarding the legal framework in Greece, Greek companies are governed by Law 
2190/1920 as well as by Law 3016/2002. The general meeting of shareholders is the main 
decisionmaking organ of the company. Regarding the board structure, Greek organizations 
are characterized by the co-existence of the unitary system where shareholders directly 
elect the directors through the shareholder general meeting and of the two-tier system 
which combines supervisory and management functions, but generally delegates day-to-
day management. The board should consist of at least three members and is required to 
meet at least once a month. For the listed companies, at least 1/3 of the total directors must 
be non-executive, of which at least two must be independent. Under Law 2190/1020 
directors and senior managers are prohibited from receiving loans by the company. Article 
23 of Law 2190/1920 prohibits directors from engaging professionally, on their own behalf 
or on behalf of others, in activities covered by the objectives of the company in which they 
are directors and be general partners in a partnership that pursues the same objectives as 
the company they serve as directors. In Europe, there are governance models that exhibit 
mechanisms and organs in the areas of audit/control and director’s nomination. In Greece, 
an internal auditor is appointed by the board which is hierarchically integrated in the 
management of the company but remains independent in the exercise of his duties 
(Mertzanis, 1999; 2001 and Xanthakis et al., 2003).  
 
The Greek capital market has been transformed largely during the last four years. Three 
new markets were established: the Athens Derivatives Exchange, the New Market for 
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small and innovative firms and the Market for Emerging Markets. At the same time, the 
new electronic trading system (OASIS) in the Athens Stock Exchange expanded the 
possibilities for efficient and transparent transactions. The Capital Market Commission, the 
main regulatory authority of the Greek capital market, completed a wide range of 
institutional changes. The regulatory activities include the protection of investors, the 
enhancement of market transparency, the protection of the systems of trading and clearing, 
the enactment of codes of conducts and the assurance of the smooth function of the capital 
market. 
 
Corporate governance is still far from adequate; for example ownership concentration of 
the listed companies is still high. The ownership dispersion in Greece is perceived as 
middle to low. Greece presented a high concentration of ownership (La Porta et al., 1999). 
A recent study of HCMC (2001) in a sample of 370 listed organizations found that the 
average ownership dispersion was 47.22 per cent when the major shareholder is defined as 
the shareholder owning at least 5 per cent.370 Greek listed organizations were held by 974 
major shareholders while the major shareholders per listed company were 3. The 
competition for control at company level is low. Usually large families control most of the 
small-and-medium-sized companies.  
 
Recent laws and regulations have been introduced to restore public confidence, to protect 
(minority) shareholder rights and to improve corporate governance mechanisms. 
Moreover, the corporate governance debate has been largely debated among academics and 
the business world, resulting in many voluntary activities (e.g. corporate governance codes, 
rating actions).  
 
The Committee on Corporate Governance (CCG) in Greece was introduced in October 
1999 the "Principles of Corporate Governance in Greece: Recommendations for its 
Competitive Transformation". This code was developed on the basis of internationally 
accepted corporate governance practices and according to OECD Principles on Corporate 
Governance (OECD, 1999). 
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The Greek code contains forty-four recommendations compiled on seven main categories: 
 
- The rights and obligations of shareholders (e.g. encourages voting by institutional 
investors and discourages multiple voting procedures and the issuance of non-voting 
privileged shares). 
 
- The equitable treatment of shareholders (e.g. transactions based on insider information or 
undertaken for private benefit should be prohibited). 
 
- The role of stakeholders in corporate governance (e.g. encourage active participation 
between corporations and stakeholders). 
 
- Transparency, disclosure of information and auditing (e.g. full, timely and detailed 
disclosure of information, establishment of an Internal Audit Committee consisting solely 
of non-executive directors). 
 
- The board of directors (e.g. maximum board size of 13, with a majority of non-executive 
directors, external advice to directors). 
 
- The non-executive members of the board of directors (e.g. definition of independence, 
compensation of non-executive directors should be comparable to the time they devote for 
board meetings, compensation should be reported separately in the corporation’s annual 
report). 
 
- Executive management (e.g. performance-based compensation for executives, 
compensation committee to review management compensation, appointment of the CFO in 
the top management team). 
 
In 2000, the Hellenic Capital Market Commission has established "a code of conduct for 
companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange and their affiliated persons" (CMC Rule 
5/204/2000). The code sets behavior standards for ASE listed companies and specifies 
duties and obligations of companies’ major shareholders, the members of the board of 
directors, the executive management or other individuals or legal entities relating to them. 
Each company shall ensure the prompt disclosure of information or fact occurring in its 
domain of activity, which are not accessible by the public and which may cause significant 
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fluctuation in the price of its shares. Furthermore, the code specifies the organization, 
structures and internal operation mechanisms necessary for best serving shareholders’ 
interests and investor interests in general. The aim is to eliminate uncertainty in the market 
on corporate affairs, protect shareholders and to prevend speculation by company insiders 
or other persons that may have inside information (Xanthakis et al., 2003). 
 
The Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece and the Federation of Greek Industries 
have developed voluntary corporate governance codes. Moreover, the University of Athens 
has recently established a rating system for the ASE listed companies based solely on 
corporate governance criteria. Finally, the Athens Stock Exchange announced in July 2002 
the voluntary qualitative criteria covering corporate governance, transparency and 
communication with investors. The aforementioned corporate governance codes in Greece 
are presented in the Table A below. 
 
Table A: The Evolution of Corporate Governance in Greece 
 
Date   Corporate Governance Activity   
1998 The Athens Stock Exchange conducts a study on corporate governance 
1999 April OECD Principles on Corporate Governance 
1999 October 
 
 
Corporate governance code (voluntary) by the Committee on Corporate 
Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the Capital Market 
Commission) 
2000 The Ministries of National Economy and Development set up a law making 
committee on corporate governance (Rokkas Committee) 
2000 July Capital Market Commission rule: "Tender offers in the capital market for the 
acquisition of securities (CMC Rule 1/195/2000) 
2000 November Capital Market Commission rule: "A code of conduct for companies listed in 
the Athens Stock Exchange and their affiliated persons" (CMC Rule 
5/204/2000). 
2001  August Principles of Corporate Governance by the Federation of Greek Industries 
2002  March A corporate governance rating system is presented by the Center of Financial 
Studies of the University of Athens (a project funded by the Athens Stock 
Exchange) 
2002  May Law 3016/2002: "On corporate governance, board remuneration and other 
issues" 
2002, July The Athens Stock Exchange establishes qualitative criteria covering corporate 
governance, transparency and communication with investors 
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2.4 Definitions of Corporate Governance  
The term “corporate governance” can be interpreted by different point of views. Some 
authors, such as Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.2), defined corporate governance as “the 
ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return of 
investment” emphasising economic return, security and control.  
 
Donaldson (1990, p.376) defined corporate governance as the “structure whereby 
managers at the organisation apex are controlled through the board of directors, its 
associated structures, executive initiative, and other schemes of monitoring and bonding” 
thereby narrowing the scope to the board of directors and their structures.  
 
Weiner and Pape (1999, p. 152) consider corporate governance as a system where 
economic, social, political and cultural factors interact under “a more or less country 
specific framework of legal, institutional and cultural factors shaping the patterns of 
influence that stakeholders (e.g. managers, employees, shareholders, creditors, suppliers 
and the government) exert on managerial decision-making”.  
 
Kaplan and Norton (2000), analysed corporate governance from the political point of view 
focused on general shareholder participation, as such define corporate governance as the 
connection between directors, managers, employees, shareholders; customers, creditors 
and suppliers to the corporation and to one another.  
 
In addition, the Chairman of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance Sir Adrian Cadbury (2000, p. 8) defined corporate governance as “the system 
by which companies are directed and controlled”. He described Boards of Directors as a 
critical link between those who provide the capital and those who direct the flow of the 
capital. He suggested that the two important issues that characterise the function of Boards 
of Directors are accountability towards the capital providers and performance in terms of 
attainment of goals. 
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2.5 Theories 
Numerous corporate governance theories have been developed which are discussed 
below (Table B presents the main theories in corporate governance). Table B presents the 
key theories in corporate governance, their theoretical origin and their representative 
studies. 
 
Table B: Theories in Corporate Governance 
 
 Theoretical Perspective 
 Agency  Stewardship Resource 
Dependency 
Stakeholder Managerial 
Hegemony 
Class 
Hegemony 
Board Role Ensure 
match 
between 
managers 
and 
shareholde
rs 
Ensure the 
stewardship of 
corporate 
assets 
Reduce 
uncertainty; 
boundary 
spanning 
Inclusive 
pursuit of 
stakeholder 
interests 
Board  
“ a legal 
fiction” 
Perpetuate 
elite and 
class 
power 
Theoretical 
Origin 
Economics 
and 
finance 
Organisation 
theory 
Sociology Politics, 
Law,  
and 
Management 
theory 
Organisation 
Theory 
Sociology 
Representative  
Studies 
Fama and 
Jensen 
(1985) 
Jensen and 
Meckling 
(1976) 
Kosnik 
(1987) 
Donaldson 
and Davis 
(1991) 
Donaldson 
and Davis 
(1994) 
Pfeffer 
(1972) 
Pfeffer and 
Salancik 
(1978) 
RSA (1995) 
Blair (1995) 
Mace (1971) 
Lorsch and 
MacIver 
(1989) 
 
Mills 
(1981) 
Useem 
(1980) 
 
Adopted by Philip Stiles, London Business School (1997) 
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2.5.1 Agency Theory 
The dominant theoretical lens for examining corporate governance is agency theory. 
Agency theory as it can be seen in Table B has been a dominant approach in the economic 
and finance literature (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and describes the relationship between two 
parties with conflicting interests: the agent and the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
For agency theorists, the role of the board is to ratify and monitor the decisions of the top 
management team (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Agency theory deals with aligning the 
interests of owners and managers and it is based on the assumption that there is an inherent 
conflict between the interests of the firm’s owners and its managers (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory provides a framework that 
explains the conditions under which directors can carry out their fiduciary responsibilities 
(Johnson, Ellstrand, Dalton and Dalton, 2005). Agency theory provides a rationale for how 
organisations have to be governed through two mechanisms: the external; the market for 
corporate control and the internal, primarily among Boards of Directors (Roberts, McNulty 
and Stiles, 2005).  
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) introduced a decision-management model, which involved four 
steps decision model. Professional managers are responsible for the decision management 
role, which requires decision initiation (first step) and decision implementation (third step) 
and in which decision alternatives are created and developed and if approved by the board 
then they can be implemented. The board as fiduciary of the shareholders is responsible of 
the stockholders and has decision control role, which requires decision ratification (step 
two) and monitoring (step four) and involves examining and accepting or rejecting 
alternatives proposed by management. The sine qua non of the model is the independence 
between the two classes of actors who are responsible for these roles. In this way, the 
shareholders delegate responsibility to executives within the organisation in effort to 
reduce agency cost occurred by principals by imposing internal control to the agent’s self-
serving behaviour under control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is achieved by 
exercising decision control, which involves monitoring managerial-decision making and 
performance (by appointing independent and non-executive directors as well as outside 
directors).  
 
The model is based on the assumption that there is conflict between the interests of 
managers and those of directors. The agency theory underlines the importance of 
monitoring and governance function of boards (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Zahra and Pearce, 
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1989) and the need for establishment mechanisms in order to protect shareholders from 
management’s conflict of interest (Fama and Jensen, 1983). It finally suggests that boards 
should consist of outside and independent directors, also that the position of Chairman and 
CEO should be separate (Daily and Dalton, 1994). When the separation of those two roles 
is violated mainly when the Chairman is under the influence of the CEO, the agency cost 
becomes great and the firm will suffer in the financial and control market (Johnson, 
Ellstrand, Dalton and Dalton, 2005).   
 
Agency theory does not apply at all managerial decisions and does not necessarily result 
tin increase of wealth for principals or in favourable outcomes. Jensen and Meckling 
(1994) criticised the model of man mainly for its simplification of mathematical modelling 
and its unrealistic description of human behaviour on strategic decisions. Also, it has been 
criticised for the isomorphism between managers and shareholders interests (Donaldson, 
1995). Doucouliagos (1994) stated that it can not explain the complexity of human action. 
Hirsch et al., (1987) described it a broad-brush approach which diminishes empirical 
verisimilitude and includes less robust policies. Another criticism is related to how agency 
theory has a negative impact on society. Ghoshal and Moran (1996) accused agency theory 
of being one of the main reasons for some of the corporate scandals. Agency theory also 
embodies incorrect assumptions including: opportunism, shareholder value supremacy, 
ownership and separation of roles and time perspective and discrete contrasts (Huse, 2007). 
Alternative theories on corporate governance and Boards of Directors are proposed. 
 
2.5.2 Stewardship Theory 
 
In the context of critiques of agency theory, alternative theories of corporate governance 
are proposed and notably stewardship theory (Davis, Schooman and Donaldson, 1997). As 
it is presented in Table B stewardship theory has its roots in organisational theory and 
more specifically in psychology and sociology (Boyd, 1995; Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991) and aims to examine the situations where executives as stewards are 
motivated to act according to the interests of their principals (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
The behaviour of the steward is collective, because the steward aims to achieve the 
objectives of the organisation (sales growth, profitability) (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship 
theorists believe that there is a strong association between the organisational success and 
the principal’s satisfaction. Stewardship theory suggests that there is no conflict of interest 
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between managers and owners and both parties can cooperate in order to achieve a “goal 
alignment” (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 1994).  
 
Stewardship theorists argue that managers are not motivated by self-interested behaviour 
and their goals are consistent with those of shareholders (Davis et al., 1997; Lane, Cannella 
and Lubatkin, 1998). Stewards are motivated by higher –level needs towards a collective 
good of their firms to which they are committed to make it succeed at any cost (Davis, 
Schoorman, Mayer and Tan, 2000). Their behaviour is organisationally centred since they 
take decisions in the best interest of the group. Their performance is mainly affected by 
structural situations in which the steward facilitates effective decisions (Davis, Schoorman 
and Donaldson, 1997). Stewardship theorists contend that superior corporate performance 
is associated with the majority of inside directors because; first, they ensure more effective 
and efficient decision- making and second, they contribute to maximise profits for 
shareholders (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Regarding the leadership structure, stewards 
maximise their utility because they achieve organisational rather than self-serving 
objectives (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship theory has to be examined in the light of some 
boundaries. Tricker (1994) stated that stewardship theory “ignores the dynamics of boards, 
inter-personal perceptions of roles and the effect of board leadership”. Stewardship theory 
does take into consideration the power of conflict and the ideology of different parties. 
 
The fact that the steward is consistently motivated by organisational objectives, diminishes 
the control of the steward over the decisions and decreases his or her motivation (Argyris, 
1964). Therefore, stewardship theorists focus on structures that facilitate and empower 
rather than those that monitor and control (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997, p. 26). 
In an owner-executive relationship, risk-averse executives are self-serving and prefer 
agency governance prescriptions. However, implementing stewardship governance 
practices will not be suitable for an agent. The mixed empirical findings from both agency 
and stewardship theories (Donaldson and Davis, 1994) suggest a need for theoretical 
pluralism which will be critical to the progress of governance research (Roberts, McNulty 
and Stiles, 2005).  
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2.5.3 Resource Dependency Theory 
 
 Proponents of resource dependency theory (Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik) attempted 
to explain organisations in terms of their interdependence with the environment (Pugh and 
Hickson, 1997, p. 62; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Resource dependency theory as 
explained in Table B is about the dependency relationship of one organisation with the 
external environment of resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pugh and Hickson, 1997).  
According to resource dependency theory, organisations are interdependent with their 
environment or other organisations for their survival. Since organisations are not self-
directed and self-dependent (Pugh and Hickson, 1997, p. 62; Daft, 2001, pp. 146-147), 
they require resources for survival such as money, materials, personnel, information and 
technology. The degree of interdependency varies according to three conditions: first, 
availability of resources, second, control over the allocation of resources and third, the 
extent to which those who control those resources develop a monopolistic behaviour 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pugh and Hickson, 1997, p. 62). 
 
Resource dependency theory proposes that corporate board is a mechanism for managing 
external dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), reducing environmental uncertainty 
(Pfeffer, 1972) and the environmental interdependency (Williamson, 1984). Pfeffer (1972) 
stated that board composition reflects the firm’s external dependencies and it is expected 
any environmental change to affect strategic changes in board composition.  Boards of 
Directors can be used in order to decrease interorganisational dependencies by establishing 
interlocking directorates (Burt, 1980) or co-optation strategies (Pfeffer, 1972).  According 
to resource dependency theory, directors act as a linkage between the firm and the external 
environment which generate uncertainty and external dependencies. Organisations are 
requested to comply with uncertainty as well as with different environmental changes in 
order to survive (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967).  Resource dependency 
theory also views outside directors as a critical link to the external environment (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). The theory predicts a relationship between the extent of uncertainty 
and dependence and the composition of the board with respect to boards’ size and 
proportion of outside board members. Although some scholars provide support to the logic 
behind the resource dependency theory (e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Boyd, 1990; Gales 
and Kesner, 1994), they cannot explain how board composition will vary in size or in 
proportion of inside or outside directors according to various environmental dimensions.  
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2.5.4 Stakeholder Theory 
 
Stakeholder theories encompass all the important consistencies of the firm in its 
governance mechanisms and stress their fundamental importance. Freeman (1984) defined 
stakeholders as group or individuals who can affect or be affected by the actions of an 
organisation. Stakeholders include a variety of government and other non-profit 
organisations that exist within the community. Carroll (1996, p. 74) stated that stakeholder 
is “any individual or group who can affect or is affected by actions, decisions, policies, 
practices or goals of the organisation”. Clarkson (1995) in defining stakeholder theory 
stated that: “Firm is a system of stakeholders operating within the larger system of the host 
society that provides the necessary legal and market infrastructure for the firm’s activities. 
The purpose of the firm is to create wealth for its stakeholders by converting their stakes 
into goods and services”. Clarkson defined a stakeholder as “those persons or interests 
that have a stake, something to gain or lose as a result of its (the corporation’s) activities” 
(Clarkson, 1998, p.2). Stakeholders are consumers, suppliers, government, competitors, 
communities, employees and stockholders (Carroll, 1996, pp. 84-88).  
 
Stakeholder management takes into consideration the interests and concerns of various 
groups and individuals in order to achieve a decision that satisfies all parties (Buchholz and 
Rosenthal, 2005). Since stakeholders (i.e. employees, owners, investors, customers, 
government, community) of the firm provide the essential inputs and infrastructure in order 
to be achieved, it follows that they should be included in the government centres that are 
responsible for the firm’s fate. Their inclusion, however, in the corporate governance 
mechanisms should be limited to the extent that their interests are threatened because they 
usually lack the managerial knowledge and long-term experience to take strategic 
decisions. The firm and its managers have special obligations to ensure that the 
shareholders receive a “fair” return on their investment, but the firm also has special 
obligations to other shareholders, which go above and beyond those required by law. 
Stakeholder management involves taking the interests and concerns of theses various 
groups and individuals into account in arriving at a management decision in order to reach 
a desirable outcome (Carroll, 1996). 
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2.5.5 Institutional Theory 
 
In early years, Hughes (1936) presented institutions as stable and slowly changing social 
systems. Selznick (1957) regarded institutionalisation as a process by which organisations 
or social entities are pervaded with values beyond the technical requirements of their tasks. 
Institutional theorists argue that institutions are socially constructed templates for actions 
generated and maintained through ongoing interactions. In this way, they regard 
institutions as providers of framework and procedures that certain organisations should 
follow. Burns and Flam (1987) defined institutions as shared rules that categorise social 
actors, their activities and their relationships. Sociologists believe in supra-individual units 
of analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations or direct consequences of individual 
motives (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). From the sociological point of view, 
institutionalisation is “a phenomenological process by which certain social relationships 
and actions come to be taken for granted and shared cognitions that define what has 
meaning and what actions are possible” (Zucker, 1983). 
 
The institutional theory framework for modelling firm behaviours suggests that 
organisations attempt to incorporate norms in their institutional environments so that they 
can gain legitimacy, resources, stability and enhanced survival prospects (Di Maggio and 
Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have introduced the 
concept of isomorphism and they believe that competitive and institutional types of 
isomorphism might be sources of pressure for the organisations. By competitive 
isomorphism, they refer to similar organisations due to market competition (Di Maggio 
and Powell, 1983), which focuses on population ecologists (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claimed that there are three mechanisms through which 
institutional isomorphic change occurs, each with its own antecedents: 1) coercive 
isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy; 2) mimetic 
isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; and 3) normative 
isomorphism, associated with professionalisation.  Mimetic isomorphism change as a 
response of individuals to environmentally constructed uncertainties. 
 
Isomorphism is used in order to reduce the impact of uncertainty, to enhance the issue of 
co-ordination, during emergencies; it may serve the purpose of reducing human casualties, 
by supporting a holistic approach on emergency management. 
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Despite the differences, institutional theory suggests that institutions have a significant 
influence on the behaviour of individuals and organisations. This theory explores the 
relationship between institutions and organisations (e.g. DiMaggio, 1988; Meyer, Scott and 
Deal, 1983; Olivier, 1991; Zucker, 1987), the behaviour of organisations and the 
organisation’s competitive advantage (Olivier, 1997).   
 
Institutional theory proposes that firms should appoint outside directors, while subtly 
limiting their independence (Westphal, 1999; Zajac and Westphal, 1996). Scholars have 
examined the effects of institutions on specific dimensions of organisations such as 
organisation form (e.g. Arndt and Bigelow, 2000), performance (e.g. Carroll et al. 1988), 
and strategy (Chang and Choi, 1988). However, institutional theory has been criticised by 
scholars for the lack of attention to strategic behaviour of organisations in response to the 
institutional process that affects them (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985). 
 
2.5.6 Managerial Hegemony Theory  
 
The managerial hegemony theory as it is presented in Table B describes the board as a 
legal fiction: a co-opted appendage institution that despite its governing power over 
management is ineffective in mitigating conflicts between management and stockholders 
(e.g. Galbraith, 1967; Mace, 1971). Therefore, board’s role is restricted to be “another 
management (-dominated) tool” (Pfeffer, 1972, p.219), a passive “rubber stamp” for 
management’s proposals and decisions (Herman, 1981). The instrumental view of 
corporate board emphasises that management control over corporate affairs becomes more 
spread among small stockholders (Berle and Means, 1932; Winter, 1964). The directors’ 
passive behaviour derives from lack of knowledge about company’s affairs (Estes, 1980), 
dependence on information and insights provided by company’s top executives (Bacon and 
Brown, 1975) and the prestige and status that are associated with board membership 
(Mills, 1981; Vance, 1983).  The theory of managerial hegemony describes the board as an 
ineffective governing institution, which lacks of independence regarding outside directors 
from incumbent management.  
 
2.5.7 Upper Echelons Theory  
The upper echelons perspective has developed since Hambrick and Mason's 1984 
introduction. The theory has its roots in the behaviour theory of the firm (March & Simon, 
1958; Cyert & March, 1963). According to this theory, decision makers are often unable to 
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make economically rational decisions because they are bound by rationality and must act 
in a social context of multiple and conflicting goals. Hambrick and Mason (1984) extended 
these ideas in their upper-echelons perspective. Hambrick and Mason (1984) formalized 
the upper echelons perspective, "proposing that senior executives make strategic choices 
on the basis of their cognitions and values and that the organisation becomes a reflection 
of its top managers" (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996, p. 6). Finkelstein and Hambrick 
further formalized the upper echelons perspective as strategic leadership theory. The theory 
links these observable demographic characteristics of the TMT to organisational processes 
and outcomes (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Knight et. al., 
1999). Further, the "theory states that organisational outcomes can be partially predicted 
from managerial backgrounds" (Hambrick & Mason, 1984, p. 197) and executives will 
make decisions as a team that are consistent with their cognitive base of executive 
orientation (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Knight et. al., 1999, p. 447). The cognitive base 
consists of two elements: psychological characteristics and observable experiences. A 
fundamental principle of upper echelons theory is that observable experiences (i.e., 
demographic measures) are systematically related to the psychological and cognitive 
elements of executive orientation. Upper echelons research employs the use of observable 
demographic characteristics as proxy measures of executive orientation (Knight et. al., 
1999, p. 447).  
Upper-echelons theory emphasises on the effects of executives on corporate strategy, but it 
neglects the governance context in which corporate elites are situated. Upper-echelon 
theorists generally do not place emphasis on governance differences and combine the CEO 
and other executives into the top management team unit of analysis (e.g. Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984), or even suggest combining the top management team with the nonexecutive 
directors into a supra-TMT (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1996). 
 
2.5.8 Structuration Theory 
 
Structuration theory is based more on the ‘humanist’ strands of sociology rather than 
‘scientific’ strands. Giddens’ structuration theory is an attempt to ‘put sociology back 
together again’. Its starting point is that the division between structural and social action 
approaches is essentially false. It attempts to reconcile structural and interpretive sociology 
and subjectivism and objectivism. It distinguishes between ‘system’ and ‘institution’. 
Social systems refer to reproduced practices. Institutions refer to reproduced rules and 
resources. ‘Systems’ and ‘institutions’ do not exist independently of individual activity 
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rather they only exist insofar as they are continually produced and reproduced via the 
duality of structure (Giddens in Layder 1998 p.  140). Structure exists only at the instances 
where rules and resources are employed in social activity-instatiation. According to 
Giddens, structure refers to the visible patterning of social relations; it is the rules and 
resources that actors draw upon as they produce and reproduce social activity. ‘Structure is 
not external to action rather it is internal to the flow of action which constitutes social 
practices’ (Layder 1998). Also, the structures both enable and constrain action. ‘Sociology 
should be concerned first and foremost with reworking conceptions of human being and 
human doing, social reproduction and social transformation’ (Giddens, 1984). It rejects 
determinism; the notion that structural forces externally constrain and determine 
behaviour. It rejects objectivism; here are no ‘objective’ ‘social facts’, ‘structures’, 
‘systems’ or ‘institutions’ rather peoples reasons and motivations are central to sociological 
analysis. Subjective understandings and relationship between ‘observer’ and ‘observed’ are 
central. It rejects functionalism; social systems cannot be analysed independently of actors. 
Also, it rejects reification of the social system; social systems do not have sets of needs (ie 
adaptation/ integration/ equilibrium as in functionalism) that are independent of the needs 
of social actors. It rejects dualism but accepts a duality of structure. According to 
structuration theory, the individuals constantly monitor their actions, they are aware and 
conscious of what they do but, but they may not do things purposively. They sometimes do 
things without intending to do them, and things they do intend to do have unintended 
consequences. In the duality of structure, agency is both structured, and reproduces and 
revitalises the structure. It occurs through time and unintended consequences of actions 
modify future intended actions. 
 
One of the criticisms of structuration theory is that it cannot address the emotional 
“constitution” of society. Also, the objectivity of constraints in Giddens’ theory (Archer, 
1982, p. 479) has been questioned. 
 
2.5.9 Overview of Corporate Governance Theories 
Various corporate governance theories have been analysed with respect to their advantages 
and drawbacks, but the phenomenon of Boards of Directors cannot be explained 
thoroughly by adopting a single theoretical approach. Table B provides a comprehensive 
overview of the corporate governance theories and their key proponents. Theoretical 
pluralism is recommended as a critical progress of corporate governance research. 
Eisenhardt (1989a) argued that apart from agency theory additional perspectives will 
32 
 
facilitate the capture of the complexity of the phenomenon. Stewardship theory argues that 
managers have the same interests as shareholders; whilst resource dependency theory 
emphasises on the linkage role of directors with the external environment. Regarding the 
validity of agency and stewardship theory, Donaldson and Davis (1991, p. 61) stated that 
“each may be valid for some phenomena but not for others”. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) 
recommended to link agency and resource dependency theory. Furthermore, Daily, Dalton 
and Cannella (2003, p. 372) concluded that “a multi-theoretic approach to corporate 
governance is essential for recognising the many mechanisms and structures that might 
reasonably enhance organisational functioning”.  A multi-theoretical approach will help 
to overcome the limitations of different theories and it will allow us to focus more on the 
“inner workings of boards” (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Pettigrew, 1992). 
 
2.6 Boards of Directors and their Roles  
 
 Scholars (e.g. Monks and Minow, 1995; Ooghe and De Langhe, 2002) regard Boards of 
Directors as an important mechanism-entity within the company that creates a link between 
the shareholders and managers and therefore plays an important role in the corporate 
governance system of the firm. Board of Directors is one mechanism that contributes to the 
solution of the problems arising from separation of ownership from control.  Board has the 
obligation to determine the firm’s overall strategy and to ensure the protection of 
shareholders (Keenan, 2004). It exists primarily in order to hire, fire, monitor, compensate 
management and vote on important decisions in an effort to maximise the value of 
shareholder (e.g. Fistenberg and Malkier, 1994; Salmon, 1993; Denis and McConnell, 
2003; Becht et. al., 2002). According to Iskander and Chambrou (2000), Board of 
Directors is the centre of the internal system of corporate governance and, in this scope, 
has the responsibility to assure long-term viability of the firm and to provide oversight of 
management. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) asserted that the Boards of Directors have the 
fiduciary duty of monitoring management performance and protecting shareholders’ 
interests. Other roles of board are the institutional role, strategy role, disciplinary role, 
figurehead role, ethical role, auditing role and class hegemony role (e.g. Hung, 1998; Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989). 
 
In the literature, they have been identified six major roles of governing boards: linking, 
coordinating, control, strategic, maintenance and support. These roles are consistent with 
and reflect one of the main schools of thoughts: resource dependency theory, stakeholder 
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theory, agency theory, stewardship theory, institutional theory and managerial hegemony. 
Judge and Zeithaml (1992) developed a typology by studying two theoretical perspectives: 
the institutional and the strategic choice. The institutional perspective or intrinsic influence 
perspective examines the organisational structures and processes as the result of 
socialisation and institutionalisation. The institutional perspective is a deterministic 
theoretical framework, which focuses on environmental norms and social influences 
beyond the control of the organisation. On the contrary, strategic choice or extrinsic 
influence perspective focuses on the actions that the organisation’s members take in order 
to adjust to the environment. It emphasises nondeterministic explanations of organisational 
processes and outcomes. Gupta, Dirsmith and Fogarty (1994) indicated that these two 
opposite approaches explain the reasons for the development of different formal structures. 
According to the contingency perspective, governing bodies are formulated by task, 
environment and technical nature they perform, while, institutional perspective suggests 
that an organisation has to be conventional with the institutionalised demands of traditional 
practices and customs and influence the choice of control and coordination mechanism.  
Judge and Zeithaml (1992) have developed a typology with the theories in corporate 
governance relating to board (Figure 2:1). 
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Figure 2:1 Typology of the Theories relating to Roles  
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(Judge and Zeithaml, 1992) 
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Institutionalised  
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2.6.1 Linking Role and Resource Dependency Theory 
 
The linking role of board is explained by resource dependency theory, which assumes that 
corporations depend on each other in order to gain access to valuable resources and 
establish links in an effort to regulate their interdependence as it can be seen in Figure 2:1. 
An interlocking director is a type of link in the complex chain of connections among 
organisations. An interlock director is the social relationship between two or more 
corporations when an executive is a member on one or more boards (Scott, 1985). 
Participating in various boards provides access to finance and operations as well as to 
specific corporate information of the firm and the required resources are allocated in 
favour of the interlocking corporation (Hung, 1998).   Governing board acts as a linking 
instrument of the organisation to the external environment since it enhances its legitimacy 
and assists in achieving its goals of efficiency and performance (Pfeffer, 1972). Ornstein 
(1984) considered governing boards as vehicles that corporations use to control other 
organisations and to coordinate business activities among corporations.  
 
Interlocking directors are regarded as media or channels for transmitting information about 
the industry in which they work (Penning, 1980). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued that 
interlocking directorates facilitate corporations first, to obtain valuable resources and 
second, to control other organisations through manipulation of available resources. Useem 
(1978) stated that directorship-interlocking directors could be an advantage for 
organisations because they cause threats or uncertainties to other organisations. 
Interlocking directors have been examined from the intraclass or class solidarity approach. 
According to this approach, individuals within the capitalist class have a unified interest. In 
an effort to achieve their interests, capitalists establish links with each other (Palmer, 
1983). Mace (1971) observed that a type of “roundtable” set up by top managers having as 
primary objective the “effective and efficient operations for corporations”.  
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2.6.2 Coordinating Role and Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory is a pluralistic approach to organisations. Freeman (1984) defined a 
stakeholder as “any group of individuals who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement 
of a corporation’s purpose”. In this perspective, corporations are responsible for many 
social groups and their primary purpose is to balance the conflicting interests of different 
groups. It recognises that this requires direction and supports the coordinating role of 
governing board.  
 
Wang and Dewhirst (1992) considered that stakeholder theory explains how members of 
governing boards perceive the interests of corporate constituencies and how organisations 
are managed. For the institutional point of view, Kotter and Heskett (1992) argued that 
stakeholder theory is used to identify the connection between stakeholder management and 
achievement of social responsibility.  
2.6.3 Control Role and Agency Theory 
The control role derives from agency theory and the relevant studies are described in 
Figure 2:1. According to Eisenhardt (1989a), agency theory describes the relationship 
between two parties; the principal and the agent, which have divergent interests and 
attitudes toward risk. Agency theory deals with the solution of problems that arise between 
the agent and the principal. Fama and Jensen (1983) proposed that agency theory describes 
a governance system that limits the agent’s self-interest behaviour in circumstances of 
ambiguity between agent and principal. Therefore, Fama and Jensen (1983) proposed that 
the role of the governing board is to act as a ratifier of the decision that is implemented and 
a controller in monitoring the implementation and performance of the decisions. 
 
2.6.4 Strategic Role and Stewardship Theory 
 
Stewardship theory emphasises the performance function or the strategic role of a 
governing board as it is presented in Figure 2:1. According to Donaldson (1990), 
stewardship theory suggests that governing board is responsible for the setting of 
strategies. Andrews (1981) proposed that board involvement in strategy evaluation should 
be limited. According to stewardship theory, the role of governing board in this theory is 
the guidance of management towards attainment of mission and objectives. 
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2.6.5 Maintenance Role and Institutional Theory 
The institutional theory explains the impact of institutionalisation from pressure outside a 
governing board. According to institutional theory, Ingram and Simons (1995) argued that 
organisations are constrained by social rules, which shape the form and practice of 
organisations. The maintenance role of a governing board in response to institutional 
pressure is focused on indoctrinating the organisation by interpreting the external 
environment (Hung, 1998). Figure 2:1 incorporates the governace role of board. Corporate 
governance is an act performed by a governing board as “a highly objectified and exterior” 
process in conformity with the norms derived from the socialisation board members 
(Berger and Luckman, 1967). Regarding the institutional impact of governing board, Scott 
and Meyer (1983, p. 140) considered that it includes all the necessary rules and 
requirements that individual organisations need to receive support and legitimacy. 
 
2.6.6  Support Role and Managerial Hegemony 
 
The institutional force applied to managing boards is explained by the managerial 
hegemony theory. Managerial hegemony occurs when the Board of Directors serves as a 
“rubber stamp” and it does not get involved in the strategic decisions (Whisler, 1984; 
Mace, 1971). The support role derives from objective and subjective factors.  The 
subjective factors indicate that Boards of Directors deny involvment in the strategic 
decision making because, firstly, directors are appointed by managers, secondly, directors 
are chosen into the organisation and thirdly, they have accrued benefits from directorship 
which act as an incentive to compliance. Regarding the objective reason, governing boards 
are constrained from making independent decisions because they rely on information 
provided by management (Hung, 1998).  
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2.7 Environmental Factors and Influences 
 
2.7.1 Introduction 
 
An important theoretical perspective in the strategy and organisational theory suggests that 
the performance of the organisation is associated with the environmental dimensions 
(Romanelli and Tushman, 1988; Keats and Hitt, 1988).  
 
Numerous scholars have attempted to investigate the “fit” between strategy and the 
external environment (e.g., Andrews, 1980; Miller and Friesen, 1983; Venkatraman and 
Prescott, 1990; Wiersema and Bantel, 1993; Anderson and Zeithaml, 1984; Bourgeois, 
1980; Hambrick, 1988) or organisational characteristics such as structure (Chandler, 1962; 
Rumelt, 1974), administrative systems (Lorange and Vancill, 1977; Galbraith and 
Nathanson, 1978) and managerial characteristics (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984).  More 
specifically, Romanelli and Tushman (1988) claimed that: “…where environments are 
changing and/or performance outcomes are low or declining, leadership’s primary task is 
to intervene in ongoing patterns of commitment and exchange to redirect the character of 
an organisation’s relationship with its environment” (p. 130). This indicates that 
successful executives are required to examine the external environmental conditions prior 
of any crucial decision. Organisation’s environment enhances and limits activities and 
behaviours within the boundaries of the firm (e.g., Duncan, 1972; Aldrich, 1979; Dess and 
Beard, 1984). Research has shown the impact of environment to organisational life as 
strategy (Porter, 1980; Miller, Droge and Toulouse, 1988), structure (Lawrence and Lorch, 
1967; Keats and Hitt, 1988), organisational processes (Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992). 
A few studies have examined the interrelationships between the environmental dimensions 
and board characteristics.  
 
2.7.2 Environmental Dimensions 
 
Several attempts have been made by researchers to describe the environment (e.g., Aldrich, 
1979; Emery and Trist, 1965; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Duncan, 
1972) but Tan and Litschert (1994) have observed two dominant perspectives in 
organisational environment research. The first perspective is the information uncertainty, 
which considers the environment as the source of information (Duncan, 1972; Lawrence 
and Lorch, 1967; Tung, 1982). The research emphasised perceived uncertainty rather than 
objective data gathered from the participants of the organisation (Tan and Litschert, 1994). 
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The second perspective is known as resource dependence, which posits that scarce 
resources exist in the environments, which are sought after by competing firms (March and 
Simon, 1958; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). As the environment becomes less munificent or 
more hostile, it can be conceived that firms experience greater uncertainty. Therefore, 
executives manage these conditions by reducing the firm’s dependence or by increasing its 
control over these resources that affect the firm’s overall organisational effectiveness 
(March and Simon, 1958). 
 
Emery and Trist (1965) stated that organisations change according to environmental 
circumstances. They proposed a typology, which identifies four “ideal types” of 
organisational environments. 
 
The simplest type is called the placid, randomised environment where goals and noxiants 
do not alter and are randomly distributed. The organisation’s viewpoint is that there is no 
difference between tactics and strategy and organisations exist as single and adaptive small 
units.  The second type is called the placid, clustered environment, which is also static but 
goals and noxiants are not randomly selected. Under these environmental conditions, there 
is a need for strategy within large organisations that require centralised control and co-
ordination.  
 
The third type is called distributed-reactive environment and is more dynamic than static 
and is a clustered environment in which there is more than one system of the same kind. 
Control becomes more centralised to allow these to be conducted. In addition to these 
perspectives, the environment has been empirically examined as multidimensional 
constructs. On the other hand, stability may require a certain coming-to-terms between 
competitors. 
 
The fourth type is called turbulent fields. In these dynamic processes, component 
organisations arise from the environment itself. The turbulence derives from the 
complexity and multiple characters of causal interconnections. 
 
Aldrich (1979), after an extensive review of the literature on population ecology theory and 
resource dependence theory that “refer to the nature and the distribution of resources in 
environments with different values on each dimension implying differences in appropriate 
structures and activities” (1979, p. 63), he identified the following six dimensions of 
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organisational environments: capacity, homogeneity-heterogeneity, stability, 
concentration, consensus and turbulence. The six environmental dimensions are presented 
and described briefly below. 
 
• Capacity is the relative level of resources available to organisation.  
• Homogeneity-heterogeneity is the degree of similarity between elements of the 
domain population.  
• Stability is the degree of turnover in environmental elements.  
• Concentration is the degree to which resources are evenly distributed over the 
environment.  
• Consensus is the degree to which an organisation’s claim to a specific domain is 
disputed by other organisations.  
• Turbulence is the degree of interconnection among elements in environment (1979, 
p. 74). 
 
 
Dess and Beard (1984) condensed Aldrich’s (1979) codification of environmental 
dimensions into the following three dimensions; munificence: capacity, dynamism: 
stability-instability, turbulence, complexity: homogeneity-heterogeneity, concentration-
dispersion. They developed a multi-dimensional construct of environment which includes 
“munificence” in terms of resource abundance and resulting capacity to support growth; 
“dynamism” primarily reflected instability (volatility) and “complexity” as heterogeneity 
and concentration of environmental elements. These perspectives offer a better 
understanding of the external environment and its impact on firm’s strategy. These 
environmental dimensions help executives to have a clear understanding of environmental 
uncertainty and how it might influence strategic decision characteristics such as propensity 
for risk-taking, futurity, proactiveness and defensiveness (Miles and Snow, 1978; Miller 
and Friesen, 1982).  
 
2.7.2.1 Environmental Complexity refers to the number of environmental factors that 
encroach on organisations (Thompson, 1967); environmental instability is defined by the 
rate of change in these factors (Thompson, 1967); environmental munificence refers to the 
extent to which the environment supports sustained growth (Starbuck, 1976). 
Environmental complexity was defined as heterogeneity in the environment and the 
concentration of resources. Child (1972) conceptualised environmental complexity as “the 
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heterogeneity of and range of an organisation’s activities” (1972, p.3). Duncan (1972) 
argued that managers who deal with complex (i.e. heterogeneous) environments will 
perceive greater uncertainty and have greater information-processing requirements than 
managers with simple environments. 
 
Organisations operating in complex environments are confronted with conflicting demands 
from multiple constituencies (Thompson, 1967). Managing these stakeholders might 
require various skills and competencies that force companies to adopt more structural 
differentiation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). As Gupta (1988, p.160) stated: “The more 
diverse an organisation’s environment, the more necessary it becomes to have a 
differentiated top management team in order to appropriately monitor the diversity of the 
environment”. Environmental complexity requires significant changes in the organisation 
and affects a wide range of organisational functions (Russo and Fouts, 1997).  
Executives operating in complex environments will experience difficulty in identifying the 
key strategic factors and to use valuable resources and capabilities (Black and Boal, 1994). 
Environmental complexity has been also operationalised as heterogeneity in the 
environment (e.g. Dess and Beard, 1984; Keats and Hitt, 1988). Firms in complex 
environments face problem-solving situations and they require larger and more 
heterogeneous TMT to copy with the circumstances (Janis, 1972). Heterogeneous groups 
are likely to develop diverse interpretations and perspectives (Wanous and Youtz, 1986). 
In less complex environments, this heterogeneity is not needed and it might create 
communication barriers (Zenger and Lawrence, 1989) and conflict (Ebadi and Utterback, 
1984). Thompson (1967) argued that the degree of environmental complexity creates 
challenges for Top Management and larger coalition. 
 
However, environmental complexity promotes greater differentiation within the Top 
Teams and reduces the opportunity for executives to interact, share resources and operate 
in a cohesive manner. Environmental demands characteristics require task specialisation 
and make coordination difficult to achieve (Mintzberg, 1979). As Galbraith (1973) has 
argued, complexity forces greater specialization and decentralization, reduces opportunities 
for coordination and increases the number of individuals involved in decision-making and 
their decision-making independence.  
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2.7.2.2 Environmental Munificence:  Munificence was defined as the relative level of 
resources available in an environment and was measured by growth at industry level. 
Starbuck (1976) described munificent environment as the extent to which the environment 
can support sustained growth. Rajagopalan et. al. (1993, p. 359) pointed out “uncertain 
environments that are also munificent (e.g. high growth industries in initial stages of 
industry evolution) are very different from environments that are far less munificent (e.g. 
mature industries with declining demand or increasing competition). Hence, the 
performance effects of comprehensiveness are likely to be different across these 
environments”. Aldrich (1979) and Starbuck (1976) state that organisations pursue   permit 
organisational growth and stability which enable organisations to accumulate slack 
resources (Cyert and March, 1963). Munificence gives organisational flexibility and 
growth opportunities (Aldrich, 1979) and limits external threats (Cyert and March, 1963). 
The lack of external threat allows agreement and cooperation between TMT members. 
 
 On the other hand, environmental munificent offers TMT a variety of choices on how to 
compete and diversity on opinions (Dess and Origer, 1987). Organisations that operate in 
munificent environments have available resources and the problem is how to use these 
resources. Munificent environment provides the chance to the organisation to obtain 
resources for the development of additional capabilities and make a better use than the 
competitors (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999). The availability of resources increases the 
possibility for innovation and favours the changes in structures required to generate a 
proactive environmental strategy (Aragón-Correa and Sharma, 2003). Williamson (1963) 
has suggested that organisations with available resources tend to hire more executives. 
Jensen (1986) claimed that top managers with “free cash flow” tend to engage a more non-
profit maximising behaviour. In contrast, companies that focus on cost containment tend to 
reduce the staff (Hofer, 1975). Therefore, environmental munificence has an impact on 
board size (Keats and Hitt, 1988; Bantel and Finkelstein, 1995). 
  
2.7.2.3 Environmental Dynamism/Instability: The second environmental dimension was 
dynamism, which was defined as the level of turbulence or instability facing an 
environment and measured by variability in growth rates. The literature in organisation 
theory and business-policy theory refers to dynamism as a measurement of environmental 
stability-instability. Therefore, the terms “dynamism” and “instability” are used 
interchangeably. Organisations that operate in dynamic industries will be more likely to 
show some homogenous elements of their environment that enable them to copy with 
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uncertainty (Simon and March, 1958). Thompson (1967, p.159) considered dealing with 
uncertainty the “essence of the administrative process”. Uncertainty also affects 
organisation structure because as task uncertainty increases, more information must be 
processed among decision makers to achieve a given level of performance (Galbraith, 
1973, p.  4).  
 
Aldrich (1979) stated that environmental turbulence “leads to externally induced 
changes…that are obscure to administrators and difficult to plan for” (1979, p. 69). Adrich 
focused on the extent of interdependence among environmental connections. Pfeffer and 
Salancik argued that interconnections among organisations create uncertainty and that 
“changes can come from anywhere without notice and produce consequences 
unanticipated by those initiating the changes and those experiencing the consequences” 
(1978, p.68). 
 
Environments vary on the extent to which they are characterised by unpredictability and 
unexpected change (Mintzberg, 1979). This environmental instability can affect the way 
organisations are structured and operate and the composition of top management teams.  
Environmental instability may refer to the “steady-state” rate of change in environmental 
factors that affect the organisations (Thompson, 1967) or to the extent of discontinuous 
change in the environment (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). Environmental instability 
might affect TMT as well as board heterogeneity and size. Instable environments increase 
the variation and fragmentation of managerial work (Mintzberg, 1973) and therefore, 
enlarge the information-processing demands on the top team (Daft, Sormunen and Parks, 
1988). The information –processing requirements of unstable environments have two 
effects on Top Teams: greater heterogeneity and greater size. As environments become 
unstable, the TMT has to increase the information absorbed and recalled, the different 
perspectives on a problem and the recommendations required (Shaw, 1981). Therefore, the 
greater information-processing capabilities of larger and more heterogeneous groups are 
needed to adapt to the greater information-processing requirements of unstable 
environments (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993). 
 
Environmental instability might affect other aspects of TMT as well as the Boards of 
Directors. Challenging environments create demands on TMT and on board members to 
adapt to environmental requirements (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). TMTs face greater 
information processing and decision-making demands (Kotter, 1982) and pressure to reach 
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decisions (Eisenhardt, 1989b). This results in less interdependence and social integration 
among group members. TMT consensus will be more difficult to attain due to instability 
and diversity of perspectives (Khandalla, 1977). This diversity of opinions might create 
conflicts and make consensus elusive. In contrast, higher consensus may be relatively 
achievable in stable environments (Priem, 1990). The more unstable the environment is, 
the less the degree of role interdependence within TMTs. 
 
According to organisational theory perspective, a strong and unified leadership structure is 
easier to adapt to environmental demands (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). A single leader 
has more power to make critical decisions (Harris and Helfat, 1998). Furthermore, 
stewardship theory suggests that joint leadership structure facilitates decision-making and 
improves organisational performance under specific circumstances (Boyd, 1995). The 
existence of a single leader during periods of high environmental turbulence facilitates a 
more unified corporate response to events and limits potential agency costs.  
 
For example, the following environmental dimensions have been explored in a number of 
contexts: turbulence (Davis et al, 1991; Naman and Slevin, 1993); dynamism (Thompson, 
1967; Miller and Friesen, 1982; Dess and Beard, 1984); complexity (Child, 1972; 
Mintzberg, 1979; Tung, 1982); volatility (Bourgeois, 1985); and hostility (Khandwalla, 
1977; Miller and Friesen, 1978; Mintzberg, 1979). These dimensions affect the decision 
makers’ perception of uncertainty, which can result in a number of strategic outcomes (Tan 
and Litschert, 1994). 
 
The degree of environmental uncertainty has been measured using both objective and 
perceptual research devices (Bourgeois, 1980; Lindsay and Rue, 1980; Koberg, 1987; 
Milliken, 1990). Much on the earlier work treated the environmental uncertainty construct 
as perceptually determined (Lawrence and Lorch, 1967; Weick, 1969; Duncan, 1972) and 
examined individual decision makers as the level of analysis. Others, however, argued 
against the adoption of perceptual measures and preferred alternative, objective measures 
(e.g., Child, 1975; Yasai-Ardekani, 1986), which produced equivocal empirical results and 
confounded research conclusions. Furthermore, only a weak association has been found 
between decision makers’ perception of the environment and objective measures of such 
phenomena (e.g., Tosi et al., 1973; Osborn and Hunt, 1974; Downey et al, 1975; Boulton et 
al, 1982). 
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Many researchers have criticised the use of objective measures of environmental 
uncertainty (e.g., Miles et al, 1974; Snow, 1976) with the main contention being that these 
researchers considered that firms respond to the environment as it is perceived and, 
thereafter, interpreted by decision makers. By default, the environmental forces and 
conditions, which are not perceived by decision makers, go unnoticed and do not affect 
management decisions and actions. Thus, firms may perceive the same environmental 
characteristics differently and respond with different strategy formulation behaviour 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Duncan, 1972; Starbuck, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Therefore, it is a common place for researchers, in present times, to adopt perceptual 
measures in testing the environmental uncertainty construct (Naman and Slevin, 1993; 
Sawyer, 1993; Tan and Litschert, 1994). Given that the process of perceiving and 
interpreting information from environmental sources is both complex and uncertain, a 
decision maker’s cognitions and individual background greatly impact upon the way an 
organisation is likely to adapt and, ultimately, determine its future strategic posture (e.g. 
Selznick, 1957; Mintzberg et al, 1976; Donaldson and Lorsch, 1984; Schwenk, 1988; 
Starbuck and Milliken, 1988; Wiersema and Bantel, 1993). The coalignment between 
environmental dimensions and strategic orientation contribute to an outstanding 
organisational performance. 
 
Theoretical as well as empirical studies found strong effects of environmental dimensions 
upon board composition. After a careful investigation on the existing literature on the 
effect of environment to board composition, the researcher attempted to examine the 
impact of environment on the Greek board composition. Therefore, a set of well- grounded 
hypotheses have been developed. The hypothesis aims to suggest a solution to a problem 
or to explain a phenomenon (Ary, Jacobs and Razavieh, 1984).  
 
H1a: The more complex the environment, the larger the size of the board and the higher 
the number of interlocking directorates. 
H1b: The more unstable the environment the larger the size of the board. 
H1c: The more munificence the environment the larger the size of the board 
H1d: Munificent environment is negatively related to both board size and the number of 
interlocking directorates 
H1e: Dynamic environments favour the dual leadership structure. 
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2.8 Boards of Directors 
 
Board of Directors is an important mechanism-entity within the company that creates a 
link between the shareholders and managers and therefore plays an important role in the 
corporate governance system of the firm (Daily et al., 2003, p. 372). Board of Directors is 
considered as the official first line of defence against managers who act against the 
interests of shareholders (Brennan, 2006). Therefore, board has as obligation to determine 
the firm’s overall strategy and to ensure the protection of shareholders. Board of Directors 
is the centre of the internal system of corporate governance and, in this scope, has the 
responsibility to assure long-term viability of the firm and to provide oversight of 
management.  
 
The term “Board of Directors” has been adopted by strategic leadership theory.  Board of 
Directors is the body designated for this function. Board of Directors is composed of inside 
directors (i.e., current and former members of the top management team) and outside 
directors. Outside directors act as professional referees who oversee and monitor top 
management (Fama, 1980). The greater the proportion of outside directors, the more 
effective the board will be in monitoring and limiting managerial opportunism (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). While Boards of Directors are not responsible for routine administration of 
the firm, however they are responsible for reviewing major policy choices (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1988). Agency theory as Zahra and Pearce (1989, p. 302) stated: “places a 
premium on board’s strategic contribution, specifically on board’s involvement in and 
contribution to the articulation of the firm’s mission, the development of the firm’s strategy 
and setting of guidelines for implementation and effective control of the chosen strategy”.  
 
 
Boards influence strategy indirectly through “decision control” activities such as 
evaluation of strategic decisions, review of strategic plans and monitoring executive and 
firm performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Furthermore, boards can influence strategy 
through “decision management” activities such as strategic proposals, asking probing 
questions about important issues and decide for strategic alternatives (Judge and Zeithaml, 
1992). Previous studies have shown that most of the board review strategy and 
performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983) but few boards have an influential role in strategic 
decisions (Mace, 1971; Vance, 1983). 
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2.9 Board Structure 
It refers to the formal organisation of the Board of Directors where its major dimensions 
are: size, board composition and leadership structure. The study attempts to examine the 
effects of board structure on the strategic decision-making process, strategic choice of 
innovation and on financial performance. 
 
2.9.1 Board Size 
 
Board size is the most important demographic attribute of board composition; however it 
receives considerable attention in board composition studies due to board functioning role. 
Board size is a major element of board structure (Daily and Dalton, 1992) and board 
reform (Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma, 1985). Board size can range from very small (5 or 
6) to very large (30 plus) (Chaganti, Mahajan, Sharma, 1985). Early studies have found 
that the average size of board is between 12 and 14 and has remained the same over the 
past 50 year (Gordon, 1945). As board size increases both expertise and critical resources 
for the organisation are enhanced (Pfeffer, 1973). Larger boards, also, prevent the CEO 
from taking actions that might not be in shareholders’ interests such as golden parachutes 
contracts (Singh and Harianto, 1989). Finally, larger boards may be associated with higher 
levels of firm performance (e.g. Alexander, Fennell and Halpern, 1993; Goodstein, Gautam 
and Boeker, 1994; Mintzberg, 1983). Large have more skills, opinions and knowledge that 
stimulate proactive strategic actions (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1990). However, increased board size inhibits the board’s ability to initiate 
strategic actions (Goodstein, Gauten and Boeker, 1994). In addition, large boards tend to 
evade the responsibility for deciding on behalf of shareholders (Pye, 2000). Large groups 
are more difficult to coordinate and more likely to develop potential interactions among 
group members (O’Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett, 1989). 
 
On the contrary, a smaller board has the ability to adopt and exercise a controlling role 
(Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma, 1985). Also, smaller group size increases participation 
and social cohesion (Muth and Donaldson, 1998) that might contribute to organisational 
performance (Evans and Dion, 1991). Yermack (1996) found that board smallness was 
associated with higher market evaluations as well as higher returns on assets, sales over 
assets, and return on sales (ROS).  
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Corporate size is also associated with board size (Dalton et al., 1999; Yermack, 1996) and 
with corporate performance (Pugh et al., 1963; Aldrich, 1972; Thompson, 1967). From the 
agency perspective, larger firms require more executives in order to monitor and control 
firm’s activities (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). However, resource dependency theory 
suggests that the need for environmental linkage increases as a direct function of firm size 
increases (Allen, 1974; Dooley, 1969; Pfeffer, 1972; Warner and Unwalla, 1967).  
 
In the same line, empirical studies have associated board size with the number of executive 
and non-executive members. Several studies support the association between board size 
and board structure (e.g Pugh, Hickson, Hinings and Turner, 1969; Hickson, Pugh and 
Pheysey, 1969; Child, 1972). Any change in the number of board members will 
consequently result in change in the number of executive and non-executive directors.  
Clifford and Evans (1997) argued that larger companies appoint a larger board size and 
consequently, they have a greater representation of non-executive directors. Empirical 
findings from large and mature firms indicate a high representation of non-executive 
directors (O’Sullivan, 2000; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). O’Sullivan (2000) argued 
that as organisational size increases, the proportion of non-executives is increasing.  
 
Many scholars have studied the board-performance relationship with contradictory 
findings (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003).  Agency theorists argue that small boards 
faciliatate coordination and group cohesion and might contribute to better performance 
(Gertner and Kaplan, 1996). On the contrary, resource dependency theorists suggest that 
large boards are associated with higher levels of firm’s performance (e.g. Boyd, 1990; 
Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker, 1994; Alexander, Fennell and Halpern, 1993) due to the 
fact that larger boards have greater access to resources (Pfeffer, 1973). Empirical studies 
that have been conducted in various cultural contexts did not provide any support for 
hypothesised relationship between board size and company’s performance (e.g. Holthausen 
and Larcker, 1993; Wan and Ong, 2005; Rose, 2005).   
 
Within this section arguments have been advanced to suggest that there is a relationship 
between organisational and board structure characteristics which are related to firm’s 
performance. This provides the basis for the following set of hypotheses which state that:  
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H2a: The larger the firm’s size, the larger the board size 
H2b: The larger the board size the better the organisational performance 
H2c: The larger the board size, the higher the number of executive BOD 
H2d: The higher the board size, the higher the number of non-executive BOD 
 
2.9.2 Board Composition 
The composition of Board of Directors defines the affiliations of each director. Corporate 
governance scholars have a long history of interest in board composition (e.g., Baysigner 
and Butler, 1985; Baysigner and Hoskisson, 1990; Hill and Snell, 1988; Westphal, 1999). 
The central issue in the literature is the distinction between inside and outside directors. 
Insider or internal directors are employees of the firm and outside/external directors are not 
employees of the firm. An insider is a full-time officer of the corporation, whereas an 
outsider member does not serve in a managerial capacity the firm in which he/she is a 
director. Some scholars have characterised outside/external members as affiliate directors, 
when they are suppliers, bankers or creditors of the firm or being employees of the firm’s 
subsidiaries or holding companies are related by blood/marriage with a board member. The 
two types bring different skill sets and outlooks to decision making. The cooperative 
tandem of roles should make overall board effectiveness stronger than that offered by 
either of the individual types of directors (Harris and Shimizu, 2004).  
 
 
Inside directors can enhance board decision- making because of their knowledge of day –
to-day operations (Baysigner and Hoskisson, 1990) and ability to integrate intra-firm 
functions (Hill and Snell, 1988). In contrast, outside directors are viewed as a means of 
independent monitoring. 
  
Many authors have strongly objected to management participation in and domination of 
board proceedings (Eisenberg, 1988a), contending that the common practice of including 
managers on board compromises its efficacy in controlling managers. This implies that 
boards dominated by outsiders are less likely to take actions that deviate from the interests 
of shareholders, especially when outsiders are truly independent from management.  
 
Outsiders perceive their role as separate and complementary to the management, whereas 
insiders regard their role as an extension of their managerial duties (Mace, 1986). In recent 
years, the boards of publicly traded firms contain a majority of outsiders on key 
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committees. However, outsiders act to safeguard the shareholders’ investment in a firm in 
the face of potential managerial opportunities or incompetences. Strong outsider 
representation is also considered to be an essential feature of an independent board (Daily 
and Dalton, 1994; Mallette and Fowler, 1992). Outsiders are those board members who do 
not work for or have professional relationships with the corporation they govern (Mallette 
and Fowler, 1992). Since the mid-1980s corporate reformers have recommended the 
addition of outsiders to corporate boards as strategy for improving board governance. 
Therefore, government agencies and stock exchanges have adopted rules and regulations 
requiring corporations to strengthen their boards’ outsider representation. From the agency 
theory perspective, outsiders are more likely than insiders to carry out their oversight 
responsibilities effectively because their interests will be more closely aligned with those 
of the corporation’s owners (Johnson et al., 1993). Insiders will not want to raise the 
sensitive topic of the CEO’s performance because in all likelihood they are beholden to the 
CEO for their jobs and livelihood. Outsiders fulfil this governance obligation by ratifying 
management initiatives and then monitoring the quality of managerial decision making as 
these initiatives are implemented.  The board can be either composed of inside or outside 
directors. Agency theorists argue that outside directors are more able to monitor the actions 
of managers. Outside directors can introduce clear and independent considerations prior to 
the managerial strategic decisions (Baysigner and Hoskisson, 1990; Gabrielsson and Huse, 
2005). They have an influential role in corporate decision-making (Pye, 2000).  
Outsiders can be considered as a link to strategic resources and as providers of timely 
advice and counsel to the CEO and management in the areas that where there is lack of 
knowledge (Castaldi and Wortmann, 1984). A high proportion of outsiders provide a better 
forum for corporate governance decision-making and more quality decisions rather than 
insiders (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
 
On the contrary, insiders have the necessary information to make valid decisions regarding 
managerial decision-making. Insiders are well acquainted, familiar to work together   on a 
regular basis and have a comprehensive understanding of the firm’s affairs (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999). Proponents of stewardship theory argue that superior performance for 
internal and external stakeholders is linked with majority of insiders (Vance, 1964; Kesner, 
1987). The empirical evidence on the relation between firm performance and board 
composition is again mixed. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) found a relationship for a 
positive impact of the number of outsiders; Baysigner and Butler (1985) came to a similar 
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conclusion. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Bhagat and Black (1999) and Dalton et al. 
(1998) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) did not find a robust relationship. 
 
2.9.3 Executive versus Non-Executive Directors  
 
Over the last decades, the globalisation and liberalisation of financial markets worldwide 
the need has emerged for transparency and accountability in the boardroom. Numerous 
regulatory reforms recommend an increased number of non-executive directors in the 
boardroom. Non-executive directors are appointed as part-timers in order to protect 
shareholders’ interests (Weir, 1997) and at the same time, they bring experience and 
expertise to the organisation, provide objective views, a counterbalance to control the 
executives of the company and enhance networking.  They provide advice and counselling 
to executive directors (Bezemer, Maassen, Van den Bosch and Volberda, 2007). Dulewicz 
and Gay (1997) described non-executives as critical faculty to the organisation that provide 
organisational as well as strategic awareness, judgement and promote change. Stiles (2001) 
stated that the contribution of non-executives to the organisation was the review of 
strategic initiatives and to provide quality strategic proposals and effectiveness in strategic 
decision-making. Boards have a broader, more inclusive role when non-executives 
directors participate in the strategic decision-making process (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 
2005). Non-executive directors act as effective monitors of executive directors and they 
have a positive effect on the firm’s performance (Vance, 1964; Ezzamel and Watson, 
1993; Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Agency theorists, in an effort to protect shareholders’ 
interest, claim that greater representation of non-executive directors will provide a more 
effective governance for the firm (Jensen and Zajac, 2004). On the other hand, executive 
directors are regarded as full time employees that are responsible for the organisational 
strategic and operational aspects (Weir, 1997). There is a distinction between one tier and 
two-tier board structure. In one-tier board structure, executives as well as non-executive 
directors form one board which is called a “unitary” and “monistic” board. Executives are 
involved in board matters and are responsible for the operations and daily execution of 
board decisions. A unitary system exists in Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
U.K. 
 
The two-tier board system, the “highest” board is formed of non-executive or outside 
directors only. Their duties are supervision, control and strategic advice.  This board 
structure exists in European countries like Austria, Denmark, Germany and the 
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Netherlands.  The board can also be referred to as “supervisory board”. The second tier is 
formed by the board of executive directors which is responsible for the execution of 
strategic decisions. In countries where are a two-tier regime is the rule for large 
corporations smaller companies have one-tier boards. However, in counties with a unitary 
board structure, large companies delegate a substantial amount of their governance to chief 
executive forming an executive board with other directors and managers. This structure is 
found in Belgium, France, Spain and Italy (Van den Berghe, 2002). 
 
Empirical studies have revealed that two tier of board members are non-executives (e.g., 
McMichael, 1976; Hunt, 1984; Logan and Dunstan, 1993). Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) 
found that non-executive directors are associated with a positive excess return. Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1991) found no relationship between the percentage of non-executives on 
the board and firm value. On the contrast, there are studies that revealed a negative effect 
of non-executive directors to the organisational performance (Yermack, 1996; Bhagat and 
Black, 1999; Hermalin and Weisback, 1991).  
 
2.9.4 Independent versus Affiliated Board of Directors 
A major debate about outside directors on the board is the extent to which they are 
independent of executives (Bainbridge, 1993). Outside directors are defined as “all non-
management members of the board” (Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996, p. 417). Outside 
directors are not necessarily independent directors; they might be affiliated with family or 
professional relationships. They may have been co-opted by management through family 
or and/or business ties (Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000, p.237). They defined 
affiliated outside directors as management directors who have family and/or professional 
relationships with the firm and non-affiliated outside directors as non-management 
directors who have no relationships. Most of the research has been discussing the 
importance and effect of independent vs. depended boards primarily at the membership 
level. Independent directors are likely to be more effective in monitoring managers and as 
a result to reduce the agency costs that rise from the separation of ownership (shareholders) 
and control (managers) in day-to-day company management (Brennan and McDermott, 
2004). Thus, agency theorists support the independence structure of the board and suggest 
that affiliated directors tend to protect or enhance their business relationship with the firm 
and are considered to be less objective and less effective monitors of management than 
independent directors (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Daily and Dalton (1992) proposed that 
affiliate directors develop conflicts of interests due to their relationship with the firm. 
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Empirical findings demonstrate that outside independent directors on the board improve 
firm’s performance (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Barnhart et al., 1994; Daily and Dalton, 
1992; Schellenger, Wood and Tashakori, 1989; Baysigner and Butler, 1985). However, 
other studies have shown zero effect on corporate performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1991; Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994) or negative effect (Beatty and Zajac, 1994). In 
summary, agency theory suggests a negative impact of affiliated directors on firm 
performance. 
 
On the contrary, stewardship theory suggests that affiliated directors may feel aligned with 
company’s future performance because of their long-term employment and the close 
working relationship with the CEO. Thus, it may be argued that a separate but affiliated 
board structure tends to develop trust and empowerment and provide ease of 
communication needed for effective functioning (Muth and Donaldson, 1998).  
Scholars argue (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Kesner et. al, 1986) that Boards of 
Directors should be independent of management and should consist of independent 
outsiders and should have an independent outsider as Chairman (Donaldson and Davis, 
1994).  
 
2.9.5 Interlocking Directors 
Another trend in board composition is that of interlocking directorships, which is the focus 
of resource dependency theory. Interlocking occurs when a person affiliated with one 
company sits on the board of another company (Mizruchi, 1996). Resource dependency 
theory suggests that boards with interlocking directorships are intended to link the 
companies with the external environment and resources to maximize their performance 
(Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006).  Interlocking 
directors are viewed as a mechanism for collusion and cooperation (Burt, 1983), which 
enables companies to control or monitor others (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Some 
researchers believe that interlocking directorates serve as a source of information on 
business practices (e.g. Useem, 1984; Davis, 1991). 
 
Interlocking directors are considered as the mediators for the inter-organisational 
coordination or control. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Aldrich (1979) regarded 
interlocks as dyadic inter-organisational strategies that “are used to manage the 
organisation’s relationship with the environment by reducing competitive uncertainty”. 
However, Zajac (1988) suggested that board members serving two or more positions do 
54 
 
not necessarily act as organisational linkage, “in joining another board, a board member 
may simply be acting on personal motives”.  
The theory of interlocking directorates suggests that interlocks exist for class integration 
defined as the mutual protection of the interests of a social class by its members (Useem, 
1982). According to inter-organisational perspective, high strategic interdependence 
contributes to high incidence of interlocking behaviour (Penning, 1981). Penning identified 
three types of interdependence: a) horizontal between competing organisations, b) vertical-
between organisations located in adjacent stages of production and c) symbiotic between 
complementary organisations. Researchers have found contradictory results regarding the 
impact of interlocking directors on corporations. More specifically, Burt (1983) found 
positive effects on company profits but Fligstein and Brantley (1992) found a negative 
effect. 
2.9.6 Leadership Structure or CEO Duality 
 
 An important parameter of corporate governance is the existence of CEO duality. CEO 
duality occurs when the same person holds both the CEO and Chairperson’s positions in a 
corporation (Rechner and Dalton, 1991). The CEO is a full–time position and has 
responsibility for the day-to-day running of the office as well as setting, and implementing 
corporate strategy and mainly, the performance of the company. Whereareas, the position 
of the Chairman is usually a part-time position and the main duties are to ensure the 
effectiveness of the board and the evaluation of the performance of the executives (Weir 
and Laing, 2001).  In serving simultaneously as CEO and Chairperson, a CEO is likely 
have greater stature and influence among board members (Harrison, Torres and Kukalis, 
1988) thus hampering the board’s independent monitoring capacity (Beatty and Zajac, 
1994).  
 
Agency theorists assume that Boards of Directors strive to protect shareholders’ interest 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983) and thus suggest a negative relationship between CEO duality 
and firm performance (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Rechner and Dalton, 1989; 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Therefore, they support the idea that the separation of the 
jobs/roles of CEO and Chairperson will improve organisational performance, because 
Boards of Directors can better monitor the CEO (Harris and Helfat, 1998). The dual 
structure continues to be criticised. “These are those who argue that this dual role 
represents a prima facie case of conflict of interests. Given that one of the board’s prime 
characters is to monitor the performance of management, there is some question as to 
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whether a CEO/Chairperson can exercise the necessary independence of judgment for 
such-evaluation” (Rechner and Dalton, 1989, p. 141). 
 
The separation of the functions of the CEO and the Chairman has been commonly 
suggested by practitioners and shareholder rights activists as an important condition for 
avoiding the conflict of interest between the corporate constituencies and the management 
as well as for improving the board governance (e.g., OECD, 2004; Monks and Minow, 
2001; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Berg and Smith (1978) reported a negative 
relationship between duality and ROI and no correlation between ROE or stock price and 
firm’s performance. A complementary study of the same firms found that CEO duality is 
negatively related to ROE, ROI and profit margin (Rechner and Dalton, 1991).  
 
In contrast to agency theory, the leadership perspective suggests that firms will perform 
better if one person holds both titles, because the executive will have more power to make 
critical decisions (Harris and Helfat, 1998).  Furthermore, steward theorists argue that if 
one person holds both positions, the performance might be improved, as any internal and 
external ambiguity regarding responsibility for organisational outcomes is being 
minimized (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Donaldson, 1990). It also proposes that CEO 
duality would facilitate effective action by the CEO and consequently improves the 
organisational performance under specific circumstances (Boyd, 1995). Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) argued that a single leader can respond to external events and facilitate the 
decision- making process. Harrison, Torres and Kukalis (1988) suggested that CEO duality 
facilitates the replacement of CEO in poorly performing companies. Additional, Worrell et 
al., (1997) and Dahya et. al. (1996) reported that the consolidation of CEO and chair 
positions is positively related to shareholders’ return.  
 
The agency problem theory predicts that firms with a unitary leadership structure should 
engage in more of this type of opportunistic behavior. However, a unitary leadership 
allows a better flow of information to the board of directors. The board functions properly 
when it receives accurate information about the operations of the firm. Accurate 
information is supplied when there is a combined leadership structure and the CEO has a 
detailed knowledge about the operations of the firm. The CEO/Chair can then bring to the 
board's attention the issues and information that directors need to consider. In addition, 
decisions can be easily taken mainly during emerging situations. Having someone else 
serve as Chair would result in a reduced flow of information to the board and compromise 
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board decision making. This theory implies that the monitoring problems created by 
allowing one person to be both Chair and CEO are relatively small in comparison to the 
benefits of enhanced information flow to the board.  
 
Support for the independent structure is by no means universal. The dual structure has been 
strongly suggests as well. The reason that positions of chairman and CEO are usually 
combined is that this provides a single focal point for company leadership. There is never 
any question about who is boss or who is responsible. This is an important issue 
…(otherwise)…this is guaranteed to produce chaos both within the organisation and in 
relationships with the board (Andersen and Anthony, 1986, p. 54). 
 
The approaches that have been developed with respect to CEO duality have concluded to 
inconsistent results and there is no clear direction and magnitude of CEO duality–board 
vigilance and firm performance (Daily and Dalton, 1992, 1993; Dalton et. al., 1998; 
Rechner and Dalton, 1989). 
 
2.10 Board Demographic Characteristics 
Organisational demography is conceptualised as the distribution of organisational members 
along any demographic traits or any set of demographic traits (Pfeffer, 1983). Pfeffer 
(1983, p. 348) argued that “demography is an important, causal variable that affects a 
number of intervening variables and processes and, though them, a number of 
organisational outcomes.” Upper echelon theory suggests that the demographic 
characteristics of managers bring a cognitive base and values to the decision-making 
process that restricts their field of vision. 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) contended that a manager’s personal experiences and values 
can be inferred from observable demographic characteristics and be linked with top 
management team attributes. 
Executives’ demographic characteristics, strategic choices, and firm performance have 
been unified on the upper echelons theory advanced by Hambrick and Mason (1984). It 
draws upon literatures in organisational behaviour and strategic management to posit that 
executives’ observable experiences determine their orientation and that strategic choice “to 
some extent …reflect the idiosyncrasies of decision makers” (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
Demography refers to “the composition, in terms of basic attributes such as age, sex, 
educational level, length of service or residence, race, and so forth of the social entity 
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under study” (Pfeffer, 1983, p. 303). Relevant research has covered issues regarding the 
way that executives’ demographic characteristics such as age, educational background, 
functional background, industry, organisational and position/job tenure affect 
organisational performance and effectiveness. 
2.10.1 Age is considered as an indicator of experience and a signal of a person’s propensity 
for risk-taking and change (e.g. Guthrie and Datta, 1997; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). An 
individual’s age is expected to influence perceptions and choices of individual (Wiersema 
and Bantel, 1992); as age increases, flexibility and resistance to change decrease. Younger 
managers may pursue risky strategies (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Age is associated with 
corporate growth and innovation strategies (Child, 1974), total work experience, 
organisational tenure and industry tenure (Tyler and Steensma, 1998). Studies conducted 
by Child (1974) and Noburn and Birley (1988) indicate that younger managers achieve 
superior performance. In addition, they are expected to be better educated and to have 
more current technical knowledge (Bantel and Jackson, 1989).  
 
In contrast, older managers consider financial and career security very important, thus they 
might avoid risky action that could change the strategic direction of the firm (Vroom and 
Pahl, 1971). Older executives tend to be more conservative and they have experienced 
difficulty in adopting new ideas (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  Age is associated with the 
capacity for information processing and analysis, therefore, older managers have less 
information processing ability compared to younger ones due to their physical and mental 
stamina (Child, 1974). Empirical findings have shown that old executives pursue lower-
growth strategies (Child, 1974). Older executives tend to have less confidence in their 
decisions and therefore they may lack the conviction necessary to provide leadership for 
strategic change (Taylor, 1975). In a study of 500 top executives conducted by 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990), it was found that mature executives proved to be risk 
averse and resistant to change. In addition, Guthrie et al. (1991) claimed that companies 
that have changed their strategies, they have young top executives.  
 
2.10.2 Educational level is viewed as an indicator of executives’ knowledge, cognitive 
orientation and skill base (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Studies conducted by Hitt and Tyler 
(1991) and Wally and Baum (1994) have shown that educated managers have grater 
cognitive complexity and ability to adopt new ideas and to accept innovations. Researchers 
have equated a high level of education with greater capacity for information processing and 
receptivity to innovation (e.g., Guthrie et al., 1991; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Highly 
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educated managers are more likely to promote innovation and risk taking decisions (Hitt and 
Tyler, 1991; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981). Executives 
with high educational background are expected to develop problem-solving skills when 
complex problems arise (Hitt and Tyler, 1991; Goll et al., 2001). Furthermore, TMT 
members with high educational background, particularly open-mindedness, information-
processing capabilities, flexibility could be advantageous for firms seeking international 
diversification (Herrmann and Datta, 2005). Finally, the level of education has been 
associated with firm performance (Noburn and Birley, 1988) and change in corporate 
strategy (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). 
Not only the level of education but also the type of education is equally important. 
Educational specialisation reflects an individual’s cognitive style and personality (Holland, 
1973). Hitt and Tyler (1991) argued that the types of educational specialty influence the 
strategic decision-making process and strategic change. Executives with formal education 
training in sciences and engineering are likely to understand the technological base of the 
company and to be more favourable to cooperative opportunities. Heilmeier (1993) 
suggested that technically trained executives are aware of relevant technologies and are 
able to predict, comprehend and anticipate long-term change.  In contrast, executives with 
only a formal management education are more likely to pursue short-term performance 
goals at the expense of innovation and long-term asset building compared to executives 
with other educational backgrounds (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Focusing on business 
education and more specifically on MBA programmes, students are risk-averse and 
resistant to innovation (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). However, executives with 
technical education in science and engineering have a complete understanding in 
technology and innovation and are likely to focus more on opportunities rather than on 
threats (Tyler & Steensma, 1998). In general education and in particular professional 
management education focuses more on application of analytical techniques rather than 
risk-prone idiosyncratic judgements of “self-made” executives (Goll and Rasheed, 2005, 
p.1005). 
2.10.3 Functional Background represents an important aspect of an individual’s experience 
base and as a result a key indicator of the type of skills and cognition that the executive 
brings to his/her job (Rajagopalan and Datta, 1996). Dearborn and Simon (1958) 
concluded that managers with different functional backgrounds differ in their attitudes, 
knowledge and perspectives and therefore, different strategic choices. Functional 
background is a lens through which business situations are viewed (Guthrie and Datta, 
1997). Functional backgrounds indicate the way in which problems are defined (Dearborn 
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and Simon, 1958), how information is processed (Walsh, 1988) and how strategic choices 
are made (Hitt and Ireland, 1985). 
Empirical studies have identified systematic relationships between managers’ functional 
experience and firm’s strategy. Thomas et al., (1991) have found strong associations 
between CEO functional experience and strategic orientation. In addition, Smith and White 
(1987) observed significant relationships between new CEOs functional background and 
firm’s diversification strategies.  
Hambrick and Mason (1984) have distinguished functional background into two broad 
categories the “output” functions and the “throughput” functions. The “output” functions 
include functional areas relating to marketing, sales, merchandising as well as product 
research and development (R&D) and entrepreneurship, which emphasise on growth, 
search for new opportunities and are responsible for monitoring and adjusting products. On 
the other hand, “throughput functions” include areas of productions/operations, 
engineering finance and accounting, which aim to the increase of efficiency in the 
transformation process. This classification provides a linkage between functional 
background and organisational decision-making. 
The organisation’s strategy partly determines the types of functional background that are 
essential for the firm’s success (Hitt, Ireland and Palia, 1982).  For instance, executives 
with backgrounds in R&D are associated with progress, invention and improvement 
(Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) as well as with differentiation and low-cost strategy 
(Govindarajan, 1989). On the other hand, throughput backgrounds are important in 
industries which are characterized by high capital intensity or concentration and lower 
growth (Rajagopalan and Datta, 1996). Additionally, managers with an output background 
have greater ambiguity and less control compared to those that with throughtput 
background, whose skills and knowledge are more suitable for foreign orientations 
(Herrmann and Datta, 2002). 
2.10.4 Executive Tenure has been conceived in various ways: tenure in the position (e.g., 
Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Miller, 1991); tenure in the organisation (e.g., Thomas et 
al., 1991); and tenure in the industry (Hambrick, Geletkanycz and Fredrickson, 1993).  
2.10.4.1 Industry Tenure refers to the number of years that the executive has worked for 
the particular industry/sector. Noburn and Birley (1988) indicate that the number of 
companies an executive has worked for is positively related to growth and financial 
performance of the company. 
 
60 
 
2.10.4.2 Organisational Tenure is defined as the number of years an individual has worked 
for the organisation (Iaquinto and Fredrickson, 1997). Miller (1991) pointed out that those 
organizations with long-tenured CEOs were less likely to have strategies and structures in 
order to respond to environmental requirements. Board members have acquired a high-
level of firm-specific knowledge and skills (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). The familiarity 
that exists among the members leads to higher levels of cohesiveness and to better use of 
knowledge and skills. Long tenured executives have been associated with increased 
understanding of organisational policies and procedures (Kanter, 1977); greater 
commitment to status quo (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Hambrick et al., 1993; Michael and 
Hambrick, 1992) and to organisational values (Stevens, Beyer and Trice, 1978). 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990, p. 488) put it “…(executives) with short tenures have 
fresh, diverse information and are willing to take risks… As tenure increases, perceptions 
become very restricted and risk taking is avoided”. Consequently, long tenured CEOs are 
hesitant to change the strategic direction of the firm (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) and to 
adopt innovative strategies (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). However, Noburn and 
Birley (1988) found a positive association between executive’s tenure and company 
performance (growth and profitability) in stable industries but negative association in 
turbulent industries. Thomas et al. (1991) found that longer executive firm tenure is related 
with “defender” rather “prospector” strategies. The length of organisational tenure has 
impact on the firm’s sales growth.  
 
2.10.4.3 Position Tenure demonstrates the length of time a person has served the company 
from the current position (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). Executives with long position 
tenure are familiar with decision process, task knowledge, expertise and experience along 
with increased power within an organisation (Herrmann and Datta, 2002). Furthermore, 
increased position tenure is associated with adoption of risky strategies (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996) and greater autonomy (Miller, 1991). The average company tenure of an 
executive has been associated with cohesion (Korac-Kakabadse et al., 1998), socialization, 
shared experiences and a common vocabulary (Katz, 1982).  
Hambrick and Mason (1984, p. 200) stated: “executives who have spent their entire 
careers in one organisation can be assumed to have relatively limited perspectives. In 
extreme cases where the entire top management team has risen solely through the 
organisation, it is likely that it will have a very restricted knowledge base from which to 
conduct its limited search”. 
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Tenure has been associated with commitment to established policies and practices and the 
development of routines for dealing with information (Katz, 1982). Scholars have 
attempted to examine the relationship between tenure and strategies and they concluded 
that long tenured executives reduce strategic change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) and 
increases strategic persistence (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). However, long tenured 
managers are associated with internally focused rather than externally focused changes 
(Chaganti and Sambharya, 1987). Long tenured managers tend to be committed, use 
limited amount of sources of information and exhibit a moderately low task interest 
(Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). Miller (1991) concluded that it is less likely for long 
tenured executives to produce strategies and structures according to environmental 
circumstances.  
 
2.10.4.4 Female Representation 
 
Recent corporate reforms encourage the participation of women in the boardrooms. 
Williams (1988, p. 129) stated that “women are advancing through the corporation on 
schedule… Most female managers are still too young and training to have reached the 
upper echelons, but they are maturing into candidates for the senior jobs of the next two 
decades”. Bilimoria (1995) argued that women executives bring fresh and well-informed 
news related to market, environment and ethical issues and have an impact on the decision-
making process. Furthermore, Fondas and Sassalos (2000) indicated that boards with more 
than one female director have a greater influence over strategic decisions because they 
provide a broader perspective and different voice. Apart from broader perspectives, women 
have a more civilised behaviour and sensitivity to various opinions and have a more 
transformational and interactive management style (Rosener, 1990). Female directors have 
non-business related backgrounds (Ruigrok, Peck and Tacheva, 2005) and they are dealing 
mainly with soft managerial positions such as human resources, corporate social 
responsibility, marketing (Zelekowsi and Bilimoria, 2005). Women are more effective in 
performing qualitative control functions rather than effective financial monitoring 
(Tacheva and Huse, 2006).  
Singh et al. (2001) concluded that executive female directors are appointed in firms with 
high turnover. However, Rose (2007) reported no effect of female directors on Danish 
firm’s financial performance.  
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2.11Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making 
Boards of Directors play a critical role in shaping the strategy of the firm.  Board strategic 
involvement is regarded as the major responsibility of the board (Andrews, 1981; 
Baysigner and Hoskisson, 1990; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Golden and Zajac, 2001; 
Huse, 2007). Board strategic involvement is a complex and multidimensional concept that 
cannot be explained by a single theoretical approach (Ravasi and Zattoni, 2006). Zahra and 
Pearce (1990, p. 165) stated that: “board strategic involvement refers to the level of 
attention given by director to the various areas of strategic process. Therefore board 
strategic involvement covers corporate mission development, strategy conception and 
formulation, and strategy implementation”.  
 
Agency theory as Zahra and Pearce, (1989, p. 302) state: “places a premium on a board’s 
strategic contribution, specifically the board’s involvement in and contribution to the 
articulation of the firm’s mission, the development of firm’s strategy and setting of 
guidelines for implementation and effective control of the chosen strategy”. In research on 
Boards of Directors, the strategic role of the board has largely ignored the emergent nature 
of strategy and its implications for board involvement. Demb and Neubauer (1992) briefly 
mentioned the issue and asserted that the more an organisation is characterized by an 
emergent strategy-development process, the less likely it is that the board will be involved; 
the more fluid and fragmented the decision-making process, the less chance there is for 
non-executive directors to intervene or to submit their opinion (Demb and Neubauer, 
1992). Ruigrok et al. (2006, p. 1205) narrowed down the concept of board involvement and 
claimed that: “evaluation and proposals of different alternatives and consider different 
options”. Board involvement describes the overall level of participation of board members 
in making decisions that affect the long-term performance of the organisation (Judge and 
Zeithaml, 1992, p. 771).  
 
A common distinction of board involvement is based on the largely accepted view of 
specific strategy decisions as being composed of a formation phase and an evaluation 
phase (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). In both formation and evaluation, there are levels of 
involvement, which can be represented as continuum (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; 
Pettigrew and McNulty, 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). In formulation, the board’s 
involvement has been claimed to range from working with management to developing 
strategic direction in order to ratify management proposals (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992).  
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In evaluation, boards can be classified as to whether they probe management’s evaluations 
of resource allocations or whether they simply accept the evaluation top management 
provides (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). Firstly, Mace (1971) 
examined the boards as a baseline of strategic involvement in service-related activities. 
Tashakori and Boulton (1983) found that board involvement has increased in all stages of 
strategic planning process. The section below presents some influential factors on board 
involvement in strategic decision-making process. 
 
2.11.1 Insider versus Outsider Representation: Insiders are characterised as board 
members who are current or former employees of a firm (Cochran, Wood and Jones, 
1985). Inside directors provide valuable insights and information to the board and 
therefore, they allow board to be more involved in the strategic decision process 
(Baysigner and Hoskisson, 1990). Ford (1988) found that insider representation is 
positively associated with board involvement in the strategic decision process. Tashakori 
and Boulton (1983) concluded that a higher proportion of insiders were associated with 
greater board participation in the strategic planning process.  Inside directors with industry 
and company experience actively participate in strategic decisions (Goodstein and Boeker, 
1991; Johnson et al., 1993; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). 
 
From the agency theory perspective, outsiders are aligned with shareholders interests 
because they focus more on performance (Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt, 1993). Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1988) found that poorly performing companies replace insiders with 
outsiders because outsiders play an important role in board involvement in strategic actions 
mainly restructuring of the firms. However, outsiders have limited time to spend in 
company, so they lack knowledge and expertise regarding the strategic process of several 
decisions. Outsiders bring knowledge and expertise to the organisation and they contribute 
to the organisational performance of small and entrepreneurial organisations (Daily and 
Dalton, 1993; Daily and Dalton, 1992). The unclear previous findings lead to formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3a: Inside representation is positively related to board involvement in the strategic 
decision-making process 
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2.11.2 Board Size and Board Involvement:  Resource dependency theories argue that the 
larger the board the higher the expertise and the knowledge they bring (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Board size was found to be positively related to the company’s size, 
diversification, internationalisation (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Sanders and Carpenter, 
1998). The above arguments indicate that the boards contribute significantly to board 
strategy. However, other scholars have reported a negative impact of large board on 
involvement. Large boards are not able to conduct effective discussions and are ineffective 
in making strategic decisions in a timely fashion (Herman, 1981). Large boards might have 
a diversity of perspectives which may cause conflict problems (Amason and Sapienza, 
1997). Therefore, large boards might be less cohesive and they may prevent effective 
participation by board members in strategic decision (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Mueller 
and Baker, 1997).  Finally, Judge and Zeithaml (1992) concluded that board involvement 
in the strategic decision process was positively related to financial performance. Strategic 
board involvement required active and cohesive boards that meet up regularly and discuss 
strategic opportunities (Ruigrok et al., 2006). The effect of board size on strategic 
involvement has led to mixed conclusions. Therefore, the researcher developed the 
following hypothesis to examine how the board size affects the board participation on 
strategic decisions of Greek firms. This lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
H3b: Board size is negatively related to board involvement in the strategic decision-
making process 
 
2.11.3 Frequency of Board Meetings: The number of board meetings reflects the frequency 
of information exchanged. It is quite essential for the directors to meet each others, to 
discuss main issues of the organisation and to accomplish their legal duties and 
responsibilities (Pugliese and Wenstøp, 2007). The frequency of board meetings has been 
considered as a measurement of board effectiveness and of evaluation of board’s 
performance (Rutherford and Buchholtz, 2007). The board as decision-making apex has to 
understand firm-specific information and to use the relevant knowledge in order to make 
intelligent and coherent business plans to survive. Therefore, it is assumed that the higher 
the frequency of board meetings, the higher the board strategic involvement will be 
(Pugliese, 2006). Hence, the following hypothesis states: 
 
H3c: The higher the frequency of board meetings, the higher the board’s strategic 
involvement will be 
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2.11.4 Length of Board Meetings: The length of board meetings represents the general 
duration of information exchange. The agenda of board meetings includes topics such as 
strategy formulation which requires enough time (Stiles, 2001). Long meetings imply the 
board’s role in evaluating the strategic alternatives and provide more accurate information 
regarding strategic choices (Pugliese, 2006). Additionally, board meetings last longer 
because the directors need time to utilise comprehensive understanding and to develop a 
safer procedure prior to any strategic decision (Pugliese and Wenstøp, 2007). Formally, the 
following hypothesis states:  
 
H3d: The longer the board meetings, the higher the board’s strategic involvement will be.  
 
2.11.5 Environmental Conditions: According to resource dependency perspective, boards 
are selected because they are able to manage interorganisational dependencies. In case of 
environmental uncertainty, board is required to be more actively involved in strategic 
decision-making. These board members have the appropriate expertise and they can help 
the Top Management (Filkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Several scholars have argued that 
the strategic role of board members is critical during periods of environmental uncertainty 
(Boulton, 1978; Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker, 1994). During environmental uncertainty, 
board members have greater ambiguity and therefore, they are less effective and able to 
have organisational impact (Olson, 1982). Organisations operating in uncertain 
environments are required to have organisational flexibility and high levels of participation 
in the strategic decision-making (Ashmos, Duchon and McDaniel, 1998). Therefore, 
companies operating in uncertain environments require a greater board involvement in 
strategic decisions. Board involvement in strategic decision-making process is even more 
urgent in certain environmental circumstances. When, Boards of Directors face great 
environmental uncertainty they are required to be more actively involved in strategic 
decision-making. Therefore, it is possible to state that: 
 
H3e: The more uncertain the environment, the more involved the board will be in the 
strategic decision-making process 
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2.12 Organisation Strategy 
 The word strategy is derived from the Greek strategos, which means the “the art of the 
general” (Hart, 1967). The notion of strategy as a normative approach was introduced by 
the Harvard Business School and strategy was described as a situational art and as an 
imaginative act of integrating numerous complex decisions (Learned, Christensen, 
Andrews and Guth, 1965). Chandler (1962) viewed strategy as a descriptive concept. In 
Chandler’s view, strategy refers to “determination of the basic long-term goals and 
objectives of the enterprise and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of 
resources necessary for carrying out these goals” (Chandler, 1962). Chandler concluded 
that strategy was the key mechanism for designing a new direction that will have an impact 
on organisational structure and performance. Mintzberg (1979, p. 25) defined strategy as 
“a mediating force between the organisation and its environment: consistent patterns in 
streams of organisational decisions to deal with the environment”. 
 
In addition, Hofer and Schendel (1978, p. 25) defined strategy as “a fundamental pattern of 
present and planned resource deployments and environmental interactions that indicates 
how the organisation will achieve its objectives”. An organisation’s strategy determines 
the extent of alignment between its external environment and its internal structure and 
processes (Galbraith and Nathanson, 1978; Jemison, 1981; Miles and Snow, 1978). This 
alignment can be achieved by using a formal planning process, which has resulted in 
organisation strategy usually being through a consciously integrated “plan” (Andrews, 
1971; Chander, 1962).  
 
2.13 Models of Strategy 
 
 Strategy as a concept has its roots in business policy (e.g. Andrews, 1971; Hofer, 1975) as 
well as in organisational theory (e.g. Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Child, 1972). Strategy is 
regarded as a set of decisions that a) guide the organisation according to the environment, 
b) affect the internal structure and processes and c) consequently, its performance.  
Strategy is the outcome of formal planning; an analytical process, which establishes long-
term objectives, a process usually initiated by Top Management and undertaken by staff 
strategists (Ansoff, 1965; Chandler, 1962). Strategic process includes strategic analysis, 
strategic choice and strategic implementation (Andersen, 2000). Strategic analysis is 
concerned with the strategic position of the organisation in terms of internal and external 
environment in which it operates and the expectations and influences of stakeholders. 
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Strategic choice deals with identifying and understanding stakeholders’ expectations, 
strategic vision and mission, portfolio management and financial capabilities. Finally, 
strategic implementation refers to the translation of strategy into organisational action 
through organisational structure and design, resource planning and the management of 
strategic change (Andersen, 2000).  
 
2.14Strategic Decision Making Process 
 
Dean and Sharfman (1996, pp. 379-380) describe strategic decisions as: “committing 
substantial resources, setting precedents, and creating waves of lesser decisions 
(Mintzberg et al. 1976) as ill-structured, non-routine and complex ( Schwenk, 1988); and 
as substantial, unusual and all pervading ( Hickson et. al. 1986)”. top management team is 
responsible for the strategic decisions, which can be either formal or informal (Penning, 
1985) and they reflect the interaction between an organisation and its environment 
(Ginsberg, 1988). They deal with issues that are essential for the survival of an 
organisation rather than issues, which lend themselves to routine strategic-making (Stahl 
and Grigsby, 1992). Strategic decision-making has received increased attention among 
scholars and business practitioners (Ireland and Miller, 2004). Strategic decision-making 
has been distinguished into two broad categories: content research and process research. 
Content research deals with issues of strategy content such as portfolio management, 
diversification, mergers and the alignment of firm strategies with environmental 
characteristics (Elbanna, 2006, p. 2). However, process research deals with the process by 
which a strategic decision is made and implemented and the factors, which affect it 
(Elbanna, 2006, p. 2). Although most of the studies deal with content issues, equivalent 
attention has to be placed on process research. The two perspectives of strategic decision-
making are not separate but complementary (Rajagopalan et al., 1997). The process of 
strategic decision-making has been at the centre of strategic research for over 30 years.  
 
Various scholars have described the strategic decision-making as a sequence of phases 
(e.g. Fredrickson, 1984; Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret, 1976; Hart, 1992), a set of 
different characteristics/dimensions (e.g. Hart, 1992; Hickson, Wilson, Cray and Mallory 
and Butler, 1986; Stein, 1980; Dean and Sharfman, 1996; Papadakis et al., 1998; Wally 
and Baum, 1997) and the effects of these dimensions on organisational outcomes (e.g. 
Dean and   Sharfman, 1996; Goll and Rasheed, 1997; Hough and White, 2003; Papadakis, 
1998). Among these dimensions are comprehensiveness/rationality, politicization, 
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centralization and formalization (Dean and Sharfman, 1996; Lyles and Mitroff, 1980; 
Rajagopalan, Rasheed and Datta, 1993). The aforementioned strategic decisions 
dimensions are presented and described below: 
 
• Comprehensiveness/rationality dimension has been defined as the “extent to which 
an organisation is exhaustive or inclusive in making and integrating strategic 
decisions (Fredrickson, 1984, p. 447). Rationality has been examined under the 
light of the following different dimensions: complexity of methodology (Langley, 
1990), degree of enquiry (Lyles, 1987) and scrutiny (Cray et. al., 1988).  
• Centralisation (Cray et al., 1988; Lyles, 1987; Miller, 1987) 
• Formalisation / Standardisation of the process (e.g. Mallory et al., 1983; Stein, 
1980) 
• Political/Problem-Solving dissension dimension: has been analysed by (Lyles, 
1987; Hickson, Wilson, Cray and Mallory and Butler, 1986; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1974), as negotiation/bargaining (Hickson, Wilson, Cray and Mallory and Butler, 
1986; Cray et al., 1988), individual versus group dynamics (Stein, 1980), power 
(Narayanan and Fahey, 1982) and consensus/dissension (Lyles, 1987). 
 
Other factors that have been mentioned are: dynamic factors (Cray et al., 1988; Mintzberg 
et al., 1976), forcing (Bryson and Bromiley, 1993), duration (Hickson et al., 1986) and 
lateral communication (Papadakis and Barwise, 2002). Papadakis and Barwise (1997) 
highlighted the problem of identifying the influential factors of the strategic decision-
making process. Hitt and Tyler (1991) argued that a combination of different dimensions 
on the strategic decision-making process will contribute to a better understanding of the 
factors that influence the strategic decision-making process. Brouthers et al. (2000) 
examined two perspectives of the strategic decision-making process: environmental 
determinism and strategic choice perspective.  
 
2.14.1 The Environmental Determinism Perspective 
 
According to environmental determinism, strategic decisions and processes show 
adaptation to opportunities, threats, constraints, and other environmental characteristics. 
Several scholars (e.g. Starbuck, 1976) have argued that the environmental characteristics 
have an impact on the strategic decision-making process. Several scholars contented that 
environmental characteristics exert a significant influence on the rationality of the strategic 
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decision-making process (e.g. Agor, 1989; Bresser and Bishop, 1983; Cyert and March, 
1963). Environmental dynamism is associated with greater level of rationality in the 
planning process at high performing firms (Miller and Friesen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989b). 
Fredrickson (1985) assumed that decisions that occur during environmental threats will be 
more rational compared to those that are taken in environmental opportunities. Fredrickson 
and Iaquinto (1989) concluded that companies operating in stable environments have 
rational-comprehensive strategic processes. Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) argued that 
firms operating in high velocity environments have to follow a rational decision-making 
process. Empirical findings have shown that firms operating in low munificent 
environments follow comprehensive decision processes (Khandwalla, 1973; Miller and 
Friesen, 1983). Kukalls (1991) stated that the greater the environmental complexity, the 
greater the level of planning extensiveness.  
 
Concerning environmental dynamism, executives operating in dynamic environments are 
more likely to pursue rational planning process (e.g. Miller and Friesen, 1983; Glick et al., 
1993). Although environments can be conceptualized in many ways, environmental 
munificence is considered an important attributable for strategic behaviour 
(Castrogiovanni, 1991). So far, there has been limited research on the impact of 
environmental hostility/munificence to the rationality of strategic decision-making process 
(Goll and Rasheed, 2005; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). Thus, although association between 
environmental characteristics and the strategic decision-making process is not clear, 
“external environment has been recognized as an important variable in explaining many 
organisational phenomena” (Jones et al., 1992, p. 222). 
 
2.14.2 Strategic or Management Choice Perspective 
  
Strategic choice perspective focuses on the role and attributes of decision makers. It 
reflects the idiosyncrasies of decision-makers (Child, 1972; Cyert and March, 1963). The 
existing literature examines the relationship between Top Management and corporate 
strategies (Miller and Toulouse, 1986; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990) as well as 
performance (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993). However, there is no empirical work that 
examines the relationship between Top Management characteristics and strategic-decision 
making processes (Bantel, 1993, Smith et al., 1994). Hitt and Tyler (1991) found the 
CEO’s demographic characteristics to have an impact on the strategic decision-making 
processes. In a sample of Greek manufacturing firms, Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers 
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(1998) found that education level is positively associated with financial reporting. 
Education level shows the degree of people’s information analysis (Dollinger, 1984). 
Educated CEOs are likely to demand detailed information and extensive financial reporting 
(Bantel, 1993). The empirical findings of Papadakis and Barwise (2002) indicate that CEO 
characteristics (position tenure and education) as well as TMT characteristics (education 
and competitive aggressiveness) are related to the degree of hierarchical decentralization. 
More specifically, TMTs characteristics relate more to comprehensiveness/rationality and 
even more to lateral communication. The most influential CEO characteristic is its tenure, 
which is positively related to hierarchical decentralization (Papadakis and Barwise, 2002). 
 
Finally, in a study conducted by Goll and Rasheed (2005), they found a significant and 
positive relationship between tenure and educational level and rational decision-making. 
The relationship between managerial characteristics and the strategic decision-making 
process has led to mixed findings. Lyles and Mitroff (1980, p. 117) argued that: “It is still 
not clear the influence of managerial characteristics on the organisational problem-
formulation process. The results of the study indicate that the problem formulation process 
is at an organisational rather than individual managers might not have a strong influence 
on the process…”. Many researchers argue that managers’ characteristics do not play a 
dominant role in strategic decision-making (Lieberson and O’Connor, 1972; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977). Stein (1980, p. 332) claimed that “leadership does not constitute a 
meaningful contextual domain influencing strategic procedures”.  
 
The existing literature examines the relationship between Top Management and corporate 
strategies (Miller and Toulouse, 1986; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990) as well as 
performance (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993). However, there is no empirical work that 
examines the relationship between top management characteristics and strategic-decision 
making process (Bantel, 1993, Smith et al., 1994). As Rajagopalan et al., 1993, p. 364) 
point out “research relating organisational factors such top management team (TMT) 
characteristics to strategic decision making processes is limited”.  Therefore, the influence 
of Boards of Directors on the strategic decision-making process remains unclear. In 
addition, Papadakis and Barwise (1997) pointed out the problem of identifying key 
influences on the strategic decision-making process. Therefore, Hitt and Tyler (1991) 
identified and examined rational-normative perspective, the external control perspective 
and the strategic choice perspective as influential factors of strategic decision-making 
process which received great empirical support. Furthermore, Brouthers et al. (2000) 
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examined the environmental determinism and the strategic choices as influences of the 
strategic decision-making process.  However, it is worth mentioning that very few studies 
have adopted multiple perspectives of the strategic decision-making process (Child et al., 
2003).  
 
Hitt and Tyler (1991) found the CEO’s demographic characteristics have an impact on the 
strategic decision- making processes. In a sample of Greek manufacturing firms, Papadakis 
et al. (1998) found that education level is positively associated with financial reporting. 
Educated CEOs are likely to demand detailed information and extensive financial reporting 
(Bantel, 1993). The empirical findings of Papadakis and Barwise (2002) indicate that 
CEOs’ characteristics (position tenure and education) as well as TMTs’ characteristics 
(education and competitive aggressiveness) are related to the degree of hierarchical 
decentralization. More specifically, TMT characteristics relate more to comprehensive 
/rationality and even more to lateral communication. The most influential CEO’s 
characteristic is its tenure, which is positively related to hierarchical decentralization 
(Papadakis and Barwise, 2002). Finally, in a study conducted by Goll and Rasheed (2005), 
a significant and positive relationship between tenure and educational level and rational 
decision-making was found. The relationship between managerial characteristics and 
strategic decision-making process has led to mixed findings. Lyles and Mitroff (1980) 
argued that the influence of executives’ characteristics on organisation problem-
formulation process is still not clear.  
 
Several scholars (e.g. Starbuck, 1976) have argued that the environmental characteristics 
have an impact on the strategic decision-making process. Environmental dynamism is 
associated with greater level of rationality in the planning process at high performing firms 
(Miller and Friesen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989b). Fredrickson and Iaquinto (1989) concluded 
that companies operating in stable environments have rational-comprehensive strategic 
processes. Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) argued that firms operating in high velocity 
environments have to follow a rational decision-making process. Empirical findings have 
shown that firms operating in low munificent environments follow comprehensive decision 
processes (Khandwalla, 1973; Miller and Friesen, 1983). So far, there has been a limited 
research on the impact of environmental hostility/munificence to the rationality of strategic 
decision-making process (Goll and Rasheed, 2005; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). Thus, 
evidence on the relationship between environmental characteristics and strategic decision-
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making process resulted is contradictory. Drawing from these research conclusions it is 
possible to articulate grounded hypotheses which states that: 
 
H4a: Educated executives tend to pursue the following strategic decision-making 
processes: financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and lateral 
communication 
H4b: The executives’ educational specialty is associated with the following strategic 
decision-making processes: financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical 
decentralisation and lateral communication 
H4c: The executives’ functional background is associated with the following strategic 
decision-making processes: financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical 
decentralisation and lateral communication 
H4d: Long tenured executives in terms of industry, company and position tenure are 
associated with the following strategic decision-making processes: financial reporting, rule 
formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and lateral communication 
H4e: The various environmental dimensions influence the process of the strategic decision-
making process in terms of financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical 
decentralisation and lateral communication 
 
2.15Strategic Choices 
 
As it has already been mentioned, strategic choice is one of the fundamental elements of 
strategic process. Organisational choice emphasises on the way the meaning of a choice 
alters over time. It pays attention to the strategic effects of timing, through the introduction 
of choices and problems, the time pattern of available energy and the impact of 
organisational structure (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972).  
 
According to the strategic choice perspective (Andrews, 1986; Child, 1972), organisational 
members take actions in order to adapt to an environment as an explanation to 
organisational outcomes. Strategic choice supporters focus on the effect of managers on 
strategic decisions. They argue that individuals take decisions that depend on prior 
processes of human perception and evaluation (Child, 1972). Child (1972) suggested that 
top managers make strategic choices according to the goals, domains, technologies and 
structure of a firm. He examined the exercise of strategic choice as a process in which 
coalitions members evaluate their organisation position, what expectations are presented 
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by resource providers, what are the trends of events in the environment, what is the 
environment current performance, the congeniality of its present internal configuration. 
Recent theorists have examined the relationship between managers’ characteristics and 
perceptions, objective decision criteria and strategic choice (Finkelstein, 1988; Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984).  
 
Schwenk (1989) claimed that individual characteristics affect the heuristic and cognitive 
maps that are used to make strategic decisions and suggested three variable categories of 
individual differences: cognitive style, demographic factors and personality traits. 
 
Some researchers have emphasised the link between managerial characteristics and 
strategic behaviour of the firm. Dess, Lumpkin and Covin (1997) identified three different 
kinds of strategic behavior: adaptive, conservative (simple and participative) and 
entrepreneurial. This typology seems similar to that developed by Miles and Snow (1978). 
Adaptive behaviour shows evidence of entrepreneurial and conservatism behaviours. 
Adaptive firms maintain a relatively stable base of activities while at the same time seeking 
the selective development of attractive products and/or new markets. This is similar to the 
analyser behaviour of Miles and Snow (1978). 
 
Conservative behavior focuses on penetrating existing markets and improving operating 
efficiency. Finally, entrepreneurial behavior is regarded as introduction of products and 
application of new marketing policies. Executives that are in contact with outsiders are 
able to respond to emerging tendencies that bring change to the industry.  
 
In the landmark study, Miles and Snow (1978, p. 263) have reached three fundamental 
dimensions of the strategic choice perspective: “a) strategic choice views managerial or 
strategic choice as the primary link between organisation and environment, b) focuses on 
management’s ability to create, learn about, and manage the organisation’s environment; 
and c) encompasses the multiple ways that organisations respond to environmental 
conditions”. Although there are conflicting viewpoints of various scholars the process of 
the strategic choice includes the following steps: formation or pre-choice, phase of 
strategic activity, evaluation or post-choice phase (Fredrickson, 1983). In general, the 
strategic choice perspective emphasizes nondeterministic explanations of organisational 
processes and outcomes (Bourgeois, 1984).  
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The strategic choice paradigm (Child, 1972) postulates that key decision-makers have 
considerable control over an organisation’s future direction. In the upper echelons 
perspective, Hambrick and Mason (1984) introduce the coalignment between strategy and 
managerial characteristics. It provides a framework, which examines how managers 
influence organisational outcomes. Organisational outcomes such as strategies and 
performance are expected to reflect the characteristics of the leaders. As first developed by 
the Carnegie School (e.g., Cyert and March, 1963), top executives tend to make strategic 
choices under complex situations. The logic of the Carnegie school served as the main 
foundation for Hambrick Mason’s (1984) upper echelons model, which investigate the 
relationship between top executives’ characteristics and organisational outcomes.   
 
Experiences serve to shape values and cognitive models in ways that it might substantially 
affect decision making and behaviour (Hitt and Tyler, 1991). If so, then it is likely to be an 
association between demographic or background factors, reflective of executives’ 
experiences and strategic choices.  
 
Current research has found that the characteristics and experiences of a top management 
team might predict a range of organisational outcomes better than the characteristics of 
CEO alone (e.g. Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Smith et. 
1994). Empirical results have shown that executive team characteristics are significant 
determinants of organisational strategy as well as for firm-level performance outcomes 
(Eisenhardt and Schoohoven, 1990). The strategic choice perspective (Child, 1972) has 
generated a large body of research examining the impact of executives on organisational 
outcomes (e.g. Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984; Miller, Kets de Vries, and Toulouse, 1982). 
The empirical results of many scholars have demonstrated strong associations between the 
characteristics of the executives and strategy/performance (Day and Lord, 1992; Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984; Miller and Toulouse, 1986; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984). Company’s 
strategy can be viewed by a number of dimensions including: product differentiation or 
low cost (Porter, 1980), innovation or reliability (Miles and Snow, 1978), innovation 
timing or focus (Maidique and Patch, 1982), domestic or international activity (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989).  
 
More specifically, Dearborn and Simon (1958) found that the functional background of 
executives is related to interpretation of critical problems in a complex business case. The 
empirical studies of Gupta and Govindarajan (1984) have indicated that experience in 
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marketing and sales were associated with growth strategies rather than harvest strategies. 
Both Kimberly and Evanisko (1981) (studying hospitals) and Bantel and Jackson (1989) 
found that executives’ educational background was associated with innovation. 
 
2.16Innovation 
 
The focus on innovation is driven by a substantial body of empirical and theoretical work 
that highlights its increasingly critical role as a source of sustainable competitive advantage 
due to global competition and technological change (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Fiol, 
1996; Kelly and Storey, 2000; Teece et al., 1997; Porter and Ketels, 2003; Tushman and 
O’Reilly, 2002. The strategic choice perspective introduces the notion of equifinality into 
examinations of firm performance within similar environments which they might effective 
organizational strategies (Doty et al., 1993). Firms may thus establish competitive 
advantage on the basis of different sets of distinctive competencies, which are aggregates 
of specific activities that organisations perform especially well relative to other 
organisations within a similar environment (Selznick, 1957; Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980). 
Empirical work has shown that competitive success is based on the organisation’s 
management of innovation process and factors associated with successful management of 
the innovation process (e.g. Balachandra and Friar, 1997; Rothwell, 1992). 
 
Innovation is defined as the creation or adoption of new ideas (Daft, 1978). At the 
organisational level, innovation is defined as the adoption of new product, production 
service, technology, policy, structure or administrative system (Daft, 1978; Damanpour, 
1991). It is actually an attempt of an organisation to be proactive and risk-taking instead of 
following the competitors (Mintzberg, 1973; Toulouse, 1980). The adoption of innovation 
aims to contribute to the performance and effectiveness of the adopting organisation. 
Innovation is perceived as a way of changing an organisation due to internal or external 
environmental forces (Damanpour, 1991). 
 
Innovation has been divided into administrative and technical. Technical innovation 
includes products, services and production process technology and is related to basic work 
activities and deals either with product or process (Damanpour and Evan, 1984). On the 
contrary, administrative innovation involves organisation structure and administrative 
processes and is directly related to the management (Damanpour and Evan, 1984; 
Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981). 
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Upper echelons perspective argues that organisational outcomes both strategy and 
performance can be considered to reflect the values and cognitive characteristics of top 
managers. Investigators have focused on examining how top management characteristics 
are associated with strategies. An early empirical work held by Hage and Dewar (1973), 
has shown that the executives’ attributes influence the organisation’s degree of innovation.  
Organisational and strategic leadership literature has shown that top managers influence 
organisational capabilities by establishing organisational culture, motivating and enabling 
managers and employees and building capacity for change and innovation (Daft, 2001; 
Elenkov, Judge and Wright, 2005). Top managers affect innovation adoption because they 
can modulate the process of scanning the environment and formulating policy to respond 
to environmental change and to influence major decisions (Damanpour and Schneider, 
2006). 
 
Previous studies have investigated the relationship between CEO characteristics and 
innovation strategies. More specifically, empirical studies suggested that CEO tenure is 
positively related to R&D expenditure and/or innovation (Barker and Mueller, 2002), CEO 
age is negatively related to innovation (Child, 1974; Barker and Mueller, 2002) and inside 
directors encourage innovation (Baysigner, Kosnik and Turk, 1991; Zahra, 1996; 
Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson and Grossman, 2002).  
While studies have recognized that innovation contributes to sustainable competitive 
advantage (Cahill, 1998; Ettlie et al., 1984; Ireland et al., 2001; Knott, 2003; Mone et al., 
1998; O'Brien, 2003), there is surprisingly little work that explores how firms with 
different innovation practices differ (Ettlie et al., 1984).  
Studies have focused on organisational attributes that differentiate more from less 
innovative firms. A number of attributes have been examined including structure, 
managerial characteristics, available resources, administrative intensity, and 
internal/external communication (Damanpour, 1991) although no set of explanatory 
variables has emerged (Wolfe, 1994). This may be because research in this tradition 
typically centers on whether or not organisations innovate (e.g., adoption decisions), rather 
than on how they innovate. Although our work fits within this broad research stream, we 
have adopted a more process-oriented approach by examining specific innovation 
strategies in a holistic manner.  
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2.16.1 Boards of Directors, External Environment and Firm’s Innovation 
 
2.16.1.1 Outside Directors  
Outside directors are not able to update for the operations of the organisation, thus they 
have to access the information about the quality of management’s strategic decisions 
(Tashakori and Boulton, 1985). On the contrary, insiders are well-informed due to their 
position (Baysigner and Hoskisson, 1990). Outside directors that focus on financial 
outcomes may enhance risk aversion among managers, because they have to accept risk for 
financial decisions when board members do not understand complex strategy formulation 
process. A high proportion of outside directors is positively associated with director’s 
strategic involvement, since they contribute to the organisation more due to the knowledge 
that they have from different companies (Zahra et al., 2000). Although inside directors 
have better information, they seem to be reluctant to suggest innovative strategies. Thus, 
Zona et al. (2006) suggested that outside directors have contributed to firm’s innovation. 
The previous discussion suggests the following hypothesis: 
 H5a: Outside directors are positively related to firm’s innovation strategies. 
 
2.16.1.2 Age  
Age is regarded as an indicator of experience and a person’s propensity for risk-taking 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Young managers have an increased risk-taking propensity 
compared to older who prefer financial and career security (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
Older executives typically have less physical and mental stamina (Child, 1974) and less 
information-processing. They are more risk averse and less oriented to innovation strategy.  
Young managers initiate innovative strategies, because, first, they bring better cognitive 
resources to decision-making (Bantel and Jackson, 1989); second, they are more receptive 
to adopting new ideas (Hambrick and Mason, 1984); and third, they are more favourable 
toward risk-taking (Vroom and Pahl, 1971). Empirical findings have shown that as CEO 
age increases, CEOs tend to follow lower-growth strategies (Child, 1974) and reduce the 
R&D spending especially before retirement (Dechow and Sloan, 1991). Zona et al. (2006) 
proposed a negative relationship between age and firm’s innovation. Due to 
inconclusiveness of the available research, the following hypothesis is only tentative: 
 
H5b: Young executives are more likely to pursue innovative practices 
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2.16.1.3 Gender  
Findings on the effect of gender on innovation are inconclusive. Stelter (2002) indicated 
that women adopt a more transformational leadership style compared to male counterparts, 
suggesting that female leaders will positively affect innovation adoption. Male managers 
are more likely to take risks and to initiate innovative strategies. On the contrary, female 
counterparts have a more participative leadership type and are more able to influence the 
implementation of innovation practices (Eagly and Johnson, 1990; Hooijberg and 
DiTomaso, 1996). DiTomaso and Farris (1992) found that female R&D engineers are less 
innovative compared to men. Other scholars (Sonfield et al., 2001; Damanpour and 
Schneider, 2006) could not provide any support between gender and innovation adoption 
or implementation. The above reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
H5c: Gender is unrelated to firm’s innovative practices 
 
2.16.1.4 Tenure 
 Long tenured executives are likely to have restricted perspectives and limited knowledge 
in order to search for alternatives (Cyert and March, 1963). Tenure reflects the manager’s 
ability to gather and process information (Miller, 1991). Over time, executives are not 
likely to establish routine information sources and therefore, they rely on past experience 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996).  
 
Newly appointed mangers are more receptive to innovation, because they bring new ideas 
to their job (Huber and Durfee, 1993). After a while, these managers become more inclined 
to accept the position and they pursue less innovative practices (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984). This can be explained by the fact that tenured managers are committed to the 
organisational status quo (Staw and Ross, 1987) as well to organisational values (Schmidt 
and Posner, 1983). Thus, tenure in position and in organisation inhibits the adoption of 
innovation. Damanpour and Schneider (2006) proposed a negative association between 
tenure in position and in management and innovation adoption (Pfeffer, 1983). Damanpour 
and Schneider (2006) found a positive relationship between tenure in position and the three 
phases of adoption (initiation, decision and implementation). Long-tenured managers are 
knowledgeable about implementation process and have more skills to manage them 
(Mumford, 2000).  The above discussion suggests the following hypothesis 
 
79 
 
H5d: Executives’ tenure (in terms of industry, company and position) is related to firm’s 
innovation practices 
 
2.16.1.5 Educational Background  
Executives’ educational background is regarded as an indicator of the person’s values and 
cognitive preferences mainly with respect to innovation (Daellenbach, McCarthy and 
Schoenecker, 1999). Educated executives are more likely to adopt and use complex and 
diverse approaches for problem solving and decision making (Huber et., 1993). Those 
executives are able to gain information in order to reduce uncertainty and facilitate the 
adoption of innovation (Rogers, 1995). Education is related to receptivity to new ideas, 
which detects innovation need and creates a favourable environment for its implementation 
(Damanpour and Schneider, 2006; Becker, 1970; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Therefore, 
educated managers have the ability to generate solutions and have receptive attitudes 
toward innovation (Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981; Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971). Bantel 
and Jackson (1989) supported similar findings. However, a recent study conducted by 
Damanpour and Schneider (2006) did not support any association. Thus, the following 
hypotheses should be seen as only tentative: 
 
H5e: The level of formal education is positively related to innovation strategies 
H5f: Specific educational specialty favours firm’s innovation strategies. 
 
2.16.1.6 Environmental Dimensions   
According to Morris and Jones (1994), environment refers to technological, economic, 
legal/regulatory, customer, competitive, supplier, distributor and social dimensions. Zahra 
et al. (2000) described the environmental turbulence by the following environmental 
dimensions: dynamism, hostility and complexity of a subsidiary’s local environment. 
Naman and Slevin (1993) found that firms operating in turbulent environments are likely 
to be more innovative, risk-taking and proactive. Dynamic environments are characterised 
by changes in the environment due to technology and market shifts which create new 
opportunities for companies to pursue profitability and growth (Tushman and Anderson, 
1986). In environmental dynamism companies tend to be more innovative and proactive in 
pursuing emerging market opportunities (Covin and Covin, 1990). Organisations in an 
attempt to respond to competition, introduce new products, administrative techniques and 
they adopt a competitive behaviour. Miller and Friesen (1982) argued that the more 
dynamic or hostile the environment is, the greater the need for innovation will be.  
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Hostile environments as described by Khandwalla (1977, p. 335) are “risky, stressful and 
dominating”. Hostility derives from unfavourable changes in the local market through the 
proliferation of rivals (Miller, 1983).  Researchers argue that hostility results in intense 
competition in the industry and destroys any previous structural and competitive 
equilibrium in the industry (e.g. Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Zahra et al., 2000). Companies 
cope with competition by introducing global-scale efficiencies, worldwide learning and 
local responsiveness (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Finally, complexity is a result of 
perceived diversity of the needs of the different customer groups (Miller, 1983; Miller and 
Friesen, 1982). If environmental complex circumstances occur, companies are more 
proactive in their operations and encourage entrepreneurial risk-taking (Zahra, 1991). 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed: 
 
H5g: The various environmental dimensions influence the innovation strategies. 
 
2.17Organisational Performance  
 
Organisational performance is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon in strategic 
management literature (Venkatraman and Ramanujan, 1986). Many scholars have studied 
the board-performance relationship with contradictory findings (Daily, Dalton and 
Cannella, 2003). More specifically, regarding board composition, Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990) found a positive impact of the number of outsiders and firm’s performance. 
However, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Bhagat and Black (1999) and Dalton et. al. 
(1998) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) did not find a robust relationship. The 
inconclusiveness regarding the impact of the board can be explained by the fact that there 
is an emphasis on board structure rather than on the background, experiences and 
competences of board members. Recent research takes into account a range of influential 
factors that might influence the impact of board to the firm’s performance such the roles of 
the board, the impact of board demographic characteristics, the environmental conditions 
and the strategic decision-making process. Few scholars have examined the impact of the 
strategic decision-making process on the firm’s performance (e.g. Bourgeois, 1980; 
Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Dess, 1987; Goll and Rasheed, 1997). In particular, Goll 
and Rasheed (2005) provided support for the association between rationality in the 
strategic decision-making process and organisational performance during munificent 
environments. Outstanding performance can be achieved also with centralised and 
decentralised strategic decisions (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988). Papadakis (1998) 
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suggested a positive relationship between financial reporting and long term organisational 
performance. 
 
Scholars have portrayed the upper echelons’ characteristics as determinants of strategic 
choices and their outcome to organisational performance (Smith et al., 1994; Hambrick, 
Cho and Chen, 1996; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
posited that strategic choices contribute to positive organisational outcomes. Mergers and 
acquisitions is a strategic choice that is expected to enhance firm’s performance. Scholars 
(e.g. Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Vermeulen, 2005) have 
found a positive effect of acquisitions on the firm’s performance. Innovation is another 
strategic choice that is supposed to influence innovation through R&D. Lawless and 
Anderson (1996) reported that innovation is related to firm performance in dynamic 
environments. Therefore, a hypothesis underpinned by this research evidence could 
justifiably state that: 
 
H6: Board involvement, strategic decision-making processes and innovation strategies 
contribute to the firm’s overall performance.  
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2.18 Critical Observations from Literature Review 
The section below will provide a brief review of the literature and will present the findings of the factors that influence strategic decisions. 
Category Empirical Studies Findings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental 
Conditions-Board 
Composition 
Pfeffer &Salancik (1978) Link between interlocking directors and environmental uncertainty.  
Bazerman &Schoorman (1983) 
Pfeffer &Salancik (1978) 
Stearns& Mizruchi (1993) 
Outside directors provide access to resources and info 
Pfeffer (1972) The proportion of outside directors was positively related with 
environmental demands 
Gupta (1988) Complex environments require a more diversified top management team in 
order to monitor the diversity of the environment 
Janis (1972) Complex environments face problem-solving situations and, thus, require 
larger and heterogeneous board 
Boyd (1990) No impact of environmental complexity to board size and number of 
interlocking directorates in high performing firms.  
Keats& Hitt (1988), Bantel &Finkelstein (1995) A direct effect of munificent environment to board size 
Mintzberg &Waters (1985) A strong and unified leadership structure is easier to adapt environmental 
demands 
(Boyd, 1995) Joint leadership structure facilitates decision-making and improves 
organisational performance under specific circumstances 
Daily et al. ( 1999) Yermack (1996) Corporate size is also associated with board size and organisational 
performance 
Pugh et al.  (1969) Hickson et al. (1969),  The association between board size and board structure 
Clifford & Evans (1997),O’Sullivan (2000) 
 Shivdasani &Yermack (1999) 
Larger companies appoint a larger board size and have a greater 
representation of non-executive directors. 
Gertner &Kaplan (1996) Small boards contribute to organisational performance 
Boyd (1990), Goodstein et al., (1994),Alexander et al., (1993) Large boards are associated with higher levels of firm’s performance 
Holthausen &Larcker (1993), Wan & Ong (2005), Rose 
(2005) 
 
No support for hypothesised relationship between board size and 
company’s performance 
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Board Involevement in SDM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Decision-Making Process 
Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003 Board size with level of involvement in the strategic decision-making 
process 
Baysigner &  Hoskisson(1990) 
Goodstein &Boeker (1991) 
Johnson et al. (1993) 
Judge & Zeithaml (1992) 
Inside directors provide valuable insights and information because they 
participate in the strategic decision-making process 
Ruigrok et al. (2006) The proportion of insiders or outsiders respectively directors does not 
affect their involvement in the strategic decision-making process 
Pugliese (2006) The frequency of board meetings alongside with their duration shows an 
active participation of the board in the decision-making phase 
Boulton (1978), Goodstein et al. (1994) The strategic role of board members is critical within periods of 
environmental uncertainty 
Pugliese (2006) The frequency of board meetings alongside with their duration shows an 
active participation of the board in the decision-making phase 
Boulton (1978), Goodstein et al. (1994) The strategic role of board members is critical within periods of 
environmental uncertainty 
Hitt & Tyler (1991) CEO’s demographic characteristics have an impact on the strategic 
decision- making processes 
Papadakis et al. (1998) 
Bantel (1993) 
Education level is positively associated with financial reporting 
Papadakis & Barwise (2002) TMTs’ characteristics (education and competitive aggressiveness) 
are related to the degree of hierarchical decentralization. 
Goll & Rasheed (2005) A significant and positive relationship between tenure and 
educational level and rational decision-making 
Miller & Friesen (1983); Eisenhardt (1989b) Environmental dynamism is associated with greater level of 
rationality in the planning process at high performing firms 
Fredrickson & Iaquito (1989) Companies operating in stable environments have rational-
comprehensive strategic processes. 
Bourgeois&Eisenhardt (1988) Firms operating in high velocity environments have to follow 
rational decision-making process 
Khandwalla (1973) 
Miller and Friesen (1983) 
Firms operating in low munificent environments follow 
comprehensive decision processes 
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Innovation 
Eisenhardt &Schoohoven (1990), Bantel & Jackson 
(1989), Finkelstein & Hambrick (1990), Smith et. 
(1994) 
Gupta & Govindarajan (1984), Sturdivant et al. (1985) 
Executives’ characteristics are significant determinants of 
organisational strategy 
Gupta & Govindarajan (1984) Marketing and sales functional background were associated with 
taking growth strategies than taking harvest strategies. 
Kimberly & Evanisko (1981), Bantel &Jackson (1989) Executive educational background was associated with innovation. 
Bantel &Jackson (1989), Enns, Huff and Golden (2003) Linkage between executives’ demographic characteristics and 
innovation strategy 
Papadakis et al. (1998); Elenkov( 2002) Strategic choices are influenced by top managers and external 
environment 
Tushman & Anderson (1986) Dynamic environments are characterised by changes in the 
environment due to technology and market shifts which create new 
opportunities to companies to pursue profitability and growth 
Covin & Covin (1990) In environmental dynamism companies tend to be more innovative 
Morris & Jones (1994) 
 Zahra (1991) 
In environmental complex circumstances occur, companies are 
more proactive in their operations and encourage entrepreneurial 
risk-taking  
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Organisational 
Performance 
Bourgeois (1980) , Bourgeois & Eisenhardt (1988) 
 Dess (1987) 
Strategic decision-making process influences the firm’s 
performance 
Goll & Rasheed (2005), Fredrickson (1984) 
Fredrickson & Mitchell (1984) 
Association between rationality in the strategic decision-making 
process and organisational performance during munificent 
environments 
Dess & Origen (1987), Pearce, Robins &Robinson (1987), 
Grinyer & Norburn (1977-78) 
Rule formalisation was found to have a positive relationship 
Bourgeois &Eisenhardt ( 1988), Burgelman (1983) 
 Wooldridge & Floyd (1990), Judge & Zeithmal (1992) 
Board involvement in the strategic decision-making process 
enhances organisational performance 
Bertrand  & Schoar (2003)  Certain strategic choices have improved the financial position of 
the firm 
Vermeulen ( 2005) Acquisition activities affect firm’s performance 
Lawless & Anderson (1996) Innovation is related to performance within dynamic 
environments 
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2.19 Integrative Framework of the Study 
 
Critical review of previous strategic management literature yields some key observations 
beyond their existing presentation in previous sections. 
 
First, an integrative model has not been developed that examines the factors that influence 
the strategic decisions. Although there are a numerous studies that have examined the role 
of upper echelons in determining strategy contents, process and performance (Brouthers et 
al. 2000; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Miller and Toulouse, 1986), there is limited 
research, to the best of the author’s knowledge, regarding the influence of the 
characteristics of executives on strategic decision-making processes. Lyles and Mitroff 
(1980, p. 117) posit that “It is still not clear what influence managerial characteristics 
have on the organisational problem-formulation process”. The study aims to investigate 
the key factors that influence the member of the board to improve organisational 
performance.  
 
Second, previous research has based on theoretical reflections about board role 
expectations, but actual board task performance is rarely measured (Gabrielsson and Huse, 
2004). The existing literature on executives focuses on TMTs and mainly examines board-
performance relationship with contradictory findings. Therefore, one of the challenges is to 
clarify the process of strategic decisions and how they affect the financial performance. 
 
Third, most of the studies have focused on the managerial characteristics and their impact 
on strategic decisions. As a result limited research has investigated the impact of 
environmental dimensions on the strategic decision-making process (Goll and Rasheed, 
2005; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). Thus, examining managers respond to the external 
environment and pursue certain strategic decisions according to environmental challenges 
would be an orginal research. 
 
Finally, board research has failed to establish any association between demographic 
characteristics and organisational outcomes (Schwenk and Dalton, 1991; Johnson et al., 
1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Furthermore, current literature has either focused on the 
impact of managerial characteristics on the strategic decision-making process or on the 
strategic choices (e.g., diversification, mergers and acquisitions, capacity). Therefore, it 
will be pioneer to the existing knowledge to open the “black box” within Boards of 
87 
 
Directors’ dynamics and understand the impact of environmental conditions and 
managerial attributes on both the context and the process of strategic decisions. Based on 
the above gaps, the conceptual framework, for this research, is developed as shown in 
Figure 2:2. 
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Board Characteristics 
 Size 
 Inside/Outside Directors 
 Independent/Affiliated Directors 
 Executive/Non Executive Directors 
 Interlocking Directors 
 Leadership Structure 
 Females Directors 
 
 
Demographics Characteristics 
 Age 
 Educational Level & Background 
 Functional Background 
 Industry/Company/Position Tenure 
Figure 2:2 Theoretical Framework of the 
Study 
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In strategic management literature two important topics have been identified, first, the role 
of Top Management (Lewin and Stephens, 1994) and second, the process of making 
strategic decisions (Rajagopalan et al., 1993; Papadakis and Barwise, 1998). Although 
numerous studies have examined the role of upper echelons in determining strategy 
content, process and performance (Brouthers et al. 2000; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; 
Miller and Toulouse, 1986), there is limited research so far on the influence of the 
characteristics of executives on strategic decision-making processes.  
 
The existing literature on executives focuses on TMTs and mainly examines board-
performance relationship with contradictory findings. Hambrick and Mason (1984) have 
introduced the upper echelons perspective in macro-organisational research. They 
suggested that “organisational outcomes-both strategies and effectiveness –are viewed as 
reflections of the values and cognitive bases of powerful actors in the organisation” (1984, 
p. 193) and provided the foundations for further research on an organisation’s dominant 
coalition. Eschewing “some important but complex psychological issues”, Hambrick and 
Mason (1984, p. 193) recommended that “their primary focus is on managerial 
characteristics as indicators of the given that a manager brings to an administrative 
situation.  These observable managerial givens are demographic factors such as age, 
tenure in the organisation, functional background, education, socioeconomic roots and 
financial position”.  
 
This study is actually based on the theoretical framework of Hambrick and Mason (1984), 
but because executives’ cognitions, values and perceptions are hard to be measured, they 
have been omitted from the theoretical framework. The theoretical framework that was 
developed includes not only the upper echelons’ demographic characteristics but also 
composition characteristics. Furthermore, it focuses to a greater extent on adding nuance to 
understanding of the processes by which executives affect organisational outcomes and 
elaborating on Hambrick and Mason’s original model.  
 
In the research model below, additional fundamental issues related to upper echelons have 
been incorporated such as: board structure, involvement in strategic decisions as well as 
the certain characteritics of strategic decision making process and the strategic choice of 
innovation. 
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The limited knowledge on board decisions has stimulated the researcher’s interest to 
examine the factors that affect firm’s strategic decisions. In this study, Boards of Directors 
are considered as a social construction and board members are understood through their 
attributes, working styles, and actual board task performance and the processes inside the 
boardroom. Therefore, for the present study, an integrative theoretical model was 
developed by combining the effects of Boards of Directors on both strategic decision-
making process and strategic choice of innovation.  
 
The study introduces a theoretical framework which combines the strategic decisions from 
both research and process perspectives providing a holistic perspective on the factors that 
influence strategic decisions in Greek listed organisations. The proposed theoretical 
framework aims to cover the existing gaps in the literature and to address the main issue 
regarding the explanatory factors of strategic decisions. Figure 2:2 depicts an integrative 
model by combining factors associated with four perspectives on the strategic decisions: 
(1) environmental dimensions, (2) board structure characteristics, (3) board members’ 
demographic characteristics and (4) financial performance.  
 
The model highlights an array of theoretical constructs proxied by Boards of Directors’ 
attributes and empirically linked to major organisational outcomes. The proposed 
theoretical model is an expansion of the model of Hambrick and Mason (1984) regarding 
upper echelons. Furthermore, the study is applied to Boards of Directors since business 
literature focused on TMTs research supported by contradictory findings and neglected the 
role of the board in strategy formulation and in strategic choices. This study aims to 
examine in depth the phenomenon of Boards of Directors and how they affect the firm’s 
strategy. This research attempts to examine the impact of external environment on board 
composition, on board involvement in strategic-decision making, on strategic-decision 
making process and finally, on innovation. Overall, the study aims to identify the factors 
that affect the strategic decisions of Greek firms. 
 
In this research, theories on Top Management Teams have so far been applied (e.g. agency, 
stewardship, resource dependency and upper echelons theory) to Boards of Directors. The 
empirical work regarding Boards of Directors with these constructs is limited and second, 
they are both considered as the most influential apex of an organisation. The integrative 
theoretical framework is tested in a new cultural context; Greece.  In particular, it is 
applied to Greek executives of listed companies in the Athens Stock Exchange. Corporate 
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governance in Greece is in a primary stage. During the last couple of years they have 
established some legislation regarding corporate governance operations and behaviour of 
Greek corporations as well as the Greek legislations regarding corporate governance. 
Corporate governance practices in Greece as well as the proposed theoretical framework 
have not been examined empirically before.  
 
The preceding chapter reviews a number of issues, which have been extensively tested in 
empirical studies within strategic leadership and upper echelons theory. Empirical studies 
within corporate governance and strategic leadership have been reviewed. The purpose of 
the study as already mentioned is to explain and investigate the phenomenon of Upper 
Echelons, therefore this chapter attempts to synthesise the concept of Boards of Directors 
and presents an integrated model forming a conceptualisation of the factors associated with 
environment, board composition, board’s demographic characteristics, involvement in 
strategic-decision making, the strategic-decision making process and strategic choice and 
their final effect on organisational performance (see Figure 2:2). 
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2.20Research Hypotheses 
Based upon the review of previous literature, the following research hypotheses are 
developed for this study these are aggregated below. 
 
H1a 
 
The more complex the environment, the larger the size of the board and the 
higher the number of interlocking directorates 
H1b The more unstable the environment the larger the size of the board 
H1c The more munificence the environment the larger the size of the board 
H1d Munificent environment is negatively related to both board size and the number 
of interlocking directorates 
H1e Dynamic environments favour the dual leadership structure 
H2a The larger the firm’s size, the larger the board size 
H2b The larger the board size the better the organisational performance 
H2c The larger the board size, the higher the number of executive BOD 
H2d The higher the board size, the higher the number of non-executive BOD 
H3a Board size is negatively related to board involvement in the strategic decision-
making process 
H3b  Inside representation is positively related to board involvement in the strategic 
decision-making process 
H3c The higher the frequency of board meetings, the higher the board’s strategic 
involvement will be 
H3d The longer the board meetings, the higher the board’s strategic involvement will 
be.  
H3e The more uncertain the environment, the more involved the board will be in the 
strategic decision-making process 
H5a Outside directors are positively related to firm’s innovation strategies. 
H5b Young executives are more likely to pursue innovative practices 
H5c Gender is unrelated to firm’s innovative practices 
H5d Executives’ tenure (in terms of industry, company and position) is related to 
firm’s innovation practices 
H5e The amount of formal education is positively related to formal innovation 
strategies 
H5f Specific educational specialty favours firm’s innovation strategies. 
H5g The various environmental dimensions influence the innovation strategies. 
H6 Impact of board involvement, strategic decision-making processes and 
innovation strategies to the firm’s overall performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
2.21 Hypothesised Theoretical Framework 
The hypothesised model for this research will be presented according to the sequence of 
the hypotheses. The phases of the hypothesised model will be presented in the Figures 
below. Due to the complexity of the theoretical framework presented in Figure 2:2, the 
original theoretical framework was divided into sub-figures aiming to depict the 
interrelationships between the constructs and to test the hypothesised relationships. The 
design of separate figures will provide a clear understanding of the proposed hypotheses. 
 
Figure 2:3 illustrates an association between the external environment and the board 
composition. In particular, research hypotheses H1a-H1d suggest that companies operating 
in complex, uncertain and hostile environments require a large board and a high number of 
interlocking directors that will provide the organisation with critical information and 
resources that will facilitate their strategic decisions. Furthermore, hypothesis H1e suggests 
that companies during environmental turbulence adopt a unified leadership structure. 
 
Figure 2:3 Hypothesised Research Model between Environmental Conditions and 
Board Structure 
 
 
 
 H1a-H1e 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:4 depicts the association between the organisational characteritics and the board 
composition characteritics. Hypothesis H2a suggests a positive relationship between 
organisational size and board size. Hypothesis H2b suggests that the board size contributes 
to the organisational performance. In addition, Hypothesis H2c proposes an effect of board 
size to the number of executive and non-executive board members respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental Dimensions 
 Complexity 
 Dynamism 
 Munificence/Hostility 
Board Composition 
 Board Size 
 Number of 
Interlocking Directors 
 Leadership Structure 
94 
 
Figure 2:4 Hypothesised Research Model between Organisational Structure and 
Board Structure 
 
 
 
                                                                                     H2b  
 H2a  
   
 
 H2c-d                                                           H2c-d 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Below the figure 2:5 presents the relationships between the factors that influence board 
involvement in the strategic decision-making process. Hypothesis H3a proposes a negative 
association between board size and the different forms of strategic decision-making 
processes. Hypothesis H3b examines the impact of inside directors to the involvement in 
the strategic decision-making process. Hypotheses H3c and H3d indicate an association 
between the frequency and the duration of the board meetings and their involvement in the 
strategic decision-making process. Finally, Hypothesis H3e suggests an effect of 
environmental munificence towards the board in the several stages of strategic decision 
making processes. 
 
 
Figure 2:5 Hypothesised Research Model of the Factors Affecting Board Involvement 
in Strategic Decision-Making 
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Similarly, Figure 2:6 depicts the factors that play an influencial role in the strategic 
decision-making process. Hypotheses H4a, b, c and d examine the relationships between 
managerial characteristics and strategic decision-making process. Also, Hypothesis H4e 
investigates the effect of the environment on strategic decision-making process. 
 
 
Figure 2:6 Hypothesised Research Model between Board Characteristics, 
Environmental Dimensions and Strategic Decision-Making Process 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The associated factors between board characteristics and innovation strategies are 
presented in the Figure 2:7 suggesting an effect of demographic managerial characteristics 
among them age, gender, tenure, education level and background as well as the number of 
outside directors on innovation strategies. In particular, Hypothesis H5a examines whether 
the proportion of outside or external directors contribute to the innovation practices. 
Hypothesis H5b suggests a relationship between executive’s age and innovation practices. 
Hypothesis H5c states that gender is unrelated to firm’s innovative practices. Hypothesis 
H5d suggests that the number of years that Greek board members have spent in the current 
industry, company or position is associated with innovation practices. Hypotheses H5e and 
H5f advocate a positive relationship between education and innovation strategies. 
Hypothesis H5g investigates how Greek executives pursue innovation strategies within 
various environmental dimensions. 
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Figure 2:7 Hypothesised Research Model between Board Characteristics, 
Environmental Dimensions and Innovation Strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
The last hypothesis presented in Figure 2:8 is developed in order to investigate the 
influential role of key strategic decisions that Boards of Directors pursue towards the 
organisational performance. The concluding hypothesis aims to examine the final outcome 
of board involvement in the strategic decision-making process, the strategic decision-
making processes of financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation as 
well as lateral communication and finally the innovation practices on the organisational 
performance.  
Figure 2:8 Hypothesised Research Model between BOD Involvement, Strategic 
Decision-Making, Innovation and Organisational  
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2.22 Cultural Context: Greece 
 
2.22.1 General Context 
 
The population in Greece exceeds 10 million people. Greece is a developed country, a 
member of the European Union since 1981 and a member of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) of the European Union (EU) since 2001. Greece became the tenth member 
of the European Union on 1 January 1981 and ever since the nation has experienced a 
remarkable and sustained economic growth. Investments in industrial enterprises and 
heavy infrastructure, funds from the European Union and growing revenues from tourism, 
shipping and a fast growing service sector have increased the standards of living to 
unprecedented levels. Greece has a stable democratic political system and a free market 
economy. Greek has been characterised as an advancing economy because it is between 
developed and developing countries with more of their disadvantages than advantages. The 
remuneration of employees is higher compared to third world countries but not compatible 
with those of developed countries however the productivity of employees is lower. The 
majority of Greek firms are small and family owned with limited R&D and market 
spending due to their size. The low R&D spending forces Greek firms towards low value 
added products and services where competition is fierce and profit margins are small and 
where developing countries due to low wages have a considerable advantage. Greece faces 
a great number of government regulations, huge bureaucratic obstacles, and uncooperative 
labour unions particularly in the public sector and with a labour force with high 
expectations. These circumstances prevent Greek companies from taking strategic actions 
and provide them with problems and challenges which are different to those of developed 
or under developed countries (Makridakis et al., 1997). 
 
After World War II, Greece tranformed from an agricultural to an industrial and service –
based economy. It has experienced the "Greek economic miracle" since the GDP growth 
averaged 7% between 1950 and 1973. However, the industrialisation in Greece has fallen 
behind in its rate of economic growth and has been approached by countries like Portugal. 
Greece has been the poorest country in the EU and has implemented of a number of 
structural and fiscal reforms while receiving considerable European Union funding. 
Responsible for this situation are various governments which did not make the appropriate 
choices that contribute to economic wealth and allow Greek firms to adjust to 
environmental challenges in order to become internally competitive (Makridakis et al., 
1997). According to World Competitiveness Scoreboard, the performance of Greek 
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companies has been rated as the 40th out the 45 nations (IMD, 1996). At the same time, the 
Scoreboard rankings revealed that the Greek economy includes some highly competitive 
industries (e.g. merchant shipping) and some extremely well managed firms which achieve 
excellent results (Papadakis et al., 1997) despite the competitive environment in which 
they operate.  
 
 In 2001, Greece joined the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Empirical findings 
show an increase of foreign direct investment over the last thirty years. Greek governments 
have offered investment incentives through capital grants, tax allowances, increased 
depression rates and interest rate subsidies. Before 1992 European drive toward a “single 
market”, a large number of European and some U.S. companies have invested in several 
Greek industries, mainly by acquiring them. For instance, the acquisitioning of Metaxa 
(ouzo and brandy producer) by Grand Metropolitan, of AGET Hercules (cement producer) 
by Calzestruzzi, of Pavlivis (chocolate producer) by Jacobs Suchard and of Misko (pasta 
producer) by Barilla. Currently the service industry is considered as the most vital and 
fastest-growing sector of the Greek economy, followed by industry and agriculture (ICAP, 
2006). In addition, the shipping industry plays a key role in Greek economic activity dating 
back to ancient times. 
 
2.22.2 Cultural Context 
 
Previous research suggests that the management of Greek organisations as an art and 
science is underdeveloped relative to other national partners (EEDE, 1986). From the 
Greek culture of management, it is not easy to classify Greece as a member of any one of 
the clusters of countries suggested (Cummings and Schmidt, 1972; Hofstede, 1980). 
Hofstede (1980) found that Greece was characterised by the highest “uncertainty 
avoidance” index as well as by a masculine culture. He suggested that the need for security 
and status are important for Greeks. Mead (1955) and Triandis, Vassilious and Nassiakou 
(1968) have mentioned that the need for self-esteem is strong in Greeks and that it derives 
from the prominent cultural value known as philotimo (cooperative and self-sacrificing 
behaviour). The majority of empirical studies have been carried out in Greece a few 
decades ago, in a period of low levels of industrialisation, growth rate and level of 
disposable income. In addition, during this period Greece was experiencing high levels of 
unemployment, immigration and low educational level among employees, managers and 
entrepreneurs. However, the situation in Greece has changed since Greece joined the 
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European Union and the levels of education, development, political stability and 
democracy have been improved. Bourantas et al. (1987) mentioned that there are 
significant changes in the needs of Greeks suggesting that Greeks place enormous attention 
of on the “ego needs” of self-esteem and status through wealth. Regarding the Greek 
leadership styles, Hofstede (1976) showed that Greek executives preferred the consultative 
style (i.e., 70 percent of respondents preferred the consultative style, 18 percent the 
participative style, 12 percent the persuasive style and 0 percent the autocratic). Triandis et 
al. (1968) suggested two central attributes of the Greek national character are extreme 
competitiveness and an unsual response to people in authority. Within the in-group 
(members of a person’s immediate family, friends) people with authority and cooperative 
behaviour are welcome compared to those within out-group people whith suspicious, 
hostile and extremely competitive behaviour. 
 
2.19.2 The Management Culture of Greek Organisations 
 
Academic writings have focused on the impact of individual behaviour and organisational 
effectiveness suggesting that different organisation have different cultures and different 
effects on organisational effectiveness (Ouchi, 1981; Pascale and Athos, 1982; Beyer, 
1981; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Kilmann, 1984; Schein, 1985). Corporate cultures have 
been shaped by certain factors such as: the founder (Pettigrew, 1979), leadership style 
(Schein, 1985) and environment of the organisation (Beyer, 1981; Bhagat and McQuaid, 
1982). 
 
Harrison (1972) and Handy (1980) have developed a framework which compares the 
attributes of four gods of Greek mythology. The name of each of the four gods is used to 
describe the management and organisational culture: 
 
• The Club Culture (Zeus): Zeus is the king of the gods and respected by other gods 
and is the figurehead of the club culture. He represents the power-centered 
patriarchical tradition with irrational but often benevolent power and charisma. 
This type is found in small enterprise organisations. 
 
• The Role Culture (Apollo): Apollo is the the god of of order and rules. This culture 
assumes that humans have rational behaviour. The role is fixed and individuals are 
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parts of the machine, doing their jobs in a more or less freely interchangeable 
fashion. 
• The Task Culture (Athena): The task culture, under the figurehead of Athena, the 
goddness of wisdom, recognises only expertise as the basis of power and influence. 
Management is concerened with the successful solution of problems. It draws 
resources from different parts of the organisation in order to focus on a particular 
problem.  
• The Existential Culture (Dionysus): Existentialism assumes that the world is not 
part of some high purpose and everybody is in charge of his or her own destiny. 
This philosophy has various managerial implementations. The individual helps the 
organisation to achieve its goals and the organisation helps the individual to 
achieve his purpose.  
 
In Greece most private firms are family businesses and their top management consists of 
members of their family who dominate whatever professional management there is. 
Managers of Greek public enterprises are appointed by the Government and consist of 
political friends and party leaders. The appointment of professional managers is rare. The 
concentration of power and control are in the hands of top management teams. Bourantas 
et al. (1990) found that the majority of Greek managers perceived their companies to be 
dominated by centralised power (Zeus) and bureaucratic roles (Apollo). This reflects the 
autocratic nature of industrialists which is consistent with previous research (e.g. 
Cummings and Schmidt, 1972; EEDE, 1986; Makridakis at al., 1996; Nikolaidis, 1992). 
Papadakis (1993) reported a lack of modern systems to support strategic decisions. The 
strategic decision-making styles of Greek companies are less comprehensive/rational and 
less formalised, used less lateral communication and experience and more problem-solving 
dissension. Others (e.g. Kanelopoulos, 1991; Papalexandris, 1988) have documented a lack 
of wide diffusion of modern management methods and systems such as formal structures, 
planning and control systems, human resource management systems and management 
information systems.  
 
An important question that has been raised is whether the Greek management has any 
unique characteristic that distinguishes it from other European management styles (e.g. the 
institutionalised participation of employees in Germany or Sweden and the informal 
network relationships among small and medium-sized enterprises in Italy). So far, the 
existing empirical work has not identified an important dimension distinguishing Greek 
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management from the management style of other European countries.  Bourantas and 
Papadakis (1997, pp. 23-24) stated “We would rather characterize Greek management as a 
Western-Type management style that has not yet reached a high level of modernazitaion 
and adoption of scientific and analytical methods and techniques”. They imply that Greek 
management differs in the degree of modernisation and professionalism of management 
functions, management systems and professional knowledge and skills. Greek management 
compared to other European countries does not have any different model but a different 
degree of development.   
 
The fact that Greek management is not differentiated from the Western model can be 
explained by the fact that Greece was fully liberated from foreign occupation only at the 
beginning of this century. Therefore, Greece “missed” the Renaissance and the industrial 
revolution and at the same time the developments in Western Europe did not come fast in 
Greece. The majority of the entrepreneurial class of the beginning of the century were 
Greeks who lived and worked in other European countries (Bourantas and Papadakis, 
1997). 
 
The underdevelopment management in the private sector can be attributed primarily to the 
family status and the small size of most firms (Georgas, 1993). Their small size prevented 
them from attracting, hiring, and rewarding high-quality professional managers (Papadakis, 
1993). At the same time, the managers are not willing and are not aware of the techniques 
of modern management (Georgas, 1993). The traditional structure and functioning of the 
Greek state especially prior to EU integration did not encourage management 
modernisation. So far, the small firms have survived due to the high level of protectionism. 
The management education of until the mid-80s was underdeveloped. The graduates of the 
Greek technical universities received very little formal management training, while 
economic and business universities focused more on law, macroeconomic and accounting 
courses rather than on management and marketing (Bourantas and Papadakis, 1997). 
 
The underdevelopment of management in the public sector is due to powerful political 
forces. Modern Greece is a relatively new democracy that bears painful memories from 
both world wars, from the civil war of 1944-49, and from the military dictatorship of 1967-
73. The above circumstances have strengthened the power of politicians over technocrat 
managers mainly in the state controlled enterprises. Even in our day, the top management 
teams of major public enterprises are appointed by the government due to their loyalty and 
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to their contributions to the political party rather than managerial competence (Bourantas 
and Papadakis, 1997).  
 
Despite the fact that Greece is developing slowly compared to other counterparts, it is 
worth to mentioning that the society is undergoing some major changes. The forces of 
these changes are related to macroenvironmental dimensions. Two well-known 
management theories are used to explain the evolution of the Greek management: 
environmental determinism and comparative management.  The former posits that 
organisational structures, management systems and practices are determined by the 
complexity, hostility and dynamism of the external environment in which the company 
operates. This perspective has received considerable theoretical and empirical support 
(Aldrich, 1979; Bourgeois, 1984; Hofer, 1975) and it seems to apply to Greek context. This 
argument suggests that the external “environment” forces drive Greek management toward 
rapid convergence with “Western type-professional management”. In comparative-
management studies, several forces determine management in various national contexts. 
Farmer and Richman (1965) categorised these factors into: sociocultural, sociological, 
educational-learning, political-legal and economic.  
 
Papadakis and Bourantas (1997) developed a theoretical framework in which they have 
incorporated the following forces: environmental dynamism and complexity, sociocultural, 
educational-learning, political-legal and economic that could influence either at a national 
or European international level the evolution of Greek management. The results of their 
study showed that there is a gap between the cultures and management practices of Greek-
owned organisations and those of subsidiaries of multinationals operating in Greece. The 
forces that bring Greek management into line are EU membership, the presence of many 
subsidiaries of multinationals, the strong expedition for modernisation and expansion to 
neighboring countries and the restructure of university education towards a “Western-
type/professional” management. However, there are forces that prevent Greek 
management evolution including the “administrative heritage”, the lack of strong and 
differentiated Greek management culture, political intervention and the weak economy of 
Greece compared to other EU members. 
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 2.23 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has attempted to introduce the concept of Boards of Directors and examined 
its conceptual elements and provided the theoretical platform of the research carried out 
and documented in this thesis. The main body of the literature review focuses on 
environmental dimensions, on Boards of Directors, board’s demographic characteristics, 
involvement in strategic decision-making, the strategic decision-making process, strategic 
choice of innovation and organisational performance.  A theoretical framework between 
the factors that influence strategic decisions and the hypothesed relationships are 
developed and presented in Figure 2:2 showing the hypothesised relationships between the 
factors that influence strategic decisions. Also, it provided the geographical and 
socioeconomic context with which this study is set – Greece. The research design and 
methodology for the study are described in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 In the previous chapters, relevant theory was reviewed and evidence was provided in 
support of the hypothesised relationships between Boards of Directors, strategic decision-
making process, strategic choices, environmental variables and firm’s performance. This 
chapter attempts to illustrate the proposed methodology for the study and explain the 
overall design used for testing the conceptual model presented below. The principal themes 
that are documented are: empirical research objectives, research approach, survey 
methodology, data collection methods, and finally, data analysis methods. 
 
3.2 Empirical Research Objectives 
“The objective of academic research, whether conducted by sociologists, political 
scientists, or anthropologists, is to try to find answers to theoretical questions within their 
respective fields. In contrast, the objective of applied social research is to use data so that 
decisions can be made” (Rubin, 1983, pp. 6-7). 
 
A number of empirical research objectives were formulated from the conceptualisation and 
hypotheses development proposed in Chapter 2. The first objective is to examine the 
impact of external environment on board composition, board involvement, strategic 
decision-making process, and strategic choice of innovation. The second objective is to 
investigate the effects of the board structure as well the board’s demographic 
characteristics on board involvement in strategic-decision making, on certain 
characteristics of the strategic decision-making process and on strategic choice of 
innovation. Finally, the third objective is to identify the influence of board involvement, 
the strategic decision-making process and strategic choice of innovation to firm’s 
performance.  
 
In acknowledging each of these empirical research objectives, the ultimate aim of the study 
is to determine the factors that influence the strategic decisions of Greek executives 
Therefore, data were collected for an analytical purpose. The methodological approach for 
the study will be analysed below. 
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3.3 Research Approach 
3.3.1 Research Methodology 
 
Research methodology refers to a procedural framework within which the research is 
conducted. It describes an approach to a problem that can be implemented either in a 
research programme or process. 
 
Leedy (1989) defined research methodology as “an operational framework within which 
the facts are placed so that the meaning may be seen more clearly”. Research 
methodology refers to the theory of acquiring knowledge and the activity of considering, 
reflecting upon and justifying the best methods. Methods are the specific techniques for 
obtaining the data that will provide the evidence base for the construction of the 
knowledge. Therefore, methodology is concerned with the theoretical and overall approach 
to a research project rather than with the characteristics and practical application of 
particular methods (Wellington et. al, 2005).  
 
Business and management research provides conclusions that enhance knowledge and 
understanding but also address contemporary business issues and practical managerial 
problems (Saunders et al. 2003). Additionally, Zikmund (2003) defined business research 
as the methodical and objective procedure of getting the necessary information in order to 
facilitate the decision making procedure regarding various organisational issues.  
 
The purpose of a research method is to investigate a particular and therefore, to choose the 
appropriate method for the specific research problem. As Bryman (1989, p. 255) stated: 
“Each design and method should be taken on its merits as a means of facilitating (or 
obscuring) the understanding of particular research problems, …a fetishist espousal of 
favourable designs or methods and an underpinnings can only stand in the way of 
developing such an understanding”.   
 
As has been established in Chapter 2, corporate governance in Greece is in a primary stage 
and most of the constructs of this research have not been examined empirically before. 
Therefore, it is required a careful consideration of fitting research methods is required. 
There is a remaining gap in our understanding, since there is no theoretical similar work to 
our model and it will be examined empirically in a new cultural context; Greece. The 
research problem in the study is to discover the impact of external environment on board 
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composition, strategic decisions; the effects of board structure as well board’s demographic 
characteristics on involvement in strategic-decision making and on strategic choice of 
innovation. Finally, the aim is to explore the effects of strategic decisions on firm’s 
performance.  
 
3.3.2 Methodological Distinctions  
 
The dominant approaches that have been developed in the area of management are 
ontology and epistemology (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).     
Ontology and epistemology influence the structure and processes of social research and 
provide explanations in the area of philosophy of science (Machamer, 2002; Nelson, 1990).  
Ontology derives as a term from theology and is concerned with the nature or essence of 
things. Ontological assumptions focus on issues around being human within the world and 
whether a person sees social reality or aspects of the social world as external, independent, 
given and objectively real or instead as socially constructed, subjectively experienced 
(Wellington et. al, 2005). Ontology informs methodologies as to the nature of reality or 
better as to “what” social research is supposed to study (Sarantakos, 2005).  
 
On the contrary, epistemology is the theory of knowledge and deals with what constitutes 
knowledge, from where knowledge comes and whose knowledge it is, and with what it is 
possible to know and understand and represent. 'Epistemology', according to Chambers 
Dictionary, is the theory of knowledge, thus epistemology is concerned with what does and 
does not count as knowledge. In Plato's dialogue Theaetetus, Socrates considers knowledge 
is as true belief that has been “given an account of”. An epistemological issue concerns the 
question of what is considered as acceptable knowledge in a discipline (Bryman and Bell, 
2003). Epistemology informs methodologies about the nature of knowledge, or about what 
counts as a fact and where knowledge is to be sought (Sarantakos, 2005). Methodology as 
a research strategy translates ontological and epistemological principals into guidelines that 
show how research has to be conducted (Cook and Fonow, 1990, p.72). For the purpose of 
the undertaken study, the epistemological research approach is applied. 
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3.3.3 Epistemological Approach 
 
In the section below different epistemological approaches will be described providing 
some understanding of the philosophical foundations and different approaches to research 
methods. 
 
a. Positivism and Post Positivism 
 
Positivism is an epistemological position that advocates the application of the methods of 
the natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond (Neuman, 2006). Positivist 
theory was developed in detail during the early part of this century although its 
fundamental concepts can be traced back to the philosophers of the Enlightenment but it 
was the French philosopher August Compte who posited that the principles of natural 
science could be applied to the study of human behaviour. Positivism can take many forms 
(Halfpenny, 1982).  
 
In the social sciences, there is an attempt to discover the factors which cause phenomena in 
much the same way that scientists construct various theories to explain the behaviour of 
dependent variables. Positivism maintains that knowledge should be based on real facts, 
not abstractions, thus knowledge is predicated on observations and experiment in contrast 
to the phenomenological paradigm of searching for the inner meaning or the essence of 
things (Robson, 2002). Positivism is associated with many specific social theories and acts 
as a linkage to structural-functional, rational choice and exchange-theory framework. 
According to positivism, “there is only one logic of science, to which any intellectual 
activity aspiring to the title of “science” must conform (Keat and Urry, 1975 p. 25). 
Positivist social science is “an organised method for combining deductive logic with 
precise empirical observations of individual behaviour in order to discover and confirm a 
set of probabilistic causal laws that can be used to predict general patterns of human 
activity” (Neuman , 2006, p. 82).  
 
Positivism is also known as hypothetico-deductive methods and follows the specific 
sequence: first, a formally expressed general statement which attempts to test theory; 
second, the purpose of the theory is to generate hypotheses that can be tested and allows 
explanations of laws to be assessed (deductive principal); third, a careful operationalisation 
of constructs; fourth, measurement of constructs; fifth, hypotheses testing and finally, 
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verification of the theory (Jankowicz, 2000). Positivism is considered as link between the 
theory and the research and attempts to test theory in order to increase predictive 
understanding of phenomena.  
 
In our days, positivist approach is predominant in management research (Alvesson and 
Deetz, 2000; Alvesson and Willmott, 1992) and is similar to the natural and physical 
science approaches provided that it falls into the following main grounds: 1. That there is 
no single method which generates scientific knowledge in all cases. 2. That what may be 
an appropriate method for researching the natural or physical world may be inappropriate 
in the social world given the inherent meaningfulness of management action and its 
contextual nature. 3. That knowledge generated is affected by the goals of managers and 
their validation criteria (Cited in Gill and Johnson, 2002, p. 8). 
 
From a positivistic perspective, the aim of research in the field of management is to 
establish regulations, which govern the ways in which organisations operate. In a way, the 
generation of causal relationships or laws enable management to become more scientific 
and managers to be able to predict their environment (Johnson and Duberley, 2000). 
Positivists believe that only the phenomena which are observable and measurable are 
regarded as knowledge. Positivists are considered as objective and view the phenomena of 
their research as objects (Collis and Hussey, 2003).  In the writings of Lex Donaldson 
(1997, p. 87) in strategic management argued: “a fully positivist approach would not 
presume to call the approach strategic management but would rather call it corporate 
development. It would seek to ascertain the laws that cover corporate development that is 
the laws that explain changes in corporate size, diversification, geographic extensiveness, 
innovation and so on. Attention would be paid to material factors as explanatory 
variables…. The search would be for parsimonious models utilising as few variables as 
possible with the variables being of an objective kind. Subjective variables, including 
strategies would be included to fill in unexplained variance”. 
 
The concern of positivist research is to test theory against empirical observation. Actually 
positivism attempts to “connect observations with theoretical statements constructed in 
rational non-observational concepts in an isomorphism of theory and observation. This 
isomorphism is achieved in terms of laws and theories which have been interpreted by 
abstractive connection to empirical events for at least some of their relevant scope (Clegg 
and Bunkerley, 1980:261). 
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Several management scholars (e.g. Bryman, 1992; Easterby-Smith et al., 1992) focus on 
Aston studies in order to explain positivistic research. This is a research programme that 
identifies the dimensions of organisational structure and the influential factors for structure 
and functioning of organisations (Pugh and Hickson, 1976; Pugh et al., 1986). Pugh (1983, 
p. 50) identified five assumptions of the general research strategy of the Aston Studies: 
 
1. The need for comparative studies to distinguish problems specific to particular 
organisations from those common to all organisations 
2. Meaningful comparisons require common standards for measurement 
3. The nature of an organisation will be influenced by its objectives and environments so 
these must be taken into account 
4. Study of the work behaviour of individuals or groups should be related to the study of 
the characteristics of organisations in which the behaviour occurs 
5. Studies of organisational processes of stability and change should be undertaken in 
relation to a framework of significant variables and relationships established through 
comparative study. 
 
The purpose of the Aston approach is to establish measurements in order for organisations 
to be compared certain criteria and to factors of the organisation that  influence its 
structure.  
 
One of the limitations of positivism management research is that it neglects the need for 
relevance (Bharadwaj, 1998; Schon, 1995). Schon (1995) argued that management 
research is on high ground while it does not deal with providing solutions to manageable 
problems. Hogan and Sinclair (1996, p. 439) regarding the lack of relevance in positivist 
management research argued: “Industrial psychologists have, as organisational 
consultants, advocated a general method that involves identifying the requirements of a job 
(i.e. description), identification of a set of characteristics that enable an individual to meet 
those requirements (i.e. prediction). These methods are rational, theoretically derived, and 
depend on replicable and generalisable empirical validation to determine whether or not 
they work. If poor choices are made, poor results are obtained. Although these methods 
are imperfect, organisations that utilise the basic process hire people with less adverse 
impact that they did 30 years ago-while simultaneously advancing understanding of the 
theoretical domain of job performance. This process is not simply the effective utilisation 
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prediction technology; the technology is founded on certain theoretical notions concerning 
the nature of human performance”. 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 255) summarized below the criticism of positivism approach: 
“Science is based on “taken for granted” assumptions, and thus, like other social practice, 
must be understood within a specific context. Traced to their source all activities which 
pose as science can be traced to fundamental assumptions relating to everyday life and can  
in no way be regarded as generating knowledge with an “objective”, value-free status, as 
is sometimes claimed. What passes for scientific can be shown to be founded upon a set of 
unstated conventions, beliefs and assumptions, just as every day, common-knowledge is. 
The difference between them lies largely in the nature of rules and the community which 
recognises and subscribes to them. The knowledge in both cases is not so much 
“objective” as shared”.  
 
Therefore, there is a need to change the  perception about science to a more problem-or 
puzzle–solving approach, where science is regarded as a problem solving approach with 
certain conventions (Kuhn, 1970).  
Post-positivism is a current approach of social research and attempts to overcome the 
criticism that is made of it. While positivists argue that the researcher and the researched 
person are independent, post-positivists accept that theories, hypotheses, background 
knowledge and values affect what is examined (Reichardt and Rallis, 1994). They believe 
in the existence of reality but they acknowledge the limitations of the researchers. Post-
positivists can be viewed as recognising that positivism is dead but they maintain its 
respectability and authority as a research approach (Robson, 2002). 
 
b. Paradigm 
The term “paradigm” has been introduced by Thomas Kuhn (1970) and derives from the 
evolution of science and means a basic orientation to theory and research. The paradigm 
includes basic assumptions, key issues, models of quality research and methods for seeking 
answers. It explains how the social world is perceived, “what is important, what is 
legitimate and what is reasonable” (Patton, 1990, p. 37). A paradigm is defined as “a 
cluster of beliefs and dictates which for scientists in a particular discipline influence what 
should be studied, how research has to be done and how results have to be interpreted” 
(Bryman 1988, p. 4). Examples of such paradigms are positivism, symbolic interactionism, 
ethnomethodology and phenomenology (Sarantakos, 2005). 
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Burrell and Morgan (1979) have provided us with an influential understanding of 
epistemology and ontology of business foundations of business research. Similarly, in 
sociology of radical change, there is a distinction between scholars adopt the “objective” 
and the “subjective” views of society.  
 
The debate comes from the publication in France in 1966 and Britain in 1969 of Louis 
Althusser’s work For Marx. “This represented the notion of an “epistemological break” in 
Marx’s work and emphasised the polarisation of Marxists theorists into two camps: those 
emphasing the “subjective”aspects of Marxism (Lukacs and the Frankfurt School) and 
those advocating more “objective” approaches, such as those associated with Althusserian 
structuralism” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 22).  
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggest that each paradigm contains paradigms that can be 
represented either as objective or as subjective. 
 
“Objectivist is an external viewpoint from which is possible to view the organisation, 
which is comprised of consistently real process and structure. On the contrary, subjectivist 
is when an organisation is a socially constructed product, a label used by individuals to 
make sense of their social experiences, so it can be understood only from the point of view 
of individuals who are directly involved in its activities” (Bryman and Bell, 2003, p. 22). 
Each paradigm makes assumptions regarding the function and purpose of research, which 
can be either regulatory or radical. Regulatory is when the purpose of the research is to 
describe the progress of the organisation and suggest some improvements. However, 
radical is when management and business research criticise the way the organisations 
operate and make suggestions (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified four distinct sociological paradigms: functionalist, 
interpretative, radical humanist and radical structural. Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 23) 
regarded the four paradigms as “being defined by very basic meta-theoretical assumptions 
which underwrite the frame of reference, mode of theorising and modus operandi of the 
social theorists who operate within them”. The four paradigms depicted the four different 
views of social world based on different meta-theoretical assumptions regarding the nature 
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Functionalism Paradigm is the dominant framework for the study of organisations, derives 
from the sociology of regulation and provides rational explanations of social affairs from 
an objectivist point of view. It provides explanations of the status quo, social order, 
consensus, social integration, solidarity, need satisfaction and actuality. It approaches the 
following sociological concerns: realists, positivist, determinist and nomothetic (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). 
 
Interpretive Paradigm is described as the sociology of regulation and its main concern is to 
understand the world as it is, the fundamental nature of the social world at the level of 
subjective experience. It perceives the social world as a social process which is created by 
individuals’ consciousness and subjectivity (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
 
Radical Humanist Paradigm deals with the development of the sociology of radical change 
from a subjectivist’s point of view (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
 
 The organisation is viewed as a social arrangement from which individuals need to be 
emancipated and research as guided by the need for change (Bryman and Bell, 2003, p. 
23). It regards the social world from a nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and 
ideographic perspective and focuses on radical change, modes of domination, 
emancipation, deprivation and potential (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
 
 Radical structuralist paradigm regards the organisation as a product of structural power 
relationships, which lead to conflict (Bryman and Bell, 2003, p. 23). 
 
An important feature of paradigms is that they are incommensurable because they are 
inconsistent with each other due to different assumptions and methods (Bryman and Bell, 
2003), resist the hegemony of functionalist approaches, which dominate business research 
in North-American journals (Jackson and Carter, 1991).  Reed (1985, p.205) argued that 
the overstatements of the differences between them leads to isolationism and reduces “the 
potential for creative theoretical development”. Willmont (1993) suggested that the four-
paradigm model enhances the possibilities for alternative forms of analysis with 
management research. The paradigm debate focuses on the relationship between 
epistemology and ontology in business and management research. The choice of a 
paradigm has implications for the design of the research and the data collection approach. 
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3.4 Research Design 
 
Research design is the “science (and art) of planning procedures for conducting studies so 
as to get the most valid findings” (Vogt, 1993, p. 196). According to Yin (1984, p. 13) the 
methodological design has to be suitable to “(1) the research problem, (2) the extent of 
control the researcher has over actual behavioural events and (3) the time-focus of the 
phenomena observed, i.e. contemporary or historical”. Determining the research design 
the researcher will have a detailed plan which will be used to guide and focus the research. 
The research design includes a range of dimensions of the research process such as: 
expression of interrelationships between variables, generalisation of larger group of 
individuals than those who actually participate in the investigation, understanding 
behaviour and the meaning of behaviour in a specific social context and a temporal 
appreciation of social phenomena and their interconnections (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
 
There are two different approaches regarding the research design: the inductive and the 
deductive research approach. Inductive approach is defined as “an approach to developing 
or confirming a theory that begins with concrete empirical evidence and works toward 
more abstract concepts and theoretical relationships” (Neuman, 2006). The induction 
approach focuses on: understanding meanings of human attacks to events, understanding of 
research context, qualitative data, and flexible structure to permit changes, and the 
researcher participation in the research process (Saunders et. al., 2003). Whereas, 
deductive theory is regarded as a more positivistic approach to examine the relationship 
between theory and research.  
 
The deduction approach focuses on scientific principles, moving from theory to data, 
causal relationships between variables, quantitative data and controls to ensure validity of 
data, operationalisation of concepts, highly structured approach, research independence 
and objectivity as well as samples of sufficient size (Saunders et. al., 2003). In the case of 
deductive approach, the researcher is aware of the existing literature in a particular field 
and develops hypotheses in order to empirical examine them. Testing is concerned with 
validating or disconfirming existing theory. The scholar develops propositions, which are 
logical conclusions or predictions derived from theory. Then, he/she collects data 
pertaining to the propositions. The propositions are tested by comparing findings from 
observed reality (the collected data) with the expected outcome (theoretical propositions) 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003). Social scientists deduce a hypothesis and then translate it into 
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operational items and they explain how data can be collected in relation to the concepts 
that make up the hypothesis. This view of the role of the theory is that it is  close to the 
work of Merton (1967, p. 39) who argued that middle-range theory “is principally used in 
sociology to guide empirical inquiry”. 
 
“Deductive research approach entails the development of a conceptual and theoretical 
structure prior to testing through empirical observation (Gill and Johnson, 2002, p. 34).” 
The theory and the hypotheses deduced from it come first and drive the process of 
gathering data (theory, hypothesis development, and data collection, hypothesis confirmed 
or rejected). The theory can be rejected or confirmed. In the case that theory is confirmed, 
then the researcher feels that his/her theory is a reasonable reflection of reality.  
 
Yin (1984) has divided the theoretical propositions into two basic categories: deductive 
those that are pattern matching and explanation building and inductive those that data 
display and analysis, grounded theory and narrative analysis. Popper (1967, pp. 130-43) 
claimed that “to many researchers working within the deductive tradition, the source of 
one’s theory is of little significance- it is the creative element in the process of science that 
is essentially unanalysable”. The logic of reduction and the operationalisation process and 
the hypothesis testing through empirical evidence is important.  
 
In this study, the key strategic decisions factors and the hypothesised relationships between 
them can be identified via thorough literature review (Chapter 2). The main objective of 
this study is to determine the relationships among strategic decisions factors. In the current 
study, the deductive approach was considered as the most appropriate in order to test the 
theory through empirical investigation. Given the structured nature of the research problem 
and the fact that there is sufficient evidence to formulate hypotheses for testing, the 
research design that is adopted for the purpose of our study is cross-sectional. Cross-
sectional is a widely used research design in social sciences studies which is associated 
either with questionnaires or structured interviews. It entails the collection of data 
(qualitative or quantitative) with more than one case (usually more than fifteen) within a 
specific period of time in order to detect associations between variables (Robson, 2002). 
Based on the formulated hypotheses, the quantitative survey is applied for the current 
study. After a thoroughly literature review in strategic management, comparing and 
evaluating the reseach design of similar studies, a research hypothesised model (Figure 
3:1). Therefore, a conceptual and analytical framework was developed using existing 
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theory and then this framework was tested in order to explain the empirical findings. Based 
on the hypothesised model (see Figures 2:3-2:8), quantitative approach is conducted to 
assist the measures development of the constructs. In this case, dependent and independent 
variables were used to explain the cause and effect relationships between the variables 
(Yin, 1984). 
 
The primary data for the current study was collected through questionnaires to boards’ 
members of Greek companies. This is the first reported study that has empirical data from 
Boards of Directors of listed companies in Greece. The questionnaires were translated into 
Greek language as well as and they have been pretested in a few Greek executives prior to 
their distribution. Additionally, secondary data was collected from companies’ annual 
reports. Figure 3:1 shows the design of the research.  The Figure 3:2 below presents the 
method of selecting the most appropriate source of data and data generation method. Table 
3:2 and Table 3:3 describe the pre-test process of the questionnaire as well as the 
questionnaire development process. 
 
Figure 3:1 Research Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Literature review 
Constructs & measures of 
the conceptual model 
Research design 
Quantitative 
survey 
 
Data analysis 
Findings 
Hypothesis 
 
116 
 
Figure 3:2 The Process of Selecting the Most Appropriate Source of Data and Data 
Generation Method. 
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3. 5 Data Generation Sources and Communication Method 
 
3.5.1 Introduction 
The undertaken study is characterised as quantitative survey research and uses a cross-
sectional research design in order to gather information regarding Boards of Directors in 
Greek listed firms on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) and then evaluate and examine the 
collected data to discover patterns of interrelationship between the variables (Bryman and 
Bell, 2003). Data sources are generally divided into two categories: primary and 
secondary. The information gathered for the research will be primary and secondary data. 
 
3.5.2 Secondary Data 
Secondary data have been described as data already generated but published for some 
reason other than solving the research problem at hand, while primary sources refer to 
generation of data, which relate specifically to the research problem. It refers to 
information offered in either written or electronic form and is divided into internal or 
external based on the source of information (Blumberg et al., 2005).  
 
For research purposes, secondary data were collected from “documentary-based secondary 
data that refer to information collected from previous similar researchers which have also 
included primary data and have already been analysed for their original purpose” 
(Saunders et al., 2003). Secondary data can be gathered by various sources such as: books, 
periodicals, government sources, regional publications, companies’ annual report, media 
and commercial sources (Zikmund, 2003).  
 
In this research, secondary sources were gathered from the Athens Stock Exchange where 
all Greek organisations are quoted as well as Nautemporiki, ICAP Consulting, Ernest and 
Young Consulting, Kantor Consulting and Hellenic Capital Market directory.  
 
Secondary data have some essential benefits: cost and time, high quality, opportunity for 
longitudinal analysis, subgroup and subset analysis, opportunity for cross-cultural analysis, 
more time for data analysis, reanalysis may offer new interpretations. However, secondary 
data have to be considered under the light of their limitations: lack of familiarity with data, 
complexity of data, no control over data quality and absence of key variables (Bryman and 
Bell, 2003). 
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3.5.3 Primary Data  
Primary data refer to the generation of sources, which are related specifically to the 
research problem. Kinner and Taylor (1991) have described three sources of primary data 
as being respondents, analogous situations and experimentation. The analogous situation 
and experimental design options were considered unsuitable because of the number of 
inherent methodological limitations and their perceived lack of effectiveness for the 
purpose of our study. The respondent source is considered more appropriate, for our study 
on the basis that: “When the information needs of a study require data about respondents’ 
attitudes, perceptions, motivations, knowledge, and indented behaviour, asking people 
questions is essential” (Kinner and Taylor, 1991, p. 135). Traditionally, the methods for 
data generation are observation techniques, personal interviews, protocol research and 
postal questionnaires.  
 
3.5.3.1 Interviews 
 
Bryman and Bell (2003) have divided interviews into the following major categories: 
structured interview, standardised interview, semi-structured interview, unstructured 
interview, intensive interview, qualitative interview, in-depth interview, focused interview, 
focus group, group interview, oral history interview and life history interview. In this 
research, structured interviews were conducted where the questionnaire was explained to 
the respondents and then, to questions were asked following the sequence of the 
questionnaire. 
 
Structured interview or otherwise standardised interview entails the administration of an 
interview schedule by the interviewer. The purpose is for all interviewees to be given the 
same questions and them to reply to the questions.  Questions are very specific and they 
offer the interviewee a fixed range of answers (closed, closed ended, pre-coded or fixed 
answer) (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
 
Personal interviews are associated with favourable response rates, high levels of flexibility 
and control during the interview, greater complexity and range of potential questions made 
possible, and spontaneous rich information obtained immediately as well as ability to 
correct misunderstanding of respondents. However, in contrast to alternative 
communicative methods personal interviews are regarded as expensive, demanding a 
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sustainable degree of administration, offering less assurance of anonymity, to the 
respondent, involving a considerable level of inconvenience, sensitivity to certain issues 
and providing more opportunities for response error with interviewer (Brenner et. al, 1985; 
Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
 
3.5.3.2 Protocol Research Approach 
 
In business research protocol analysis is a data collection method used to identify the 
mental processes in problem solving and is associated with phenomenological 
methodology (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Newell and Simon, 1972). 
 
Verbal data can be generated either by retrospective verbalisation when the participant is 
asked to describe processes after they occurred or by concurrent verbalisation which occurs 
when the participant is asked to describe and explain thoughts as they undertake a task. 
Concurrent verbalisation is distinguished into two types: directed reports: where 
participants describe only behaviours and think-aloud protocol: where participants are 
asked to think aloud when performing a task (Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
 
Smagorinsky (1989, p. 475) described protocol analysis as “an expensive and meticulous 
research method that has its share of growing pains”. Smagorinsky (1994) used protocol 
to study writing and Bolton (1991) used concurrent verbal protocols in order to pre-test 
questionnaires. Bolton (1991, p. 565) argued that protocol analysis facilitates evaluation of 
draft questionnaires and but it is also “time consuming and labour intensive”. 
 
3.5.3.3 Postal Questionnaire 
There are three main types of survey data collection: self-completion or postal 
questionnaires, face to face interview and telephone interview (Robson, 2002). 
Questionnaires are associated with both positivist and phenomenological methodologies. 
Questionnaire is characterised a list of structured questions, chosen after examination, in an 
attempt to choose reliable responses from a chosen sample.  
 
According to the positivist paradigm, questionnaires can be used for large scale surveys. 
Each questionnaire can be coded at the design stage and when it is completed to be 
processed. Positivist approach suggests closed questions, while the phenomenological 
approach suggests the open-ended questions (Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
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This method of data generation is regarded as reliable  in assuring respondent anonymity, 
demanding low levels of administrative requirements (cheap to administer, quicker to 
administer), possessing a high degree of standardisation and accessibility, absence of 
interviewer effect, convenience for respondents and not particularly resource-laden. 
However, recognised limitations are the investigator’s lack of control over the 
questionnaire completion process, low response rate, limited volume of data capable of 
being generated and the possibility of biases being present in the sample frame, greater risk 
for missing data (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Paxson, 1992; Chawla and Nataraajan, 1994). 
 
3.5.3.4 Online Surveys 
Online surveys are in their infancy but they have a great potential. Online surveys are 
distinguished into two categories: e-mail surveys and web surveys. E-mail surveys fall into 
two categories again; embedded and attached questionnaires sent by email. Sheehan and 
Hoy (1999) argued that email surveys are likely to be applied to smaller  and more 
homogeneous groups  while Web-based surveys focus on large groups of online users. The 
embedded questionnaire is easier to fill in since it requires less computer literacy however, 
its appearance is dull and featureless (Bryman and Bell, 2003). The attachment e-mail 
allows to the respondent to type material on it. Dommeyer and Moriarty (2000, p. 48) 
commented that “the attached e-mail survey presents too many obstacles to the potential 
respondent”, including virus threat, unfamiliarity with this research approach. In addition, 
web-based survey is an online survey which can be completed through a website. As a 
method it offers a wider variety of embellishments in terms of appearance, although it 
requires an advanced knowledge of HTML (Bryman and Bell, 2003).  
 
Despite the fact that online survey approaches have increased response rates compared to 
postal questionnaires, Yun and Trumbo (2000) claimed that “the electronic only survey is 
advisable when resources are limited and the target population suits an electronic 
survey”. Scholars (e.g. Cobanoglu et al. 2001; Kent and Lee, 1999; Schaeffer and Dillman, 
1998) regard on-line surveys as a low cost and fast response administration technique with 
limited unanswered questions. On the contrary, they are limited to online population, 
require additional motivation from the respondent and have a low degree regarding 
confidentiality and anonymity issues.  
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3.5.4 Triangulation  
Triangulation is considered as a valuable and widely used strategy. Denzin (1978, p. 291) 
defined triangulation as: “the combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon”. Researchers use triangulation in an attempt to enhance the accuracy of their 
judgments by collecting data from different sources (Jick, 1979). Triangulation is 
employed because it addresses all possible aspects of the topic, increases the amount of 
research data, and achieves a high degree of validity, credibility and research utility, while 
it overcomes the limitations of single-method studies (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
 
Robson (2002) has divided triangulation into four different types: data triangulation, 
observer triangulation, methodological triangulation and theory triangulation. In this our 
study, data triangulation and methodological triangulation were employed since 
questionnaire were distributed, some complementary structured interviews were conducted 
and data from secondary sources were gathered.  
 
Data triangulation is defined as the use of more than one method of data collection (e.g. 
observation, interviews, documents). Additionally, theory triangulation is defined as the 
use of multiple theories or perspectives (Robson, 2002). Lamnek (1993, pp. 245-57) has 
criticised triangulation by arguing that it can be useless if it isbased on wrong conditions, is 
used as a way of legitimatising personal views and interests, is difficult to replicate and is 
not suitable for studying every social phenomenon. In this research work, data collection 
triangulation approach was applied since mainly primary data but also secondary data 
concerning the board composition were collected. Primary data were collected mainly 
through e-mail surveys and secondary data through companies’ annual reports.  
 
3.5.5 Response Issue 
E-mail attached questionnaire is regarded as an accepted and familiar method for 
systematic survey methodology taking into consideration that is a  low cost and fast 
response method as well as that the respondents are well educated and have computer 
literacy. In addition, no part of the information requested in the questionnaire is regarded 
as particularly commercially sensitive, implying that sampling units would not be averse to 
responding on grounds of disclosure and confidentiality. Finally, the majority of empirical 
studies in management have adopted a questionnaire survey method (Kumar et al., 1993).  
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Mangione (1995, pp. 60-61) has provided the following classification of response rate: 
over 85% excellent, 70-85% very good, 60-70% acceptable and below 50% not acceptable.  
It is well known that questionnaires are associated with low response rates. Therefore, the 
questionnaire should be followed by a detailed cover letter and cover page which will 
provide instructions regarding the research subject, the researcher’s and supervisor’s 
details, types of questions, necessary time to be completed not only to increase the 
response rate but also to facilitate the procedure for the respondents. Furthermore, it was 
made clear that all information obtained from the particular survey will remain absolutely 
confidential. Finally, in the last page respondents were able to express their opinion and to 
indicate if they are keen on receiving the results of the survey. In addition, the researcher 
has to contact the respondent by telephone after two to four days and explain the purpose 
of the project (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
 
3.5.6 Methodological Issues  
Questionnaires offer great assurance of anonymity, limit the risk for bias or errors caused 
by the behaviour of interviewer, offer an objective view of the issue since respondents 
prefer to write rather than to talk about certain issues. In addition, questionnaires allow a 
wide coverage since researchers can approach respondents more easily (Sarantakos, 2005). 
Also, constructs and variables depicted in the conceptual model have been clearly defined 
within the relevant literature and the measurements for each construct were reasonably 
developed. This study requires a self-administered respondent approach because there is no 
necessity to consider a direct control over the physical data generation method. 
 
3.5.7 Questionnaire Instrument Issue 
Selltiz (1981) states that a structured standardised method can increase the response rate 
since it provides greater anonymity and the respondent will have more time to think for 
their responses. The length of the questionnaire is a critical factor for the success of data 
generation. The researcher has to bear in mind the length of the questionnaire without any 
compromise in the operationalisation of the constructs (Churchill, 1991).  
 
3.5.8 Sampling Issues 
The purpose of the study is to examine how Greek executives pursue strategic decisions in 
Greek listed firms; therefore, it is important to elicit answers from a large sample of Greek 
firms in order to assure validity and reliability. The sample frame was Greek organisations 
listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. A list of 316 companies from the Athens Stock 
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Exchange (ASE) was derived, since it is the sole official market of shares trading in the 
Greek capital market. Companies that were de-listed were excluded and the remaining 
sample frame consisted of 290 firms. In the late 2007, we sent questionnaire to board 
members of 290 firms. One hundred and five companies returned completed questionnaires 
for an overall response rate 39.6%. 
 
Quoted companies are classified into 53 economic activity related sectors, which fall into 
twelve categories: primary production, manufacturing industries, public services, retailers, 
hotels-restaurants, transport and communication, financial-accounting services, real estate 
and commerce activities, health and social care, general services, constructions and 
transitional category.  
 
For the purpose of the study a snowball sampling technique was used to identify boards’ 
members of Greek listed organisations that are involved in the strategic decision-making 
process. Snowball sample is used to contact individuals for whom there is no sample frame 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003). Similar studies in the strategic management field have used the 
same approach (Franwick et al., 1994). 
 
The appropriate sample size of the each study is hard to determine. A small sample could 
be a waste of effort because it cannot provide significant effects (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000). 
Many studies suggest a ratio of fifteen to twenty observations for each independent 
variable.  A general rule is that the ratio should never fall below 5 to 1, meaning that there 
should be five observations for each independent variable (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and 
Balck, 1998). 
 
For the purpose of the study, the researcher has used the method of response rate 
calculation proposed by the Council of American Survey Research Organisations 
(CASRO, 1982) which assumes that the percentage of ineligible responses among non-
respondents is equivalent to that in the respondent set. Table 3:1 illustrates the 
mathematical method of calculation. 
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Table 3:1 Survey Response Rate Statistics 
Total number of sampling units 290 
Total number of respondents 115 
Total number of eligible respondents 105 
Total number of ineligible respondents 10 
Percentage of eligible firms=105/115 91.30% 
Total number of non-respondents (290-115) 175 
Expected percentage of eligible firms in non-
respondents=175*(105/115) 
160 
Response Rate=(105*100)/(105+160) 39.6%
 
 
 
The response rate was considered acceptable and compares favourably with other studies 
on Top Management Teams in strategic decision-making (Papadakis, Lioukas and 
Chambers, 1998; Elbanna and Child, 2007).  
 
The questionnaire was distributed initially to board members of Greek organisations in 
April and then we have conducted a follow-up process of the questionnaire which took 
place by the end of May 2007. Researchers should assess for any potential non-response 
bias in the data set. Armstrong and Overton (1977) suggested that a formal extrapolation 
test should be conducted in order to compare early and late survey respondents. The 
sample framework of this study consists of corporate elites of Greek organisations. Greek 
executives have a heavy schedule and are quite relunctant to reveal confidential 
information of their organisation. Therefore, a snowball technique has been applied and the 
researcher has approached consulting and auditing companies asking them to distribute the 
questionnaire to board members. The researcher could not estimate the exact time that the 
board members took to receive the questionnaire, fill it in and return it. Therefore, the 
researcher could not assess any potential non-response bias in the data set.  
 
 3.5.9 Research Constraints 
 
The limitations of survey techniques are the data that are affected by the respondents who 
did not report their beliefs and attitudes accurately (Robson, 2002). E-mail attached 
questionnaires did not provide opportunities for motivating the respondent to participate in 
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the survey. Researchers are not sure whether the right person has completed the 
questionnaire.  Finally, due to the lack of guidance, researchers are not sure if the 
questionnaire is completed in the right order and also, partial response is possible 
(Sarantakos, 2005). Important constraints for the researcher are time and cost, therefore we 
have chosen on-line questionnaires.  
 
3.6 Questionnaire Development Process 
 
The effective administration is vital to the achievement of an acceptable response rate 
(Walker et al., 1987). Literature on questionnaires suggests a survey pre-notification (e.g. 
Heaton, 1965; Ford, 1967; Murphy et al., 1990) and following ups mailings (Pucel et al., 
1971; Paxson, 1992). Many scholars have proposed various survey approaches (Kimball, 
1961; Churchill, 1991). Dillman (1978) developed an influential survey approach by 
introducing the total design method (TDM) of survey administration. Dillman’s 
administration approach is related to mail questionnaires but the procedures are similar to 
the web surveys (Dillman, 2000). After reviewing 200 mail questionnaires, Dillman (1978, 
pp.7-8) stated: “Implicitly, although probably not intentionally, researchers assumed that 
respondent behaviour is primary a reaction to particular aspects of mail questionnaire 
studies, rather than a reaction to the whole. It is more correct to assume that the decision 
to respond is based on an overall, subjective evaluation of all the study elements visible to 
the prospective respondent. The nature of any survey is communicated to respondents in 
diverse ways: the shape, size and colour of the envelope; the way the address is affixed to 
the envelope; content and appearance of the questionnaire; and so on. Each element 
contributes to the overall image of the study. This suggests that to maximise response rate 
all aspects of a study should be designed to create the most positive image”.  
 
 Dilliman’s method is used to improve validity, usefulness, cost-effectiveness, reduce all 
types of errors and maximise response rate. TDM survey consists of two parts. The first 
presents the survey process which affects the quality and quantity of response and the 
second presents the survey activities and the design implementations. The second part 
deals with the physical process of survey design in the form of an administrative plan. 
Dillman’s model has the following steps: development, questionnaire construction and 
survey implementation.  
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Concerning the questionnaire design, Dillman (1978) recommended: clear instructions and 
attractive layout, ordering the  questions according to the topic , choose the first question, 
formulate the  pages, establish a vertical flow, provide directions for how to answer,  use 
graphical design and numerous question-writing principles to ease the task of reading and 
answering questions, booklet format, use photocopier to reduce the size of the 
questionnaire, personalisation of correspondence, designing the front cover, designing the 
back cover, pretesting, follow up two weeks after the original mailing, a first replacement 
questionnaire and cover letter  after the first mailing, a second replacement questionnaire 
accompanied by cover letter seven weeks  after the first one.  
 
3.6.1 Pilot Study 
Researchers have used numerous procedures to pre-test a questionnaire. Pilot study is an 
instrument employed by quantitative researchers in business field before the actual data 
collection. It is regarded as a small-scale replica and a rehearsal of the main study, since it 
deals with administrative and organisational problems of the whole study. Several scholars 
(e.g Oppenheim, 1992; Sproull, 1988) have analysed the following goals of pilot studies: 
the costs and duration of the main study, effectiveness of the study’s organisation, 
suitability of research methods and instruments, response rate,  ascertain the degree of 
survey population, discover weaknesses and limitations.  
 
In this research, before the distribution of questionnaires, a pilot study to representative 
firms was conducted in order to test the response of the subjects to the overall research 
design. Dillman (1978) suggested that the pilot study is carried out in order to ensure that 
the questions measure what they are supposed to, the questions are interpreted similarly by 
all respondents, close-ended questions are applied to all respondents, the questionnaire 
creates a positive impression, questions are answered correctly and the questionnaire does 
not suggest any bias.  
 
Adopting Dillman’s pretesting method, two versions of the questionnaire were constructed 
(English and Greek). Although Greek executives are well educated, questionnaires have 
been translated into Greek in order to increase the response rate. The Table 3:2 summarises 
the steps of pretesting procedures adopted by Dillman (2000) that the researcher has 
followed. 
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Table 3:2 Survey Pilot Process (Adopted by Dillman, 2000) 
 
Stage 1 Questionnaire has been tested by executives with academic affiliation 
to ensure question completeness, efficiency, relevancy and format 
appropriateness. 
Stage 2 Observation and “think loud” protocols test if the respondents could 
complete the survey. Interviews have been conducted as well. 
Stage 3 Small pilot study that completed all the procedures proposed in the 
main study. 
Stage 4 During the last revision process, reseachers have checked for for typos 
and errors prior to the questionnaire distribution. 
 
When collecting data in one language and presenting the findings in another, researchers 
have to make a number of translation-related decisions. Important techniques for 
eliminating translation-related problems include back translation, consultation and 
collaboration with other people during the translation process and pre-testing or piloting 
(for example, interviews) whenever this is possible. Back translation was used for the 
purpose of the study. Back translation is a common technique used in cross-cultural 
research which involves looking for equivalents (Ercikan, 1998, p. 545; Warwick and 
Osherson, 1973, p. 30). This is done by: 
• the translation of items from the source language to the target language 
•  independent translation of these back into the source language 
• ‘the comparison of the two versions of items in the source language until 
ambiguities or discrepancies in meaning are clarified or removed’  
Brislin et al. (1973) suggested the following five translation techniques for cross-cultural 
studies:  
• comparisons of meaning between the original and back-translated forms  
•  comparisons of meaning, by bilinguals other than the translator, between the 
original and translated form  
• answering questions written about the content of the original version; the questions 
should be answered correctly by people who have read only the target version 
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•  comparing performance to instructions written in the original and in the target 
language 
•  Administering both versions of attest or questionnaire to a sample of bilinguals. 
These techniques are incorporated in our translation. In the back translation process of our 
questionnaire four bilingual academic members of staff from Brunel and Cardiff 
University were voluntary participants. 
A pilot questionnaire was distributed to few Greek executives in order to ensure question 
completeness, efficiency and format completeness. The pilot questionnaire was distributed 
in the beginning of March 2007 (Appendix A). Eight executives from Greek listed 
organisations in the ASE completed this questionnaire. The purpose was to test that its 
tools were correct, suitable, reliable and valid. The Greek executives that we chose for our 
pilot study were also members of Greek academic community who have the knowledge to 
make recommendations regarding the questionnaires. In fact, the pre-test questionnaire 
allowed us to get constructive feedback for the questionnaire. Greek executives provided 
numerous insightful recommendations regarding question wording, elimination of several 
questions, replacement of questions, and format of questions.  
It is worth mentioning the pilot study was conducted, the respondents suggested that two 
characteristics of strategic decision-making process be omitted in the final questionnaire. 
The politicisation and problem-solving dissension include certain elements that were 
difficult to be fully understood by the Greek managers. Therefore, they have been 
incorporated in the construct of strategic decision-making.  
All these issues were adhered to in the final questionnaire used for the data generation in 
this survey which was distributed to Greek listed organisations in April 2007 (Appendices 
B and C). The figures from the pilot study have not been included in the final data set. The 
purpose of conducting a pilot study was to ensure that the respondents understand the 
questionnaire and not to collect data. 
Two weeks after the first round of the email questionnaire, we started the follow-up 
process of the questionnaire accompanied by cover letter explaining the importance of the 
study. The second follow up of questions took place at the end of May 2007. In order to 
convince executives to fill in our questionnaire, we made numerous telephone calls and 10 
personal visits to the companies. The procedures of survey development and survey 
implementation are presented in Table 3:3. 
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Table 3:3 Survey Procedure adopted by Dillman (2000) 
Su
rv
ey
 
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t 
Questionnaire design • Ordering questions including cover 
letter.  
• Description of the importance of the 
study. 
• Use of graphic and photo reduction 
• Consistent use of large and small 
letter and different color schemes 
• Attach the questionnaire to the email 
Pilot Questionnaire • Send out pilot questionnaire 
• Analyse the feedback from the pilot 
• Finalise the questionnaire according to 
the feedback 
Su
rv
ey
 Im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
 
 
Questionnaire Distribution • Check and back up the responses from 
time to time 
• This process last for two weeks 
Questionnaire follow-up • Analyse responses from the first round, 
try to identify the reason why some 
respondents have not fill it in the 
questionnaire. 
• Explain the importance of the study 
again and that all information are 
treated confidentially 
• Check and back up the responses from 
time to time. 
• This process lasts two-four weeks. 
2nd Questionnaire follow-up • Final reminding to the recipients to 
answer the questionnaire. 
• Check and back up the responses from 
time to time. 
 
 
3.6.2 Ethical Consideration and Confidentiality 
It is quite important in the early stage of the study to take into consideration the ethical 
aspects of the proposed study. Ethics refer to the rules of conduct codes or set of principles 
(Reynolds, 1979). The research was conducted according to the economic and social 
research council (ESRC) research ethics framework. In the current study, the participants 
were informed about the nature and purpose of the study and they were assured about the 
anonymity and the confidentiality of the data. Both English and Greek versions of the 
questionnaire were designed according to ESRC ethical guidelines. Prior to the distribution 
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of the questionnaire to the participants, the questionnaires received the ethical approval 
from Brunel University Ethics Committee.   
 
3.7 Conceptualisation and Operationalisation of Variables  
Researchers use the following sequence for quantitative research: first, conceptualisation, 
followed by operationalisation, followed by applying the operational definition or 
measurement in order to collect data (Neuman, 2006). 
 
Conceptualisation is “the process of taking a construct and refining it by giving it a 
conceptual or theoretical definition” (Neuman, 2006, p. 182). Operationalisation is defined 
as “the process of converting concepts into empirical referents, or of quantifying concepts 
for the purpose of measuring their values, such as occurrence, strength and frequency” 
(Sarantakos, 2005). Actually, it is employed when concepts are abstract or unclear and 
translates these constructs into synonymous empirical referents. 
 
3.7.1 External Corporate Environment  
Environment is an important parameter in both strategy and organisational theory since it 
is related to the evolution and performance of the organisation (Romanelli and Tushman, 
1988). Researchers have investigated environment through two different perspectives: 
information uncertainty and resource dependence (e.g. Duncan, 1972; Tung, 1982; March 
and Simon, 1958). Emery and Trist (1965) suggested a typology of four types of 
organisational environments: placid, randomised environment; placid, clustered 
environment; distributed-reactive environment and turbulent fields. Aldrich (1979) 
identified six dimensions of organisational environments: capacity, homogeneity-
heterogeneity, stability, concentration, consensus and turbulence. Dess and Beard (1984) 
condensed Aldrich’s dimensions into three: munificence, dynamism and complexity. 
 
Environment can be measured either by objective (Aldrich, 1979) or by perceptual 
measurements (Weick, 1969). Objective environments are relevant to primary strategy 
making (domain selection), while perceived environment is input to secondary strategy 
making (domain navigation). Current literature suggests that there are two perceptions of 
organisational environment, first, it is the task environment, which is defined as all aspects 
of the environment “potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attainment” (Dill, 1958, 
p. 410). Second, the environment that focuses on large corporate systems is called 
institutional environment and includes societal, demographic, economic, political and 
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international elements (Scott, 1987). Tan and Litschert (1994), Khandwalla (1977), Jauch, 
Osborn and Glueck (1980) examined eight environmental segments: competitors, 
customers, suppliers, technological, regulatory, economic, socio-cultural and international. 
Respondents were asked to rate their perception in terms of environmental circumstances: 
hostility, dynamism and complexity. Respondents were asked to evaluate the following 
statements according to the above eight environmental segments: 
 
1. to what extent do you think that these factors have impact on your firm? 
2. to what extent do you think that factors have become more favourable to your firm? 
3. to what extent do you think these factors have become more predictable? 
4. in each sector, how much change have you observed in last five years? 
5. in each sector, how many factors does your firm need to deal with ? 
6. following the previous question, are those factors different from or similar to each 
other? 
 
A seven-point scale was used in order to measure environmental hostility, dynamism and 
complexity (1” for similar, “4” for about middle and “7” different). 
 
Other scholars have attempted to measure different types of environment using the 
following operationalisations: 
 
Environmental Dynamism/instability: Three values are used in order to capture 
environment: 1.dynamism in marketing practices, 2. competitor dynamism and 3. customer 
dynamism. Each scale is measured in a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from “1” (no 
change) to “7” (very frequent changes) (Achrol and Stern, 1988). The concept of instability 
refers to volatility or difficult to predict discontinuities in the industry (Aldrich, 1979). 
Volatility is measured by the following indicators: 1. net sales and 2. operating income in 
the dominant industry over the period 1969-73 (Keats and Hitt, 1988). 
 
Environmental Munifence-Hostility: is measured by the following indicators: 1. riskiness, 
2. stressfulness and 3. dominance over the company (Khandwalla, 1977). 
According to Aldrich (1979), environmental capacity, which is called by Dess and Beard 
(1984) “munificence”, refers to the availability of resources to support growth. The 
primary indicator of growth is the industry sales or market sales (Dess and Beard, 1984). 
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Keats and Hitt (1988) measured munificence by net sales and operating income in the 
dominant industry over the period 1969-73. 
 
Turbulence: Miller, Burke and Glick (1998) developed the following statements and they 
asked the respondents whether they agree or disagree. Each statement was ranged between 
“1” strongly disagree to “7” strongly agree. The following indicators are used to measure 
turbulence: 1. products/services become obsolete very slowly in your firm’s principal 
industry, 2. your firm seldom needs to change its marketing practices to keep up with 
competitors. 3. consumer demand and preferences are very easy to forecast in your firm’s 
principal industry and 4. your firm must frequently change its production/service 
technology to keep up with competitors and/or consumer preferences.  
For the purpose of our study, we have adopted the measurements of Tan and Litschert 
(1994), Khandwalla 1977), Jauch, Osborn and Glueck (1980) in order to capture 
environmental dimensions. 
 
3.7.2 Board Structure 
 
Board Size represents the number of board members. It is defined as the absolute number 
of directors in the boards (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Golden and 
Zajac, 2001; Muth and Donaldson, 1998; O’Sullivan and Diacon, 1999; Dalton et al., 
1999; Cahan et al., 2005; Goodstein et al., 1994; Randoy and Jensen, 2004; Beiner et al., 
2004; Filatotchev, 2005).  
 
 Outside or External Directors are characterised as those with no relationship with the firm 
(Daily and Dalton, 1997; Mallette and Fowler, 1992). Outside director proportion is 
measured by counting the absolute number of outside directors with no personal or 
professional ties to the firm (Daily and Dalton, 1997; Cochran, Wood and Jones, 1985; 
Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker, 1994; Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid and Zimmermann, 2004; 
Bergh, 1995).  
 
Inside or Internal Directors are characterised those that are employees of the firm (Harris 
and Shimizu, 2004). Inside directors are measured by the number of insiders in the board 
divided by board members (Cahan, Chua and Nyamori, 2005; Johnson, Hoskisson and 
Hitt, 1993; Certo, Covin, Daily and Dalton, 2001).  
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Independent Directors are characterised as the outside directors with no personal or 
professional relationships with the organisation (Daily and Dalton, 1997). Independent 
directors in this study are defined as the individuals with no ties with employees or 
managers of the firm. 
 
Interlocking Directorates: are characterised as the directors that serve simultaneously to 
more than two boards (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Ruigrok, Peck and Keller (2006) as well 
as Kiel and Nicholson (2003) defined as interlocking directorship the situation where an 
individual simultaneously has a mandate on the Board of Directors and the Management 
Team of two or more companies, which are adopted for the purpose  of the study. 
 
Executives Versus Non-Executive Directors: Non-executives are board members with no 
executive responsibilities who are appointed as part-timers in order to protect shareholders’ 
interests while executive directors are regarded as full time employees that are responsible 
for the organisational strategic and operational aspects (Weir, 1997). Staikouras et al. 
(2007) defined executives as directors who are currently employed by the firm, related 
company officers or immediate family members of firm employees.  Non-executive 
directors are members of the board who are not top executives, retired executives, former 
executives, relatives of the CEO or the chairperson of the Board, or outside corporate 
lawyers employed by the firm. For the purpose of the study, the above measurements for 
executive and non-executive directors are adopted.  
 
Board Leadership Structure or CEO Duality: occurs when the same person holds both the 
CEO and Chairperson’s positions in an organisation (Rechner and Dalton, 1991). Board 
leadership structure is characterised as a binary variable coded as “0” for those firms 
employing the joint structure and “1” for those firms employing the separate board 
leadership structure, measurement that has been adopted by various researchers and us 
(e.g. Daily and Dalton, 1993; Kesner and Johnson, 1990; Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Muth 
and Donaldson, 1998; Petra, 2005; Boyd, 1995; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998, Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003). 
 
Gender: In this study, respondents were asked to count the overall number of male and 
female board members.  
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3.7.3 Boards of Directors’ Demographic Characteristics 
 
Age is measured as the chronological age of the executive (Thomas, Litschert and 
Ramaswany, 1991; Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Guthrie and Datta, 1997; Datta and 
Rajagopalan, 1998; Davidson, Worrell and Cheng, 1990; Herrmann and Datta, 2006). In 
the study, the age of the board members is calculated as the average age of the executives. 
Responses are grouped in nine categories, each covering a period of five years, starting 
from a class of 25 to 29 and ending with a class of 65 and above. 
 
Educational Background: Educational background of top management team is defined as 
the executives’ fields in the highest level of education (Thomas and Ramaswamy, 1996; 
Hitt and Tyler, 1991).  
 
Finkelstein (1988) measured CEO education background using the following 7-point scale 
based on the highest degree earned by the CEO: 1=high school, 2=some college, 
3=undergraduate degree, 4=some graduate school, 5=master’s degree, 6=attended 
programme and 7=doctoral degree. For the purpose of the study, the above measurements 
are adopted and modified according to the Greek reality. Educational background is 
measured by using a 4-level scale: 1=high school, 2=bachelor’s degree, 3=college 
4=master’s degree and 5=doctoral degree.  In addition, respondents were asked to indicate 
the area of highest educational background from eight modified disciplines used by 
Hambrick, Seung Cho and Chen (1996): engineering, sciences, business administration, 
business, social sciences-economics-sociology, marketing, civil engineering and other. 
 
Functional Background: Top management team functional background is defined as the 
area in which top management team had spent more years (Carpenter and Fredrickson, 
2001; Michael and Hambrick, 1992). Functional background is distinguished into the 
following eight categories: 1. production –operations, 2. R&D and engineering, 3. 
accounting and finance, 4. management and administration, 5. marketing and sales, 6. law, 
7. personnel and industrial relations, 8. other (Carpenter and Fredrickson, 2001; Michael 
and Hambrick, 1992). Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) attempted to categorise the 
functional background according to sixteen categories Chief Executive Officer, Chief 
Operations Officer, Finance/Treasurer, Planning, Personnel, Public Affairs, General 
Counsel/Secretary, Operations/Field Service, Marketing/Sales/Customer Service, 
Information Systems, International, Maintenance/Field Service, General Management, 
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Other Corporate Staff, Accounting /Controller and Other. Following Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) classified functional backgrounds into two categories: throughput functions (coded 
as “0”) for marketing, sales, merchandising as well as product research and development 
(R&D) and non-throughput functions (coded as “1”) such as: productions/operations, 
engineering, finance and accounting.  In this study, respondents were asked to specify their 
functional background within the following seven categories:  
finance treasurer, general management, information systems, marketing/sales/customer 
services, accounting/controller, manufacturing and sales and engineering. 
 
Industry Tenure: Industry tenure is defined as the number of years that the executive has 
been employed in a specific industry (Hambrick, Geletkanyez and Fredrickson, 1993; 
Geletkanycz and Black, 2001).  
 
Organisational Tenure: Iaquinto and Fredrickson (1997) as well as Hambrick, 
Geletkanyez and Fredrickson (1993) defined it as the number of years an individual has 
worked for this organisation. This is the common definition of organisational tenure, which 
has been adopted by most researchers (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Thomas, Litschert 
and Ramaswamy, 1991, Hambrick et al., 1996; Singh and Harianto, 1989b; Schnake et al., 
2005; Herrmann and Datta, 2006). Greek executives’ organisational tenure was computed 
as the average organisational tenure of board members.  
 
Position Tenure: defined it as the number of years the executive has spent in the current 
position (Hambrick, Geletkanyez and Fredrickson, 1993). In this study, the measurements 
used by various scholars are adopted (Smith et al. 1994; Ocasio, 1994; Young and 
Buchholtz, 2002) and Boards of Directors were asked to specify the number of years that 
they have been serving the company from the current position.  
 
International Experience was calculated by the number of years the executives have spent 
abroad (Sambharya, 1996; Hermann and Datta, 2006). 
Female Directors:  Female ratio was measured as the ratio of female directors to total 
directors (Bonn et al., 2004). 
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3.7.4 Involvement in the Strategic Decision Making 
 
Involvement in strategic decision-making is an abstract construct and therefore, it is 
difficult to be measured. Board involvement has been divided into two categories 
formation phase and evaluation phase (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) measured board involvement by asking the executives of each 
company to assess the degree to which the board is involved in decision management and 
decision control with the following questions: how often do board member initiate issues 
on the agenda, how often does  Board of Directors change solutions suggested by the CEO, 
how often do suggestions for solutions originate within Board of Directors and finally, how 
often does Board of Directors conduct a follow-up review of a large investment? An 
ordinal scale range from one (“almost never”) to five (“almost always”) is used in order to 
evaluate the extent to which Boards of Directors  involve in the strategic decision –making. 
The first three items indicate a high level of involvement in decision-making and the fourth 
and fifth item indicate a high level of involvement in decision control Fama and Jensen 
(1983).  
 
Judge and Zeithaml (1992) constructed two scales in order to measure board involvement: 
involvement in the formation stage of the strategic decision-making process and 
involvement in the evaluation stage. Respondents were asked to rate statements listed 
below that best describes the board’s level of involvement. 
 
Formation of New Strategic Decisions 
 
1. The board is usually not involved with the formation of strategic decisions 
2. The board usually ratifies strategic proposals that are formed solely by top 
management 
3. The board usually asks probing questions and then ratifies strategic proposals that 
are formed primarily by top management 
4. The board usually asks probing questions which lead to revisions of strategic 
proposals that are formed by top management 
5. The board usually helps to form strategic decisions with top management in board 
meetings 
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6. The board usually helps to form strategic decisions with top management within 
and between board meetings 
7. The board usually forms strategic decisions separate from top management 
 
Evaluation of Prior Strategic Decisions 
 
1. The board is usually not involved with monitoring the progress of strategic 
decisions 
2. The board usually accepts the evaluation given to it by top management without 
asking probing questions 
3. The board usually accepts the evaluation given to it by top management after 
asking probing questions 
4. The board usually determines the timing and criteria of evaluation, but that 
information is supplied by top management and it is rarely challenged by the board 
5. The board usually determines the timing and criteria of evaluation, but that 
information is supplied by top management and it is often challenged by the board 
6. The board usually determines the timing and criteria of evaluation and it often 
requests additional information after receiving the progress report from top 
management 
7. The board usually collects its own information about the progress of the strategic 
decision in addition to top management reports 
 
Board involvement in the strategic decision -making process was operationalised by using 
the measurements of Judge and Zeithaml (1992) for formation of new strategic decisions 
and evaluation of prior strategic decisions. The above statements were modified and the 
respondents were asked to evaluate them using 7-point likert scale (“1” for never and “7” 
for always). In addition, two other parameters were incorporated; the frequency of board 
meetings: once a year, every six month, quarterly, every month, every fifteen days, every 
week as well as the length of board meetings: more than two hours, two hours, one and 
half  hour, one hour, 30 minutes, less than 30 minutes. 
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3.7.5 Strategic Decision Process Dimensions 
 
The strategic decision making process has been examined and interpreted by different 
perspectives: content research as well as process research. Different scholars have provided 
various measurements regarding the strategic-decision making process. 
 
Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers (1998) as Papadakis (1998) have been adopted by 
several researchers’ seven strategic making process dimensions and they have measured 
them. 
 
Rationality/Comprehensiveness 
Fredrickson (1984) developed rationality/comprehensiveness dimension. There are five 
stages in the strategic decision process that are measured (i.e., the situation diagnosis, 
alternative generation, alternative evaluation, making of the final decision and decision 
integration). For each of these stages, Fredrickson (1984) used the following eight 
rationality elements for rationality of strategic decision-making which have been adopted 
for the purpose of the study (i.e. extent of scheduled meetings, assignment of primary 
responsibility, information-seeking activities, symmetric use of external sources, 
employees involved, use of specialised consultants, years of historical data view, and 
functional expertise of people involved).  
 
Financial Reporting 
 The financial reporting activities consist of four items: 1. use of NPV-IRR methods, 2. 
Use of net present value as capital budgeting method, 3. inclusion of pro forma financial 
statements, 4. detailed cost studies, 5. incorporation of the strategic decision into company-
wide financial plans (Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers, 1998; March, Barwise, Thomas 
and Wensley, 1988). The measurement scale ranges from “1” strongly disagree to “7” 
strongly agree. 
 
Rule Formalisation/Standardisation Process 
 The following items are used in order to measure the degree of 
formalisation/standardisation of the strategic-decision process:  1. the extent to which there  
exists a written procedure guiding the process, 2. existence of a formal procedure to 
identify alternative ways of action, 3. formal screening procedures, 4. formal documents 
guiding the final decision, 5. predetermined criteria for strategic decision evaluation  
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(Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers, 1998). The measurement scale ranges from “1” 
strongly disagree to “7” strongly agree. 
 
Hierarchical Decentralisation 
 The forthcoming measurements capture the extent of vertical decentralisation of the 
decision-making during all the phases of the process.  Hierarchical levels include owner-
main shareholder, CEO, first-level directors, middle management and lower management. 
Values are ranged between “1” no involvement at that stage to “5” active involvement and 
influence (Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers, 1998; Tannenbaum, 1968; Grinyer, Al-
Bazzaz and Yasai-Ardekani, 1986).However, in this study the above statement have been 
measured on a 7-point Likert scale. 
 
Lateral Communication 
 Lateral communication is measured as the degree of balanced participation of all major 
departments in the five stages of the process: finance-accounting, production, marketing-
sales, personnel and purchasing department (Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers, 1998; 
Tannenbaum, 1968). 
 
In this study, the following measurements have been adopted by various scholars (e.g. 
Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers, 1998; Pettigrew, 1973; Mintzberg, Raisinghani and 
Theoret, 1976; Tannenbaum, 1968; Grinyer, Al-Bazzaz and Yasai-Ardekani, 1986; Miller, 
1987): 
• Comprehensiveness/rationality 
• financial reporting 
• rule formalisation/standardisation process 
•  hierarchical decentralisation  
•  lateral communication. 
 
3.7.6 Innovation 
 
Innovation is defined as the creation or adoption of new ideas, products or services (Daft, 
1978). Damanpour and Schneider (2006) measured innovation by using the following three 
variables: initition, adoption decision and implementation of ten administrative 
programmes associated with the new public management (NPM) movement of government  
reinvention (OECD, 1995; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) that were adopted by local 
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governments between 1992 and 1997. Examples of programmes used in the survey are: 
training government, employees for customer service and for decision-making, contracting 
out government services to outside vendors, partnering with private business, training 
neighbourhood organisations for decision-making and conducting surveys to measure 
citizens’ expectation and satisfaction. The data was drawn from the International 
City/County Management Association (ICMA) about “reinventing government” in the 
United States. ICMA is a professional organisation that conducts frequent surveys on a 
variety of public sector topics and its sample consists of municipalities and and counties 
meeting size selection criteria. 
 
Initiation was measured by the organisation’s proposal to request funding for each 
programme from the City Council (“0”for no request for funding, “1” for request for 
funding). Adoption decision is measured by the degree of support for programme funding 
(“0” for no funding, “1” for partial funding, “2” for full funding). 
Implementation is operationalised by the degree of employment of the programme in the 
firm (“0” for not implemented, “1” for sometimes implemented, “2” always implemented). 
 
Miller and Friesen (1983, pp. 32-33) measures innovation by using a 7-point likert-scale by 
asking the respondent to rate in the following five statements the degree to which these 
methods affect the innovation. 
1. The rate, relative to competitors, of new product/service introduction by the firm 
(“1” for the rate has decreased very much to “7” for that has increased very much). 
2. The rate of change in your methods of production or rendering of services (“1” for 
rate of change that has declined much to “7” for change that has accelerated 
rapidly). 
3. Risk taking by key executives of the firm in seizing and exploring “chancy” growth 
opportunities (“1” has decreased very much to “7” has increased very much). 
4. In dealing with its competitors, the firm (“1” for resorts much more to a live and let 
live philosophy to “7” has become more aggressive). 
5. Seeking of unusual, novel solutions by senior executives to problems via the use of 
“idea men”, “brainstorming” etc.) (“1” has become less common to “7” has become 
much more common). 
 
Zahra (1996) used 5 items in order to capture innovation items covering the creation and 
introduction of products, emphasis on R&D investments and commitment to patenting. 
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Executives were asked to rate the firm’s actual entrepreneurial activities using a five-point 
scale (“1” for strongly disagree to “5” strongly agree) according to the following 
statements:  
Over the past three years, this company: 
1. Has heavily spent (well above the industry average) on research and development 
(R&D) 
2. Has maintained world-class research and development ( R&D) facilities 
3. Has introduced a large number of new products to the market 
4. Has acquired significantly more patents than its major competitors  
5. Has pioneered the development of breakthrough innovations in its industry 
 
Bantel and Jackson (1989) divided innovation into two categories: technical and 
administrative and developed 55 items in order to measure it.  They asked respondents to 
generate a list of innovations and to indicate their perceptions in terms of a) the percentage 
of bankers that have adopted the innovation, b) customer acceptance and c) financial 
investment required. 
 
Huse (1994) develops 12 items in order to capture innovation. Using a 5-point Likert scale 
(beginning from “1” very low emphasis to “5” very high emphasis), respondents rated the 
firm’s actual emphasis on each item. Corporate innovation is divided into three categories: 
product innovation (4 items), process innovation (5 items) and organisational innovation (3 
items). 
 
Product Innovation 
1. Being the first company in the industry to make new products 
2. Creating new products for fast market introductions 
3. Creating new variations to existing product line 
4. Increasing the revenue from new products less than 3 years old 
 
Process Innovation 
1. Being the first company in the industry to introduce new technology 
2. Being the first company in the industry to introduce technological improvements 
3. Creating innovative technologies 
4. Investing heavily in cutting edge process technology-oriented  R&D 
5. Developing radically new technology 
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Organisational Innovation 
1. Developing systems that encourage initiatives  and creativity among employees 
2. Encouraging innovation in the organisation 
3. Supporting an organisation unit  
 
For the purpose the research, 12 items divided in three different categories (product 
innovation, process innovation and organisational innovation) suggested by Huse were 
used to capture innovation but instead of 5-point likert scale, a 7-point Likert scale was 
used. 
 
3.7.7 Organisational Characteristics 
 
Organisational Size: According to Mintzberg (1979) and Child (1974), organisational size 
can be measured as by the total number of employees or by sales (Fich, 2005; Certo, 
Covin, Daily and Dalton, 2001) which was adopted for the purpose of the study. 
 
Organisational Age was calculated as the number of years elapsed between the founding 
and the present year (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Tsui et. al., 2006). 
 
Organisational Performance: The performance of the organisation is divided into two 
main categories: financial and operational performance. Financial performance, which is 
the dominant model in strategic research (Hofer, 1975) consists of the following 
measurements: sales growth, profitability (reflected by ratios such as return on investment, 
return on sale, and return on equity), earnings per share, market-to-book or stock-market 
returns (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). Operational performance includes non-
financial measurements such as market-share, new product introduction, product quality, 
marketing effectiveness, manufacturing value-added and measures of technological 
efficiency (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). Different scholars use different 
measurements in order to capture organisational performance.  
 
In this study, the measurements developed by Khandwalla (1976) and Tan and Litschert 
(1994) were used in order to capture the firm’s relative performance compared to 
competitors: after-tax return on total assets, after-tax return on total sales, total sales 
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growth, overall performance and success and competitive positions. The response format 
was a 5-point Likert scale (bottom 20 percent to top 20 percent). 
 
3.8 Methodology for Data Analysis 
 
3.8.1 Introduction 
 
“Substantive problems must thus be translated into the vocabulary of social inquiry… 
Working out a way of thinking through the choices and some appropriate sequence of tasks 
will allow you to answer a research question” (Alford, 1998, p. 25). 
 
The selection of data analysis methods depends on whether the data will be qualitative or 
quantitative. Qualitative researchers focus on the knowledge of research setting; avoid 
distancing themselves from people or events of the study. The researcher is personally 
involved in the research and he or she is sensitive to prior assumptions (Neuman, 2006). 
However, quantitative researchers endeavour to achieve objectivity and integrity, therefore, 
they apply objective technology such as precise statements, standards techniques, 
numerical measurements, statistics and replication (Neuman, 2006). As Porter (1995, p. 7 
74) has argued: “Ideally, expertise should be mechanised and objectified....grounded in 
specific techniques…. This ideal of objectivity is a political as well as scientific one. 
Objectivity means rule of law, not of men. It implies the subordination of personal interests 
and prejudices to public standards”.  
As adopters of the positivist research, we attempt to apply quantitative research in our 
work. 
 
3.8.2 Variables 
 
Variables have been categorised into four main categories: interval/ratio variables: these 
are variables where the distances between the categories are identical across the range of 
categories; ordinal variables: these are variables whose categories can be rank ordered but 
the distances between the categories are not equal across the range; nominal/categorical  
variables: these comprise categories that cannot be rank ordered and finally, dichotomous 
variables: these contain data that have only two categories (Bryman and Bell, 2003, p. 
241). 
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Multivariable indicator or multiple-item measures of concepts, like Likert scale produces 
strictly ordinal variables (Bryman and Bell, 2003, p. 240). After coding the variables, use 
SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) version 13 in order to analyse them. A 
summary of the techniques used for data analysis in the study are presented below: 
descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, factor analysis, regression analysis and GLM 
(General Linear Model). 
 
3.8.3 Classification of Statistical Techniques 
 
For the analysis of our variables univariate and bivariate analysis will be employed. 
Univariate analysis occurs when one variable is analysed at a time and bivariate analysis 
occur when two variables at a time are analysed in order to test any interrelationship 
between variables. Univariate analysis includes frequency tables, diagrams, measures of 
tendency (i.e. arithmetic mean, median, mode). Popular univariate techniques include chi-
square, t-test, z-test and GLM (General Linear Mode). The bivariate analysis includes 
contingency tables, Pearson’s r, Spearman’s rho, Phi and Cramer’s V (Bryman and Bell, 
2003). In our case, univariate techniques such as descriptive analysis and GLM analysis 
and the bivariate technique of correlation analysis are employed for the purpose of the 
undergoing study. 
 
Multivariate analysis is a statistical method that deals with one or more variables. It can be 
examined either by defining dependent or independent variables or treating them equally 
(Bryman and Cramer, 2001).  
 
3.8.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive analysis is a univariate analysis which consists of frequency tables, diagrams, 
measures of central tendency (arithmetic mean, median, and mode) and measures of 
dispersion (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
 
3.8.5 Correlation Analysis  
 
It examines the relationships between variables describing the direction and degree of 
association between them. A correlation matrix includes the values of the correlation 
coefficients for the variables involved. (Robson, 2002). A correlation is very low if the 
145 
 
coefficient has a value under 0.20,  low between 0.21 and 0.40, moderate between 0.41 and 
0.70, high between 0.71 and0.91 and very high if it is over 0.91 (Pfeifer, 2000). Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient was used in order to examine the strength of a 
correlation and whether is appropriate to proceed toward subsequent analysis.  
 
3.8.6 Factor Analysis  
 
Factor analysis is one of several multivariate techniques. Factor analysis is used in order to 
discern the underlying dimensions or regularity in phenomena. In effect, it summarises the 
information contained in a large number of variables into a smaller number of factors 
(Rummel, 1967). Factor analysis was used to inform the reduction of items to a more 
manageable number (Gerbing and Anderson, 1988). This technique attempts to determine 
the number and nature of the underlying factors affecting the relationship between a set of 
variables (Schwartz, 1971). A factor matrix is a table of coefficients that expresses the 
relationships between the variables and the underlying factors. The elements in the factor 
matrix are referred to as "factor loadings". Factor analysis is a statistical technique used for 
a large number of variables to establish interrelationships between variables. It is often 
used with multiple-indicator measures to see if the indicator tends to cluster one or more 
groups of indicators. This group of indicators are called factors (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
Principal component analysis with varimax rotation was used in order to reduce the 
number of variables (Hair et al., 1998). 
 
3.8.7 Regression Analysis  
 
Regression is used to examine the relationship between variables especially the extent to 
which a dependent variable is a function of one or more independent variables. It is used to 
analyse the relationship between a single dependent variable and several independent 
variables (Hair et al., 1998). The values of one are used to predict the values of others 
(Robson, 2002). Multiple regression analysis was used to examine the proposed research 
hypotheses. In this study we used multiple regreesions since we attempted to predict an 
outcome from various predictors (Field, 2005). Usually, the investigator seeks to ascertain 
the causal effect of one variable upon another. The regression line is described 
algebraically by the regression equation that expresses the relationship between two 
variables. In fact the straight line is defined by (1) the slope or gradient (usually denoted by 
b1) and (2) the point at which the line crosses the vertical axis of the graph (known as the 
intercept of the line b0). The general model can be expressed in the equation below: Yi= 
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(b0+b1Xi) +εi., where Yi is the outcome, Xi the participants’ score on the predictor 
variable, b1 is the gradient of the straight line fitted to the data and b0 the intercept of that 
line, b0 and b1 are regression coefficients and finally, εi represents the difference between 
the scores. 
 
T-statistic was used which is drawn from a t distribution if the null hypothesis is true. This 
statistic can be positive or negative as the parameter estimate from which it is derived is 
greater or less than the hypothesised true value of the parameter. 
The researcher conducted fundamental tests of the underlying assumptions for multiple 
regression analysis in order to ensure that the data were conducive to such analyses. For 
example, the relationships between the independent variables as well as the relationships 
between the dependent and independent variables were analysed using correlation 
coefficients for every potential pair of variables used in the study. Multicollinearity tests 
were developed using variance inflation factors (VIF) to test for the presence of 
multicollinearity between each of the independent variables. The results of the tests for 
multicollinearity depended upon the values of the VIFs for all independent variables.  
 
3.8.8 General Linear Model 
General Linear Model (GLM) is a statistical analysis method. The General Linear Model 
(GLM) underlies most of the statistical analyses that are used in applied and social 
research. It is the foundation for the t-test, analysis of variance (ANOVA), Analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA), regression analysis, and many of the multivariate methods 
including factor analysis, cluster analysis, multidimensional scaling, discriminant function 
analysis, canonical correlation. The general linear model can be expressed in the following 
equation: y = b0 + bx + e, where: y = a set of outcome variables, x = a set of pre-program 
variables or covariates, b0 = the set of intercepts (value of each y when each x=0), b = a set 
of coefficients, one each for each x. 
 
 GLM provides an advantage by allowing analysis of variance through splitting the data 
into levels and running the analysis using categorical data that define the levels. For the 
purpose of our study, we have used GLM as a univariate analysis method. GLM uses a 
model-specified data analysis. However, the major problem in using GLM is model 
specification as the exact equation that best summarises the data for the study has to be 
specified (Trochim, 2001). Apart from regression analysis, GLM was used in order to test 
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the hypothesised relationships. GLM was applied as a statistical tool because the 
independent variables of in the study consist of both continuous and categorical data. Also, 
the moderating effect of categorical data needed to be analysed. Moderation effect, by 
definition, implies a categorical variable because it involves a comparison of high and low 
values. In the current study, environment is proposed to be a moderator so using GLM the 
combined effect of high and low levels of certain strategies can be measured. 
For the hypothesis testing, two statistical techniques have been employed: multiple 
regression analysis and GLM analysis. The use of several statistical approaches might be 
explained by the fact that most of the studies in strategic management have used regression 
analysis to test the hypothesised relationships (i.e. Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers, 
1998; Elbanna and Child, 2007; Goll and Rasheed, 2005). Linear regression models often 
enter variables in a purely additive way, and thereby the resulting estimates concern effects 
of a single variable in isolation. The estimated effect does then not say anything about how 
the effect from the variable interacts with other factors, and is therefore context-
independent. GLM analysis was also employed since we have a mix of continuous and 
categorical independent variables. Employing two statistical analyses, the researcher 
attempted to have a holistic understanding of the nature of causal relationships.  
In addition, the researcher attempted to achieve a robust methodological approach using 
two statistical techniques. Also, the results from the two analyses would provide a clear 
understanding of the factors that influence strategic decisions in Greek organisations.  
Regarding the appropriateness of ordinal-scaled data in parametric tests, Stevens (1951, p. 
26), the inventor of the four levels of measurement stated "As a matter of fact, most of the 
scales used widely and effectively by psychologists are ordinal scales ... there can be 
involved a kind of pragmatic sanction: in numerous instances it leads to fruitful results." 
Based on the central limit theorem and Monte Carlo simulations, Baker, Hardyck, and 
Petrinovich (1966) and Borgatta and Bohrnstedt (1980) argued that for typical data, 
worrying about whether scales are ordinal or interval does not matter. Debate of statistics 
in terms of scale types (Luce et al., 1990) assert that the scale type of data is determined by 
the nature of the measurement and it constrains the hypotheses suggested and then tested. 
Modern approaches to data analysis such as Exploratory Data Analysis (e.g. Tukey, 1977; 
Velleman and Hoaglin, 1981 and Hoaaglin et al., 1983) stated that hypotheses often do not 
precede the data. Some social scientists (e.g. Blaikie, 2003; Santina and Perez, 2003 and 
Hren, 2004) believe that the ordinal-scaled data based upon a Likert-scale could be 
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converted into a form of -interval-scaled data. To be specific, when 50 five-point Likert-
scaled items are totaled as a composite score, the possible range of data value would be 
from 1 to 250. In this case, a more extensive scale could form a wider distribution. 
Nonetheless, this argument is not universally accepted. In our case, we have transformed 
the scale ordinal data into continuous by using principal component analysis and we have 
concluded with certain number of factors that describe each construct of our study. 
3.9 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, the research approach followed in the study was described and explained. 
The use of quantitative techniques: e-mail attached questionnaires, and secondary data and 
analysing the data using positivism theory which will enable the data to be conceptualised. 
The survey methodology and the proposed data collection methods have been analysed in 
the lights of their limitations. Being aware of the limitations and how they can affect the 
undertaken study, is likely to increase the validity and reliability of the research. The 
following chapter will present the descriptive findings of the study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Descriptive Research Findings 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an account of the descriptive findings generated from the empirical 
analysis detailed in Chapter Four. Descriptive statistics such as averages and measures of 
central tendency and dispersion are used in order to understand the structure of the data 
and to identify potential problems with the misconception of data (Peacock, 1998). 
However, Bailey (1982, p. 39) stated that: “In a descriptive study…the researcher may be 
more concerned with describing the extent of occurrence of a phenomenon that with 
studying its correlates. In such a case univariate presentation is in order”. 
 
Descriptive research findings are detailed and discussed on a construct by construct basis. 
The descriptive results will be presented in the following order: company’s background; 
board composition; board demographic characteristics; external corporate environment; 
involvement in sthe trategic decision-making process; characteristics of the strategic 
decision-making process; strategic choice of innovation and  organisational performance.  
 
4.2 Measures of Company’s Background: Descriptive Findings 
 
The empirical findings presented in Table 4:1a illustrate the organisational characteristics 
of 105 Greek listed organisations in ASE. The listed companies of the study employed on 
average 1481 employees range from 1 to 26208 with a mode of 790. 
The Greek organisations quoted on ASE are relatively young with an average age of 34 
with mode of 8 and with the oldest company being 128 while the youngest being 6 years 
old. The companies of the sample have registered on average 13 years in the ASE 
however; the majority (30%) of Greek firms was quoted in the last twenty years and only 
10% of them in the last 60 years. The fact that Greek organisations have recently entered 
the Athens Stock Exchange indicates that they do not have an institutional corporate 
governance mechanism. 
 
The respondent companies are engaged in the following economic sectors according to the 
classification of Athens Stock Exchange. The vast majority (17.1%) of 104 Greek firms 
were retailing followed by 12.4% industrial goods and services and 11.4 % financial 
services.  Findings from previous studies presented in Table 5:1b have a lot of similarities 
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with the Greek firms with respect to organisational characteristics such as organisational 
size, age and the economic sectors in which they are engaged.  
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Table 4:1a Measures of Company’s Background 
Company’s Background                
 Minimum Maximum Mean Median Mode SD n 
Number of Employees 1 26208 1481.98 600.0000 790.00 3296.93 103 
Organisational Age 6 128 33.78 26.500 24.00 24.95 104 
Number of Years Listed 1 95 13.36 9.0000 8.00 15.18 96 
Economic Sector                                                                                                                                                
Oil and Gas 1.9% 
Chemicals  1% 
Basic Resources 3.8% 
Construction and Material 9.6% 
Industrial Goods & Services 12.5% 
Food and Beverages 6.7% 
Personal and Household Goods 4.8% 
Insurance 1.9% 
Technology 3.8% 
Health Care 4.8% 
Retail 17.3% 
Media 1.9% 
Travel and Leisure 2.9% 
Telecommunications 3.8% 
Utilities 1.9% 
Banks 7.7% 
Financial Services 11.5% 
Port Services 1% 
Fish Farming 1% 
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Table 4: 1b Company’s Background of Relevant Studies 
Organisational 
Size 
Study Sample Size Mean  (no of employees) 
 Daily and Dollinger, 1992 486 Small Manufacturing 
Firms 
78.89 
 Rose, 2005 446 listed Danish Firms 3273 
Organisational 
Age 
Study Sample Size Mean (no of years) 
 Mak and Li, 2001 147 listed Singapore firms 12.83 
 Daily and Dollinger, 1992 486 Small Manufacturing 
Firms 
41.72 
 Boeker and Goodstein, 
1993 
67 firms consist of 43 
publicly traded and 24 
privately traded 
10.42 
 Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan, 
2004 
104 Australian manufacturing 
firms 
43.44 
 Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan, 
2004 
169 Japanese manufacturing 
firms 
63.73 
 Filatotchev and Bishop, 
2002 
251 IPO quoted firms in LSE 5 
 Qian, Li, Li and Qian, 2008 U.S firms on Fortune 500 24 
Economic 
Sectors of 
Listed Firms 
Study Sample Size Economic Sectors 
 Wan and Ong, 2005 212 listed Singapore 
companies 
40% manufacturing 
 Aloneftis, 1999 48 Cyprus listed firms 48% financial ,18.55% 
manufacturing and construction, 
10.5% tourism, 4.5% transportation 
and distribution, 2% retail and 7% 
other industrial categories 
 El Mehdi, 2007 Tunisian firms 48.2% wholesale and retail, 23.5% 
services, 19.2% manufacturing, 
18.8%banking, 6%finance and 
insurance 
 Bennett and Robson, 2004 U.K SMEs 58%manufacturing,  
42%business 
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4.3 Measures of Board Composition: Descriptive Findings 
 
The empirical results presented in Table 4:2a demonstrated Greek board composition 
characteristics. The average number of directors in Greek boards is 8; the majority of 
Greek companies consist of either 7 (24%) or 5 (20%) directors respectively.  
 
The average board size of Greek listed firms is similar to those boards operating in other 
countries mainly in Europe, in Australia and in New Zealand as it can be seen from Table 
4:2b. Regarding the board composition, the majority of Greek boardrooms consist of inside 
directors (mean: 3.76) rather than outside (mean: 2.57). On the contrary, the composition 
of other boards in Europe, in the United States and in Asia is characterised by a large 
proportion of outside directors (Table 4:2 b).  
 
Furthermore, Greek listed organisations seem to have a balance between executive and 
non-executive directors. The average number of executive directors in listed Greek 
organisation was 3.24 with a minimum of one and a maximum of eight board members. 
The majority of Greek organisations (28.6%) have three executive directors while the 
average board size is 8.   However, the average number of non-executive directors was 
3.77 range from one to eleven non-executive board members. The majority of Greek 
corporations (16.2%) have three non-executive directors. Companies operating in different 
cultural contexts tend to employ a larger proportion of non-executive directors as they have 
to comply with international corporate governance codes (Table 4:2b). It is worthy of 
mention that Greek listed firms have few independent and non-executive board members 
(mean: 2.36) in an average board size of eight. This is explained by the fact that most of 
Greek organisations are family businesses and sometimes the appointment of a board 
member is through personal ties or business contacts with the owner/shareholder of the 
firm (Papalexandri, 1992).  
 
Concerning the interlocking directorates, the majority of Greek listed firms (16.2%) have 
on average two board members that serve in another board as Table 4:2a indicates. Firms 
operating in other international contexts have more interlocking directors and 
consequently, greater access to information.  
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The board leadership structure in Greece is characterised by independent leadership 
structure. The majority of publicly traded firms (57.4%) have a separate leadership 
structure, while 42.6% have adopted the joint leadership approach where the positions of 
Chairman and CEO are fulfilled by different individuals. Similar to Greek boards, 
European boardrooms adopt the separate leadership structure compared to American 
boards which choose the CEO duality.  
 
Finally, the female representation in Greek boardrooms is very low (mean: 0.68). Boards 
of Directors as well as many managerial positions in Greece are considered to be male 
dominant.  
 
These findings confirm many preoccupations related to the hierarchical position of men 
and women in the society as well as the dominance in the business field.  It is worth 
mentioning that recent regulations encourage the female representation on Greek boards. 
The female representation in other boards in Continental Europe, in U.S and in Australia is 
considerably higher and ranges from 10 to 50% (Table 4:2b).  
 
 
a 
   Scale: (1) The position of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman are hold by the same individual, (2) The position of 
CEO and    Chairman are hold be different individuals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:2a Measures of Board Composition  
Board Composition 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Median Mode SD n 
Total Number of Board Members 3 17 8.09 7.0000 7.00 2.84 103 
Inside/Internal Board Members 1 9 3.76 3.0000 3.00 1.99 96 
Outside/External Board Members 0 9 2.57 2.0000 2.00 1.31 100 
Interlocking  Board Members 0 15 3.57 3.0000 2.00 3.11 83 
Executive Board Members 1 8 3.24 3.0000 3.00 1.64 93 
Non-Executive Board Members 1 11 3.77 3.0000 3.00 2.49 75 
Independent and Non-Executive 
Board Members 
1 7 2.36 2.0000 2.00 .94 87 
Female Board Members 0 4 .68 1.000 0 .78 102 
CEO Dualitya 1 
43 
(42.6%) 
2 
58 
(57.4%) 
1.57 2.000 2.00 .49692 101 
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Table 4:2b Measures of Board Composition in Other  Studies 
 
Board Composition 
Board Size Study Sample Mean 
(no of board members) 
 EUROPE   
 O’Sullivan and Diacon, 1999 43 UK mutual insurance firms 10 
 O’Sullivan and Diacon, 1999 86 property firms  7.5 
 Rose, 2005 446 Danish listed firms 5.2 
 Ruigrok, Peck and Tacheva, 
2007 
210 Swiss publicly listed firms 7.99 
 De Andres, Azofra and Lopez, 
2005 
450 non-financial firms from 
West European Countries and 
North America 
15 (German firms) 
9(Swiss and Italian firms) 
12-13 (American, British, 
Spanish, French and Belgian 
firms) 
 UNITED STATES   
 Yermack, 1996 452 industrial corporations  12.25 
 Carpenter and Fredrickson, 
2001 
300 U.S firms 6.03 
 Baker and Gompers, 2003 1116 IPO firms 6.07 
 Goodstein,Gautam and 
Boeker, 1994 
334 US hospitals 10.26 
 Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt, 
1993 
92 U.S restructuring firms  11.28 
 Byrd and Hickman, 1992 111 US firms making 128 
acquisitions  
12.1 
 Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990 1251 12.2 
 Ocasio, 1994 120 industrial corporations 10 
 Judge and Zeithaml, 1992 6800 general hospitals 12.9 
 ASIA   
 Wan and Ong, 2005 212 Singapore firms 7.4 
 Abdullah, 2004 Malaysian  firms 7.66 
 Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan, 
2004 
169 Japanese manufacturing 
firms 
27.62 
 Kim, 2007 199 publicly traded Korean 
firms 
10.51 
 AUSTRALIA   
 Kang, Cheng and Gray, 2007 100 Australian firms 8.19 
 NEW ZEALAND   
 Cahan, Chua and Nyamoki, 
2005 
112 public sector firms 5.85 
  
156 
 
Table 4:2b Measures of Board Composition in Other  Studies(cont.) 
 
Board Composition 
Inside versus 
Outside Board  
Members 
Study Sample % of Inside vs. Outside 
Board Members 
 Roosenboom (2005) IPOs firms 46.9% inside directors 
(current managers), 18.9% 
affiliated directors (outsider 
directors that are former 
managers of the company or 
the TMT of the firm) and 
34.2%independent directors 
(outside directors without 
affiliation) 
 Schellenger, Wood and 
Tashakori, 1989 
750 firms listed on Compustat 
Industrial tape and centre of 
research in Security prices  
64.7% outsiders 
 Ooghe and De Langhe, 2002 Belgian firms 60% outsiders 
 Hanson and Song, 2000 U.S firms  33.3%insiders, 66%outsiders 
including gray directors 
 Denis and Sarin, 1999 U.S firms 40% insiders, 20%affiliated 
outsiders and 
39%independnet outsiders 
 Fich, 2005 US firms listed in NYSE 62.9% outsiders 
 Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan, 
2004 
Japanese and Australian firms outsiders 
 Chaganti, Mahjan and 
Sharma, 1985 
US failed and non-failed firms  51% outsiders for failed 
firms 
49%of outsiders for non-
failed firms 
 Mak and Li, 2001 Singapore firms outsiders 
 Cahan, Chua and Nyamoeri, 
2005 
New Zealand firms  13% insiders, 17%grey 
directors and 
70%independent outsiders 
 De Andres, Azofra and Lopez, 
2005 
Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, 
Germany, Spain, France, U.K, 
Italy, Netherlands, U.S.A 
83% outsiders, 17% insiders 
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Table 4:2b Measures of Board Composition in Other  Studies(cont.) 
 
Board Composition 
Executive 
Board 
Members 
Study Sample % of Executive Board 
Members 
 O’Regan, O’Donnell, 
Kennedy Bontis and Cleary, 
2005 
Irish firms 95% executives 
 Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998 U.K firms 39% non-executives 
 Brennan and McDermott, 
2004 
Irish firms 39% executives, 61% non-
executives 
    
 
 
Table 4:2b Measures of Board Composition in Other  Studies(cont.) 
 
Board Composition 
Non-Executive 
Board 
Members 
Study Sample % of Non-Executive 
Members 
 De Andres, Azofra and Lopez, 
2005 
Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, 
Germany, Spain, France, U.K, 
Italy, Netherlands, U.S.A 
70% non-executives 
 Weir and Laing, 2001 U.K firms 83% three or more non-
executive directors 
 Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998 U.K firms 33% non-executives 
 O’Sullivan, 2000 175 largest quoted firms 41.17% non-executives 
 Bhagat and Black, 1999 U.S firms 76% non-executives 
 Kiel and Nicholson, 2003 Australian firms 69% non-executives 
 Wan and Ong, 2005 Singapore firms Non-executives 
 Yermack (1996) Large U.S firms Non-executives 
    
 
 
 
Table 4:2b Measures of Board Composition in Other  Studies(cont.) 
 
Board Composition 
Independent 
and Non-
Executive 
Board 
Members 
Study Sample %of  independent 
executives 
 Bhagat and Black, 1999 U.S firms 80% independent executives 
 Weir and Laing, 2001 320 quoted UK firms 24% independent executives 
 Bhagat and Black, 2002 U.S firms 70% independent executives 
 Anderson and Reeb, 2004 Non-Family firms 61.2 % independent 
executives 
 Clifford and Evans, 1997 Australian firms 35.2% independent 
executives 
 Chen and Jaggi, 2000 Hong Kong 28.2% independent 
executives 
 Ruigrok, Peck and Tacheva, 
2007 
Swiss firms 4.38% independent 
executives 
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Table 4:2b Measures of Board Composition in Other  Studies(cont.) 
Board Composition 
Interlocking 
Board 
Members 
Study Sample % of Interlocking 
Executives 
 Boyd, 1990 U.S firms 22 interlocking directors 
 Kiel and Nicholson, 2003 Australian quoted firms  20% of firms have more than 
10 interlocks 
 Phan, Lee and Lau, 2003 Singapore sample 6.62% interlocking 
executives 
 Fich, 2005 U.S quoted firms on NYSE 6.3% interlocking executives 
 Rose, 2005 Danish firms 5.2% interlocking executives 
 Zajac, 1988 Chemical firms in U.S 50 random groups of 53 
firms have on average 16 
interlocking executive 
    
 
 
Table 4:2b Measures of Board Composition in Other  Studies(cont.) 
Board Composition 
Leadership 
Structure 
Study Sample Joint or Separate 
leadership structure 
 EUROPE   
 Weir and Laing, 2001 U.K firms 17%joint leadership structure 
 Canyon and Mallin, 1997 U.K firms 14% joint leadership 
structure 
 Dahya and Travlos, 2000 U.K firms Separate leadership structure 
 Brown, 1997 480 U.K firms Separate leadership structure 
 ASIA   
 Wan and Ong, 2005 Singapore firms 30% joint leadership 
structure 
 Mak and Li, 2001 Singapore firms 48% joint leadership 
structure 
 Huafang and Jianguo, 2007 Chinese firms 11%joint leadership structure 
 Abdullah, 2004 Malaysian firms Separate leadership structure 
 UNITED STATES   
 Sundaramurthy, Mahoney and 
Mahoney, 1997 
U.S firms 18.4 % separate leadership 
structure 
 Aguilera, 2005 U.S firms Joint leadership structure 
 Dahya and Travlos, 2000 U.S firms Joint leadership structure 
 Daily and Dalton, 1997 U.S firms  on Business 
Week20% 
Separate leadership structure 
    
 
Table 4:2b Measures of Board Composition in Other  Studies(cont.) 
Board Composition 
Female 
Representation 
Study Sample %of females directors 
 Rose, 2007 Danish firms 22% females executives 
 Catalyst, 2003 U.S firms 13.6% females executives 
 Peterson and Philpot, 2007 U.S firms on Fortune 500 13.2% females executives 
 Pajo, McCregor and Cleland, 
1997 
New Zealand firms 28% females executives 
 Kang, Cheng and Gray, 2007 Australian firms 51%females executives 
 Tacheva and Huse, 2006 Norwegian firms 13.2%females executives 
 Ruigrok, Peck and Tacheva, 
2007 
Swiss firms 3% females executives 
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4.4 Measures of Demographic Characteristics of the Board: Descriptive Findings 
 
The Table 4:3a presents the demographic characteristics of Greek directors. The average 
age of board members of quoted firms on ASE was 45.94. The youngest director was 26 
years old while the oldest was 72. The mode identified in the age of board members is 33 
with a standard deviation of 11.81. European and American executives seem to be quite a 
lot older compared to their Greek counterparts (Table 4:3b).  
 
The majority of the executive respondents of this research questionnaire were male 
directors (86%) which is compatible with the low ratio of women in Greek boardrooms.  
 
Greek board members of listed organisations have a relatively high level of formal 
education with 46% of Master’s holders, followed by 35% of Bachelor’s degree, by 15% 
PhD and only 4% of High School diploma. Greek executives receive higher education 
compared to European and American counterparts (Table 4:3b). Greek directors have an 
educational specialty mainly in Business (34%), followed by Business Administration 
(28%), Social Sciences-Economics-Sociology (16%), Engineering (9%), Marketing (4%), 
Sciences (2%) and other (2%).  
 
Their functional background is mainly in general management (54.5%), in accounting 
(30.3%), in finance treasurer (4%), in marketing (3%), in banking (3%), in human 
resources (2%), in public affairs (1%), in maintenance (1%) and in operations (1%). 
However, other international counterparts have “throughtput” functional experience in 
production/operations, finance and accounting/data processing/information systems and 
process (Table 4:3b).  
 
Regarding the executives’ tenure, their industry tenure varies from 1 to 44 (mean: 14.41), 
company tenure varies from 1 to 37 (mean: 10.63) and position tenure varies from 1 to 32 
(mean: 7.88). In addition, Greek executives have relatively little international experience 
(mean: 1.4 years abroad). The results below reveal that board members of Greek 
organisations are committed to both organisation and position and seem to be quite 
reluctant for either rotation or career change. However, other board members in 
international cultural contexts have limited tenure within their company or the position 
they serve. 
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a    Scale : (1) Male, (2) Female 
 
b    Scale: (1) High-School Graduate, (2) Bachelor’s Degree, (3) Postgraduate Degree (Master’s), (4) PhD (Doctorate) 
 
c
 Scale: (1)Engineering, (2) Sciences(Physics, Chemistry, etc), (3) Business Administration, (4) Business (Accounting, 
Finance,HRM,etc), (5) Social Sciences-Economics-Sociology, (6) Marketing, (7) Civil Engineering, (8) Other  
 
d Scale: (1)Finance Treasurer, (2) Human Resource Management, (3)Public Affairs, (4)General 
Management,(5)Maintenance/FieldService, (6) Marketing/Sales/Customer, (7)Operations/Field Service, (8) 
Accounting/Controller, (9) Banker        
 
  
                                              Table 4.3a  Measures of Board’s Demographic Characteristics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Median Mode SD n 
Age  of Board 
Members 
26 72 45.94 46.0000 33.00 11.81 99 
Industry Tenure 
of Board 
Members 
1 44 14.41 11.5000 3.00 10.68 96 
Company 
Tenure of Board 
Members 
1 37 10.63 7.0000 4.00 9.26 97 
Position Tenure 
of Board 
Members 
1 32 7.88 5.0000 2.00 7.69 97 
International 
Experience of 
Board Members 
0 17 1.4 .0000 .00 3.37 80 
 
Board Demographic Characteristics                                  Response Scale                    Descriptive Scale                                                 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) n 
Gender of 
Board 
Members a        
86% 14% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 
Highest 
Educational 
Degree of 
Board 
Members b 
4% 35% 46% 15% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 
Highest 
Educational 
Specialty of 
Board 
Members  c 
9% 2% 28% 34% 16% 4% 2% N/A N/A 100 
Functional 
Background 
of Board 
Members d 
4% 2% 1% 54.5% 1% 3% 1% 30.3% 3% 99 
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            Table 4.3b: Board’s Demographic Characteristics in  Other Studies 
Age of Board 
Members 
Study Sample Mean (director’s age) 
 Bonn, Yoshikawa and 
Phan, 2004 
Australian firms 56.71 
 Kang, Cheng and Gray, 
2007 
Australian firms 60.5 
 Bonn, Yoshikawa and 
Phan, 2004 
Japanese firms 59.25 
 Dedman, 2000 U.K firms 54.64 
 Mcknight and Tomkins, 
2004 
U.K firms 53.5 
 Rose, 2005 Danish firms 57 
 Egri and Herman, 2000 Swiss firms 56.5 
 Egri and Herman, 2000 Korean firms 51.62 
 Egri and Herman, 2000 U.S and Canadian 
firms 
45 
 Guthrie and Datta, 1997 U.S firms 51.24 
 Wiersema and Bantel, 
1992 
U.S Manufacturing 
firms 
55.5 
 Barker and Mueller, 
2002 
R%D U.S firms 57.42 
 Young and Buchholtz, 
2002 
U.S industrial firms 58.6 
    
Table 4.3b: Board’s Demographic Characteristics in  Other Studies(cont.) 
Gender of 
Respondents 
Study Sample Percentage of respondents 
 Egri and Herman, 2000 Swiss, Korean, U.S 
and Canadian firms 
86.6% males, 13.2 females 
    
Table 4.3b: Board’s Demographic Characteristics in  Other Studies(cont.) 
 
Highest 
Educational Degree 
of Board Members 
 
Study 
 
Sample 
 
Highest Educational Specialty(%) 
 Egri and Herman, 2000 U.S and Canadian 
profit and non-profit 
firms 
31% bachelor’s degree, 34%master’s 
degree, 7% doctoral degree 
 Wiersema and Bantel, 
1992 
Largest U.S 
Manufacturing firms 
on Fortune 500 
2%high school graduate, 10%college 
graduate, 55%baccalaureate degree, 
22%master’s degree, 9%doctoral degree 
 Datta and Rajagopalan, 
1998 
U.S Manufacturing 
firms 
graduate degree 
 Rajagopalan and Datta, 
1996 
U.S Manufacturing 
firms 
graduate degree 
 Barsade, Ward, Turner 
and Sonnenfeld, 2000 
U.S firms graduate degree 
    
Table 4.3b: Board’s Demographic Characteristics in  Other Studies(cont.) 
Highest 
Educational 
Specialty of Board 
Members 
Study Sample Educational Specialty (%) 
 Rose, 2006 Danish firms 28% economics, 22%engineering, 11% 
law 
 Egri and Herman, 2000 U.S and Canadian 
profit firms 
30%sciences, 27%arts, 17%business 
administration, 17%engineering, 
10%environmental sciences 
 Egri and Herman, 2000 U.S and Canadian 
non-profit firms 
46%arts, 36%sciences, 11%law and 7% 
environmental sciences 
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Table 4.3b: Board’s Demographic Characteristics in  Other Studies(cont.) 
Functional 
Background of 
Board Members 
Study Sample Functional Background (%) 
 Barsade, Ward, Turner 
and Sonnenfeld, 2000 
U.S firms 37%management, 17%marketing, 
11%finance, 11%entrepreurship, 
9%operations, 6%law and 9%other 
specialties 
 Guthrie and Datta, 1997 U.S firms 63%throughput functional background 
(production/operations, 
finance/accounting/data 
processing/information systems and 
process) 
 Datta and Rajagopalan, 
1998 
U.S firms 72%througput functional 
background(production/operations, 
finance/accounting/data 
processing/information systems and 
process) 
    
Table 4.3b: Board’s Demographic Characteristics in  Other Studies(cont.) 
Company Tenure  Study Sample Mean (no of years) 
 Guthrie and Datta, 1997 U.S firms 18.15 
 Egri and Herman, 2000 Canadian firms 9.9 
 Egri and Herman, 2000 U.S firms 9.2 
 Entrialgo, 2002 Spanish firms 14.19 
 Wiersema and Bantel, 
1992 
U.S Manufacturing 
firms on Fortune 500 
21.5 
 Hambrick, Cho and 
Chen, 1996 
32 U.S airline firms 14.32 
    
Table 4.3b: Board’s Demographic Characteristics in  Other Studies(cont.) 
Position Tenure of 
Board Members 
Study Sample Mean (no of years) 
 Dedman, 2000 U.K firms 10.34 
 Mcknight and Tomkins, 
2004 
U.K firms 6.1 
 Bathala and Rao, 1995 U.S firms 10.5 
 Kosnik, 1990 U.S firms 9.17 
 Entrialgo, 2002 Spanish firms 10.21 
 Egri and Herman, 2000 Profit and non-profit  
Canadian firms 
7.5 
 Egri and Herman, 2000 Profit and non-profit 
U.S firms 
7.8 
 Schnake, Fredenberger 
and Williams, 2005 
U.S financial services 
firms 
8.57 
 Barker and Mueller, 
2002 
U.S R&D firms 8.29 
 Pfeffer and Moore, 1980 Heads of Academic 
department in U.S 
2.87 
 Singh and Harianto, 
1989a 
89 Largest U.S firms 19.66 
 Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1990 
100 U.S firms 22 
 Young and Buchholtz, 
2002 
U.S large industrial 
corporations 
7.76 
    
Table 4.3b: Board’s Demographic Characteristics in  Other Studies(cont.) 
International 
Experience of 
Board Members 
Study Sample Mean (no of years) 
 Magnusson and Boggs, 
2006 
200 largest U.S firms Few years 
 Herrmann and Datta, 
2006 
U.S Manufacturing 
firms 
3.80 
 Carpenter, Sanders and 
Gregersen, 2001 
U.S firms 16 
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4.5 Measures of External Corporate Environment: Descriptive Findings 
 
The descriptive statistics of the environmental dimensions can be found in Tables 4:4. 
Respondents were asked to consider to what extent they believe that their company 
operates under the following three environmental circumstances: environmental 
complexity, or otherwise homogeneity-heterogeneity, environmental dynamism and 
finally, environmental munificence/hostility.  
 
Their responses were constructed on a seven-point agreement scale and certain notable 
findings were evident. Only one of the environmental munificent item exhibited mean 
score below the mid-point of 4.  The variable that was recognisably low was the little 
threat to the survival and well-being of the company (mean=3.93). The fact that the 
respondents scored low is explained by the fact that most of board members of Greek firms 
actually do not have a “small” fear regarding the well being and the survival of the firms 
but actually they have an increased concern regarding the prosperity of their firm. The 
remaining 17 items have exhibited scores above the mid point of 4.  This indicates that the 
respondents agree to some extent that their organisations operate within the environmental 
circumstances namely: complexity, dynamism and munificence or hostility.  Dess and 
Beard (1984) condensed Aldrich’s (1979) codification of environmental dimensions and 
identified these environmental dimensions. These three environmental circumstances are 
similar to those proposed by other scholars (e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Mintzberg, 
1979; Scott, 1981). 
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Scale: (1) “Strongly Disagree”, (2) “Disagree”, (3) “Slightly Disagree, (4) Neither Agree or Disagree, (5) Slightly Agree, (6) Agree, (7) Strongly Agree 
                                     Table 4: 4 Measures of External Environment 
External Corporate Environment                                                              Response Scale                                                                                                         Scale Descriptive 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Mean SD n 
Environmental Complexity 
Predictability in the  market activities of your key competitors in 
your sector 
N/A 9.1% 2.0% 14.1% 21.2% 45.5% 8.1% 5.16 1.34 99 
Predictability in the tastes and preferences of your 
customers in your principal industry during the recent years 
2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 12.5% 18.8% 53.1% 9.4% 5.40 1.21 96 
Increase in the innovation rate of new operating processes and 
new products or services in your principal industry 
N/A 4.1% 6.2% 15.5% 20.6% 36.1% 17.5% 5.30 1.32 97 
Hostility in the market activities of your key competitors 2.1% 11.3% 2.1% 25.8% 16% 25.8% 13.4% 4.80 1.57 97 
Influence of the market activities from your key competitors 1.0% 5.2% 2.1% 16.5% 28.9% 35.1% 11.3% 5.17 1.29 97 
Increase in the needed diversity in your production methods and 
marketing tactics to cater your different customers 
3.2% 5.3% 2.1% 17.0% 21.3% 34.0% 17.0% 5.18 1.50 94 
 
 
Environmental Dynamism 
Changes in the mix of products/brands carried 4.3% 9.7% 6.5% 14.0% 25.8% 30.1% 9.7% 4.76 1.61 93 
Changes in the sales strategies 5.3% 1.1% 5.3% 17.9% 18.9% 35.8% 15.8% 5.14 1.52 95 
 
Changes in the sales promotion/advertising strategies 3.2% 4.2% 2.1% 18.9% 28.4% 30.5% 12.6% 5.07 1.40 95 
Changes in the competitor’s mix of products/brands 4.3% 6.4% 8.5% 26.6% 28.7% 21.3% 4.3% 4.50 1.41 94 
Changes in the competitor’s sales strategies 4.2% 5.3% 8.4% 28.4% 30.5% 16.8% 6.3% 4.51 1.40 95 
Changes in the competitor’s sales promotions/advertising 
strategies 
3.2% 7.4% 7.4% 28.7% 28.7% 21.3% 3.2% 4.48 1.36 94 
Changes in the customer preferences of the product features    N/A 7.8% 6.7% 27.8% 16.7% 28.9% 12.2% 4.88 1.42 90 
Changes in the customer preferences of the brands N/A 12.8% 7.0% 27.9% 16.3% 31.4% 4.7% 4.60 1.44 86 
Changes in the customer preferences of the product quality/price 1.1% 9.7% 3.2% 18.3% 24.7% 32.3% 108% 4.95 1.45 93 
Environmental Munificence/Hostility 
Little threat to the survival and well-being of the company 18.3% 14.0% 5.4% 21.5% 9.7% 21.5% 9.7% 3.93 2.03 93 
Rich in investment and marketing opportunities 2.1% 8.5% 5.3% 20.2% 21.3% 31.9% 10.6% 4.88 1.50 94 
An environment that the company can control and manipulate to 
its own advantage, such as a dominant firm has in an industry 
with little competition and few hindrances 
5.2% 15.5% 10.3% 23.7% 19.6% 18.6% 7.2% 4.21 1.65 97 
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4.6 Measures of Board Involvement in the Strategic Decision - Making Process: 
Descriptive Findings  
 
The Table 4:5a illustrates the distribution of responses scored for the measures of board 
involvement in strategic decision-making process. Respondents were asked to indicate the 
extent to which Boards of Directors participate in the formation and evaluation of strategic 
decisions. Their responses were constructed by a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” and certain notable findings were evident. 
 
Upon inspection of the calculated mean results, it was notable to observe that four 
indicators of board involvement in formation as well as evaluation of the strategic 
decision-making process were particularly low in their scoring. Two of these specific 
variables referred to the involvement of the board regarding the formulation of strategic 
decisions: the board is not usually involved with the formation of strategic decisions 
(mean=2.40); the board usually forms the strategic decisions separately from the TMT 
(mean=3.11) and the remaining two referred to the evaluation of  strategic decisions: the 
board is not usually involved with the monitoring of the progress of strategic decisions 
(mean=2.69), the board usually accepts the evaluation of strategic decisions by the TMT 
without asking probing questions (mean=2.78). Two of the variables have low scoring 
because the variables contain a negative meaning and the majority of the board members 
indicate that they strongly disagree with the fact that the board is not actively involved 
with the formation of decisions as well as with the monitoring of the progress of strategic 
decisions. Indeed, the board members argue that they play a dominant role in the formation 
of strategic decisions and they monitor effectively the progress of their decisions. 
Regarding the remaining two low scoring variables, directors state that they cooperate with 
the top management team of their firms prior to any decisions and they accept their 
decisions after careful investigation. A host of other variables tended to exhibit results that 
were widely distributed throughout the seven-point scale which consequently, 
characterised mean scores above the mid-point of 4.  
 
Table 4:5b depicts the distribution of responses for board’s involvement in the strategic 
decision-making process with respect to the frequency and duration of their board 
meetings. The vast majority of board members in Greek listed organisations in ASE have a 
scheduled formal meeting once a month as it is required by the regulations of Hellenic 
166 
 
Capital Market. Boards require quite a long time (more than two hours) for their meetings 
which implies that the board puts great emphasis on monitoring and evaluation of their 
strategic decisions and provides a better judgement about strategic choices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
167 
 
 
Scale: (1) “Strongly Disagree”, (2) “Disagree”, (3) “Slightly Disagree, (4) Neither Agree or Disagree, (5) Slightly Agree, (6) Agree, (7) Strongly Agree 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:5a  Measures of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making 
  
Board Involvement in SDMaking                                                                    Response Scale                                                                          Scale Descriptive 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Mean SD n 
Formation of New Strategic Decisions 
The board is not usually involved with the formation of the 
strategic decisions 
42.6% 24.8% 6.9% 10.9% 5% 9.9% N/A 2.40 1.68 101 
The board usually ratifies strategic proposals which are formed 
solely by the TMT 
2.9% 21.6% 13.7% 12.7% 12.7% 27.5% 8.8% 4.28 1.79 102 
The board usually asks probing questions and then ratifies 
strategic proposals formed primarily by the TMT 
5.8% 14.6% 5.8% 13.6% 26.2% 19.4% 14.6% 4.56 1.79 103 
The board usually asks probing questions which lead to revisions 
of strategic proposals formed by the TMT 
9.9% 18.8% 5.9% 19.8% 22.8% 13.9% 8.9% 4.03 1.82 101 
The board usually helps to form strategic decisions with the TMT 
in board meetings 
6.8% 9.7% 7.8% 9.7% 20.4% 27.2% 18.4% 4.82 1.83 103 
The board usually helps the Top management to form strategic 
decisions within and between board meetings 
3.9% 6.9% 11.8% 18.6% 14.7% 27.5% 16.7% 4.82 1.68 102 
The board usually forms the strategic decisions separately from 
the TMT 
17.5% 35.9% 10.7% 14.6% 1% 15.5% 4.9% 3.11 1.85 103 
Evaluation of Prior Strategic Decisions  
The board is not usually involved with the monitoring of the 
progress of strategic decisions 
22.8% 40.6% 9.9% 8.9% 7.9% 8.9% 1% 2.69 1.61 101 
The board usually accepts the evaluation of strategic decisions by 
the TMT without asking probing questions 
19.2% 39.4% 13.1% 10.1% 8.1% 10.1% N/A 2.78 1.57 99 
The board usually accepts the evaluation of strategic decisions by 
TMT after asking probing questions 
3.1% 12.2% 8.2% 21.4% 26.5% 26.5% 2% 4.43 1.47 98 
The board usually determines the timing and criteria of the 
evaluation but that information is supplied by TMT 
1% 20.4% 6.1% 22.4% 31.6% 17.3% 1% 4.19 1.43 98 
The board usually determines the timing and criteria of the 
evaluation and requests additional info 
5% 8.9% 9.9% 21.8% 16.8% 31.7% 5.9% 4.55 1.60 101 
The board usually collects its own info about the progress of the 
strategic decisions 
3% 19.8% 6.9% 18.8% 15.8% 30.7% 5% 4.36 1.68 101 
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a Scale: (1) One a year, (2) Every six months, (3) Quarterly, (4) Every month, (5) Every 15 days, (6) Weekly 
b   Scale: (1) More than two hours, (2) Two hours, (3) One and half hour, (4) One hour, (5) 30 Minutes, (6) Less than 30 minutes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:5b Measures of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Mean 
Frequency of board meetings a 5% 3% 11.9% 55.4% 16.8% 7.9% 4.0 1.08 
Duration of board meetings b  41.6% 27.7% 16.8% 9.9% 2% 25 4.0 1.21 
Board Involvement in SD Making                                                              Response Scale                                                                                     Scale Descriptive 
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4.7 Measures of Strategic Decision-Making Process: Descriptive Findings 
 
Table 4:6 illustrates the survey responses for five dimensions of the strategic decision–
making process: comprehensiveness/rationality of strategic decision making, financial 
reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and lateral communication.  
 
4.7.1 Measures of Comprehensiveness/Rationality 
 
The comprehensiveness or rationality of strategic decision-making was captured by five 
variables. First, the responsibility of determining the cause of a problem, where the 
respondents were required to choose one of the following five options: no specific 
individual or group, one specific individual, two people jointly, an existing committee and 
finally, a  specially formed group of three or more employees. 29.3% of the respondents 
confessed that they assign a specialised group of employees followed by 23.2% of 
directors who rely on one specific individual in order to address the cause of a problem. 
 
Second, the attempt to determine the cause of a problem, where board members were asked 
to identify what their organisations would choose of the following in order to determine the 
cause of a problem: not rely on outsiders for assistance, rely on one or two outsiders for 
limited assistance, rely on a few outsiders for moderate assistance, rely on a few outsiders 
for significant help and finally, rely entirely on outsiders for significant assistance. The 
majority of Greek directors (31.6%) tend to rely on a few specialised outsiders for limited 
help and only 2% rely entirely on outsiders for determining the cause of a problem.  
 
Third, the cause of the problem could be identified by asking directors how they determine 
the cause of a problem which could be through: ideas of single individual, informal 
discussions among managers, scheduled meetings among managers, scheduled meeting 
and analysis or scheduled meetings and extensive analysis. Most of the executives of 
Greek quoted organisations tend to identify possible causes of problems through formal 
scheduled meetings and careful analysis.  
 
Fourth, the number of employees required to identify a cause of a problem. Descriptive 
findings have shown that the majority of Greek firms assign three to four employees in an 
effort to determine the cause of a problem.  
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Finally, fifth is the number of years of historical data required to address the cause of a 
problem where the majority of Greek directors confessed that within one year of historical 
data the board members are able to identify the cause of the problem. 
 
4.7.2 Measures of Financial Reporting 
 
The Table 4:6 illustrates the survey responses to the variables concerning the financial 
reporting as a significant factor of the strategic decision-making process. Board members 
were asked to what extent they use the following elements of financial reporting in their 
strategic decision-making process. Their responses were constructed on a seven point 
Likert scale varying between “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” and significant 
findings are evident. Upon inspection of the calculated mean results, it was notable to 
observe that all elements of financial reporting were above the mid-point of 4. The 
majority of Greek directors agree that they use the following financial reporting elements 
in their strategic decision-making process: internal rate of return (34.4%), net present value 
as capital budgeting method (29.7%), inclusion of pro-forma financial statements (38.8%), 
detailed cost studies (38.9%) and finally, incorporation of strategic decision (48.9%).  
 
4.7.3 Measures of Rule Formalisation 
 
Table 4:6 depicts that the distribution of responses for rule formalisation. Respondents 
were asked to indicate the extent to which Boards of Directors use the following elements 
of rule formalisation. Their responses were constructed by a seven-point Likert scale 
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” and certain notable findings were 
evident. The mean score of the items that describe the rule formalisation were above mid-
point of four. It is interesting to note that the vast majority of respondents rely on written 
procedures guiding the process (37.9%); on formal procedures to identify alternative ways 
of action (32.6%); on formal screening procedures (32.3%); on formal documents guiding 
the final decision (31.9%) and on predetermined criteria for strategic evaluation (32.3%). It 
is worth mentioning that recently Greek listed firms are required by law to disclose sound 
policies and formal procedures regarding their strategic decision-making process.  
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4.7.4 Measures of Hierarchical Decentralisation 
 
The descriptive findings of the hierarchical decentralisation can be found in Table 4:6. 
Greek executives were asked to indicate to what extent the following individuals or 
groups: owner/shareholder, chief executive officer, first level directors,  middle level 
management and lower level management are involved in the strategic decision-making 
process. Their responses were constructed on a seven-point Likert scale range from “no 
involvement” to “active involvement”.  After careful examination of mean results, it was 
notably to observe that one hierarchical decentralisation issue was particularly low in their 
scoring. This specific variable refers to lower level management where the mean is equal 
to 2.94. The descriptive results reveal that in Greek boardrooms the lower level 
management does not actually participate in the strategic decision-making process. 
However, the remaining variables tended to exhibit results that are widely distributed 
throughout the seven-point scale, which, consequently, characterised mean scores above 
the mid-point of four.  It is worth mentioning that in Greek listed organisations in ASE 
separate individuals or groups such as owner, CEO, first level director and middle level 
management compose the apex of the organisation and play a crucial role in their 
decisions. 
 
4.7.5 Measures of Lateral Communication 
 
Table 4:6 presents the descriptive findings generated from lateral communication. All the 
items that describe lateral communication tend to exhibit results that are widely distributed 
throughout the seven-point scale which, consequently, characterised mean scores above the 
mid-point of four. The results reveal that the departments of accounting, production, 
personnel and purchasing are actually involved in the strategic decision-making process in 
Greek organisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
172 
 
 
 
Refer to Legend on the following page
Table 4:6  Measures of Strategic Decision-Making Process 
Strategic Decision-Making Process                                                                   Response Scale                                                                                   Scale Descriptive 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Mean SD n 
Comprehensiveness /Rationality of SD Making 
Responsibility of determining the cause of a problem would be 
assigned a  
19.2% 23.2% 7.1% 21.2% 29.3% N/A N/A 3.18 1.54 99 
Attempt to determine the cause of a problemb 26.5% 31.6% 24.5% 15.3% 2% N/A N/A 2.34 1.09 98 
Possible problem causes would be identified throughc 9.4% 11.5% 18.8% 19.8% 40.6% N/A N/A 3.70 1.35 96 
Number of employees involved in determining primarily 
throughd 
3.33% 54.5% 11.1% 1% N/A N/A N/A 1.79 .66 99 
Number of years of historical data used to determine the cause 
of a probleme 
57.3% 15.6% 11.5% 7.3% 5.2% N/A 3.1% 2.05 1.61 96 
  
Financial Reportingf 
Use of internal rate of return (IRR) as capital budgeting 7.8% 12.2% 5.6% 10% 15.6% 34.4% 14.4% 4.74 1.88 90 
Use of net present value as capital budgeting method 6.6% 7.7% 4.4% 12.1% 17.6% 29.7% 22% 5.03 1.80 91 
Inclusion of pro-forma financial statements 9.4% 9.4% 5.9% 11.8% 11.8% 38.8% 12.9% 4.75 1.89 85 
Detailed cost studies 5.6% 2.2% 5.6% N/A 23.3% 38.9% 24.4% 5.53 1.50 90 
Incorporation of strategic decision 4.5% 4.5% 1.1% 11.4% 21.6% 48.9% 8% 5.19 1.44 88 
Rule Formalisationf 
Written procedures guiding the process 5.3% 2.1% 8.4% 11.6% 15.8% 37.9% 18.9% 5.20 1.61 95 
Formal procedures to identify alternative ways of action 4.2% 6.3% 10.5% 17.9% 18.9% 32.6% 9.5% 4.76 1.58 95 
Formal screening procedures 5.4% 7.5% 5.4% 12.9% 22.6% 32.3% 14% 4.92 1.66 93 
Formal documents guiding the final decision 4.3% 9.6% 5.3% 19.1% 17.0% 31.9% 12.8% 4.81 1.66 94 
Predetermined criteria for strategic evaluation 4.2% 10.4% 6.3% 20.8% 15.6% 32.3% 10.4% 4.71 1.65 96 
Hierarchical Decentralisationg  
Owner/Shareholders 4.0% 5.0% 5.9% 5.0% 4.0% 21.8% 54.5% 5.83 1.76 101 
Chief Executive Officer N/A 1.0% N/A 1% 4% 19.8% 74.3% 6.64 .75 101 
First level directors N/A 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 12.0% 45.0% 31.0% 5.87 1.16 100 
Middle level management 7.1% 8.2% 7.1% 18.4% 43.9% 14.3% 1.0% 4.30 1.43 98 
Lower level management 18.8% 16.7% 28.1% 24.0% 12.5% N/A N/A 2.94 1.29 96 
Lateral Communicationg 
Finance-Accounting department 3.0% 1.0% 3.0% 5.9% 20.8% 35.6% 30.7% 5.70 1.36 101 
Production department 6.0% 3.6% 10.7% 9.5% 19.0% 33.3% 17.9% 5.03 1.69 84 
Personnel department 10.8% 7.5% 9.7% 21.5% 26.9% 18.3% 5.4% 4.22 1.68 93 
Purchasing department 6.5% 1.1% 7.6% 9.8% 22.8% 38.0% 14.1% 5.11 1.58 92 
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a
 Scale: (1) No specific individual or group, (2) One specific individual, (3) Two people jointly, (4) An 
existing committee of three or more employees, (5) A specially formed group of three or more employees 
 
bScale: (1) Not be willing to rely on outsiders for any assistance, (2) Be willing to rely on one or two 
outsiders to provide limited assistance, (3) Be willing to rely on one or two outsiders to moderate  assistance, 
(4) Be willing to rely on outsiders for significant assistance, (5) Rely entirely on outsiders if necessary 
 
 
cScale: (1) The ideas of a single individual, (2) Informal discussions among managers, (3) Scheduled 
meetings among managers, (4) Scheduled meetings and some analysis, (5) Scheduled meetings and extensive 
analysis 
 
dScale: (1) Two or less, (2) Three to four, (3) Five to six, (4) Seven to eight, (5) Nine to ten, (6) Eleven to 
twelve, (7) More than twelve 
 
eScale: (1) Less than one, (2) One, (3) Two, (4) Three, (5) Four, (6) Five, (7) More than five 
 
f  Scale: (1) “Strongly Disagree”, (2) “Disagree”, (3) “Slightly Disagree, (4) Neither Agree or Disagree, (5) 
Slightly Agree, (6) Agree,  
(7) Strongly Agree 
 
g  Scale: (1) No Involvement, (2) Very Low Involvement, (3) Low Involvement, (4) Moderate Involvement, 
(5) Involvement, (6) High Involvement, (7) Active Involvement 
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4.8 Measures of Innovation: Descriptive Findings 
 
In order to examine to what extent Greek listed organisations emphasise innovation 
practices, board members were asked to rate their opinion across three dimensions of 
innovation namely product, process and organisational innovation. Responses were 
constructed on a seven point Likert scale ranging from “low emphasis” to “extreme 
emphasis”. Table 4:7 highlights the distribution of responses for these variables. Almost 
all the variables that measure innovation have mean values above the mean point of four.  
 
With respect to the variable product innovation, it appeared that 40.4% of Greek directors 
agree that their company is the first in the industry to introduce new products or services. 
Furthermore, 34.8% of the firms focus on the creation of new products for fast market 
introduction while 40.9% emphasise creating new variations of existing product lines. 
Respondents confessed (32.6%) that the product innovation practices have led to increase 
of the revenue from less than three years old new products. Regarding the process 
innovation, Greek executives seem to emphasise on the introduction of new technology 
(33.3%), on technological improvements (40.2%), on creating innovative technologies 
(30.6%), on R&D (29.1%) and a few of them on developing new technology (22.1%).  
Overall, Greek directors encourage organisation innovation (26.1%) by encouraging 
initiatives and creativity among employees (33.7%) and support various organisational 
units that drive innovation (28.9%). 
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a      Scale: (1) No Emphasis, (2) Very Low Emphasis, (3) Low Emphasis, (4) Moderate Emphasis, (5) Emphasis, (6) A Lot of Emphasis, (7) Extreme Emphasis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:7 Innovation 
  
Innovation Practices                                                Response Scale                                                                 Scale Descriptive 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Mean SD n 
Product Innovationa 
Being the first company in the industry to introduce new 
product/services 
4.5% 3.4% 4.5% 5.6% 22.5% 40.4% 19.1% 5.35 1.52 89 
Creating new products for fast market introduction 7.9% 2.2% 5.6% 6.7% 25.8% 34.8% 16.9% 5.12 1.67 89 
Creating new variations to existing product lines 4.5% 3.4% 2.3% 11.4% 22.7% 40.9% 14.8% 5.26 1.48 88 
Increasing the revenue from less than 3years old new products 7.0% 3.5% 3.5% 9.3% 31.4% 32.6% 12.8% 5.03 1.59 86 
Process Innovationa 
Being the first company in the industry to introduce new technology 11.5% 3.4% 6.9% 6.9% 24.1% 33.3% 13.8% 4.83 1.84 87 
Being the first company in the industry to introduce technological 
improvements 
10.3% 3.4% 6.9% 9.2% 16.1% 40.2% 13.8% 4.93 1.82 87 
Creating innovative technologies 12.9% 2.4% 11.8% 11.8% 22.4% 30.6% 8.2% 4.52 1.82 85 
Investing heavily in cutting edge process technology-oriented R&D 15.1% 5.8% 8.1% 18.6% 16.3% 29.1% 7.0% 4.30 1.89 86 
Developing radical new technology 19.8% 8.1% 10.5% 14.0% 18.6% 22.1% 7.0% 3.97 1.98 86 
Organisational Innovationa 
Developing systems that encourage initiatives and creativity among 
employees 
8.6% 4.3% 5.4% 10.9% 31.5% 33.7% 5.4% 4.75 1.62 92 
Encouraging innovation in the organisation 7.6% 4.3% 4.3% 18.5% 26.1% 26.1% 13.0% 4.81 1.65 92 
Supporting an organisational unit that drive innovation 10.0% 5.6% 5.6% 12.2% 28.9% 26.7% 11.1% 4.68 1.75 90 
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4.9 Measures of Company’s Financial Performance: Descriptive Findings 
In order to measure the organisational performance of Greek companies, directors were 
asked to indicate their relative performance (compared to competitors in the industry) of 
their firms across five indicators. The perception of executives regarding their 
organisational performance was considered to be high. Directors argued that their 
organisations join the top 20% of companies in the industry in terms of total assets, total 
sales, total sales growth, performance and success and competitive position. In a five-point 
likert scale that was constructed, Greek board members scored high in order to describe the 
financial situation of their firm as it can be seen from Table 4:9. 
 
    a  Scale: (1) Lowest 20%, (2) Lower 20%, (3) Middle 20%, (4) Next 20%, (5) Top 20% 
 
 
            
       
4.10 Concluding Remarks  
 
This chapter has documented the descriptive findings from 105 listed organisations in the 
ASE. In general, most measures observed a wide range of responses. This concluded with 
a diversity of responses to the same questions. Also, it suggests that there was significant 
variation among these data which represents justification in considering correlation and 
multiple regression analyses. The results of these bivariate and multivariate analyses are 
presented in the following chapter accompanied by extensive discussion of the findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:8  Measures of Company’s Financial Performance 
Financial Performancea   Descriptive                                                   Response Scale                      Scale                           
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Mean SD n 
After-tax return on 
total assets 
10.0% 10.0% 24.4% 21.1% 34.4% 3.60 1.32 90 
After-tax return 
on total sales 
10.1% 10.1% 27.0% 21.3% 31.5% 3.53 1.30 89 
Firm’s total sales 
growth 
4.4% 8.9% 17.8% 25.6% 43.3% 3.94 1.17 90 
Overall firm 
performance and 
success 
3.5% 4.7% 20.0% 25.9% 45.9% 4.05 1.08 85 
Our competitive 
position 
2.2% 3.4% 14.8% 33.0% 46.6% 4.18 .96 88 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Principal Component Analysis and Construction of Scale Indices 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss multivariate statistical methods in 
order to analyse the data and investigate the interrelationship between the constructs and 
among the variables within each construct. 
 
Due to the presence of a large number of variables within each construct, correlation 
matrices were constructed in order to define a set of common underlying dimensions, 
known as factors (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1998). Therefore, principal 
component analysis was executed upon selected data in order to extract composite 
dimensions underlying many of the constructs.  In order for extracted factors to form the 
basis of subsequent statistical analysis, additive scales were constructed from the derived 
factor solutions, subject to tests for scale reliability and validity. The technical procedures 
and the justification for using factor analysis were discussed in Chapter Three.  
 
5.2 Correlation Analysis with Selected Constructs 
 
In Chapter Three, factors referred to hypothetical constructs developed to explain the 
intercorrelations among the variables (Robson, 2002). In order to identify that a set of 
variables have something in common, we have to conduct a bivariate correlation analysis 
within selected constructs. Conducting Pearson product-moment correlation we are able to 
identify the relationships between each of the variables of the construct. Therefore, we 
conducted Pearson correlation in order to measure the extent of any relationship between 
each of the variables within the measures of external corporate environment, involvement 
in strategic decision-making, strategic decision-making process,  innovation and 
performance (Appendix D, D:1,D:2, D:3, D:4, D:5, D:6, D:7, D:8). 
 
Upon inspection of each of these matrices it was observed that a large number of inter-
correlations existed within many of the construct measures. However, a more accurate 
method for analysing such complex relationships by using a mathematical model is the 
principal component analysis. Principal component analysis merely decomposes the 
original data into a set of linear variates (Dunteman, 1989). Therefore, a process of factor 
extraction was performed in order to reduce a data set in a more manageable size 
maintaining the original information. The Table 5:1a and Table 5:1b present the factors as 
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well as variables attributed to each construct by using two different extraction techniques: 
eigenvalue greater than one and defined number of extracted factors.   
 
5.3 Principal Component Analysis Method 
 
The principal component analysis technique was discussed, in detail, in Chapter Three. 
However, the main procedure will be described briefly. Principal component analysis was 
executed in order to reduce the data. Principal component analysis assumes no unique or 
error variance andis concerned with establishing which linear components exist within the 
data and how a particular variable might contribute to the component. Varimax orthogonal 
rotation was employed in order to produce factor solutions because it simplifies the 
interpretation of factors and attempts to maximise the dispersion of loadings within factors. 
 
Factor analysis is a data reduction method that is used as a tool in an attempt to reduce a 
large set of variables to a more meaningful smaller set of variables. Because each variable 
was measured by multi-item constructs, factor analysis with varimax was adopted to check 
the unidimensionality among items. The researcher conducted two types of principal 
component analyses. In the first case, the factors were extracted naturally which show how 
the variables load to each factor regardless of the existing literature. In that case, an 
explanatory factor analysis was conducted; where specific factors were extracted according 
to specific data set. Factors were extracted according to how certain variables describe 
each construct within the Greek cultural context. In this case, factors were extracted 
according to how Greek executives perceive certain constructs. The researcher has labelled 
the factors according to the literature and according to items that better describe each 
factor. In the second case, the researcher employed factor analysis by specifying the 
number of the extracted factors as they exist in the existing literature review. The labels 
were given according to existing literature. 
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Table 5:1a Factors and Variables Attributable to Each Construct (Factors with Eigenvalue over One) 
Construct Number of Factors Number of Variables 
Environment                                                     4                                                   17 
ENV1:Environmental Dynamism in 
Marketing Practices  
1 5 
ENV2:Environmental Customer Dynamism  1 3 
ENV3:Environmental Competitor’s 
Dynamism  
1 4 
ENV4:Environmental Complexity-
Munificence  
1 5 
Involvement in SD Making                                                     3 9 
INVSDM1 Formation and Process of SDM 1 4 
INVSDM2 Formation and Evaluation of 
SDM 
1 3 
INVSDM3 Evaluation of SDM 1 2 
SD Making Process               5 19 
FINREP: Financial Reporting 1 5 
RULEFORM: Rule Formalisation 1 5 
Hierarchical Decentralisation 2 5 
HIERDECENT1:Lower Level Management 1 2 
HIERDECENT2:Upper Level Management 1 3 
LATCOM: Lateral Communication 1 4 
Innovation                                                                                2                                                    12 
INNV1:Product &Process Innovation 1 9 
INNV2:Organisational Innovation 1 3 
ORGPERF: Performance 1 5 
Total 15 64 
Table 5:1b Factors and Variables Attributable to Each Construct (Specifying the Number of Factors) 
Construct Number of Factors Number of Variables 
Environment 3 14 
ENV1:Environmental Dynamism 1 8 
ENV2:Environmental 
Munificence/Hostility 
1 3 
ENV3:Environmental Complexity 1 3 
Involvement in SD Making 2 9 
INVSDM1:Formation of Strategic 
Decision-Making Process 
1 4 
INVSDM2:Evaluation of Strategic 
Decision-Making Process 
1 5 
SD Making Process                                                                4                                                       19 
FINREP: Financial Reporting 1 5 
RULEFORM: Rule Formalisation 1 5 
HIERDECENT: Hierarchical 
Decentralisation 
1 5 
LATCOM: Lateral Communication 1 4 
Innovation 
INNPD: Product Innovation 1 4 
INNPC: Process Innovation 1 5 
INNORG: Organisational Innovation 1 3 
ORGPERF: Performance 1 5 
Total 13 59 
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The extract dialog box provides options pertaining to the retention of factors.  In this 
chapter, we will present the factors that are extracted by the eigenvalue being greater than 
one and the factors that are extracted by specified number of factors. 
 
The results from principal component analysis indicated that fifteen factors were extracted 
with eigen value greater than one and thirteen by specifying the number of variables as 
presented in Tables 5:1a and 5:1b. 
 
 
5.4 Principal Component Analysis of External Corporate Environment  
5.4.1 Factor Structure 
 
Principal component analysis with varimax rotation was performed on the set of eighteen 
environmental dimensions in order to identify underlying dimensions for the purposes of 
scale development. Four factors with eigenvalues greater than one were extracted. Two 
factors were extracted from the set of environmental dynamism and two other factors with 
a mix of elements of environmental complexity and environmental munificence. In order 
to enhance the factor solution of principal component analysis one item was deleted from 
the analysis because it lacked variations and caused interpretability problems at conceptual 
level. This item was: little threat to the survival and well-being of the company. This item 
was excluded from the analysis, because it did not correlate high with the sum of the 
variables that describe environmental munificence or hostility.   
 
The principal component analysis of the external corporate environment measures can be 
found in Table 5:2a. The factor configuration presented in Table 5:2a indicates that the 
first four factors were found to explain the 68% of the total variance. The identification and 
labelling of the factors will now be discussed. 
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Note: Principal components analysis with varimax rotation, converging in 11 iterations 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:2a  Principal Component Analysis for External Corporate Environment 
                                                     Factor Loadings                                                                                 Communality 
                                                                                                                  
 ENV1 ENV2 ENV3 ENV4  
 Dynamism in 
Marketing 
Practices 
Customer 
Dynamism 
Environmental 
Competitor’s 
Dynamism  
Environmental 
Complexity-
Munificence 
 
Changes in the sales 
promotion/advertising strategies 
.874 .096 -.015 .157 .799 
Changes in the sales strategies .844 .055 .120 .226 .781 
Changes in the mix of 
products/brands carried 
.739 .310 .176 .001 .674 
Increase in the needed diversity in 
your production methods and 
marketing tactics to cater your 
different customers 
.657 .238 .217 .163 .562 
Changes in the competitor’s sales 
promotions/advertising strategies 
.623 .273 .367 -.012 .597 
Changes in the customer 
preferences of the product 
quality/price 
.145 .788 .090 .141 .669 
Changes in the customer 
preferences of the brands 
.448 .767 .063 .090 .800 
Changes in the customer 
preferences of the product 
features    
.541 .645 .173 .052 .741 
Influence of the market activities 
from your key competitors 
.030 -.153 .821 .217 .746 
Hostility in the market activities 
of your key competitors 
.239 .265 .728 .197 .697 
Changes in the competitor’s sales 
strategies 
.546 .301 .601 -.165 .777 
Changes in the competitor’s mix 
of products/brands 
.539 .368 .587 -.059 .774 
Rich in investment and marketing 
opportunities 
-.088 .366 .303 .660 .669 
Increase in the innovation rate of 
new operating processes and new 
products or services in your 
principal industry 
.294 -.058 .232 .658 .577 
An environment that the company 
can control and manipulate to its 
own advantage, such as a 
dominant firm has in an industry 
with little competition and few 
hindrances 
-.328 .352 -.153 .646 .672 
Predictability in the  market 
activities of your key competitors 
in your sector 
.190 -.095 .114 .632 .458 
Predictability in the tastes and 
preferences of your 
customers in your principal 
industry during the recent years 
.363 .300 -.254 .523 .560 
Eigenvalue 6.611 2.065 1.618 1.258  
%variance explained (67.95) 38.887 12.145 9.517 7.401  
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5.4.1.1 Factor 1: Environmental Dynamism in Marketing Practices (ENV1) 
 
The first factor was composed of the following five variables: changes in the sales 
promotion/advertising strategies; changes in the sales strategies, changes in the mix of 
products/brands carried; increase in the needed diversity in production methods and 
marketing tactics to cater to different customers; and  changes in the competitor’s sales 
promotions/advertising strategies. The mean score for ENV1 was the highest among the 
extracted factors indicating that the majority of respondents perceived environmental 
dynamism was explained by this vector (mean=24.67, S.D.=6.03). 
 
All the items within this factor were characterised by elements of marketing practices 
perceived and implemented by Greek board members and such elements have been 
recognised  as key components in environmental dynamism practices in other studies (e.g. 
Tan and Tan, 2005; Zhang, 2006; Zhang, 2007; Sabherwal and King, 1992; Miller and 
Friesen, 1983; Aldrich, 1979; Child, 1972; Achrol and Stern, 1988; Waldman, Ramirez, 
House and Puranam, 2001; Dess and Beard, 1984; Rueda-Manzanares, Aragón-Correa and 
Sharma, 2007 ). It is worth mentioning that elements such as: increase in the needed 
diversity in promotion methods and marketing tactics to cater to different customers 
describe a complex rather than dynamic environment and changes in the competitor’s sales 
promotions/advertising strategies portray mainly competitor’s dynamism. This factor 
indicates that Greek executives implement these marketing strategies to address the 
customer demands and to differentiate from their competitors.  Thus, the label dynamism 
marketing practices was considered to adequately convey the essence of the ENV1 factor. 
 
 
5.4.1.2 Factor 2: Environmental Customer Dynamism (ENV2) 
 
The second factor contained three variables: changes in the customer preferences of the 
product quality/price, changes in the customer preferences of the brands and changes in the 
customer preferences of the product features. The mean score of this factor was   14.63 and 
S.D= 3.63 which suggests that respondent executives were aware of their customers’ 
preferences.  
These variables referred to dimensions of customer dynamism (e.g. Dess and Beard, 1984; 
Tan and Tan, 2005; Zhang, 2006; Miller and Friesen, 1982; Balabanis and Spyropoulou, 
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2007). The label that best represented the items within this factor was believed to be 
customer dynamism. 
 
5.4.1.3 Factor 3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism (ENV3) 
 
The third factor contained four variables: influence of the market activities from key 
competitors, hostility in the market activities of key competitors, changes in the 
competitor’s sales strategies and changes in the competitor’s mix of products/brands. The 
ENV3 factor emphasises the environment in which the competitors operate and on the 
changes that the competitors pursue. Nonetheless, these issues have been considered to 
represent competitor’s environmental dynamism (Zhang, 2007; Lefebvre, Mason and 
Lefebvre, 1997). On the basis of conceptual consistency of the variables within this factor, 
it was considered most appropriate to assign the label environmental competitor’s 
dynamism issues to ENV3. 
 
5.4.1.4 Factor 4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence (ENV4) 
 
The fourth factor contained five variables: rich in investment and marketing opportunities; 
increase in the innovation rate of new operating processes and new products or services in 
the principal industry; an environment that the company can control and manipulate to its 
own advantage, such as that a dominant firm has an industry with little competition and 
few hindrances; predictability in the  market activities of the key competitors in the sector;  
and, predictability in the tastes and preferences of the customers in the principal industry 
during the recent years. This factor consists of elements of two distinct environmental 
factors; the environmental complexity and the environmental munificence. Issues of these 
two elements have been considered to represent environmental dimensions in a number of 
studies (Miller and Friesen, 1983; Sabherwal and King, 1992; Miller, 1988; Dess and 
Beard, 1984). On the basis that this factor combines elements of two factors, it was 
considered most suitable to assign the label environmental complexity/munificence to 
ENV4. 
 
The purpose of this section was to illustrate the results of a data reduction technique as it 
applied to the empirical data generated for environmental measures. The principal 
component analysis resulted in a four-factor solution: dynamism in marketing strategies, 
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customer dynamism, environmental competitor’s dynamism as well as environmental 
complexity-munificence. 
 
5.5 Principal Component Analysis for External Corporate Environment    
        (Specifying the number of factors) 
 
 
5.5.1 Factor Structure  
 
In order to enhance the factor solution of principal component analysis of external 
corporate environment, four variables were dropped from the analysis because they either 
lacked variation or caused interpretability problems at conceptual level. The items that 
have been excluded did not highly correlate with the sum of the environmental dimensions. 
These items were: hostility in the market activities of key competitors, influence of the 
market activities from key competitors, increase in the needed diversity in production 
methods and marketing tactics to cater to different customers and finally, little threat to the 
survival and well-being of the company.  
 
The principal component analysis of external corporate environment can be found in Table 
5:2b. The factor configuration presented in Table 5:2b indicates that the first three factors 
were found to explain 64% of the total variance. The identification and labelling of these 
factors will be discussed below. 
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Note: Principal components analysis with varimax rotation, converging in 8 iterations 
 
 
5.5.1.1 Factor 1: Environmental Dynamism (ENV1) 
 
The first factor identified from the analysis contained eight items which itself accounted 
for 40.5% of the total variance and exhibited an eigenvalue of 5.6.The items that loaded 
heavily onto this factor were: changes in the competitor's sales strategies; changes in the 
competitor's mix of products/brands; changes in the mix of products/brands carried; 
changes in the competitor's sales promotions/advertising strategies; changes in the sales 
strategies; changes in the customer preferences of the product feature; changes in the sales 
promotion/advertising strategies; and changes in the customer preferences of the brands. 
The conceptual association between these variables is referred to as environmental 
dynamism in several studies (Dess and Beard, 1984; Tan and Tan, 2005; Zhang, 2006; 
Miller and Friesen, 1982,1983;  Balabanis and Spyropoulou, 2007; Sabherwal and King, 
Table 5:2b  Principal Component Analysis for External Corporate Environment 
 
 Factor 
Loadings 
  Communalit
y 
 ENV1 ENV2 ENV3  
 Environmental 
Dynamism  
Environmental 
Munificence/Hostility 
Environmental 
Complexity  
 
Changes in the Competitor's Sales 
Strategies 
.836 .068 -.026 .705 
Changes in the Competitor's Mix 
of Products/Brands 
.810 .188 .028 .692 
Changes in the Mix of 
Products/BrandsCarried 
.792 .115 .143 .661 
Changes in the Competitor's Sales 
Promotions/Advertising 
Strategies 
.760 .067 .145 .603 
Changes in the Sales Strategies .734 -.034 .420 .716 
Changes in the Customer 
Preferences of the Product 
Feature 
.716 .457 .077 .728 
Changes in the Sales 
Promotion/Advertising Strategies 
.714 -.025 .339 .625 
Changes in the Customer 
Preferences of the Brands 
.612 .611 .040 .749 
Changes in the Customer 
Preferences of the Product 
Quality/Price 
.362 .761 -.048 .712 
Environment of the Company Can 
Control and Manipulate to its 
Own Advantage 
-.381 .639 .377 .695 
Rich in Investment and Marketing 
Opportunities 
.005 .564 .494 .562 
Predictability in the Market 
Activities of Your Key 
Competitors 
.073 .010 .730 .538 
Increase in the Innovation Rate of 
New Operating Processes and 
New Products 
.200 .093 .719 .566 
Predictability in the Tastes and 
Preferences of your Customers 
.207 .367 .511 .439 
Eigenvalue 5.677 2.060 1.252  
%variance explained (64.20) 40.549 14.716 8.944  
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1992; Aldrich, 1979; Child, 1972; Achrol and Stern, 1988) which is reflected in the mean 
score of ENV1 scale 38.79 and S.D. =8.49. There was found to be a clear information 
theme to the elements comprising ENV1 and the same items where found to load onto 
Dess and Beard (1984) environmental dynamism factor and more specifically under 
dynamism in marketing practices, competitor’s dynamism and customer dynamism. Thus, 
this factor was labelled ENV1 as environmental dynamism. 
 
5.5.1.2 Factor 2: Environmental Hostility/Munificence (ENV2) 
 
The variables found to load ENV2 were: changes in the customer preferences of the 
product quality/price; environment of the company can control and manipulate to its own 
advantage; and, rich in investment and marketing opportunities. The last two items were 
considered to represent the environmental munificence or otherwise hostility in a number 
of studies (Dess and Beard, 1984; Sabherwal and King, 1992; Tan and Tan, 2005; 
Balabanis and Spyropoulou, 2007). However, the item: change in the customer preferences 
of the product quality/price represents environmental dynamism rather than environmental 
hostility. On the basis of conceptual consistency of the variables within the factor, it was 
considered most suitable to assign the label environmental hostility/munificence issues to 
ENV2. 
 
 
5.5.1.3 Factor 3: Environmental Complexity/Homogeneity-Heterogeneity (ENV3) 
 
The third factor contained three items: predictability in the market activities of key 
competitors; increase in the innovation rate of new operating processes and new products 
and predictability in the tastes and preferences of customers. Strategic management 
researchers have emphasised these items to describe environmental complexity or 
homogeneity/ heterogeneity (Rueda-Manzanares, Aragón-Correa and Sharma, 2007; Dess 
and Beard, 1984; Sabherwal and King, 1992). The mean value of ENV3 was 15.86 and 
S.D. = 2.72 indicating a low regard attached by respondents to perceive environmental 
complexity in the environment in which their organisations operate. The three-item factor 
was assigned the label of environmental complexity/homogeneity-heterogeneity. 
 
This section aimed to demonstrate the findings of a data reduction technique applied to 
empirical data generated from external corporate environment. The principal component 
analysis procedure was performed on these data by forcing the number of factors and a 
three-factor solution was extracted. It is worth mentioning that after the extraction of the 
factors a few items ended up overlapping between two factors and not necessarily 
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describing a single factor. The factor structure satisfied the statistical and conceptual 
criteria and afterwards was used for scale reliability and validity. 
 
5.6 Principal Component Analysis of Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making    
     Process (eigenvalue greater than one) 
 
 
5.6.1 Factor Structure 
 
In order to enhance the factor solution of principal component analysis of involvement in 
strategic decision process, four variables were dropped from the analysis because they 
caused interpretability problems at conceptual level. These items were: the board is not 
usually involved with the formation of the strategic decisions, the board usually forms the 
strategic decisions separately from the top management, the board is not usually involved 
with the monitoring of the progress of strategic decisions and the board usually accepts the 
evaluation of strategic decisions by top management without asking probing questions. 
These items were excluded from the factor analysis because they did not correlate above 
.30 with the sum of items of each factor. More specifically, the variable: the board usually 
accepts the evaluation of strategic decisions by top management without asking probing 
questions correlated with the sum of evaluation items at .049, the variable: the board is not 
usually involved with the formation of strategic decisions correlated with the sum of 
formation items at .252, the variable: the board is not usually involved with the monitoring 
of the progress of strategic decisions correlates with the sum of evaluation items at .202 
and finally, the variable: the board usually forms the strategic decisions separately from the 
top management correlates with the sum of formation items in the strategic decision-
making process at .049. The above variables have been excluded from our principal 
component analysis due to the fact they lack variation and they cause problems with 
interpretation. The principal components analysis of involvement in strategic decision 
making with eigenvalue greater than one can be found in Table 5:3a. The factor 
configuration presented in Table 5:3a indicates that the first three factors were found to 
explain 70% of the total variance. The identification and labelling of these factors will be 
discussed below.  
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5. 6.1.1 Factor 1: Formation and Process of Strategic Decision–Making Process 
(INVSDM1) 
 
The first factor identified from the analysis contained four variables which accounted for 
39% of the total variance and exhibited an eigenvalue of 3.5. The items that loaded heavily 
onto this factor were: the board usually helps the top management to form strategic 
decisions within and between board meetings; the board usually determines the timing and 
criteria of the evaluation and requests additional information; the board usually helps to 
form strategic decisions with the top management team in board meetings and the board 
usually collects its own information about the progress of the strategic decisions. These 
issues have been advanced as the formation of the strategic decision-making process by 
Leidner et al., 1999; Ashmos, Duchon and McDaniel,  1998; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992; 
Buchholtz et al., 2005; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Ruigrok, Peck and Keller, 2006.  
 
These variables were found to describe clearly the strategic decision-making process as 
similar variables have been found to load onto Judge and Zeithaml (1992, p.781) 
“formation involvement” factor, Obeng and Ugboro (2005, p. 60) “periodic review of 
organisation’s mission” factor, and a factor proposed by Leidner et al (1999) entitled 
“extent of analysis in decision making”. Thus, the decision was taken to label INVSDM1 
as formation and process of strategic decision because it combines elements from both 
formation and process of strategic decisions. 
 
5. 6.1.2 Factor 2: Formation and Evaluation of Strategic Decision–Making   
           Process (INVSDM2) 
 
 
The variables found to load onto INVSDM2 were: the board usually asks probing 
questions and then ratifies strategic proposals formed primarily by the TMT; the board 
usually asks probing questions which lead to revisions of strategic proposals formed by the 
TMT; the board usually ratifies strategic proposals which are formed solely by the TMT. 
All these items visibly describe the formation and evaluation stage of the strategic 
decision-making process and were collectively held in relatively high regarding according 
to survey respondents (mean= 12.81; SD=4.48). Nonetheless, these issues have been 
considered to represent the formation and evaluation of the strategic decision-making 
process in numerous studies (e.g. Dess, Lumpkin and Covin, 1997; Judge and Zeithaml, 
1992; Ruigrok, Peck and Keller, 2006; Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt, 1993). On the basis of 
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conceptual consistency of the variables within the factor, it was considered most suitable to 
assign the label formation and evaluation of strategic decision-making process. 
5. 6.1.3 Factor 3: Evaluation of Strategic Decision –Making Process (INVSDM3) 
 
The third factor actually is a continuation of the second factor since it consists of two items 
that are limited in the description of evaluation of strategic decision making:  the board 
usually determines the timing and criteria of the evaluation but that information is supplied 
by TMT and the board usually accepts the evaluation of strategic decisions by TMT after 
asking probing questions. Similar items have been used to determine decision activities as 
well as timing of the group participation in process (Ashmos, Duchon and McDaniel, 
1998). The mean value of INVSDM3 was 8.57 and S.D=2.48 which suggests that across 
the whole respondent set, these where held in relatively high regard.  Due to the 
cohesiveness between these two items it was deemed appropriate to select the title of 
evaluation of strategic decision-making process for this factor. 
 
This section aimed to illustrate the findings of a data reduction technique applied to 
empirical data generated from involvement in strategic decision-making measures. 
Principal component analysis procedure was performed on these data and a three factor 
solution was extracted. The factors were used afterwards in order to test reliability and 
validity of the construct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:3a  Principal Component Analysis for Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making Process 
 
 Factor 
Loadings 
  Communality 
 INVSDM1 INVSDM2 INVSDM3  
 Formation & 
Process of 
SDM 
Formation 
&Evaluati
on of SDM 
Evaluation 
of  SDM 
 
The Board Usually helps the Top Management 
to Form Strategic Decisions within and 
Between Board Meetings 
.767 .257 -.033 .655 
The Board Usually Determines the Timing 
and Criteria of the Evaluation and Requests 
Additional Info 
.757 .074 .416 .752 
The Board Usually Helps to Form Strategic 
Decisions with the TMT in Board Meetings 
.743 .384 .059 .703 
 The Board Usually Collects its Own Info 
About the Progress of the Strategic Decisions 
.638 -.141 -.046 .430 
The Board Usually Asks Probing Questions 
and then Ratifies Strategic Proposals Formed 
Primarily by the TMT 
.185 .877 .156 .828 
The Board Usually Asks probing Questions 
which Lead to Revisions of Strategic 
Proposals Formed by the TMT 
.412 .763 .094 .761 
The Board Usually Ratifies Strategic 
Proposals which are Formed Solely by the 
TMT 
-.145 .734 .335 .672 
The Board Usually Determines the Timing 
and Criteria of the Evaluation but that 
Information is Supplied by TMT 
.188 .095 .870 .665 
The Board Usually Accepts the Evaluation of 
Strategic Decisions by TMT After Asking 
Probing Questions 
-.090 .366 .723 .801 
Eigenvalue 3.554 1.702 1.011  
%variance explained (69.62) 39.484 18.907 11.229  
Note: Principal components analysis with varimax rotation, converging in 6 iterations 
 
 
 
5.7 Principal Component Analysis of Involvement in Strategic Decision                
        Making Process (specified the number of factors) 
 
 5.7.1 Factor Structure 
 
In accordance with accepted principal components procedure four variables were deleted 
from this analysis because they were found to either lack variation or cause interpretability 
problems. These items were: the board usually forms the strategic decisions separately 
from the top management; the board is not usually involved with the monitoring of the 
progress of strategic decisions; the board usually accepts the evaluation of strategic 
decisions by the top management without asking probing questions; the board usually 
collects its own information about the progress of strategic decision, in addition to the top 
management reports.  
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The principal component analysis of involvement in the strategic decision-making process 
can be found in Table 5:3b.  The factor configuration indicated that these two factors 
explained almost 61% of the total variance. The identification and labelling of these 
extracted factors will now be discussed. 
 
5. 7.1.1 Factor 1: Formation of Strategic Decision –Making Process (INVSDM1) 
 
This factor was found to attract four variables which itself accounted for 40% of the total 
variance. The items that loaded onto INVSDM1 were: the board usually helps to form 
strategic decisions with the TMT in board meetings; the board usually helps the top 
management to form strategic decisions within and between board meetings; the board 
usually determines the timing and criteria of the evaluation and requests additional 
information and the board usually asks probing questions which lead to revisions of 
strategic proposals formed by the TMT.  
 
 Researchers have frequently cited these issues as the formulation stage of involvement in 
the strategic decision-making process (e.g. Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Johnson, Hoskisson 
and Hitt, 1993; Leidner et al., 1999; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992; Obeng and Ugboro, 
2005) and obviously there is a conceptual association between the items. 
The mean score of the INVSDM1 factor was with 18.25 (SD=5.50) with a score of above 5 
representing the fact that most of the Greek executives of listed corporations actually 
participate in strategic decision-making process and mainly in its formation process. This 
factor was given the label of formation of strategic decision-making process as suggested 
by Judge and Zeithaml (1992). 
 
 
5.7.1.2 Factor 2: Evaluation of Strategic Decision–Making Process (INVSDM2) 
 
The second factor was characterised by five heavily loaded items: the board usually ratifies 
strategic proposals which are formed solely by the TMT; the board usually accepts the 
evaluation of strategic decisions by TMT after asking probing questions; the board usually 
asks probing questions and then ratifies strategic proposals formed primarily by the TMT; 
the board usually determines the timing and criteria of the evaluation but that information 
is supplied by TMT and  the board is not usually involved with the formation of the 
strategic decisions. The mean score for this factor scale was 19.75 (S.D=5.48) suggesting 
that the Greek directors are involved in several stages of the strategic decision-making 
process. These issues of board involvement in strategic decision-making have been widely 
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cited as elements of involvement in strategic decisions by several writers (e.g. Obeng and 
Ugboro, 2005; Ashmos, Duchon and McDaniel, 1998; Ruigrok, Peck and Keller, 2006) 
and given their conceptual association of evaluation of strategic decision-making process 
reflected in Judge and Zeithaml (1992). 
 
This section aimed to illustrate the findings of data reduction technique applied to 
empirical data generated from involvement in strategic decision-making process. Principal 
component analysis was performed on these data and a two-factor solution extracted (by 
specifying the number of factors) as well as a three-factor solution (with eigenvalue over 
one). The factor structure satisfied the statistical and conceptual criteria for selection and 
the extracted factors for board involvement in strategic decision-making are: formation and 
evaluation of the strategic decision-making process which are subsequently used in validity 
and reliability tests.  
 
 
Table 5:3b  Principal Component Analysis for Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making 
 
 Factor Loadings  Communality 
 INVSDM1 INVSDM2  
 Formation of 
SDM 
Evaluation 
of SDM 
 
The Board Usually Helps to Form Strategic 
Decisions with the TMT in Board Meetings 
.866 .095 .760 
The Board Usually Helps the Top 
Management to Form Strategic Decisions 
within and Between Board Meetings 
.809 -.006 .654 
The Board Usually Determines the Timing 
and Criteria of the Evaluation and Requests 
Additional Info 
.690 .238 .533 
The Board usually Asks probing Questions 
which Lead to Revisions of Strategic  
Proposals Formed by the TMT 
.665 .471 .664 
The Board Usually Ratifies Strategic 
Proposals which are Formed Solely by the 
TMT 
.058 .832 .695 
The Board Usually Accepts the Evaluation of 
Strategic Decisions by TMT After Asking 
Probing Questions 
.074 .724 .530 
The Board Usually Asks Probing Questions 
and then Ratifies Strategic Proposals Formed 
Primarily by the TMT 
.509 .634 .660 
The Board Usually Determines the Timing 
and Criteria of the Evaluation but that 
Information is Supplied by TMT 
.260 .576 .399 
The Board is not Usually Involved with the 
Formation of the Strategic Decisions 
-.507 .558 .568 
Eigenvalue 3.596 1.865  
%variance explained (60.68) 39.959 20.728  
Note: Principal components analysis with varimax rotation, converging in 3 iterations 
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5.7.2 Concluding Remarks for Involvement in the Strategic Decision-Making  
         Process 
 
The factors that have been extracted above either with eigenvalue greater than one or by 
specifying the number of factors have indicated that the variables do not necessarily belong 
only to one factor. As the Tables 5:3a and 5:3b illustrate, there are items that are 
overlapping between two or more factors. This does not mean that the factor is not strong 
enough to explain thoroughly a construct but there are elements that can explain more than 
one construct. This is reasonable, since in a component analysis the unique variance 
becomes merged with the common variance to give hybrid “common” factors containing 
small proportions of unique variance (Child, 1973, p. 36).  Several elements can explain 
more than one factor, because all the factors that are extracted attempt to operationalise a 
construct. In addition, Schilderinck (1977) argued that the purpose of factor analysis is to 
examine the effect of general factors which are present in more than one variable at the 
same time. Specifically, the formation and evaluation stage of board involvement in the 
strategic decision-making process contain overlapping factors. The items that are supposed 
to describe a single factor were found to load to more than one factor.  
 
 
5.8 Principal Component Analysis of Strategic Decision-Making Process 
 
The principal component analysis of the strategic decision-making process falls into four 
distinctive categories: financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation 
and lateral communication. Principal component analysis allows identifying whether there 
are particular dimensions of the concept of the strategic decision-making process. The 
principal component analysis of financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical 
decentralisation and lateral communication can be found in Tables 5:4, 5:5, 5:6a, 5:6b, 5:7. 
 
5.8.1 Principal Component Analysis of Financial Reporting 
 
The principal component analysis of financial reporting is displayed in Table 5:4. The 
outcome of principal component analysis with eigenvalue greater than generated one factor 
explained 59% of the total variance. In the case of one factor extracted no rotation of the 
data matrix is possible. The solution was characterised by strong individual loadings 
ranging from 0.68 to 0.84 indicating a robust and comprehensive structure. The loadings of 
five financial reporting measurements onto a factor enhance the understanding of financial 
reporting and are consistent with previous studies (e.g. King, 2000; March et al., 1988, 
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Stein, 1980; Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers, 1998 (Cronbach alpha: 0.90); Papadakis, 
1998). 
The extracted factor captured the use of net present value as capital budgeting method, the 
incorporation of strategic decisions, inclusion of proforma financial statements, detailed 
cost studies and use of internal rate of return. As a result, the solution was accepted and the 
factor was named financial reporting with the shorthand expression of FINREP being 
ascribed to it. 
 
Note: Principal Component Analysis with a single factor extracted 
 
 
5.8.2 Principal Component Analysis of Rule Formalisation 
 
Principal component analysis of financial reporting is displayed in table 5:5. The outcome 
of principal component analysis with eigenvalue greater than one produced one factor that 
explained 76% of the total variance. In the case of a single factor extracted no rotation of 
the data matrix was possible. The solution was characterised by strong individual loadings 
ranging from 0.84 to 0.92 demonstrating a substantial influence of factor to explain 
thoroughly the rule formalisation as a dominant parameter in the strategic decision-making 
process. The sample items of rule formalisation included existence of written procedures 
guiding the process, the existence of formal procedures to identify alternative ways of 
action, formal screening procedures, and formal documents guiding the final decision and 
predetermined criteria for strategic decision evaluation. Nonetheless, other studies have 
provided evidence to suggest the overwhelming significance of these items in rule 
formalisation (e.g. King, 2000; Stein, 1980; Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers, 1998; 
Papadakis, 2006; Papadakis, 1998). The five item factor was assigned the label rule 
formalisation. 
Table 5:4  Principal Component Analysis for Financial Reporting 
 
 Factor Loadings Communality 
 FINREP  
 Financial Reporting  Indicators  
Use of Net Present Value as 
Capital Budgeting Method 
.845 .714 
Incorporation of Strategic 
Decision 
.819 .670 
Inclusion of Pro-Forma Financial 
Statements 
.766 .587 
Detailed Cost Studies .699 .488 
Use of Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR) as Capital Budgeting 
Method 
.688 .473 
Eigenvalue 2.933  
% variance explained (58.65) 58.654  
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Table 5:5  Principal Component Analysis for Rule Formalisation 
 
 Factor Loadings Communality 
 RULEFORM  
 Rule Formalisation  
Formal Procedures to Identify 
Alternative Ways of Action 
.921 .848 
Written Procedures Guiding the 
Process 
.872 .760 
Formal Documents Guiding the 
Final Decision 
.866 .751 
Formal Screening Procedures .861 .741 
Pretermined Criteria for Strategic 
Decision Evaluation 
.842 .709 
Eigenvalue 3.808  
%variance explained (76.16) 76.163  
Note: Principal Component Analysis with a single factor extracted 
 
5.8.3 Principal Component Analysis of Hierarchical Decentralisation 
 
Principal component analysis of hierarchical decentralisation generated two outcomes. The 
first outcome with eigenvalue greater than one produced two factors whereas the second 
after identified the number of factors generated one factor with five items. According to 
our theoretical model, the principal component analysis was supposed to generate one 
factor as in many studies in the strategic decision-making literature. However, the principal 
component analysis of our data extracted two factors instead of one. In both cases the 
principal component analysis presented in Tables 5:5a and 5:5b.  
 
As Table 5:6a presents, two factors resulted after principal component analysis.  
The first factor that explained the 51 percent of the total variance designated that lower and 
middle management are involved in the strategic decision-making process. The second 
factor identified an association between three variables: Chief Executive Officer, 
Owner/Shareholder and first level directors. The results extracted from principal 
component analysis show that several individuals are active in the strategic decision-
making process. Therefore, they have been classified into two district factors: the lower 
level management and upper level management factor. 
 
Regarding the principal component analysis that has been extracted by forcing the number 
of factors, as it can be seen for Table 5:6b only one factor was generated that explained the 
51 percent of the total variance. This factor contained five items: CEO, owner/shareholder 
first level directors, middle level director and lower level management. These items have 
been acknowledged as important in amplifying individuals’ involvement in the strategic 
decision-making process by several scholars (e.g. Tannenbaum, 1968; Grinyer et al. 1986; 
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Papadakis, 1998; Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers, 1998; Papadakis and Barwise, 1998, 
2002; Papadakis, 2006). It seems that should be a general tendency among respondent 
directors to perceive high involvement in the strategic decision-making of their firms. This 
conceptual association between items meant that the label of hierarchical decentralisation 
would accurately represent one aspect of strategic decision-making process. 
 
Table 5:6a Principal Component Analysis for Hierarchical Decentralisation 
 
 Factor Loadings  Communality 
 HIERDECENT1 HIERDECENT2  
 Lower Level 
Management 
Upper Level 
Management 
 
Middle Level Management .904 .213 .863 
Lower Level Management .889 -.020 .791 
Chief Executive Officer .164 .834 .722 
Owner/Shareholders -.016 .752 .565 
First level Directors .585 .638 .748 
Eigenvalue                 2.530 1.160  
%variance explained(73.8) 50.604 23.196  
Note: Principal components analysis with varimax rotation, converging in 3 iterations 
 
 
 
Note: Principal Component Analysis with a single factor extracted. 
 
 
5.8.4 Principal Component Analysis of Lateral Communication 
Principal component analysis of lateral communication can be found in Table 5:7. The 
outcome of principal component analysis with eigenvalue greater than one generated one 
factor which explained 62 percent of the total variance. The solution was characterised by 
high loadings ranging from 0.73 to 0.82 demonstrating clear understanding of the 
construct. The mean score of this factor scale was 20.18 (SD=4.92) suggesting a high 
involvement of several departments in the strategic decision-making process. The four 
items within this factor were: finance-accounting department, production department, 
personnel department and purchasing department. Participation of different departments in 
the strategic decision-making process within the organisation has been highlighted by 
several scholars (e.g. Papadakis, 2006; Papadakis and Barwise, 1998, 2002; Papadakis, 
Table 5:6b  Principal Component Analysis for Hierarchical Decentralisation 
 
 Factor Loadings Communality 
 HIERDECENT  
First level Directors .857 .734 
Middle Level Management .834 .695 
Lower Level Management .674 .454 
Chief Executive Officer .657 .431 
Owner/Shareholders .465 .216 
Eigenvalue 2.530  
%variance explained(50.60) 50.604  
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Lioukas and Chambers, 1998; Tannenbaum, 1968, Papadakis, 1998) and given that these 
items loaded onto a single factor, it was decided to assign the LATCOM factor with the 
label lateral communication. This factor has been approved and will be used for reliability 
and validity analysis. 
 
Table 5:7 Principal Component Analysis for Lateral Communication 
 
 Factor Loadings Communality 
 LATCOM  
 Lateral Communication  
Purchasing Department .829 .687 
Production Department .812 .659 
Personnel Department .768 .589 
Finance-Accounting Department .734 .539 
Eigenvalue 2.474  
%variance explained (61.85) 61.859  
Note: Principal Component Analysis with a single factor extracted 
 
 
    
5.9 Principal Component Analysis of Innovation Measures (eigenvalue greater than 
one) 
5.9.1 Factor Structure  
 
Principal component analysis of the innovation measures can be found in Table 5:4a.The 
factor configuration presented in table 5:8a indicates that the first two factors can explain 
the 78 per cent of the total variance. According to the theoretical model, it is expected to 
derive three factors that explain the construct of innovation. Instead, two factors were 
derived and each factor presented in table below has an eigenvalue greater than one. The 
justification and labelling of these two factors will be discussed.  
 
5.9.1.1 Factor 1: Product and Process Innovation (INNV1) 
 
This factor was composed of nine variables that each loaded heavily onto a vector 
generating an eigenvalue of almost eight. These variables are: creating new products for 
fast market introduction; being the first company in the industry to introduce new 
technology; being the first company in the industry to introduce technological 
improvements; creating new variations to existing product lines; creating innovative 
technologies; being the first company in the industry to introduce products/services; 
increasing the revenues from less than three years old new products; developing radical 
new technology and investing heavily in cutting edge process technology-oriented R&D. 
The first factor extracted was named INNV1 and it was given the factor label of product 
and process innovation. After conducting Pearson correlation between the sum of product 
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and process innovation and the variables that characterise the factor, high correlations 
among the items were identified.  
 
There is a clear conceptual association among the ingredients of INNV1 which align them 
clearly with the factor of commitment to innovation that was provided by Zahra (1996). 
Items covered the creation and introduction of products, emphasis on R&D investments 
and commitment to patenting. These items also correspond to previous measurements of 
radical product innovation, strong R&D and patenting (Hitt and Tyler, 1991; Zahra, 1995). 
Other scholars (e.g. Daft and Becker, 1978; Miller, 1987; Subramanian and Nilakanta, 
1996; Johannessen et al., 2001; Prajogo and Sohal, 2003) in order to measure the extent to 
which product and process innovation practices occur within their organisations, have used 
similar items including number of new products, number of patents, total research and 
expenditure, speed to market, “being” the first in the market, the newness of the new 
product as well as production lines. However, other scholars (e.g. Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson 
and Grossman, 2002) have used the term “internal innovation” in an attempt to measure 
the R&D and the new product intensity. 
 
5.9.1.2 Factor 2: Organisational Innovation (INNV2) 
 
The second factor extracted from the innovation includes items namely: supporting an 
organisational unit that drive innovation; encouraging innovation in the organisation and 
developing systems that encourage initiatives and creativity among employees. These 
items have been used in previous studies to identify organisational innovation (e.g Huse, 
1994, 2005). The INNV2 will be given the factor label of organisational innovation. 
INNV2 attracted a high mean score of 13.54 (S.D= 4.22) suggesting that the respondents 
emphasise organisational innovation. 
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Table 5:8a  Principal Component Analysis for Innovation Indicators 
 
 Factor Loadings  Communality 
 INNV1 INNV2  
 Product & Process 
Innovation 
Organisational 
Innovation 
 
Creating New Products for Fast 
Market Introduction 
.858 .251 .798 
Being the First Company in the 
Industry to Introduce New 
Technology 
.846 .310 .812 
Being the First Company in the 
Industry to Introduce 
Technological Improvements 
.836 .395 .855 
Creating New Variations to 
Existing Product Lines 
.825 .246 .742 
Creating Innovative Technologies .824 .362 .810 
Being the First Company in the 
Industry to Introduce new 
Products/Services 
.791 .226 .677 
Increasing the Revenue from less 
than 3 Years Old New Products 
.754 .218 .616 
Developing Radical New 
Technology 
.689 .448 .676 
Investing Heavily in Cutting Edge 
Process Technology-Oriented 
R&D 
.682 .464 .681 
Supporting an Organisational Unit 
that Drive Innovation 
.287 .913 .916 
Encouraging Innovation in the 
Organisation 
.281 .907 .902 
Developing Systems that 
Encourage Initiatives and 
Creativity among Employees 
.347 .847 .838 
Eigenvalue 7.999 1.323  
%variance explained(77.68) 66.659 11.028  
Note: Principal components analysis with varimax rotation 
 
 
 
5.10 Factor Structure (specified number of factors) 
 
Principal component analysis of the innovation measures with forced factors can be found 
in Table 5:8b indicating that the three factors can explain the 86 per cent of the total 
variance. Following the theoretical framework of the study, three factors were extracted. 
Similarly, Huse (1994, 2005) generated three factors that explain the corporate innovation: 
product innovation (4 items), process innovation (5 items) and organisational innovation (3 
items). The justification and labelling of these three factors will be discussed.  
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5.10.1 Factor 1: Product Innovation (INNPD) 
 
The first factor composed by five items that each loaded heavily onto a vector generating 
an eigenvalue of almost eight. These variables are: increasing the revenue from less than 3 
years old new products; creating new products for fast market introduction; creating new 
variations to existing product lines, and finally, being the first company in the industry to 
introduce new products and services.  
 
There is a clear conceptual association among the items of product innovation which align 
themselves with factors provided by Agarwal and Bayus, 2002; Ali, Krapfel and LaBahn, 
1995; Schmidt and Calantone, 1998; Cooper, 1979; Lawton and Parasuraman, 1980; 
Kleinschmidt and Cooper, 1991 who have labelled their comparative factors “product 
innovativeness” or otherwise “product newness”. In order to be consistent with previous 
studies, INNPD will be given the factor label of product innovation. 
 
The mean score for IINPD scale was 20.77  and SD=5.14 on a seven-point scale employed, 
which suggests that the overall strength of the stimuli factor could explain product 
innovation strategies of Greek listed firms. 
 
5.10.2 Factor 2: Process Innovation (INNPC) 
 
The second factor was characterised by four items each loading heavily onto a vector 
which exhibited an eigenvalue greater than one. These four variables were: investing 
heavily in cutting edge process technology-oriented R&D; developing radical new 
technology; creating innovative technologies and being the first company in the industry to 
introduce new technology. All these variables were found to reflect process innovation and 
have been collectively expressed as “process innovation”,   “radicalness of innovation”, 
“radicalness” or “radical product innovation” (Huse, 1994, 2005; Kessler and 
Chakrabarti, 1999; Chandy and Tellis, 2000; Souder and Song, 1997). The label process 
innovation was considered as an acceptable descriptor for this factor.  
 
5.10.3 Factor 3: Organisational Innovation (INNORG) 
 
The third factor contained three variables with high loadings that naturally combined to 
represent organisational innovation. The variables were: supporting an organisational unit 
that drives innovation; encouraging innovation in the organisation and developing systems 
that encourage initiatives and creativity among employees. All these items clearly enhance 
the innovation strategies at organisational level. The same organisational innovation has 
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been acknowledged by Huse (1994, 2005). The mean score INNORG scale was 13.54 
(SD= 4.22) which represented a high regard attached to organisational innovation 
strategies in considering innovation. 
 
Note: Principal components analysis with varimax rotation, converging in 3 iterations 
 
 
This section aimed to illustrate the results of data reduction techniques as they applied to 
empirical data generated from innovation measurements. Principal component analysis 
procedure resulted after specifying the number of factors in the outcome of a three factor 
solution and with an eigenvalue greater than one resulted to an outcome of two factors. 
Both resulted outcomes were coherent in structure and explained a high percentage of the 
variance without facing overleaping problems. The factors that have been derived are: 
Table 5:8 b  Principal Component Analysis for Innovation Indicators 
 
 Factor Loadings   Communality 
 INNPD INNPC INNVORG  
 Product 
Innovation 
Process 
Innovation 
Organisational 
Innovation 
 
Increasing the Revenue 
from less than 3 Years Old 
New Products 
.828 .170 .244 .774 
Creating New Products for 
Fast Market Introduction 
.813 .368 .236 .852 
Creating New Variations 
to Existing Product Lines 
.803 .326 .240 .809 
Being the First Company 
in the Industry to Introduce 
new Products/Services 
.785 .291 .224 .752 
Being the First Company 
in the Industry to Introduce 
Technological 
Improvements 
.633 .591 .325 .856 
Investing Heavily in 
Cutting Edge Process 
Technology-Oriented 
R&D 
.246 .863 .312 .904 
Developing Radical New 
Technology 
.264 .850 .300 .882 
Creating Innovative 
Technologies 
.457 .804 .235 .911 
Being the First Company 
in the Industry to Introduce 
New Technology 
.584 .665 .219 .832 
Supporting an 
Organisational Unit that 
Drives Innovation 
.245 .253 .899 .932 
Encouraging Innovation in 
the Organisation 
.238 .251 .893 .917 
Developing Systems that 
Encourage Initiatives and 
Creativity among 
Employees 
.290 .286 .827 .850 
Eigenvalue 7.999 1.323 .949  
%variance explained 
(85.59) 
66.659 11.028 7.912  
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product innovation, process innovation and organisational innovation. Whereas, the factors 
that generated with eigenvalue greater than one were product-process innovation and 
organisational innovation.  For both solutions the derived factors were accepted and used 
for reliability and validity analysis.  
 
 
5.11 Principal Component Analysis of Organisational Performance Measures 
 
 
The principal component analysis of the organisational performance is displayed in Table 
5:9. The format of the table is common to all principal components analyses presented in 
this chapter and specifies the amount of variance explained by the solution, variable 
communalities, factor loadings and eigenvalue attributable to the extracted factor. 
 
          Note:  Principal Component Analysis with a single factor extracted 
 
The configuration of the factor structure showed that a single factor was extracted which 
explained 78 percent of the total variance. A single factor was extracted in both cases when 
the eigenvalue is over one and when the numbers of factors are specified. Only one factor 
was extracted thus, rotation matrix was not possible and the convention of evaluating the 
extracted factor was undertaken. The solution was characterised by strong individual 
loadings on factor ranging from 0.76 to 0.92 indicating evidence of a robust structure. 
Pearson product-moment correlation was conducted, high correlations between the items 
of organisational performance were identified, showing that all items describe by one 
factor. In addition, the loadings of all five performance indicators onto a single factor 
seemed conceptually congruent on the basis of a deductive understanding of the 
organisational performance construct and previous performance measurements. Similarly, 
Li, Zhao, Tan and Liu (2008) identified a single factor that consists of three performance 
items: ROI, profits and market shares compared to close competitors with loadings of the 
factor ranging from 0.81 to 0.91 and Cronbach alpha 0.88. Also, Garcia-Morales, Llozéns-
Montes and Verdú-Jover (2007) concluded that a single factor describes the financial 
indicators, namely: return on assets, return on equity, return on sales and main products 
and markets.  
Table 5:9  Principal Component Analysis for Organisational Performance Indicators 
 
 Factor Loadings Communality 
 ORGPERF  
Performance Indicators Organisational 
Performance 
 
Overall Firm Performance and Success .929 .863 
Our Competitive Position .907 .824 
After-Tax Return on Total Sales .907 .822 
After-Tax Return on Total Assets .894 .800 
Firm's Total Sales Growth .762 .580 
Eigenvalue 3.889  
%variance explained (77.78) 77.778  
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On the basis that the factor captured five different elements of performance and aligned 
itself with previous measures of the concept, it is believed that the derived solution was 
coherent in nature. As result, the solution was accepted and the factor labeled 
organisational performance indicators with the shorthand expression of ORGPEF ascribed 
to it.  
 
5.12 Summary of Principal Component Analysis 
 
 
The purpose of principal component analysis is to decompose the original data into a set of 
linear variates (Dunteman, 1989). Kim and Mueller (1978, p.14) described principal 
component analysis as “a method of transforming a given set of observed into another set 
of variables”.  
 
Exploratory principal components analysis was performed primarily in order to pre-test the 
items and explore the underlying factor structure of the constructs of the study. Principal 
axis factoring in an exploratory factor analysis with a promax rotation was used taking into 
account some general requirements. Methodologists recommend a minimum sample size at 
least five to ten respondents per item (Comrey, 1988; Hair et al., 1998). Extraction method 
with eigenvalue greater than one and forced factors and a scree plot for the determination 
of factor extraction were used. Furthermore, items with loadings of greater than .40 were 
considered to be “substantial” (Floyd and Widaman, 1995) and loadings above .50 to be 
“very significant” (Hair et al., 1998). 
 
The result of this analysis was the development of 15 factors with eigenvalue greater than 
one and 13 forced  factors, details of which are summarised in Tables 5:10a and 5:10b. 
All the factors presented in Table 5:10a and 5:10b satisfied the statistical and conceptual 
criteria for acceptance and inclusion in subsequent analysis in this study. 
 
 
5.13 Construction of Scale Indices from the Extracted Factors  
 
 
5.13.1 Scale Composition  
 
After a thorough examination of extracted factors, indices had been constructed from each 
factor solution according to scale reliability and scale validity requirements (Miller, 1977; 
Kim and Mueller, 1978). “Reliability and validity are tools of an essentially positivist 
epistemology.” (Watling, as cited in Winter, 2000, p. 7). Crawford and Lomas (1980) 
argued that variables with loadings into factors with coefficients greater than 0.40 can be 
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used to construct scale indices. The Tables 5:11a and Table 5:11b provide the basis for 
scale reliability and validity. 
 
 
Table 5:10a: Summary of Principal Component Analysis Factors Attributable to Each Construct (eigenvalue 
greater than one) 
Construct/Factor Label Eigenvalue Percentage of Variance 
Explained 
External Corporate Environment   
ENV1:Dynamism in Marketing Practices 6.611 33.89 
ENV2: Customer Dynamism 2.065 12.14 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism 1.618 9.51 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence  1.258 7.40 
Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making Process   
INVSDM1: Formation and Process of Strategic Decision Making 3.554 39.48 
INVSDM2: Formation and Evaluation of Strategic Decision-
Making 
1.702 18.90 
INVSDM3: Evaluation of Strategic Decision-Making 1.011 11.23 
Strategic Decision-Making Process   
FINREP: Financial Reporting 2.933 58.65 
RULEFORM: Rule Formalisation 3.808 76.16 
HIERDECENT1:Hierarchical Decentralisation 
(Lower Level Management) 
2.530 50.60 
HIERDECENT2: Hierarchical Decentralisation  
(Upper Level Management) 
1.160 23.19 
LATCOM: Lateral Communication 2.474 61.86 
Innovation   
INNV1: Product and Process Innovation 7.999 66.66 
INNV2: Organisational Innovation 1.323 11.02 
Organisational Performance    
ORGPERF: Organisational Performance  3.889 77.78 
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Table 5:10b: Summary of Principal Component Analysis Factors Attributable to Each Construct 
(specifying the number of factors) 
Construct/Factor Label Eigenvalue Percentage of Variance 
Explained 
External Corporate Environment   
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism 5.677 40.54 
ENV2: Environmental Munificence/Hostility 2.060 14.716 
ENV3: Environment Complexity 1.252 8.944 
Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making Process   
INVSDM1:Formation of Strategic Decision-Making 3.596 39.96 
INVSDM2: Evaluation of Strategic Decision-Making 1.865 20.72 
Strategic Decision-Making Process   
FINREP: Financial Reporting 2.933 58.65 
RULEFORM: Rule Formalisation 3.808 76.16 
HIERDECENT: Hierarchical Decentralisation 2.530 50.60 
LATCOM: Lateral Communication 2.474 61.86 
Innovation   
INNPD: Product Innovation 7.999 66.65 
INNVPC: Process Innovation 1.323 11.028 
INNVORG: Organisational Innovation .946 7.912 
Organisational Performance    
ORGPERF: Organisational Performance  3.889 77.78 
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Table 5:11a Multi-item Scale Reliability and Validation Statistics 
Item-total Correlation 
Scale  Number 
of 
Scale 
Items 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
External Corporate 
Environment 
           
ENV1:Dynamismin 
Marketing Practices 
5 .890 1 .548 .621 .689 .526     
ENV2: Customer 
Dynamism 
3 .836 1 .785 .526       
ENV3:Environmental 
Competitor’s Dynamism 
4 .836 1 .550 .527 .526      
ENV4:Environmental 
Complexity-Munificence  
5 .650 1 .346 .414 .256 .210     
Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making Process 
           
INVSDM1:Formation and 
Process of Strategic 
Decision Making 
5 .565 1 .516 .734 .459 -.301     
INVSDM2:Formation and 
Evaluation of Strategic 
Decision-Making 
6 .710 1 .474 .534 .317 .403 .234    
INVSDM3:Evaluation of 
Strategic Decision-Making 
2 .423 1 .270        
Strategic Decision-
Making Process 
           
FINREP: Financial 
Reporting 
5 .818 1 .598 .399 .281 .394     
RULEFORM:Rule 
Formalisation 
5 .921 1 .818 .628 .685 .665     
HIERDECENT1:Hierarchi
cal Decentralisation(Lower 
Level Management) 
3 .579 1 .340 .299       
HIERDECENT2: 
Hierarchical 
Decentralisation (Upper 
Level Management) 
2 .810 1 .684        
LATCOM:Lateral 
Communication 
4 .793 1 .553 .347 .442      
Innovation 
           
INNV1: Product and 
Process Innovation 
9 .953 1 .789 .690 .639 .689 .718 .628 .517 .530 
INNV2: Organisational 
Innovation 
3 .938 1 .827 .799       
Organisational 
Performance  
           
ORGPERF: Organisational 
Performance  
5 .924 1 .937 .491 .756 .725     
*Pearson Correlation Coefficients. 
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Table 5:11b Multi-item Scale Reliability and Validation Statistics 
 Item-total Correlation 
Scale  Number 
of 
Scale 
Items 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
External  
Corporate Environment 
          
ENV1:Environmental 
Dynamism 
8 .900 1 .842 .650 .575 .540 .606 .469 .528 
ENV2:Environmental 
Munificence/Hostility 
3 .571 1 .255 .240      
ENV3:Environment 
Complexity 
3 .497 1 .441 .208      
Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making Process 
          
INVSDM1:Formation of 
Strategic Decision-Making 
4 .799 1 .732 .473 .527     
INVSDM2: Evaluation of 
Strategic Decision-Making 
5 .704 1 .534 .474 .317 .403    
Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
          
FINREP: Financial Reporting 5 .818 1 .598 .399 .281 .394    
RULEFORM:Rule Formalisation 5 .921 1 .818 .628 .685 .665    
HIERDECENT1:Hierarchical 
Decentralisation 
5 .706 1 .359 .302 .165 .117    
LATCOM:Lateral 
Communication 
4 .793 1 .553 .347 .442     
Innovation 
          
INNPD: Product Innovation 5 .936 1 .811 .711 .665 .742    
INNVPC: Process Innovation 4 .993 1 .834 .789 .832     
INNVORG: Organisational 
Innovation 
3 .937 1 .827 .799      
Organisational Performance            
ORGPERF: Organisational 
Performance  
5 .924 1 .937 .491 .756 .725    
*Pearson Correlation Coefficients. 
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5.13.2 Reliability of Scales Indices 
 
Joppe (2000, p.1) defined reliability as: “…The extent to which results are consistent over time 
and an accurate representation of the total population under study is referred to as reliability 
and if the results of a study can be reproduced under a similar methodology, then the research 
instrument is considered to be reliable”. Kirk and Miller (1986) identified the following three 
types of reliability regarding the quantitative research(1) the degree to which a measurement, 
given repeatedly, remains the same (2) the stability of a measurement over time and (3) the 
similarity of measurements within a given time period. 
 
 The Cronbach alpha coefficient was used to assess the reliability of the construct and to 
validate a questionnaire (Cronbach, 1951). Kline (1999) noted that acceptable value for 
Cronbach’s alpha is between .7 and .9. Nunnally’s (1967) argued that alpha coefficient of 
0.50 or greater is adequate to conclude internal consistency. All scales were found to 
satisfy this reliability criterion with Cronbach alpha coefficients ranging from 0.42 to .95 
(Tables 5:11a, 5:11b).  
 
5.13.3 Validity of Scales Indices 
 
 
The notion of validity is derived from the positivism which is defined by a systematic theory of 
validity. According to positivism, validity is the outcome and culmination of other empirical 
conceptions: universal laws, evidence, objectivity, truth, actuality, deduction, reason, fact and 
mathematical data to name just a few (Winter, 2000). Joppe (2000, p.1) argued that validity in 
quantitative research determines whether the research truly measures that which it was 
intended to measure or how truthful the research results are. 
  
Wainer and Braun (1988) described the validity in quantitative research as “construct validity”. 
The construct is the initial concept, notion, question or hypothesis that determines which data 
is to be gathered and how it is to be gathered. “Construct validity concerns how well the 
measures employed fit the theories for which a test is designed” (Scandura and Williams, 
2000; p.1252). Validity is defined as the extent of a scale or a set of measures that 
accurately represent the concept of interest (Hair et al., 1998). Two techniques for testing 
construct validity are the confirmatory factor analysis (confirm a factor that represents a 
latent construct) and explanatory factor analysis (represents a discriminant and predictive 
validity). The validity can be tested by correlating the scale item with the scale itself. The 
Tables 5:11a, 5:11b demonstrate that the coefficients were relatively high and at the 
expected direction. The correlation coefficients were significant at 0.001 and the items 
were found to significantly contribute to the measurement of construct. 
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5.14 Concluding Remarks 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to identify a series of variables with common 
characteristics among the measures of external environment, involvement in strategic 
decision-making process, characteristics of strategic decision-making process, innovation 
and financial performance. Two principal components analyses have been coducted; first, 
factors were extracted naturally according to the data set and second, factors were 
extracted as presented in the literature review. A summary of these factors derived form 
these constructs has been provided. The factors satisfied the statistical criteria of validity 
and reliability. The following chapter will proceed with hypotheses testing using both 
factors extracted. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Correlation, Multiple Linear Regression Modelling and General Linear 
Model (GLM) Analyses 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Fifteen factors extracted from the principal components analysis with eigenvalue greater 
than one and 13 factors by specifying the number of factors as well as twenty items were 
analysed in terms of their correlations with the constructs of the study. This analytical 
technique was used as the basis of hypothesis testing in this study. There are categories of 
bivariate relationships: 144 bivariate relationships (factors were extracted with eigenvalue 
greater than one) and 120 bivariate relationships (forced factors were included in the 
study). These bivariate relationships are presented by means of the nature and magnitude 
of the correlation coefficients, and discussed in the light of the literature associated with 
the mainstream theories in corporate governance and upper echelons. These factors and 
non-factor variables were then taken, correlatively as well as separately since there are 
many dependent variables that have to be tested in regression analyses.  
 
6.2 Preparation of Non-Factor Variables 
 
While a total of fifteen factors with eigenvalue greater than one and thirteen forced factors 
were extracted from the principal component analysis, it was necessary to incorporate an 
additional seventeen variables in subsequent analytical tests. Twelve of these variables 
were single-item measures which could be used directly in further statistical analyses. 
These were described and annotated as follows: board size (BODSIZ), organisational size 
(ORGSIZ), interlocking directors (INTERDIR), executive directors (EXECDIR), non-
executives directors (NONEXECDIR), inside directors (INSDIR), outside directors 
(OUTDIR), frequency of board meetings (FREQBODMEET), duration of board meetings 
(DURBODMEET), age of directors (AGED), educational level (EDUCLEVEL), 
educational specialty (EDUCSPEC), industry tenure (INDTEN), company tenure 
(COMPTEN), position tenure (POSTEN), functional background (FUNCBAC), female 
representation (FEMREPRES). There are seventeen non-factors variables overall,  twelve   
single item variables were: board size, organisational size, age of directors, interlocking 
directors, executive directors, non-executive directors, inside directors, outside directors, 
industry tenure, company tenure, position tenure and female representation. However, 
there are five categorical variables that capture educational level, educational specialty, 
functional background, frequency of board meetings and length of board meetings. Table 
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6:1 summarises the sources of these non-factor variables and describes the specific 
notations to be used from this point in the thesis.  
 
Table 6:1 Source of Non-factor Variables for Further Analysis 
Construct/Variable Label Source Variable 
Board Composition Characteristics   
BODSIZ: Board size Single-item measure 
INTERDIR: Inside directors Single-item measure 
OUTDIR: Outside directors Single-item measure 
INTERDIR: Interlocking directors Single-item measure 
FEMREPRES: Female representation  Single-item measure 
EXECDIR: Executive directors Single-item measure 
NONEXECDIR: Non-executive 
directors 
Single-item measure 
Board Demographic Characteristics  
AGED: Age of Directors Single-item measure 
INDTEN: Industry tenure Single-item measure 
COMPTEN: Company tenure Single-item measure 
POSTEN: Position tenure Single-item measure 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational level Categorical measures 
EDUCSPEC: Educational specialty Categorical measures 
FUNCBAC: Functional Background Categorical measures 
Organisational Characteristics  
ORGSIZ: Organisational Size Single-item measure 
FREQBODMEET: Frequency of Board 
Meetings 
Categorical measures 
DURBODMEET: Duration of Board 
Meetings 
Categorical measures 
 
6.3 Product moment Correlation Analysis: Hypothesis Testing and Discussion of 
Findings 
 
6.3.1 Correlation Analysis Results  
 
A correlation analysis procedure was executed with the use of Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficients. In Appendix E the results of product moment-correlation analyses 
are presented. In particular, Table 6:1a presents the correlation coefficients between the 
various environmental dimensions (factors that are extracted with eigenvalue greater than 
one), board size and the number of interlocking directors. Table 6:1a provides an insight 
into these bivariate relationships and it can be observed that of the seven variables, none 
showed to significant associations between environmental dimensions either with board 
size or the number of interlocking directorates.  
 
Table 6:1b presents the correlation coefficients between various environmental dimensions 
(forced factors were extracted), board size and the number of interlocking directors. Table 
6:1b demonstrates that none of the environmental dimensions had an association either 
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with board size or the number of interlocking directors. However, both Tables6:1a and 
Tables 6:1b indicate a strong association between the environmental dimensions and the 
dual leadership structure. 
 
 
Table 6:2 demonstrates the correlation coefficient between organisational size, board size, 
number of executive directors, number of non-executive directors and organisational 
performance. Table 6:2 provides an insight into these bivariate relationships and as it can 
be observed three out of four variables have an association with board size. 
 
Table 6:3a shows the correlation coefficients  between board size, inside directors, 
frequency of board meetings, length of board meetings, environmental dimensions (factors 
extracted with eigenvalue greater than one) and involvement in the strategic decision-
making process (factors extracted with eigenvalue greater than one). In addition, Table 
6:3a presents fifteen bivariate correlations; however, only two have a positive association 
with the involvement in the strategic decision-making process.  
 
Table 6:3b indicates the correlation coefficients between board size, inside directors, 
frequency of board meetings, duration of board meetings, environmental dimensions 
(forced factors were extracted) and involvement in the strategic decision-making process 
(forced factors were extracted). This table concludes that four variables have a significant 
impact in the strategic decision-making process.  
 
Tables 6:4a1- 6:4a5 present the correlation coefficients between educational level, 
educational specialty, functional background of board members, industry, company and 
position tenure of board members, environmental dimensions (factors extracted with 
eigenvalue greater than one) and the different aspects of the strategic decision-making 
process: rational/comprehensiveness, lateral communication, hierarchical decentralisation 
(two factors were extracted: lower and upper hierarchical decentralisation), rule 
formalisation and financial reporting. The results indicate that four variables have an effect 
on the different rational/comprehensiveness stages in the strategic decision-making 
process.  
 
Regarding the financial reporting, only three variables have a substantial effect on this 
aspect of strategic decision-making process. Also, three variables have an association with 
the rule formalisation in the strategic decision-making process. Concerning hierarchical 
decentralisation, only one variable has a positive relationship mainly with the upper level 
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management of the hierarchical decentralisation. Finally, three variables have an 
explanatory effect on lateral communication.  
 
Tables 6:4b1-6:4b5 present the correlation coefficients between educational level, 
educational specialty, functional background of board members, industry, company and 
position tenure of board members, environmental dimensions (forced factors were 
extracted) and the different aspects of the strategic decision-making process: ratio-
nal/comprehensiveness, lateral communication, hierarchical decentralisation  (forced factor 
was extracted), rule formalisation and financial reporting. The above Tables indicated that 
four variables have an association with the different forms of the rational or otherwise 
comprehensiveness in the strategic decision-making process, four variables have an 
explanatory impact on the financial reporting, only three variables have a significant effect 
on the rule formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and on lateral communication 
respectively. 
 
Table 6:5a demonstrates the correlation coefficients between outside directors, age of 
executives, female representation, industry, company, position tenure, educational level, 
educational specialty and innovation practices (factors were extracted with eigenvalue 
greater than one).  In addition, Table 6:5a provides an insight into these bivariate 
relationships and it can be seen that of the eight variables only one was shown to have a 
significant association with product and process innovation practices, while of the eight 
variables just two have a significant effect on organisational innovation practices. The 
Table indicates that environmental factors have an impact on both product and process 
innovation practices as well as on organisational innovation. 
 
Similarly, Table 6:5b presents the correlation coefficients between outside directors, age of 
executives, female representation, industry, company, position tenure, educational level, 
educational specialty and innovation practices (three forced factors namely; process, 
product and innovation practices). Table 6:5b provides an insight into these bivariate 
relationships and it can be seen that of the eight variables only one was shown to have a 
significant association with product as well as process innovation practices, while of the 
eight variables four variables including the external corporate environment have a 
significant relationship with organisational innovation practices. 
 
Finally, Table 6:6a demonstrates the correlation coefficients between strategic decision-
making processes, namely: financial reporting, rule formalisation, lower level hierarchical 
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decentralisation, upper level hierarchical decentralisation, lateral communication, product 
and process innovation as well as organisational innovation with respect to their influence 
on organisational performance (factors were extracted with eigenvalue greater than one). 
The results revealed an impact of financial reporting, rule formalisation and organisational 
innovation practices on organisational performance.  
 
Similarly, Table 6:6b presents the correlation coefficients with forced factors and it shows 
that financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and organisational 
innovation appear to have an effect on firm’s performance  
 
The following section will provide a brief analysis of the hypothesis testing as presented in 
Appendix E. The first hypothesis was related to various environmental dimensions and 
board composition characteristics.  The hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1c and H1d revealed 
inconclusive results due to lack of statistical significance between the variables. More 
specifically, the various environmental dimensions have shown no impact on board 
composition either in terms of size or number of interlocking directors. However, it was 
found that dynamic environments favour the existence of dual leadership structure which is 
in accordance with the H1e hypothesis. 
 
Regarding the hypotheses H2a, H2b, H2c and H2d, it was found that three of the four 
variables were positively associated with board size. The direction, magnitude and the 
level of significance of these correlation coefficients provide the basis for the evaluation of 
the hypothetical relationships. More specifically, board size exhibited positive associations 
with organisational size, the number of executives as well as non-executive directors; 
however, the board size did not have a substantial effect on the organisational 
performance. The results indicated that the hypotheses H2a, H4c and H4d were supported 
with significant positive correlations.  
 
With regard to the hypotheses H3a, H3d and H3e that the board size, the duration of board 
meetings as well as the environmental munificence would be positively related to the 
involvement in the strategic making process, inconclusive results were found. Despite the 
fact that marginal positive relationships were found between inside representation 
(INTERDIR) and involvement in the strategic decision-making process as well as between  
the frequency of the board meetings (FREQBODMEET) and both formation and 
evaluation stage of the strategic decision-making process. Most of the correlations that 
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were significant were in the right direction, the hypotheses overall were not adequately 
supported because the correlation coefficients were not statistically significant. 
 
Research propositions for the strategic decision-making process were outlined as 
comprising five elements of hypothesis four (H4). The first element was dedicated to a 
demographic characteristic of the executives: the educational level which suggested an 
association between this variable and the different forms of strategic decision-making 
process: financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and lateral 
communication. 
 
The correlation coefficients contained in Tables 6:4a1- 6:4a5 as well the correlations that 
have been executed with forced factors presented in Tables 6:4b1,-6:4b5 were found to fall 
between +/-0.20. Therefore, generally weak correlations were found between the 
hypothesised variables influencing the different forms of strategic decision-making process 
namely; financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical reporting and lateral 
communication. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that functional background and 
educational level and specialty of board members of the Greek listed organisations as well 
the  environmental dynamism in marketing practices (ENV1) discovered that few 
significant correlations with the different forms of strategic decision-making process were 
evident.  For the two forms of the strategic decision-making process: financial reporting 
and rule formalisation few significant correlations regarding the educational level, the 
functional background, the environmental dynamism in marketing practices and 
environmental complexity-munificence were evident. Regarding the hierarchical 
decentralisation and lateral communication in the strategic decision-making process, the 
correlation coefficients demonstrated that executives with lower educational background as 
well as companies operating in high dynamic and munificent environments are actively 
involved in the strategic decision-making process. Despite the fact that some marginal 
correlations were found between the variables and the following factors of strategic 
decision-making process: FINREP, RULEFORM, HIERCENT and LATCOM, most of the 
correlations were at the right directions but were not statistically significant at an 
acceptable level. 
 
The hypothesis (H5) stated that board and demographic characteristics of the executives 
would be related to innovation practices. Partial evidence existed to support this contention 
in that few variables such as age, industry and educational level are related to 
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organisational innovation practices. The hypothesis with female directors and innovation 
practices was confirmed as there is no significant impact of the gender of board members 
and the extent to which they pursue innovative practices. However, external corporate 
environment is regarded as a catalyst factor for Greek executives to pursue innovative 
strategies. Finally, the hypothesis (H6) outlined that financial reporting; rule formalisation 
and organisational innovation have an effect on firm’s performance. 
 
6.4 Analysis of the Results 
 
The next section contains results of the analysis used to test hypotheses proposed in earlier 
chapters. First, data were examined against the assumptions of the analyses used in the 
study. The next section details the linear regression analysis as well as the general linear 
model analysis that have been conducted in order to test the research hypotheses and 
provide a thorough understanding of the relationships examined. The research hypotheses 
will be tested by using two statistical approaches; linear regression as well as general linear 
model GLM) with both factors with eigenvalues greater than one as well as specified the 
number of factors. Results from regression analysis are presented in Appendix F and from 
GLM analysis in Appendix G. 
 
 
6.5 Multiple Regressions: Model Evaluation, Misspecification Tests and Multicol-
linearity Diagnosis 
 
 
6.5.1 Introduction  
Before analyzing the data, the data were first screened for problems that might affect later 
analyses and no problem was detected. 
Regression models were evaluated according to four tests prescribed by econometricians 
(Gujarati, 1992; Greene, 1993) in order to predict the appropriateness of an equation. The 
diagnostic tests of linearity, homoscedasticity, normality and multicollinearity have been 
conducted in order to confirm that the regression analyses met the validity requirements.   
 
6.5.2 Linearity 
 
The linearity of a regression model is based on the association between dependent and 
independent variables which represent the extent to which a change of the dependent 
variable is associated with the independent variables (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 
1992).  Linearity can be easily examined through residual plots, however this is not 
considered a scientific approach. Other scholars have proposed different approaches to test 
the functional form of in multiple regressions such as Bartlett M specification error test 
217 
 
(Kendall and Stuart, 1961) and Box-Cox test (Box and Cox, 1964). For the purpose of the 
research, a more straightforward approach is applied; the Ramsey (1974) test which is 
conducted by calculating the predicted fitted values and the standardised residuals. The 
detection of linearity is examined by F-statistic and its associated significant level. F-
statistic in most of the regression analyses was found to be low and no significant at 0.05 
level. Therefore, a linearity test confirms the appropriateness of the regression model.  
 
6.5.3 Homoscedasticity 
 
The phenomenon of homoscedasticity occurs when the residuals in a regression 
specification have equal (homo) spread (scedasticity) or equal variance. The word derived 
from the Greek word skedanime, which means disperse (Gujarati, 1992). Whereas, any 
increase, decrease of the variance is described as heteroscedasticity, which causes 
problems for the statistical inference in regression models. There is an imperative need for 
the homoscedasticity assumption to be tested before accepting the results of a regression 
analysis. Several tests of detecting heteroscedasticity have been proposed by scholars (e.g. 
Glejser, 1969; Breusch and Pagan, 1979; Evans and King, 1988). In this instance, Goldfeld 
and Quandt (1965) test was applied. Goldfeld and Quandt (1965) suggested that F-test 
where: 
 F= 
RSSn
RSSn
1
2
 
The concept of this method is that the dataset is divided into two samples. More 
specifically, n1 was composed of the residual sum of squares of the first data set and n2 
represent the residual sum of squares of the second sub-sample. The final step is to put the 
residual sum of squares into this equation in order to predict the F-value. Then, by 
checking against F-distribution tables it was possible to conclude that at the 0.05, the 
phenomenon of heteroscedasticity was not observed.  
 
6.5.4 Normality 
Another common violation in multiple linear regression modelling is that of normality 
(Hair et al, 1992). Normality can be detected by using histograms and scatter plots to test 
normal distribution. A supplementary test, numeric test for kurtosis and skewness were 
conducted. Hair et al. (1992) suggested the following equation in order to test normality:  
Z=
N
Skewness
/6
 
 If kurtosis and skewness indices are not more than 1.0 unit away from 0 absolute value, 
normality is generally considered to exist (Huck and Cormier, 1996). Furthermore, based 
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upon the 0.05 level of statistical significance, the distribution tables suggested that the 
calculated z-statistic was below the critical value of 1.96 which shows that the residuals are 
normally distributed.  
 
6.5.5 Multicollinearity 
 
The phenomenon of multicollinearity exists when there is a strong correlation between two 
or more predictors in a regression model (Hair et al, 1992). The case of multicollinearity 
exists in multiple regression models when there is more than one predictor.  
 
One of the common approaches to detect multicollinearity is to execute a correlation 
matrix of all predictors and identify if they are highly correlated (above .80 or .90) (Field, 
2005). For the purpose of the study a more scientific approach has been implemented. 
Multicollinearity is detected by the variance inflation factor (VIF) scores and the tolerance 
values of the independent variables (Brown, 1991). An acceptable threshold level of a VIF 
is to be less than 10 and a tolerance value greater than 0.10 (Myers, 1990; Hair et al., 
1992).  
 
6.6 Environmental Dimensions and Board Composition Characteristics 
 
6.6.1 Introduction  
 
Several studies in management literature have examined the alignment between person-
environment fit (e.g. Pervin, 1968; Schneider, 1987). The purpose of these studies is based 
on the “elusive criterion of fit” (Judge and Ferris, 1992) and more specifically the fit 
between individuals and environment. The “fit” between strategy and its context either in 
terms of external environment (Anderson and Zeithaml, 1984; Bourgeois, 1980; Hitt, 
Ireland and Stadter, 1982) or organisational characteristics (Chandler, 1962) and 
executives’ characteristics (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984) has a positive impact on the 
organisational performance. Organisational theorists argue that the effect of environment 
on organisational structure is critical for the organisational survival and prosperity, since 
executives act as a linkage between the organisation and the external environment (e.g. 
Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Katz and Kahn, 1978). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. 225) 
claimed that “environmental contingencies affect the selection and removal of top 
organisational administrators to make the organisation more aligned with its environment”.  
Scholars (e.g. Lawrence and Lorch, 1967; Miller, Kets de Vries and Toulouse, 1982) 
outline the influence of external environment on the managerial characteristics. Gupta 
(1988) stated that the “fit” between leadership characteristics and environment enhance 
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managerial effectiveness. More specifically, he (1988, p. 164) claimed that “an 
organisation’s environmental context has the potential to exert a direct contingency impact 
on the composition and characteristics of executive leadership.”  
Figure 6:1 presents the first set of hypothesised relationships between the environmental 
dimensions and the board composition characteristics.  
 
Figure 6:1 Hypothesised Research Model between Environmental Conditions and 
Board Structure 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
H1a: The more complex the environment, the larger the size of the board and the higher 
the number of interlocking directorates. 
 
Hypothesis H1a proposed that firms operating in complex environments tend to have a 
large board size and a high number of interlocking directors; however Tables 6:7, 6:9; 
6:11, 6:13 illustrate that the results of regression analysis were in the same line with the 
outcomes of the GLM analysis (Tables 6:73, 6:74, 6:75, 6:76) neither of which indicate 
any statistical significance of environmental circumstances towards the composition of 
Greek boardroom. Therefore, the results do not offer support to H1a hypothesis.  
 
Few studies have systematically examined the effect of environmental dimensions on the 
composition of Boards of Directors. Dess and Beard (1984) have developed a model of 
several environmental dimensions such as resource scarcity, volatility and complexity and 
how they affect the board size and the number of interlocking directors. A few studies, so 
far, have examined the role of environment on board composition and on organisational 
performance. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) found a strong association between the 
proportion of interlocking directorates and environmental uncertainty due to competition. 
In addition, Pfeffer (1972) reported that the proportion of outside directors was positively 
related with environmental demands. Other studies attempted to investigate the impact of 
specific environmental dimensions on board composition. Scholars argued that firms 
operating in complex environments require a more diversified top management team in 
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order to monitor the environmental diversity (Gupta, 1988, p. 160). Firms in complex 
environments face problem-solving situations and, thus, require larger and heterogeneous 
boards (Janis, 1972). However, Boyd (1990) reported no impact of environmental 
complexity to board size and number of interlocking directorates in high performing firms. 
Pfeffer (1973) conducted a systematic examination of the composition of hospitals’ Boards 
of Directors according to the changes in the environmental contingencies. He revealed that 
the structures as well as the attributes of board members are associated with the external 
environment. In particular, executives that come from several functional backgrounds 
might bring expertise and knowledge to the board (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974). In a similar 
study of 290 California hospitals, Boeker and Goodstein (1991) concluded that 
organisations, in an attempt to copy with environmental threat and uncertainty are required 
to modify the composition of Boards of Directors. However, the empirical findings suggest 
that Greek boards operating in complex environments are not changing their composition 
with respect to size and number of interlocking directorates according to environmental 
contingencies. Because the undertaken study is cross-sectional, the empirical results might 
be able to predict the effect of environmental changes on the board composition.  
 
H1b: The more unstable the environment the larger the size of the board. 
 
Hypothesis H1b suggests that unstable or otherwise dynamic environments which are 
comprised in factors ENV1, ENV2 and ENV3 and ENV1 for forced factors require a large 
board size. The statistical outcomes derived from regression analysis presented in Tables 
6:7 (t=0.660, t=-1.762, t=-1.094, p<0.05) and   Table 6:11 respectively (t=-0.467, p<0.05) 
show no moderating effect of environmental dimensions of board size. Similarly the results 
from GLM analysis illustrated in Tables 6:73 and 6:74 certainly do not refute the 
hypothesised relationship between board size and environmental dimensions at 0.05 levels.  
 
Unstable environments are associated with unpredictability and rapid changes for both 
individuals and organisations (Duncan, 1972; Dess and Beard, 1984) as well as with 
limited availability of information for decision-making (Simon, 1955). Therefore, decision-
makers experience high levels of stress and anxiety (Waldman et al., 2001), which can be 
partially sorted by assigning large Top Management Teams and delegating duties to them 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Pearce, 2004). Galbraith (1973, p. 4) stated that within 
unstable environments, there is a great need for information that has to be preceded by 
decision-makers. The greater information-processing requires greater heterogeneity and 
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board size (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993). In similar studies, it was found that high 
performing firms, in order to copy with environmental demands, prefer to have a small 
board size and high number of interlocking executives (Boyd, 1990). Nevertheless, the 
research findings did not support statistically any moderating effect of unstable 
environment to the board composition.  
 
H1c: The more munificent the environment the larger the size of the board. 
 
Hypothesis H1c predicts an effect of munificent environment to the board size. The factor 
(ENV4) and (ENV2, forced factor) includes elements related to environmental 
munificence. The regression results of ENV4 presented in Table 6:7 (t= 0.514, p<0.05) and 
of ENV2 in Table 6:11 (t= -1.315, p<0.05) revealed inconclusive findings towards the 
hypothesised relationship. The results that derived from the GLM analysis presented in 
Tables 6:73 (sig. =.609, p<0.05) and Tables 6:74 (sig. =.379, p<0.05) confirm the results of 
regression analysis. The results are opposed to the suggested hypothesis.  
 
Concerning munificent environments, organisations have insufficient resources; therefore, 
they tend to hire more staff than is required especially at executive level (Williamson, 
1963). Scholars have found a direct effect of munificent environment to board size (Keats 
and Hitt, 1988; Bantel and Finkelstein, 1995). Nevertheless, Boyd (1990) found that 
munificent environment has opposite effects on board size and interlocks. As resource 
becomes more limited, the number of interlocks increases while board size declines. On 
the contrary, this study did not provide any strong relationship between munificent 
environment and board size.  
 
H1d: Munificent environment is negatively related to both board size and the number of 
interlocking directorates 
 
Hypothesis H1d is a more detailed examination of the previous research hypotheses; it 
suggests that firms operating in munificent environments require a small board size and 
few interlocking directorates. The elements of munificent environments are included in the 
factor ENV4 and in the forced factor ENV2. Linear regression analysis is conducted in 
order to test the suggested hypothesis. The results from regression analyses presented in 
Tables 6:7 (t= 0.514, p<0.05), 6:9 (t= -0.481, p<0.05); 6:11 (t=-1.315, p<0.05), 6:13 
(t=0.417, p<0.05) as well as GLM analysis (Tables 6:73; 6:74; 6:77; 6:78) suggested no 
statistical significant association between munificent environments, board size and number 
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of interlocking directors. However, the beta coefficient for the interaction effect between 
ENV4 and interlocking directors and between forced ENV2 and board size was negative as 
predicted by the research hypothesis.  
 
Goodstein and Boeker (1991) contended that board composition and its control encourage 
executives to pursue specific strategies. As the board participates in the strategic decision-
making process (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985), any environmental change leading to a 
corporate strategy change might consequently require board composition change. As 
resource dependency theory proposes Boards of Directors act as a linkage between the 
firms and the external environment and are supposed to manage external dependencies 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and reduce environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1972). 
Environmental changes have been associated with alternation in the firm’s corporate 
strategy. Since, boards are “vehicles for co-opting important external organisations” 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 167); they are required to initiate strategic changes in order 
to cope with environmental demands. Strategic changes are related to any board 
composition change which might facilitate a corporate strategy change mainly during 
environmental munificence. Lang and Lockhart (1990) argued that any environmental 
change will affect the number of interlocking directors. Based on a sample of U.S airline 
firms, Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000) suggested that as environments change, 
board composition is required to change in order for the board members to be able to 
reflect the environmental demands. The results of previous studies are not in line with the 
results of this study that suggest the environmental munificence has no effect on board size 
and on the number of interlocking directors.  
 
H1e: Dynamic environments favour the dual leadership structure. 
 
Hypothesis H1e suggests that companies operating in dynamic environments tend to prefer 
the dual leadership structure. ENV1, ENV2 and ENV3 as well in the forced factor ENV1 
concerns elements related to marketing practices, customers and competitors.  Results that 
have been derived from linear regression analysis presented in Tables 6:15 (t=2.271, 
p<0.5) and Table 6:17 (t= 2.343, p<0.05) confirmed the hypothesised relationship. 
Similarly, the results from GLM analysis illustrated in Tables 6:77 (ENVV1: dynamism in 
marketing practices sig= .026, p<0.05; as well as in Table 6:78 (ENV1: environmental 
dynamism sig=.022, p<0.05). The results from both statistical approaches indicate a robust 
association between environmental dynamism and the choice of the same person to hold 
the position of CEO and Chairman in the Greek listed firms. 
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Dynamic environments are associated with unpredictability and rapid change which 
companies and individuals have to cope with (Duncan, 1972). Firms operating in dynamic 
environments tend to have an internal locus of control (Miller, Kets de Vries and Toulouse, 
1982). Therefore, they recommended that companies operating in such environments have 
to be managed by internal executives.  Internal managers rely more on their abilities to 
guide the organisation. Li and Simerly (1998) found that insider ownership is associated 
with higher returns under conditions of environmental dynamism, compared to outsiders 
who are not able to evaluate alternative strategies under conditions of dynamic 
environments.  
 
Organisational theory suggests that it is necessary for a decision maker to have a clear and 
unambiguous authority over subordinates, which is derived from a unity of command 
(Massie, 1965 cited in Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). CEO duality helps to avoid 
confusion among managers as to who is the boss and facilitates the decision-making by 
establishing clear responsibilities and authorities. Organisational theory, also, supports the 
idea that firms that are headed by strong leaders who have a strategic direction are able to 
adapt environmental demands (Mintzberg and Waters, 1982). In addition, the leadership 
perspective suggests that firm will perform better if one person holds both titles, because 
the executive will have more power to make critical decisions (Harris and Helfat, 1998).  
Furthermore, stewardship theory proposes that CEO duality would facilitate effective 
action by the CEO and consequently improve the organisational performance under 
specific circumstances (Boyd, 1995). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued that a single 
leader can respond to external events and facilitate the decision- making process. The 
existence of a single leader during periods of high environmental turbulence facilitates a 
more unified corporate response to events and limits potential agency cost. Boyd (1995) 
hypothesized a positive association between CEO duality and organisational performance 
under environmental dynamism based on a sample of 192 firms from 12 economic sectors.  
 
However, this hypotheses relationship was not supported. Virany et al., (1992) mentioned 
that the combination of CEO succession and top team change could enable the senior 
management to be proactive in their decisions during turbulent environments. Ensley, 
Pearce and Hmieleski (2006) found that the need of a transformational leader is imperative 
in dynamic environments. The results of this study indicate a positive relationship between 
CEO duality and environmental dynamism, which might have positive effect for the 
company under conditions of resource scarcity or high complexity.  
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6.7 Board Size and Board Composition Characteristics and Organisational 
Performance  
 
 
6.7.1 Introduction 
 
Organisations adopt certain structures in order to control and coordinate the members’ 
activities (Coleman, 1990; Mintzberg, 1983; Pugh et al., 1963).  Demographic theory 
focuses on compositional characteristics that influence interpersonal and group dynamics 
and how they influence the firm’s performance (Kakabadse, 1991; Kakabadse and Myers, 
1996).  Few studies have examined the organisational characteristics such as size and 
composition and even fewer the governance mechanism of the firm (Carroll, 1984). The 
current study, aims to explore the internal structures and how they affect the board 
composition in a study of Greek listed organisations in the Athens Stock Exchange. Figure 
6:2 presents the associated factors between the organisational and composition 
characteristics. 
 
Figure 6:2 Hypothesised Research Model between Organisational Structure and 
Board Structure 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H2a: The larger the firm’s size, the larger the board size 
 
Hypothesis H2a suggests a positive relationship between organisational size (in terms of 
number of employees) and board size. The results of both statistical analyses confirm the 
association as it can be seen in Table 6:19 (t=3.524, p<0.05) and in Table 6:79 (sig=.001, 
p<0.05) where was found the organisational size to be significantly related to board size.  
 
The firm size represents the number of organisational members (usually employees) 
(Glisson and Martin, 1980) and reflects the resources available to the organisation (Weiner 
and Mahoney, 1981). Corporate size contributes to the economic activities that the firm 
can engage in and the amount of resources that the firm possesses. Many studies provide 
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empirical evidence for the association regarding size and structure relationship (Pugh, 
Hickson, Hinings and Turner, 1969; Hickson, Pugh and Pheysey, 1969). In particular, 
scholars have reported a curvilinear relationship between organisational size and 
organisational structure (Child, 1972; Mileti, Gillespie and Haas, 1977). Other authors (e.g. 
Dalton et al., 1998; Pugh et al., 1963; Aldrich, 1972; Thompson, 1967) have associated 
firm’s size with corporate performance as well as with board size (Dalton et al., 1999; 
Yermack, 1996). Agency theorists argue that larger organisations require a greater number 
of directors in order to monitor and control firm’s activities (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). 
 
On the contrary, resource dependency theorists suggest that the need for environmental 
linkage increases as a direct function of firm size increases (Allen, 1974; Dooley, 1969; 
Pfeffer, 1972; Warner and Unwalla, 1967). Large organisations require access to a greater 
amount of resources; therefore they are likely to appoint more executives that will provide 
access to those resources (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Scholars state that executives act as 
an adaptive process to the external environment, since they reduce conflict and provide a 
link to external information, which helps organisations to comply with environmental 
demands (Helmich, 1980; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1977; Virany, Tushman and Romaneli, 
1992). Empirical findings in small-medium firms have shown that companies with small 
firm size (approximately 30 employees) have boards that are composed by single-owner 
managers or a small team compared to large firms (approximately 100 employees) that 
employ large boards (Bennett and Robson, 2004). Similar findings have been derived from 
105 Greek listed organisations where a positive association was found between 
organisational size in terms of number of employees and board size.  
 
Greek organisations consist mainly of SMEs that lack professional management (Georgas, 
1993). However, most Greek organisations are changing their management practices 
toward a more communication-intensive and team-based decision-making style. Greek 
firms appeared to recognize the importance of talented human capital and they have 
gradually increased the middle-line management positions in an attempt to restructure their 
firms and to compete with the EMU requirements (Spanos, Prastacos and Papadakis, 
2001). 
 
 
H2b: The larger the board size the better the organisational performance 
 
Hypothesis H2b suggests an association between the board size and the firm’s 
performance, however, the results at that instance revealed no association between the 
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variables as the Tables 6:21 (t=1.825, p<0.05) and Table 6:80 (sig. 072, p<0.05) indicate. 
Therefore, the suggested hypothesis cannot be supported. 
Recent reviews on boards have been dominated by a tradition in which board composition 
is related to corporate financial performance (Johnson et al., 1996; Pettigrew, 1992; Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989) and mainstream research has been heavily influenced by a research 
tradition from financial economics and theories treating the board as a so-called “black 
box” (Daily et al., 2003; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003).   
 
Proponents of agency theory provide evidence that a smaller board is associated with better 
performance due to coordination and free rider problems that large boards are related to 
(Gertner and Kaplan, 1996). However, other management studies found that larger boards 
contribute to organisational performance (e.g. Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; 
Jensen, 1993). These studies are consistent with resource dependency theory which 
suggests that larger boards are associated with higher levels of firm’s performance (e.g. 
Boyd, 1990; Alexander, Fennell and Halpern, 1993; Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma, 1985; 
Mintzberg, 1983) due to the fact that larger boards have greater access to resources 
(Pfeffer, 1973). Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) argue that large boards have more 
problem-solving skills.  However, large groups may be less cohesive (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992) and more difficult to coordinate due to potential interactions among group members 
(O’Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett, 1989). Largeness can inhibit the board’s ability to initiate 
strategic actions (Goodstein, Gauten and Boeker, 1994). It has been argued that a smaller 
board increases participation and social cohesion (Muth and Donaldson, 1998) that might 
contribute to organisational performance (Evans and Dion, 1991; Yermack, 1996).  
 
Furthermore, empirical studies that have been conducted in various cultural contexts did 
not provide any support for the hypothesised relationship between board size and 
company’s performance (e.g. Holthausen and Larcker, 1993; Wan and Ong, 2005; Rose, 
2005).  Results that derived from Greek listed organisations are in line with these studies, 
since it was found that the size of Greek boardrooms has no effect on the firm’s 
performance. After extensive research on board of directors, Pettigrew (1992, p. 171) 
concluded that “Great inferential leaps are made from input variables such as board 
composition to output variables such as board performance with no direct evidence on the 
processes and mechanisms which presumably link the inputs to the outputs”.  
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H2c: The larger the board size, the higher the number of executive BOD 
 
Hypothesis H2c proposes an effect of board size to the number of executive boards 
members. The research outcomes confirm a positive relationship between board size and 
the number of executive directors. The results as illustrated in Tables 6 
:23 (t=4.494, p<0.05) and in 6:81 (sig. 000, p<0.05) indicate a positive and significant 
association between the two variables. 
 
Executive directors are regarded as full time employees that are responsible for the 
organisational strategic and operational aspects (Weir, 1997). Executive directors are 
characterised as “rubber stamp” for management initiates or “as tools” of management 
(Pfeffer, 1972, p. 219). The proportion of executive directors is related to the board size. 
Several studies provide evidence for the association regarding size and structure 
relationship (e.g Pugh, Hickson, Hinings and Turner, 1969; Hickson, Pugh and Pheysey, 
1969; Child, 1972). As organisational size with respect to the number of employees 
increases, the board size increases and also, affects the proportion of executives in the 
boardroom. In the Greek boardrooms, a strong association was found between the board 
size and the number of executives. The results have shown that the board size of Greek 
organisations affects the proportion of executive directors. Results indicate a balance in the 
proportion of executive versus non-executive directors in the Greek boardrooms of quoted 
in the ASE firms. 
 
H2d: The higher the board size, the higher the number of non-executive BOD 
 
Hypothesis H2d puts forward a relationship between board size and the number of non-
executive board members. The results that have derived support an evident association 
between the board size and the number of non-executive Greek directors as can be seen in 
Tables 6:25 (t=7.853, p<0.05) and Table 6:82 (sig.000, p<0.05). 
 
Non-executive directors are employed as part-timers in order to bring experience and 
expertise to the organisation and to protect shareholders’ interests (Weir, 1997). 
Regulatory corporate governance reforms (e.g. Cadbury, 1992; Hampel, 1998) focus on the 
control task and encourage companies to appoint an increased number of non-executive 
and independent directors in order to comply with sound corporate governance codes and 
enhance the trust of shareholders. Empirical studies have revealed that two tier of board 
members are non-executives (McMichael, 1976; Hunt, 1984; Logan and Dunstan, 1993). 
Clifford and Evans (1997) argue that larger companies appoint a larger board size and 
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consequently, they have a greater representation of non-executive directors. In a sample of 
IPO firms in London Stock Exchange, Filatotchev (2005) reported that the average board 
size was 5.8 and the number of non-executive directors 2.5 respectively.  
 
Other studies that have been conducted in larger and more mature organisations indicated a 
higher representation of non-executive directors (O’Sullivan, 2000; Shivdasani and 
Yermack, 1999). Similarly, Westhead (1999) concluded that large organisations employ 
more non-executive directors compared to those of limited ownership. O’Sullivan (2000) 
argued that as organisational size increases, the proportion of non-executives is increasing. 
Non-executive directors act as effective monitors of executive directors and they have a 
positive effect on the firm’s performance (Vance, 1964; Ezzamel and Watson, 1993; 
Pearce and Zahra, 1992). In the contrast, there are studies that revealed a negative effect of 
non-executive directors on the organisational performance (Yermack, 1996; Bhagat and 
Black, 1999; Hermalin and Weisback, 1991).  
 
This research work concluded that there is a significant and positive relationship between 
the board size and the proportion of non-executive directors in a sample of 105 Greek 
quoted organisations. As previous studies have indicated the organisational size is related 
to the board size and consequently, affects the appointment of non-executive directors.  
 
  
6.8 Involvement in the Strategic Decision-Making Process 
 
6.8.1 Introduction 
 
In the strategic management literature, involvement in the strategic decision-making 
process is based on two theoretical approaches: strategic choice and the agency theory 
(Rindova, 1999).  
 
Strategic choice perspective emphasises the capacity of board members towards the 
development and refinement of strategic decisions (e.g. Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; 
Tashakori and Boulton, 1983). On the contrary, agency perspective monitors managers and 
they pursue corporate strategies in the shareholders’ interests (e.g. Baysigner and 
Hoskisson, 1990; Boeker and Goodstein, 1993). In this study, contingency perspective was 
adopted with regard to board roles as well as composition and how they influence the 
strategic decision-making process.  
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The following hypotheses presented in Figure 6:3 have been developed in order to examine 
the factors that influence board involvement in the strategic decision-making process. 
Three factors have been extracted with eigenvalue greater than one namely INVSDM1: 
formation and process of strategic decision-making process, INVSDM2: formation and 
evaluation of strategic decision-making process and INVSDM3: evaluation of strategic 
decision-making process and two forced factors: INVSDM1: formation of strategic 
decision-making process and INVSDM2: evaluation of strategic decision-making process. 
 
Figure 6:3 Hypothesised Research Model of the Factors Affecting Board Involvement 
in Strategic Decision-Making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H3a: Board size is negatively related to board involvement in the strategic decision-
making process 
 
Hypothesis H3a proposed a negative association between board size and the different 
forms of strategic decision-making processes. This hypothesis has been investigated with 
linear regression model and GLM. The results that derived from regression analyses 
concluded with insignificant findings as Tables 6:27 (t=-1.218, p<0.5), 6:29 (t=1.420, 
p<0.05), 6:31 (t=1.148, p<0.05), 6:33 (t=-0.053, p<0.05) and 6:35 (t=1.711, p<0.05) 
indicate. However, the beta coefficient for the interaction effect between board size and 
involvement in the strategic decision-making process in some instances was found to be 
negative as predicted by the research hypothesis. 
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While regression analyses concluded to insignificant findings, GLM findings support the 
association between board size and the forced factor of evaluation of strategic decision-
making process as Table 6:87 illustrates.  
 
Scholars have associated board size with level of involvement in the strategic decision-
making process (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). From the resource dependency theory 
perspective, a large board can be beneficial for the organisation (Judge and Zeithaml, 
1992). Large boards consist of a greater number of directors that have great expertise and 
knowledge that they can bring to the organisation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Larger 
boards have the ability to copy with environmental uncertainty and to form links with 
business partners (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 172) and to deal with higher information-
processing demands. Board size is related to organisational size, diversification and 
internationalisation strategies of the firm (Pearce and Zahra, 1998; Sanders and Carpenter, 
1998), indicated that a larger board is more likely to have a significant contribution to the 
firm’s strategy.  
 
However, a high number of board members could be ineffective in the strategic decision-
making process due to coordination difficulties (Cohen and Bailey, 1997). In addition, 
larger boards are slower and less cohesive in the strategic decision-making process 
(Mueller and Baker, 1997; Reed, 1978). Herman (1981) concluded that large boards cannot 
manage to pursue effective decisions. Scholars (e.g. Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Goodstein 
et al., 1994; Ruigrok et al., 2006) have reported a negative effect of board size towards the 
involvement in the strategic decision-making process. The research findings seem to be 
consistent with other scholars, since a negative association between board size and board 
members participation in the strategic decision-making process was found.  
 
 
H3b: Inside representation is positively related to board involvement in the strategic 
decision-making process. 
 
Similarly to the previous hypothesis, this hypothesis examines the impact of another board 
composition characteristic; the insider/internal directors to the involvement in the strategic 
decision-making process. The results that derived with linear regression did not support the 
hypothesis developed but also the beta coefficient suggests a negative relationship between 
the variables as it can be seen in Tables 6:27 (t=1.280, p<0.05), 6:29 (t=0.092, p<0.05), 
6:31 (t=-1.832, p<0.05), 6:33 (t=0.884, p<0.05) and 6:35 (t=-1.423, p<0.05). However, 
GLM analysis revealed a significant association between internal directors and board 
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involvement in the evaluation process of strategic decision-making as indicated in Table 
6:85. 
 
Proponents of strategic choice report that inside directors provide valuable insights and 
information to boardroom since they initiate discussions and are actively involved in the 
strategic decision-making process (Baysigner and Hoskisson, 1990). Previous studies 
indicate inside directors with company and industry experience and knowledge play an 
important role in the strategic decision-making process (Goodstein and Boeker, 1991; 
Johnson et al., 1993; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). Ford (1988) found that inside directors 
are associated with board involvement in the strategic decision-making process. Similarly, 
Tashakori and Boulton (1983) concluded that insiders were related to greater participation 
in the strategic planning process. However, in a sample of Swiss companies, Ruigrok et al. 
(2006) examined how board characteristics affect involvement in the strategic decision-
making process but without providing any evidence of insider or outsider board 
representation to their involvement in the strategic decision-making process. Empirical 
results that derived form the GLM seem to be on the same lines with previous studies in 
the field providing a strong association between inside representation and the level of 
board participation in the strategic decision-making process of Greek listed organisation in 
the ASE. 
 
H3c: The higher the frequency of board meetings, the higher the board’s strategic 
involvement will be. 
 
Hypothesis H3c indicates a positive relationship between the frequency of the board 
meetings and the involvement of board members in the strategic decision-making process. 
Regression analysis findings concluded with controversial findings between frequency of 
board meetings and board involvement as indicated in Tables 6:27, 6:29, 6:31 and 6:33. 
However, it is interesting to report that two specific frequencies of the board meeting (once 
a year and quarterly) were found to have a significant but negative effect on the various 
stages of board involvement.  The results that derived from GLM analysis provide a 
straight forward support to our research hypothesis as it can be seen in Tables 6:83, 6:86 
which shows that frequent board meetings increase the board involvement in the formation 
process of strategic decision making.  
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Weick (1995) highlighted the importance of participation by encouraging the use of 
meetings as a sense-making mechanism. Organisations operating in complex and uncertain 
environments are likely to become successful if they implement multiple approaches for 
decision-making, multiple sensors and information processors are part of strategic 
decision-making approach. Board meetings is the number of general meetings that each 
board has every year and is regarded a proxy for board activism (Vafeas, 1999). The board 
meetings enable the board to act as a governing body and their directors have the 
opportunity to meet and discuss the main issues of the research agenda and propose 
solutions to the problems that the organisation is facing (Huse, Postma, Ruess and Zattoni, 
2006). The board meetings allow to the Boards of Directors to perform their roles; namely 
control, strategy and service (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). The board meetings have been 
associated with the board involvement in strategic decision-making process. In particular, 
the frequency of the board meetings is related to the involvement in organisational 
strategic decisions. In an empirical study that has been conducted in small Norwegian 
firms, Huse et al. (2006) concluded that the higher the frequency of the board meetings, the 
higher the board strategic involvement. Similarly, Buchholtz et al. (2005) found a positive 
relationship between team power as a moderator of the relationship between board 
involvement and affective conflict. In our study, the relationship between the frequency of 
the board meetings and the level of involvement has been partially confirmed. The frequent 
Greek board meetings increase the level of involvement in the formation process of 
strategic decision making. 
 
H3d: The longer the board meetings, the higher the board’s strategic involvement will be.  
 
Hypothesis H3d advocates an association between the duration of board meetings and the 
extent of board members’ involvement in strategic decision-making process. The results 
from the regression analysis suggest a strong and positive relationship between duration of 
board meeting and board involvement. In particular, board meetings that last more than 
two hours, two hours, one and half hour or even an hour have an effect on board 
involvement with respect to board involvement in INVSDM2: formation and evaluation of 
strategic decision and on the forced factors INVSDM1: evaluation of strategic decision-
making and on INVSDM2: evaluation of strategic decision-making process.  
The significant results from regression analyses can be found in Tables 6:29, 6:31 and 
6:33. The findings that were drawn from the GLM indicate that a strong relationship 
between duration of board meetings and the board members’ evaluation phase in strategic 
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decision-making process as can be seen in Tables 6:85 and 6:87. The results from both 
statistical approaches provide full support of the research hypothesis.  
 
Apart from the frequency of the board meetings, another criterion of board participation is 
the duration of board meetings. According to recent regulatory reforms regarding the board 
composition, the majority of board members are outsiders or non-executives, these 
executives devote limited time to the firm (Huse, Postma, Ruess and Zattoni, 2006). 
Therefore, if the agenda of board meetings includes topics such as strategic choices, 
strategic context or strategy formulation, then the board meetings should last at least quite 
a long time (Stiles, 2001). Although, the duration of board meetings does not assure board 
effectiveness, longer board meetings allow to the board members to focus more on the 
evaluation of strategic alternatives and provide a better judgment regarding the 
organisational strategic choices and decisions (Huse, Postma, Ruess and Zattoni, 2006). 
Similar to the findings from Norwegian small sized companies (Huse et al., 2006); Greek 
Boards of Directors are more actively involved in strategic decisions after attending long 
board meetings.  
 
H3e: The more uncertain the environment, the more involved the board will be in the 
strategic decision-making process 
 
 The final hypothesis regarding the explanatory effect of environmental munificence  or 
otherwise called hostile towards the board the board involvement in the several stages of 
strategic decision making processes concluded with insignificant results both with 
regression as well as with GLM analysis as Tables 6:27, 6:29, 6:31, 6:33, 6:35, 6:83,6:84, 
6:85, 6:86 and 6:87 indicate.  
 
Uncertainty is defined as “an individual’s inability to predict something accurately” 
(Milliken, 1987, p. 136). Response uncertainty represents managers’ inability to evaluate 
the impact of potential approaches that firms could adopt. Response uncertainty is most 
relevant when the management of a firm perceives “a need to act because of a pending 
event or change is perceived to pose a threat or to provide some unique opportunity to the 
organisation” (Milliken, 1987, p. 137).  Uncertainty is described as a doubt about future 
events or cause and effect relationships regarding the environment (DiFonzo and Bordia, 
1998).  Environmental uncertainty can be managed through information seeking in 
interpersonal (Berger and Bradac, 1982) and organisational contexts (Ashford and Black, 
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1996; Kramer, 1999; Morrison, 2002). Participation is a process in which decision-making 
is shared between superiors and subordinates (Sagie, Elizur and Koslowsky, 1995). The 
strategic decision-making process requires high levels of social interaction and linkage to 
social complex resources (Barney, 1995). Participation in strategic decision-making 
increases the exchange of information (Ashmos, Duchon and McDaniel, 1998).  
Organisations operating in uncertain environments are required to have organisational 
flexibility and high levels of participation in strategic decision-making (Ashmos, Duchon 
and McDaniel, 1998). A volatile world requires more sensors, faster processing 
information and action taking (Peters, 1988, p.109). Organisations can achieve a 
competitive advantage through people because people participate in decisions and people 
share information with organisations (Pfeffer, 1994). In addition, Barney (1995) argues for 
“social complex resources” such as teamwork and cooperation as key elements for the 
organisation competitive advantage.  Wheatley (1992) underlines that involvement in the 
strategic decision-making process acts as a response to various ambiguous and 
unpredictable environments.  
 
Weick (1995) argued that participation facilitates process of organisations to cope with 
uncertainty. Participation acts as a managerial response to strategic issues and increases the 
comprehensiveness of analytical activities in organisations (Topping and Hernandez, 
1991). Participation in strategic decision making can reduce the levels of uncertainty 
(Bordia, Jones, Gallois and Callan. 2004). Macy, Peterson and Norton (1989) concluded 
that individuals that have participated in strategic decision-making claimed that there is a 
clarity in the criteria and the procedures of strategic decisions. Clemens et al. (2007) 
provided empirical evidence that there is a positive relationship between the level of 
uncertainty and the level of strategic response.  
 
In environmental circumstances where the future of the organisations is unpredictable, the 
companies have to adjust their internal processes.  Research findings have shown that 
organisations become more active as the level of uncertainty increases (Ansoff and 
McDonnell, 1990; Parnell et al., 1992). Carpenter and Westphal (2001) found that Boards 
of Directors are positively associated with involvement in implementation and negative 
advice on new strategic alternatives in turbulent environments. On the contrary, Bordia, 
Jones, Gallois and Callan (2004) found that participation in strategic decision-making is 
not influenced by the environmental uncertainty. The research findings are consistent with 
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the lateral findings where it was found that environmental uncertainty is not explanatory 
factor to the board involvement in the strategic decision-making process in Greek firms.  
 
 
6.9 Board Demographic Characteristics, Environmental Circumstances and Strategic 
Decision-Making Process 
 
 
6.9.1 Introduction  
 
In the strategic management literature, upper echelons demography is a critical determinant 
of organisational processes including strategic decision making process with a direct effect 
on organisational performance (Goll and Rasheed, 2005). Demography refers to “the 
composition, in terms of basic attributes such as age, sex, educational level, length of 
service or residence, race, and so forth of the social entity under study” (Pfeffer, 1983, p. 
303). Upper echelons demography acts as proxies for “real” cognitive and social 
processes (Pfeffer, 1983) and it has been regarded as a determinant of various 
organisational outcomes. The antecedents and outcomes of strategic decisions have been 
examined in previous studies (Rajagopalan et al., 1993; Bryson and Bromiley, 1993; Dean 
and Sharfman, 1996). However, organisational studies that have examined top 
management teams through a macro-organisational methodology have concluded with 
contradictory findings (Lawrence, 1997; Pettigrew, 1992; Priem et al., 1999). 
 
 In this thesis, Boards of Directors’ characteristics as well as external environmental 
dimensions are regarded as predictors of strategic decision-making process and 
organisational performance.  Figure 6:4 presents the demographic predictors and the role 
of environmental dimensions to strategic decision-making processes namely: financial 
reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and lateral communication.  
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Figure 6:4 Hypothesised Research Model between Board Characteristics, 
Environmental Dimensions and Strategic Decision-Making Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H4a: Educated executives tend to pursue the following strategic decision-making 
processes: financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and lateral 
communication 
 
Hypotheses H4a suggests that the higher the executives’ educational level the more likely 
they will be to follow the following strategic decision-making processes. For the purpose 
of the hypotheses testing, two statistical approaches were applied: first, regression analysis 
(where the educational level of high school was considered as a baseline variable, therefore 
it has been deleted form the analysis) and second, GLM analysis. The findings from 
regression analysis revealed no significant association between managerial educational 
level and strategic decision-making processes of financial reporting, rule formalisation, 
hierarchical decentralisation and lateral communication as Tables 6:37; 6:39; 6:41, 6:43; 
6:45; 6:47; 6:49; 6:51: 6:53; 6:55; 6:57 indicate (Appendix F). Similarly, the results from 
GLM analysis (see Tables: 6:89- 6:96, Appendix G) were found to be along the same lines 
with the results from regression analysis. Neither statistical approache supports the 
suggested hypothesis.  
 
Education level is regarded as an indicator of knowledge and skill base (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). It has been associated with tolerance for ambiguity, capacity for 
information processing and ability to identify and analyse alternative solutions (Wiersema 
and Bantel, 1992).  Executives who have obtained a higher general educational level or 
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management educational level focus more on the analytical techniques in the strategic 
decision-making process compared to “self-made” executives (Goll and Rasheed, 2005).  
Scholars have reported an influence of boards’ characteristics on the strategic decision-
making process (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Bantel, 1993; Smith et al., 1994).  
In particular, Goll and Rasheed (2005) found a positive relationship between educational 
background and the rationality in the strategic decision-making process. As in previous 
studies, top management team’s level of education is related to rationality (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Bantel and Jackson, 1989). This is in line with 
previous argumentation about the tendency of educated executives to pursue hierarchical 
decentralised strategic decisions (e.g. Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Papadakis, 2006).  
 
In current study of Greek listed organisations, the demographic characteristics and the 
composition of boards’ members provide no statistical significant association with most of 
the strategic decision-making processes.  A similar study conducted in 70 industrial firms 
in Greece, Papadakis and Barwise (2002) found that CEOs and top management teams’ 
educational level has no significant association with any of the strategic decision-making 
process characteristics.  
 
In a sample of Greek manufacturing firms, Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers (1998) found 
that education level is positively associated with financial reporting. Education level shows 
the degree of people’s information analysis (Dollinger, 1984). Educated CEOs are likely to 
demand detailed information and extensive financial reporting (Bantel, 1993). 
 
Although, most of the studies in the strategic management field provide evidence of the 
relationship between educational level and characteristics of strategic decision-making 
process; it will be useful to take into account that previous studies have taken place in 
different cultural contexts which might affect the results of this study. In this respect, the 
strategic decision-making process and other organisational phenomena were examined 
according to their economic and cultural effects (Child, 2000). 
 
 
H4b: The executives’ educational specialty is associated with the following strategic 
decision-making processes: financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical 
decentralisation and lateral communication 
 
This hypothesis is actually an expansion of the previous one, aiming to investigate the 
effect of demographic characteristics on different forms of strategic decision-making 
238 
 
process. More specifically, it interrogates the impact of different educational disciplines on 
financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and lateral 
communication. For the purpose of this hypothesis, GLM and multiple regression analyses 
were conducted by excluding the variable of civil engineering as a baseline variable. The 
results derived from GLM analysis do not provide significant evidence for the suggested 
hypothesis as illustrated in Tables (6:89-7:96, Appendix G) which in most of the cases are 
in accordance with the results extracted from regression analyses. Nevertheless, the 
statistical findings for hierarchical decentralisation show that executives with an 
educational specialty in sciences as well in social sciences tend to pursue lower level 
hierarchical decentralisation in the strategic decision-making processes as Tables 6:45 
(sciences, t=2.229, p<0.05, social sciences, t=2.440, p<0.05) and Table 6:47 show 
(sciences, t=2.249, p<0.05, social sciences, t=2.446, p<0.05). Thus, this hypothesis is 
partially supported. 
 
Apart from educational level, executives with different types of education are supposed to 
develop different problem-solving skills (Hitt and Tyler, 1991). Executives with formal 
education training in sciences and engineering have a better understanding of a company’s 
technological base and are more likely to establish cooperative opportunities (Tyler and 
Steensma, 1998). Heilmeier (1993) suggested that technically trained executives have 
technical knowledge and are able to predict, comprehend and anticipate long-term change 
by identifying opportunities.   
 
However, executives with only a formal management education are more likely to pursue 
short-term performance goals at the expense of innovation and long-term asset building 
compared to executives with other educational backgrounds (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
They claimed that business schools are not effective at developing risk-taking tendencies 
compared to technical schools that are risk-averse oriented. In summary, executives with 
technical education emphasise opportunities rather than on threats (Tyler & Steensma, 
1998).  
 
The empirical findings from Greek listed organisations revealed that the educational 
specialty of executives does not play a predominant role on the kind of strategic decision-
making process. Greek executives in quoted organisation in the ASE might come from 
various educational backgrounds and not from a particular one in order to be able to 
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identify the explanatory power of a certain educational specialty on the firms’ strategic 
decision-making processes.  
 
 
H4c: The executives’ functional background is associated with the following strategic 
decision-making processes: financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical 
decentralisation and lateral communication 
 
Hypothesis H4c examines the effect of Greek executives’ functional background on the 
strategic decision-making processes of financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical 
decentralisation and lateral communication. The functional background of board members 
has been distinguished into two broad categories: the “output” and the “throughput” 
functions. The “output” functions includes functional areas relating to marketing, sales, 
merchandising as well as product research and development (R&D) whereas the 
“throughput” functions include areas of productions/operations, engineering, finance and 
accounting. Statistical multiple regression and GLM analyses with factors extracted with 
eigenvalue greater than one as well as forced factors did not produce any conclusive 
finding (see Tables 6:37; 6:39; 6:41; 6:43; 6:45; 6:47; 6:49; 6:51; 6:53; 6:55; 6:57; and 
6:89-6:96, Appendices F,G). Thus, for the purposes of evaluating H4c, it can be claimed 
that these findings do not provide support for the hypothesis. 
 
Functional background is a lens through which business situations are viewed (Guthrie and 
Datta, 1997), the way in which problems are defined (Dearborn and Simon, 1958). 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) have distinguished functional background into two broad 
categories the “output” functions which focus on opportunities and the “throughput” 
functions which focus on transformation process. This classification provides a linkage 
between functional background and organisational decision-making. The organisation’s 
strategy partly determines the types of functional background that are essential for the 
firm’s success (Hitt, Ireland and Palia, 1982).  Technology oriented companies encourage 
the appointment of executives whose functional expertise is related to the firm’s success 
(Datta and Guthrie, 1994). Executives with “output” background tend to have greater 
ambiguity and less control whereas those with “throughput” background tend more to 
control (Herrmann and Datta, 2002).  Throughput backgrounds are important in industries 
which are characterized by high capital intensity or concentration and lower growth 
(Rajagopalan and Datta, 1996).   
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In a sample of 105 Greek quoted organisations, the executives come from various 
functional backgrounds, which did not allow us to provide any association between their 
functional background and the process of strategic decision-making that they pursue.  
 
H4d: Long tenured executives in terms of industry, company and position tenure are 
associated with the following strategic decision-making processes: financial reporting, rule 
formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and lateral communication. 
 
Hypothesis H4d attempts to associate one of the upper echelons’ demographic 
characteristics, the tenure in terms of industry, company and position with the strategic 
decision-making process. The research outcomes that derived after multiple regression and 
GLM analyses are not able to explain the effect of tenure on the strategic decision-making 
processes of financial reporting, rule formalisation and lateral communication. However, 
the GLM analysis provides evidence of the effect of industry tenure on upper level 
hierarchical decentralisation factor which included the two influential individuals of the 
firm: the owner and the Chief Executive Officer, as well as on forced factor of hierarchical 
decentralisation as Tables 6:93 (sig.024, p<0.05) and 6:94 (sig.053, p<0.05) indicate. 
Therefore, partial support for H4d was observed. 
 
The tenure of executives might influence the organisational processes and choices in 
various ways (Goll and Rasheed, 2005). On the one hand, long tenured executives might 
be passive (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), resistant to strategic changes (Wiersema and 
Bantel, 1992) and pursue strategies that they are more familiar and favourable for them 
(Herrmann and Datta, 2002). On the other hand, they are more familiar with the decision-
making process and they have more experience and knowledge within the organisation 
(Herrmann and Datta, 2002) which allows them to pursue risky decisions (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996). In several studies, the effect of long tenured executives on the strategic 
decision-making processes has been examined.  
 
Tushman and Romanelli (1985) argued that long tenured executives tend to pursue less 
rational decisions. However, Goll and Rasheed (2005) found a positive relationship 
between the tenure and the strategic decision-making process. Similarly, findings from a 
sample of Greek firms provide evidence that tenure is positive related to hierarchical 
decentralisation and to lateral communication (Papadakis and Barwise, 2002; Papadakis, 
2006). The empirical findings are not in line with previous findings and apart from the 
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effect of tenure on hierarchical decentralisation (upper level); Greek echelons’ tenure does 
not affect the strategic decision-making process in Greek boardrooms.  
 
 
H4e: The various environmental dimensions influence the process of the strategic 
decision-making in terms of financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical 
decentralisation and lateral communication. 
 
Finally, hypothesis H4e attempts to examine the moderating effect of various 
environmental dimensions on the strategic decision-making processes. Following the same 
statistical approaches as previously, the analysis disclosed significant results. Multiple 
regression analysis showed that Greek executives of listed organisations tend to pursue 
financial reporting in strategic decision-making during environmental dynamism in 
marketing practices (Tables 6:37; t=2.754, p<0.05 and Table 6:39; t=2.498, p<0.05). 
Additionally, Greek organisations operating in environmental competitors’ dynamism are 
inclined to have rule formalisation in the strategic decision-making process as Table 6:41 
indicates (t=2.088, p<0.05). Furthermore, in the case of environmental munificence or 
hostility, firms obtain a hierarchical decentralisation approach in the strategic decision-
making process in periods of environmental munificent/hostility (see Table 6:53, t=2.223, 
p<0.05). Finally, companies that adopt lateral communication in their strategic decisions 
mainly in dynamic marketing practices (Table 6:55, t= 3.106, p<0.05) and in complex 
environments (see Table 6:55, t= 2.372, p<0.05). Similarly, Table 6:57 (t=3.303, p<0.05) 
shows a significant relationship between the forced factor of environmental dynamism and 
lateral communication.   
 
The statistical outcomes that derived from GLM analysis demonstrate similar findings with 
those of regression analysis. Regarding the financial reporting, as illustrated in Tables 6:88 
(sig.008, p<0.05) and Table 6:89 (sig. 016, p<0.05) environmental dynamic environments 
favour financial reporting in the strategic decision-making process. In accordance with the 
previous result, companies operating in competitors’ dynamic environments follow rule 
formalisation in their strategic decisions (see Table 6:90; sig.042, p<0.05). Hierarchical 
decentralisation as a strategic decision making process is adopted within hostile or 
munificent environments (see Table 6:94; sig. 030, p<0.05). Concerning lateral 
communication, the results reveal that this strategic approach is adopted in complex 
environments (see Table 6:95; sig. 022, p<0.05) of with forced factors in dynamic 
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environments (see Table 6:96, sig. 011, p<0.05) and in complex environmental 
circumstances (Table 6:96, sig. 002, p<0.05). 
 
Scholars argue that organisations are required to respond to environmental changes by 
introducing   strategic changes (Child, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1985). Hitt and Tyler (1991) attempted to identify the factors that influence the 
strategic decision-making process in order to provide a better understanding of strategic 
decision-making processes. Most of the scholars have attempted to examine the influence 
of environmental characteristics on the rationality of strategic decision-making process 
(e.g. Agor, 1989; Bresser and Bishop, 1983; Cyert and March, 1963; Hart, 1992; Miller et 
al., 1988). Elbanna and Child (2007) have reported a significant influence of 
environmental dimensions on the strategic decision-making process which is consistent 
with the results of other scholars (e.g. Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Kukalls, 1991; 
Bresser and Bishop, 1983; Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984). Furthermore, rationality has 
been associated with outperforming organisations operating in munificent or dynamic 
environments. In addition, Goll and Rasheed (2005) concluded that environmental 
munificence has a moderating effect on the rationality of strategic decision-making 
process. Similarly, Priem et al. (1995) reported a positive relationship between rationality 
and performance in organisations operating in dynamic rather than stable environments.  
 
Most of the studies so far, have examined the impact of environmental dimensions on the 
rationality of the strategic decision-making process.  
 
The current study examines the impact of various environmental dimensions on different 
strategic decision-making characteristics namely: financial reporting, rule formalisation, 
hierarchical decentralisation and lateral communication. The findings suggest an effect of 
environmental dynamism and munificent/hostility on the strategic decision-making process 
of financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and lateral 
communication. This indicates that the strategic decision-making processes have been 
influenced mainly by two environmental dimensions: dynamism and munificence or 
hostility. 
 
Papadakis and Barwise (2002) suggested that environmental hostility had little influence 
on SDM processes and particularly in the hierarchical decentralisation.  Their work 
reported a marginally significant association between environmental hostility and 
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hierarchical decentralisation. This indicates that in hostile environments, executives might 
have a tighter centralisation in decision-making and a restrained flow of information 
(Child, 1972). The research findings that derived from 105 Greek firms showed that the 
external environment in which companies operate play an influential role in their strategic 
decision-making processes. It seems that environmental dimensions are more important 
determinants of Boards of Directors’ strategic decisions rather than their demographic or 
composition characteristics. 
 
6.10 Board Characteristics, Environmental Dimensions and Innovation Strategies  
 
6.10.1 Introduction  
 
The strategic choice paradigm (Child, 1972) postulates that key decision-makers have 
considerable control over an organisation’s future direction. In the Upper Echelons 
perspective, Hambrick and Mason (1984) introduced the coalignment between strategy and 
managerial characteristics. It provides a framework, which examines how executives 
influence the strategic choices (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Bantel and Jackson, 1989; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). However, the studies so far, resulted in inconclusive 
findings (e.g. Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Murray, 1978; Smith et al., 1994). This can 
be explained by the fact that is not very clear which demographic characteristics influence 
the strategic choice of innovation and under which environmental circumstances. 
 
Many researchers attempted to examine the key parameters that enhance firm’s innovation 
policies. The following hypotheses aim to identify whether board composition and external 
environment have any influential role on how Greek executives pursue innovation 
practices. Figure 6:5 presents the interrelationships between board characteristics and 
innovation policies. 
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Figure 6:5 Hypothesised Research Model between Board Characteristics, 
Environmental Dimensions and Innovation Strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H5a: Outside directors are positively related to firm’s innovation strategies. 
 
Hypothesis H5a examines whether the proportion of outside or external directors 
contribute to the innovation. Statistical  results that derived from both multiple regression 
(see Tables: 6:59, 6:61, 6:63, 6:65, 6:67, Appendix F) and GLM (see Tables 6:97-6:101, 
Appendix G) disclosed insignificant findings. Therefore, this hypothesis found no support. 
Few studies so far, have found an association between board demographic variables and 
innovation practices which is limited in the board composition. Proponents of strategic 
choice theory report that inside directors provide valuable insights and information to 
boardroom, since they initiate discussions and actively participate in the strategic decisions 
(Baysigner and Hoskisson, 1990). Researchers have found that inside directors enhance 
innovation practices (Baysigner, Kosnik and Turk, 1991; Zahra, 1996; Hoskisson, Hitt, 
Johnson and Grossman, 2002). However, agency theorists argue that outsiders tend to be 
vigilant and actively participate in board tasks and in firm’s strategy. In addition, outsiders, 
due to the fact that they are not employees of the organisation, are not controlled by the 
executives and particularly by the CEO, and therefore they can propose innovation 
strategies contrary to CEO will (Johnson et al., 1993). The results demonstrate that the 
proportion of outside or inside directors respectively has no effect on the innovation 
strategies. Apparently, board composition is not an influential factor for Greek Boards of 
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Directors to pursue innovative practices. This is aligned to what was reported in a recent 
study carried out in Italian firms (Zona, Huse, Minichilli and Zattoni, 2006).   
 
H5b: Young executives are more likely to pursue innovative practices 
 
Hypothesis H5b suggests a relationship between executive’s age and innovation practices 
with respect to product, process and organisational innovation. The results from multiple 
regression analysis revealed a strong but negative association between the age and product 
and process innovation (see Table 6:59, t= -2.037, p<0.05) as well as age and the forced 
factor of process innovation (see Table 6:65, t= -2.429, p<0.05).  
 
Similarly, the results derived from GLM analysis were in line with those of regression 
analysis, since the analysis  showed significant findings between age and the factor of 
process and product innovation (Table 6:97, sig.049, p<0.05 ) as well as the forced factor 
of process innovation (Table 6:100, sig.020, p<0.05 ). Therefore, the findings support the 
suggested hypothesis. 
 
Age is regarded as an indicator of experience and a signal of a person’s propensity for risk-
taking and change (Herrmann and Datta, 2005). An individual’s age is expected to 
influence strategic decisions and choices (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992); as age increases, 
flexibility and resistance to change decrease. Younger managers are more willing to adopt 
new ideas and behaviours such as innovation and they may pursue risky strategies 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984). In addition, age is associated with corporate growth and 
innovation strategies (Child, 1974; Hart and Mellons, 1970). Studies conducted by Child 
(1974) and Norburn and Birley (1988) indicated that younger managers achieve superior 
performance. In addition, they are expected to be better educated and to have more current 
technical knowledge (Bantel and Jackson, 1989).  
 
On the contrary, older managers consider financial and career security very important, thus 
they might avoid risky actions that could change the firm’s strategic direction (Vroom and 
Pahl, 1971). Older executives tend to have less confidence in their decisions and therefore 
they may lack the conviction necessary to provide leadership for strategic change (Taylor, 
1975). In a study of 500 top executives conducted by MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990), 
it was found that the most mature executives proved to be risk averse and resistant to 
change. In addition, other scholars (Grimm and Smith, 1991; Wiesema and Bantel, 1992) 
reported that the younger executives contribute to organisational change. However, Bantel 
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and Jackson (1989) found no impact of average Top Managers’ age on firm’s innovation.  
Similar findings have been reported in other studies where age does not significantly affect 
initiation, adoption decision or implementation, innovation (Huber and Durfee, 1993; 
Nystrom et al., 2002; Damanpour and Schneider, 2006). The findings from the study 
suggest a strong but negative relationship between executives’ age and product, process 
and organisational innovation. The majority of Greek listed firms consist of mature 
executives who are reluctant to pursue innovative strategies and high risk strategies.  
 
H5c: Gender is unrelated to firm’s innovative practices 
 
Hypothesis H5c argues that the gender of Greek executives did not affect their decisions 
towards innovation policies. In order to test this hypothesis two statistical approaches were 
applied regression and GLM. However, the results that derived with both statistical 
methods concluded that gender has no impact on innovation practices for Greek listed 
firms as tables 6:59, 6:61, 6:63, 6:65, 6:67 and 6:97-6:101, Appendices F, G indicate. 
Thus, this hypothesis is confirmed.  
 
Several studies have attempted to examine the influential role of certain demographic 
attributes, among them the executives’ gender on innovation practices resulting in mixed 
results. Stelter (2002) argued that women have a transformational leadership style which 
encourages innovation adoption. Sonfield et al. (2001) claimed that there is no difference 
between the gender of business owners and venture innovation practices.  Damanpour and 
Schneider (2006), also, could not provide any support between gender and innovation 
adoption or implementation. Consistent with previous studies are the results of this study 
which indicate no effect of gender on the innovation practices of Greek corporations.   
 
This is explained by the fact that female representation in Greek boardrooms is very low. 
Despite the fact that Greek women are well-educated, they are under-represented not only 
in managerial positions but generally in Greek business community (Papalexandris and 
Bourantas, 1991; Petraki Kottis, 1996). 
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H5d: Executives’ tenure (in terms of industry, company and position) is related to firm’s 
innovation practices 
 
Hypothesis H5d suggests that the number of years that Greek board members have spent in 
the current industry, company or position is associated with innovation practices. However, 
the results of this study are not able to support this proposition. The empirical findings 
extracted from multiple regressions and GLM did not provide any association between 
tenured executives and innovation policies as Tables 6:59, 6:61, 6:63, 6:65, 6:67, and 6:97-
6:101 illustrate in the Appendices F, G. 
 
Tenure is regarded as a key indicator of mangers’ ability to gather information, as tenure 
increases the amount of information gathered and processed declines (Miller, 1991). 
Newly appointed directors are willing to learn and expand their skills and expertise (Zona, 
Huse, Minichilli and Zattoni, 2006) and are open to innovation (Huber and Durfee, 1993). 
As Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) claimed executives over time develop new habits, 
establish routines and rely more on their previous experiences. In addition, they accept the 
organisation as it is and they are reluctant to suggest or adopt new ways of doing things 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Huber and Durfee, 1993). Long tenured managers prefer to 
focus more on stability rather than on pursuing innovation strategies (Barker and Mueller, 
2002; Thomas et al., 1991). Hambrick and Mason (1984) stated that CEO tenure 
encourages R&D investment and product development.  
 
The findings demonstrate no effect of Greek executives’ tenure on any innovation practices 
which are aligned to what reported in similar studies (Damanpour and Schneider, 2006; 
Zona, Huse, Minichilli and Zattoni, 2006).  
 
H5e: The amount of formal education is positively related to formal innovation strategies. 
 
Hypothesis H5e advocates a positive relationship between educational level and innovation 
strategies. This hypothesis was tested with regression analysis (high school was omitted as 
a baseline variable) and GLM analysis, where the results disclosed insignificant 
associations between the Greek executives’ educational level and the degree of innovation 
practices. Therefore, this hypothesis was rejected. 
 
The educational level of executives reflects the degree of knowledge and skills and their 
ability to suggest creative solutions in order to solve complex problems (Bantel and 
Jackson, 1989). Scholars (e.g. Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981; Bantel and Jackson, 1989; 
Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971) state that educated executives are aware of the need for 
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change and they are receptive to innovation. Camelo-Ordaz et al. (2005) found that the 
TMT’s educational level exerts a positive effect on organisational innovation. On the 
contrary, Damanpour and Schneider (2006) did not support any evidence between the 
executives’ educational level and the firm’s innovation practices. Greek educated 
managers engage excessive analysis to the disadvantages of the decision-making process 
due to their ability to process information and to forecast the threats and the opportunities 
prior to any decision; therefore, they seem to be reluctant to pursue innovation practices.  
 
H5f: Specific educational specialty favours firm’s innovation strategies. 
 
This hypothesis is actually an expansion of the previous one aiming to investigate the 
effect of different educational disciplines on the innovation practices of product, process 
and organisation. For the purpose of this hypothesis, GLM and multiple regression 
analyses were conducted by excluding the variable of civil engineering as a baseline 
variable. The results derived from GLM analysis do not provide significant evidence for 
the suggested hypothesis as illustrated in Tables (6:97-6:101, Appendix G) which is in 
accordance with the results extracted from regression analyses (Tables: 6:59, 6:61, 6:63, 
6:65, 6:67). Thus, for the purposes of evaluating H5f, it can be claimed that these findings 
do not provide support for the hypothesis. 
 
 Executives with formal education training in sciences and engineering are likely to 
understand the technological base of the company and to be more favourable to 
cooperative opportunities. Heilmeier (1993) suggested that technically trained executives 
are aware of relevant technologies and are able to predict, comprehend and anticipate long-
term change.  The empirical studies of Gupta and Govindarajan (1984) have indicated that 
experience in marketing and sales were associated more with taking growth strategies than 
taking harvest strategies. 
 
Executives with only formal management education are more likely to pursue short-term 
performance goals at the expense of innovation and long-term asset building compared to 
executives with other educational background (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). They claimed 
that business schools are not effective at developing risk-taking tendencies compared to 
technical schools that are risk-averse oriented. Focusing on business education and more 
specifically on MBA programmes, students are risk-averse and resistant to innovation 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). However, executives with technical education in 
science and engineering have a complete understanding of technology and innovation and 
are likely to focus more on opportunities than on threats (Tyler & Steensma, 1998). The 
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empirical findings did not support the association between educational specialty and 
innovation practices. Greek executives come from various educational specialties which 
does not allow us to conclude that managers from certain fields are more receptive to 
innovation compared to others.  
 
H5g: The various environmental dimensions influence the innovation strategies.  
 
The final hypothesis attempts to investigate how Greek executives pursue innovation 
strategies within various environmental dimensions. More specifically, it examines the 
moderating role of the external environment towards Greek firms’ innovation processes.  
Following the same statistical approaches as previously, the analysis disclosed significant 
results. More specifically, the regression analysis that was conducted with factors for 
environment and innovation with eigenvalue greater than one showed that Greek 
companies pursue product and process innovation practices while they operate in dynamic 
marketing practices environments (Table 6:59, t=2.862, p<0.05) and in competitors’ 
dynamic environment (Table 6:59, t=2.807, p<0.05). Furthermore, the results derived from 
forced factors concluded with significant findings. The results indicate that Greek 
executives adopt product innovation practices (Table 6:63, t=2.076, p<0.05) and process 
innovation (Table 6:65, t=1.979, p<0.05) respectively when their organisations operate in 
complex environments. GLM analysis revealed the same results. Table 6:97 illustrates that 
organisations which face environmental dynamism in marketing practices (sig. 007, 
p<0.05) as well as environmental competitors’ dynamism (sig.008, p<0.05) obtain product 
and process innovation practices. In addition, GLM disclosed the same findings with 
forced factors. It has been proved that firms operating in complex environments are likely 
to pursue product innovation (Table 6:99, sig.045, p<0.05) as well as process innovation 
practices (Table 6:100, sig.055, p<0.05). Thus, for the purposes of evaluating H5g, it can 
be claimed that these findings provide support for the hypothesis.  
 
Innovation has been of central interest in recent years because of its importance for 
organisational survival and competitive advantage due to global competition, technological 
and market changes (Tushman and O’Reilly, 2002; Damanpour and Schneider, 2006).  
Competition increases the chances for organisational innovation (Utterback, 1974) and 
Kimberly and Evanisko (1981) found it to be an important predictor for technological and 
administrative innovation.  
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Empirical studies have examined the adoption of various innovation strategies within 
certain environmental dimensions. The global environment is driving companies to find 
new ways to conduct businesses in order to survive (Stopford, 2001). Managers have to 
understand the different environmental dimensions in which their organisations operate 
and act accordingly. Firms operating in dynamic or turbulent environments are externally 
oriented, proactive in pursuing emerging market opportunities and undertake innovation 
strategies (Crant, 2000; Naman and Slevin, 1993; Dess et al., 1997; Markides, 1998). 
Firms operating in hostile environments introduce new products, are risk-taking and 
proactive compared to those operating in dynamic environments that are technology-
oriented (Miller and Friesen, 1983). Other studies have shown that both environmental 
turbulence and complexity are associated with innovation and risk taking (Naman and 
Slevin, 1993; Zahra, 1991).  
The empirical results from a sample of 105 Greek listed organisations are in accordance 
with previous studies indicating that companies operating in dynamic and complex 
environments pursue product and process innovation practices. Greek executives tend to be 
proactive and innovative in circumstances of environmental uncertainty in order for their 
organisations to maintain their competitive position in the industry.  
 
 
6.11 Organisational Performance 
 
6.11.1 Introduction  
 
Organisational performance is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon in strategic 
management literature (Venkatraman and Ramanujan, 1986). Recent reviews on Boards of 
Directors have been dominated by a tradition in which board composition is related to 
corporate financial performance (Johnson et al., 1996; Pettigrew, 1992; Zahra and Pearce, 
1989) and mainstream research has been heavily influenced by a research tradition from 
financial economics and theories treating the board as a so-called “black box” (Daily et al., 
2003; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). Researchers agree that predictions about the impact 
of board demographic characteristics and organisational performance are not clear. After 
extensive research on Boards of Directors, Pettigrew (1992, p. 171) concluded that “Great 
inferential leaps are made from input variables such as board composition to output 
variables such as board performance with no direct evidence on the processes and 
mechanisms which presumably link the inputs to the outputs”. The research so far is based 
on theoretical reflections about board role expectations, but actual board task performance 
is rarely measured (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004). The research objectives of the study are 
to introduce an integrative theoretical framework and examine how Boards of Directors 
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and their demographic characteristics influence strategic decision-making processes as 
well on strategic choice of innovation and consequently firm’s performance. The Figure 
6:6 below indicates an effect of board involvement, strategic decision-making processes 
and innovation practices on the financial performance of Greek companies. 
 
Figure 6:6 Hypothesised Research Model between BOD Involvement, Strategic 
Decision-Making, Innovation and Organisational  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
H6: The impact of involvement, strategic decision-making processes and innovation 
strategies to the firm’s overall performance.  
 
The purpose of the concluding hypothesis of the study is to examine the final outcome of 
board involvement in the strategic decision-making process, the strategic decision-making 
processes of financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation as well as 
lateral communication and finally the innovation practices on the organisational 
performance. This hypothesis was developed in order to investigate the influential role of 
key strategic decisions that Boards of Directors pursue towards the organisational 
performance. Results derived from regression analysis (Table 6:69: t=2.223, p<0.05 and 
Table 6:71: t=2.590, p<0.05) and GLM analysis respectively (Table 6:102, sig.033, p<0.05 
and Table 6:103, sig.014, p<0.05) concluded that only financial reporting in the strategic 
decision-making process ameliorates firm’s performance.  
 
Few scholars have examined the impact of the strategic decision-making process to the 
firm’s performance (e.g. Bourgeois, 1980; Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Dess, 1987; 
Goll and Rasheed, 1997). In particular, Goll and Rasheed (2005) provided support for the 
association between rationality in the strategic decision-making process and organisational 
performance during munificent environments. Furthermore, researchers (Fredrickson, 
1984; Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984) found that comprehensiveness in decision-making 
contribute to higher organisational performance in stable rather than dynamic 
environments. Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) concluded that the more analytical the 
strategic decision-making process is the higher the organisational performance during 
velocity environments will be. Concerning rule formalisation and performance, scholars 
H6 
 BOD Involvement in SDM 
 Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
 Innovation Strategies 
Organisational 
Performance 
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have reported a positive relationship (Dess and Origen, 1987; Pearce, Robins and 
Robinson, 1987; Grinyer and Norburn, 1977-78). The involvement of middle level 
management in the strategic decision-making process enhances organisational performance 
(e.g. Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Burgelman, 1983; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990). 
Outstanding performance can be achieved with centralised and decentralised strategic 
decisions (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988). Papadakis (1998) suggested a positive 
relationship between financial reporting and long term organisational performance. Judge 
and Zeithmal (1992) found that board involvement in the strategic decision-making 
process contributes to organisational performance. Scholars have portrayed the upper 
Echelons’ characteristics as determinants of strategic choices and their outcome to 
organisational performance (Smith et al., 1994; Hambrick and Cho, 1996; Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1990). Bertrand and Schoar (2003) conducted a longitudinal study and 
concluded that certain strategic choices: cash holdings, advertising investments, 
acquisitions, R&D have improved the financial position of the firm. In a study of 
microcomputers manufacturing firms, innovation is related to performance during dynamic 
environments. Additionally, fast innovation practices (Lawless and Anderson, 1996) as 
well as R&D (Chaney and Devinney, 1992) enhance organisational performance.   
 
The organisational performance of Greek listed organisations in the ASE seems to be 
influenced by neither the strategic-decision-making process nor the strategic choice of 
innovation. The findings showed that companies that have adopted the financial reporting 
in their strategic decision-making process have higher financial performance. This might 
occur due to the fact that there are several organisational, environmental and decision 
factors that moderate the relationship between strategic decisions characteristics as well as 
strategic choices and organisational performance.  
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6.12 Presentation of the Hypothesised Empirical Framework and Results 
 
In the part below, Tables 6:2-6:5 present the significant results of both regression and 
GLM analyses. Both significant and insignificant findings can be found in the Appendix H. 
Appendices F, G present in details the results of regression and GLM analyses. 
 
 
  
Table 6:2Regression 
Analysis Results  
(factors with eigenvalue 
greater than one)  
Hypotheses t-value p Statement 
H1e Dynamic environment- 
leadership structure 2.271 .026 
 
Significant 
H2a Firm’s size-board size 3.524 .001  Significant 
H2c:  Board size-executive 
BODs 4.494 .000 
 
Significant 
H2d 
 
Board size-Non-
executive BODs 7.853 .000 
 
Significant 
H3c Frequency of 
BODmeetings- 
SDM involvement 
-2.031 
-.2.031 
-2.126 
 
.009 
.047 
.038 
 
Significant (INVSDM1) 
Significant(INVSDM1) 
Significant(INVSDM3) 
H3d  Duration of BOD 
meetings- SDM 
involvement 
2.749 
2.848 
2.641 
3.238 
2.033 
 
.008 
.006 
.011 
.002 
.047 
 
Significant (INVSDM2) 
Significant (INVSDM2) 
Significant (INVSDM2) 
Significant (INVSDM2) 
Significant 
H4b Education specialty- 
financial reporting, rule 
formalisation, 
hierarchical 
decentralisation and 
lateral communication 
SDM 
 
2.229 
 030 
 
Significant(HIER,scienc
es) 
 
H4e 
 
Environment- financial 
reporting, rule 
formalisation, 
hierarchical 
decentralisation and 
lateral communication 
SDM 
2.754 
2.088 
3.106 
2.372 
.008 
.042 
.003 
.022 
Significant(ENV1,FINR
EPORT) 
Significant(ENV3,R.F) 
Significant (ENV1,LC) 
Significant (ENV4,LC) 
H5b Age- innovation -2.429 .020 
 
Significant 
 
H5g Environment-
innovation 
2.076 
 
.045 
 
Significant 
(ENV3,PROD) 
 
H6 BOD involvement , 
SDM and innovation-
organisational 
performance 
2.223 .033 Significant 
(Fin.Rep, Org.Perf) 
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Table 6:3 
Regression Analysis 
Results  
(forced factors)  
Hypotheses t-value p Statement 
H1e Dynamic environment- 
leadership structure 
2.343 
 
.022 
 
Significant (ENV1) 
 
H2a Firm’s size-board size 
3.524 .001 
Significant 
H2c Board size-executive 
BODs 4.494 .000 
Significant 
H2d Board size-Non-
executive BODs 7.853 .000 
Significant 
H3c Frequency of 
BODmeetings- 
SDM involvement 
-2.031 
-.2031 
 
.009 
.047 
 
Significant (INVSDM1) 
Significant (INVSDM3) 
 
H4b Education specialty- 
financial reporting, rule 
formalisation, 
hierarchical 
decentralisation and 
lateral communication 
SDM 
2.335 
 
.023 
 
Significant(sciences) 
 
H4e 
 
Environment- financial 
reporting, rule 
formalisation, 
hierarchical 
decentralisation and 
lateral communication 
SDM 
2.498 
2.223 
2.660 
3.303 
.016 
.030 
.011 
.002 
Significant(ENV1,FINREPO
RT) 
Significant 
(ENV1,HIERDEC) 
Significant 
(ENV1,LATCOMM) 
Significant 
(ENV3,LATCOMM) 
H5b Age- innovation -2.429 .020 
 
Significant (Process Inn. Age) 
 
H5g Environment-innovation 2.076 
 
.045 
 
Significant (ENV3,PROD) 
H6  BOD involvement , 
SDM and innovation-
organisational 
performance  
2.590 
 
.014 
 
Significant(FR,ORGPERF) 
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Table 6:4 
GLM Analysis 
Results  
( factors with 
eigenvalue greater 
than one)  
Hypotheses p Statement 
H1e Dynamic 
environment- 
leadership structure 
.026 
 
Significant  
 
H2a Firm’s size-board size .001 
 
Significant 
H2c:  Board size-executive 
BODs 
.000 Significant 
H2d Board size-Non-
executive BODs 
.000 Significant 
H3b Inside directors- 
SDM involvement 
.019 Significant (INVSDM3) 
H3c Frequency of 
BODmeetings- 
SDM involvement 
.000 
 
Significant (INVSDM1) 
 
H3d  Duration of BOD 
meetings- SDM 
involvement 
.044 
 
Significant (INVSDM3) 
H4d Industry,company, 
position tenure- 
financial reporting, 
rule formalisation, 
hierarchical 
decentralisation and 
lateral communication 
SDM 
.024 
 
Significant (upper level hier.dec) 
 
H4e 
 
Environment- 
financial reporting, 
rule formalisation, 
hierarchical 
decentralisation and 
lateral communication 
SDM 
.008 
.042 
.003 
.022 
Significant(ENV1,FINREPORT) 
Significant(ENV3,RULEFORM) 
Significant (ENV1,LATCOMM) 
Significant (ENV4,LATCOMM) 
H5b Age- innovation .049 
 
Significant (Product &Process) 
 
H5g Environment-
innovation 
.007 
.008 
Significant (Prod&Proc.,ENV1) 
 Significant (Prod. &Proc., ENV4) 
 
H6  BOD involvement , 
SDM and innovation-
organisational 
performance  
.033 
 
Significant (FINREPORT) 
 
256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6:5 
GLM Analysis 
Results  
( forced factors)  
Hypotheses p Statement 
H1e Dynamic 
environment- 
leadership structure 
.022 
 
Significant  
 
H2a Firm’s size-board size .001 
 
Significant 
H2c:  Board size-executive 
BODs 
.000 Significant 
H2d Board size-Non-
executive BODs 
.000 Significant 
H3c Frequency of 
BODmeetings- 
SDM involvement 
.000 
 
Significant (INVSDM1) 
 
H3d  Duration of BOD 
meetings- SDM 
involvement 
.000 Significant (INVSDM2) 
H4e 
 
Environment- 
financial reporting, 
rule formalisation, 
hierarchical 
decentralisation and 
lateral communication 
SDM 
.016 
.030 
.011 
.002 
 
Significant(ENV1,FINREPORT) 
Significant(ENV3,RULEFORM) 
Significant (ENV1,LATCOMM) 
Significant (ENV3,LATCOMM) 
 
H5b Age- innovation .020 Significant (Pr&PC,and Age) 
 
H5g Environment-
innovation 
.045 
 
 
Significant (Prod.Proc.Inn.,ENV1)   
 
  
H6  BOD involvement , 
SDM and innovation-
organisational 
performance  
.014 
 
Significant (FINREPORT) 
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6.13 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has documented the results of correlation analyses examining first, the 
influence of external environment to Boards of Directors’ characteristics as well as on 
firm’s strategic decisions and second, the impact of Boards of Directors’ attributes  on the 
strategic decision making processes and on the strategic choice of innovation and 
consequently on firm’s performance. Compelling evidence was provided in support of a 
number of hypotheses and discussion was given to each of these bivariate relationships.  
The results of the study have been compared with other studies in the area and the 
conclusions drawn represent the process of strategic decisions in Greek organisations. 
 
Multivariate statistical techniques such as ordinary least squares linear regression as well 
as general linear model (GLM) analyses were executed in order to gain an insight into the 
extent of association between the variables. The test of the model presented in Chapter 2 
was conducted using two statistical techniques: linear regression and GLM analyses. Enter 
linear regression analysis, supported some of the research hypotheses. However, the GLM 
revealed as well some significant relationships between the variables. It is worth 
mentioning that the results from GLM analysis were on lines with the regression results. 
The cases when the statistical analyses approaches revealed different results were only 
when in the regression analysis the independent variables were categorical, thus it had to 
be transformed into a binary variable. The results for both statistical analyses methods 
were presented by using factors with eigenvalue greater than one as well as by using forced 
factors. The purpose of using such comprehensive statistical analyses approaches was to 
provide an insight understanding of the robust associations between the variables. The 
Tables below present a comprehensive synopsis of the research findings. Tables 6:2-6:5 
present detailed findings from both statistical analyses accompanied with statistical 
significances. The Tables in the Appendix H (Tables HA-1 to HA-4) present the empirical 
findings that have been derived from regression analysis with factors with eigenvalue 
greater than one and forced factors and from general linear model analysis with factors 
with eigenvalue greater than one and forced factors. 
The following chapter presents the conclusions and the contributions of this study and 
suggests its implications for academics and business practitioners. Avenues for future 
research are also presented along with the areas of most worthy theoretical contributions.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Conclusions, Contributions and Directions for Further Research 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Reseach on the Boards of Directors was motivated by renewed interest evinced due to 
recent corporate failures and scandals. Increased attention on accountability and 
transparency in firms led to a number of countries issuing corporate governance 
regulations, codes and principles. The establishment of formal regulations would result in a 
better governance system that could improve organisational performance. 
 
Boards of Directors are considered as a social construction groups which are expected to 
play a more active role in discharging their fiduciary role for improving organisational 
performance. This thesis was set up to investigate the factors that shape strategic decisions 
in Greek listed organisations in an attempt to assist exeutives to improve organisational 
performance. This study is applied to Boards of Directors of Greek listed organisations. 
More specifically, it attempted to examine the impact of external environment on board 
composition; to identify the characteristics of board members that have an effect on the 
involvement in strategic-decision making; on the strategic decision-making processes; and 
on the strategic choice of innovation.  Finally, it investigated the impact of strategic 
decisions on the performance of Greek firms.  
 
Based on different theoretical perspectives and a review of extant literature, an integrative 
theoretical framework was developed which is composed of environmental dimensions, 
board characteristics (composition, demographic attributes), board involvement in the 
decision-making process, strategic decisions (processes and innovation as a strategic 
choice) and organisational performance.  Alongside the theoretical framework a set of 
hypotheses have been developed. 
 
The data for this study was drawn from publicly listed firms on the Athens Stock Exchange 
during 2007. The sample consists of 105 Greek listed organisations. Multiple regression as 
well as GLM techniques were used to test the hypothesized relationships.  
 
 
 
 
 
259 
 
7.2 Conclusions of the Study 
 
 
Chapter Seven summarises the findings of the study. It refers to the conceptual framework 
of the study and it allies the research objectives with the conclusions of the study. Specific 
research objectives are proposed and a summary of the conceptualisation is proposed 
which are followed by presentation of the results. Furthermore, this chapter also refers to 
the main contributions of the thesis, the implementations for business practitioners and 
suggestions for future research. 
  
The analysis and discussion presented in Chapter Six provide an insight into the key 
factors that influence the strategic decisions of Greek executives.  The results of this study 
have been compared with previous studies and they are linked with relevant theories in 
strategic management. Tables (6:1a, 6:1b, 6:2, 6:3a, 6:3b, 6:4a1, 6:4b1, 6:4b2, 6:4b3, 
6:4b4, 6:4b5, 6:5a, 6:5b, 6:6a, 6:6b, Appendix E) illustrate the results of bivariate 
correlation with forced as well as with factors with eigenvalue greater than one. 
Furthermore, the Tables demonstrate the results from multiple linear regression (Appendix 
F) and GLM (Appendix G) which were used in order to test the research hypotheses. The 
study suggests the driven forces of strategic decision making among Greek executives. The 
empirical examination of the hypotheses developed from the conceptual framework 
presented in this study revealed a set of mixed results. 
 
First, the external environment was found not to be significantly associated with the board 
composition with respect to board size and the number of interlocking directorates. 
However, the findings suggest a strong association between dynamic or otherwise 
uncertain environments and the dual leadership structure. The results indicate that Greek 
listed organisations tend to have a unified leadership structure that facilitates the strategic 
decision-making during dynamic environments. In case of uncertainty, Greek companies 
tend to rely on a dominant CEO which is attributed to the large power distance in Greek 
society (Hofsted, 1980) and the expected small and medium size of many Greek firms run 
by a dominant owner-manager. Single and powerful leadership is more proactive and 
effective on strategic decisions. Therefore, Greek firms rely on a single leader when they 
need guidance and direction which become more intense during crisis. 
 
Second, organisational theorists have linked organisational characteristics with board 
characteristics with an outcome on firm’s financial performance (Kakabadse, 1991). 
Multiple regression and GLM analyses revealed a positive and strong relationship between 
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organisational size and board size as well as board size and number of executives and non-
executive directorates. Nevertheless, the findings could not provide evidence for any effect 
of board size on organisational performance. Apparently, there are other factors that 
contribute to firm’s performance of Greek listed organisations and not the number of board 
members.  
 
Third, results from multiple regression analysis revealed that apart from the duration of 
board meetings, none of board composition characteristics or the external environment has 
an effect on the strategic decision-making process. However, the GLM analysis concluded 
with slightly different results; inside directors were found to be related to the evaluation 
process of board involvement (INVSDM2), the frequency of board meetings to be related 
to formation process of strategic decision-making (INVSDM1) and also, the duration of 
board meetings to evaluation stage of board involvement in the strategic decision-making.  
Overall, the findings show that Greek companies place a great emphasis on formal 
procedures –board meetings frequency and duration- rather than the demographic 
characteristics of the board in the board strategic involvement. Greek executives focus a lot 
on the interaction within the boardroom and they try to explore how to contribute to the 
“value creation process”. This shows that Greek companies are moving towards a more 
team-based management which requires an increased participation in the making of major 
decisions.  
 
Fourth, in the strategic management literature, Boards of Directors are regarded as the apex 
of each organisation.  Forbes and Milliken (1999) present the board as a social construction 
and employ cognitive theories to understand boards. They argue that boards should be 
understood through attributes of the board members, the board’s working styles, and actual 
board task performance. They align attributes to boards, as with any other decision-making 
group, including preparation and the use of knowledge and skills, cognitive conflicts, effort 
norms. In this thesis, Boards of Directors as well as their demographic characteristics and 
external environment are regarded as predictors of the strategic decision-making process of 
financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and lateral 
communication. Multiple regression analysis was executed and demonstrated that only 
environment has an effect on the Greek firms’ on strategic decision-making process. 
Nevertheless, GLM analysis revealed some interesting findings.  Greek executives with an 
educational specialty in social sciences tend to have a lower level hierarchical 
decentralised strategic decision-making process. On the contrary, executives with high 
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tenure showed a tendency towards an upper level hierarchical decentralisation process 
where the two individuals that participate in the strategic decisions are the owner of the 
company and the CEO. Regarding the effect of external environment, the results from 
GLM analysis are consistent with multiple regression analysis. Basically, our findings 
suggest that companies operating in either dynamic or complex environments are more 
likely to pursue a set of strategic decision-making processes. The findings are novel for a 
country like Greece.  
 
Although we could expect to find that the personal attributes of dominant executives would 
be influential in the strategic decision-making, the results have shown that the external 
environment matters more for the strategic decisions of Greek Directors. The lack of CEO 
dominance over strategic decisions can be explained first, by the fact that our sample 
consist of large Greek organisations in which all Board members participate equally in 
strategic decisions. A second explanation is that Greek organisations are operating in an 
increasingly competitive global environment, and in order to survive Directors have to be 
responsive to external stimuli by introducing effective changes in the structures and 
procedures including a more team-based style of decision-making.  
 
Although we could expect that Greek managers would defer to a higher level of authority, 
the environmental uncertainty facing business in the region made them consider external 
threats such as high interest rate, changes in the system problem of contracting, problem of 
lack in liquidity and decling demand lack prior to any strategic decisions. The results of the 
study allowed us to draw some general overviews on how Greek Boards of Directors affect 
the strategic decision making-process alongside the influence of the external environment.  
 
Fifth, the strategic choice paradigm (Child, 1972) postulates that key decision-makers have 
considerable control over an organisation’s future direction. In the Upper Echelons 
perspective, Hambrick and Mason (1984) introduced the coalignment between strategy and 
managerial characteristics. It provides a framework, which examines how managers 
influence organisational outcomes. Organisational outcomes such as strategies and 
performance are expected to reflect the characteristics of the leaders. This research 
attempted to examine how demographic characteristics of the executives and the 
environmental circumstances influence the strategic choice of innovation.  Both multiple 
regression and GLM analyses revealed an association between the executives and the 
product and process innovation as well between age and the forced factor of process 
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innovation. The findings suggest that the older the Greek executives the more reluctant 
they will be to pursue innovation practices. This is explained by the fact that average age 
of Greek executives is higher compared to the other counterparts. The organisational 
structure in Greek companies is hierarachical and the employees are promoted slowly to 
the organisational hierarchy. Regarding the external environment, the findings show that 
companies operating in dynamic environments in terms of marketing practices as well as 
competitors tend to be proactive and pursue product and process innovation practices. So 
far the majority of Greek organizations lack financial and technological resources, outdated 
production methods and at the same time they are characteriuzed by “passivity” in 
marketing, autocratic systems and limited use of modern management tools and systems to 
support strategic decisions (Bourantas and Papadakis, 1997; Bourantas, Anagnostelis and 
Mantes, 1990, Makridakis et al., 1997). However, the situation in Greece has changed 
dramatically after its integration in EMU. The institutional environment has exerted strong 
pressures towards modernization and the improvement of the competitiveness on macro-
and microeconomics fronts (Kazakos, 2001). Therefore, Greek organisations adopt several 
innovative strategies in order to compete with more advanced economies and play a key 
decision-making role in Balkan countries.  
 
Finally, the results derived from multiple regression and GLM analyses are consistent 
indicating that only financial reporting contributes to firm’s financial performance. The 
empirical results show that a key determinant of organisational performance is the financial 
reporting as a strategic decision-making process. It implies that Greek firms rely on formal 
financial reporting activities when making strategic decisions as multinational 
counterparts. 
 
According to the above findings, we have rehypothesized the proposed model presented in 
Figure 2:2. A new empirical model has derived from the multiple regression analysis 
(Figure 7:1), from the GLM analysis (Figure 7:2) and a final comprehensive model 
presented in Figure 7:3.  
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Figure 7:1 shows how Greek executives pursue strategic decisions. The results suggest that 
dynamic environments favour the dual leadership structure. A positive association was 
found between organisational characteristics and board characteristics. Also, the frequency 
and the duration of board meetings have an effect on board participation in strategic 
decisions. One of the key findings of the study is that external environment influence the 
strategic decisions in terms of process as well as for innovation practices. Contary to the 
hypothesis, demographic characteristics apart from tenure and age are not key factors of 
Greek firms’ strategic decisions. Finally, the organisational performance is improved by 
the adoption of financial reporting activities.  
 
Figure 7:2 presents a rehypotherised theoretical framework that has derived after GLM 
analaysis. The study tested the relationships among board attributes, external 
environments, board involvement, strategic decisions and organisational performance. The 
findings suggest that in dynamic environments Greek executives prefer the dual leadership 
structure. A positive relationship was found between organisational characteristics and 
board characteristics. In particular, organisational size is positively associated with board 
size and consequently board size with the number of non-executives and executive 
directors. Board involvement in strategic decision-making was found to be related to a 
number of inside directors as well as to two formal processes: frequency and duration of 
board meetings. Strategic decisions are associated with tenure and high level of dynamism 
in the external environment. Also, product and process innovation strategies have been 
affected by the external environment as well as the age of the executives. The empirical 
model derived form GLM analysis showed that only financial reporting activities led to 
better organisational performance. 
 
Finally, Figure 7:3 is a comprehensive empirical framework that shows that the dynamic 
and complex environments are the driven forces in strategic decisions with respect to 
strategic processes as well as choices. In contrast to the hypotheses, Boards of Directors 
attributes do not have a significant impact on strategic decisions. Organisational 
performance is significantly related to financial reporting only. 
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Figure 7:1 Empirical Model Derived from Multiple Regression Analysis 
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Figure 7:2 Empirical Model Derived from General Linear Model Analysis
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Figure 7:3 Final Empirical Model of the Study: The Influential Factors of Greek Executives’ on Board Decision
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7.3 Novelty and Contributions 
 
The novelty of the thesis is based on the development of a comprehensive theoretical 
framework that examines the factors that influence the Boards of Directors’ strategic 
decisions in Greek listed organisations on the Athens Stock Exchange. The theoretical 
framework is tested for the first time empirically and theoretically.  Previous studies that 
have been conducted in the area of strategic management did not focus on Boards of 
Directors and failed to establish an association between managerial characteristics and 
strategic decisions. This study develops an integrative theoretical framework that combines 
a set of factors that influence the organisational strategy. The study aims to investigate the 
effects of managerial characteristics along with the environment to both content and 
process strategy and how they might contribute to organisational performance. 
 
Several contributions emerge from this research. The major theoretical contributions of this 
thesis are: 
 
First, one of the distinctive contributions is the development of an integrated model based 
on Hambrick and Mason’s upper echelons model, which attempted to depict and explain 
strategic decision-making processes and the strategic choice of innovation with an outcome 
to the organisational performance. In the present study, an integrative model was 
developed that combines factors associated with certain perspectives of board involvement, 
on the strategic decision-making process and on strategic choice of innovation: (1) 
environmental dimensions, (2) board structure characteristics and (3) board members 
demographic characteristics. Most of the previous studies have focused on the strategic 
decision-making process; this study suggests an integrative model that combines strategic 
decisions both process and content. This is the first study to the best of our knowledge that 
combines both the composition and demographic characteristics of board members and 
investigates their effect on strategic decisions and on innovation policies. 
 
Second, another contribution to knowledge is that it is the first study to report that has 
valuable data from Greek listed organisations on Athens Stock Exchange. In addition, the 
study contributed to the limited so far knowledge on how Greek executives pursue 
strategic decisions and address the questions which are those factors that influence their 
decisions. The study reports in detail how Greek executives participate in strategic 
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decisions, the process that they follow to take their decisions and which are those decisions 
that assist them to improve the organisdational performance. It examines the board 
involvement in strategic decisions, the strategic decision-making process as well the 
innovation practices of the Greek listed organisations.  
 
The study combines a set of key factors-board composition characteristics, demographic 
characteristics and environmental dimensions and examines certain characteristics of 
strategic decision-making processes, namely: financial reporting, rule formalisation, 
hierarchical decentralisation and lateral communication as well as innovation practices. 
 
Third, it uses a multi-dimensional empirically grounded representation of the strategic 
decision-making process and on strategic choice of innovation in order to test their effect 
on performance. In this study, the board is considered as a social construction and board 
members are understood through their attributes, working styles, and actual board task 
performance and the processes inside the boardroom. This is an advantage over related 
empirical efforts which focus on specific process dimensions mainly on rationality 
(Fredrickson, 1985; Dean and Sharfman, 1993). This study examines the attributes of 
executives on specific not well examined strategic decision-making processes namely: 
financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and lateral 
communication.  
 
Fourth, a strong point of the research relates to the fact that it brings empirical evidence 
from a relatively new cultural context taking into account that most of the studies have 
taken place in the U.K, U.S.A and Canada. This is the first study reported on strategic 
decisions on Greek publicly listed companies in the ASE. This is significant in permitting a 
test of a wider validity of findings derived from research conducted in Anglo-Saxon 
context.  
 
Fifth, the accessibility to Boards of Directors allowed us to collect really rare and valuable 
data, since we are not able to attend board meetings and observe how in fact “boards 
work”.  The fact that this study was completed allowed us to draw some general overviews 
on how Greek Boards of Directors affect the strategic decisions alongside the influence of 
the external environment. The sample consists of 105 Greek listed organisations with an 
overall number of approximately 290 companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. The 
sample is regarded as a reasonably representative sample of the Athens Stock market 
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companies that allowed us to draw some conclusions on how Greek Boards of Directors 
take their strategic decisions and which individual attributes and composition 
characteristics affect their strategic choices during various environmental circumstances.  
 
Finally, the results show that the external environmental forces are better predictors of 
strategic decision-making processes. The findings are novel for a country like Greece. 
Although we could expect to find that the personal attributes of dominant executives would 
be influential in the strategic decision-making, the results have shown that the external 
environment matters more for the strategic decisions of Greek Directors.  
 
 
 
7.4 Implications of the Study 
 7.4.1 Introduction 
The research findings of the study have several practical implications. In the section below, 
specific implications for business practitioners and academics will be highlighted. 
   
  7.4.2 Implications for Practitioners 
The study offers a few important implications for Greek executives in listed organisations 
in the ASE. This thesis examined the extent to which certain characteristics of board 
members and the dimensions of external environment influence the firm’s strategic 
decisions and finally, the organisational performance.  
 
First, it highlighted the importance of external environment to executives’ strategic 
decisions. The results showed that Greek executives pursue their strategic decisions 
according to the environment that their companies are operating in. When executives 
perceive the business environment to be either dynamic or complex, they are more likely to 
integrate certain strategic decision-making characteristics such as financial reporting, rule 
formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and lateral communication.   
 
Second, the extent of board participation in the strategic decision-making process is mainly 
influenced by the duration of board meetings.  
 
Third, Greek executives were found to be proactive and to pursue innovative strategies 
during dynamic environments. Fourth, financial reporting has an effect on firm’s financial 
performance. Future research should pay more attention to identifying the factors that 
affect the firm’s performance.  
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Previous results have reported that environmental variables exert the greater influence on 
strategic decisions (e.g. Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Jemison, 1981). The findings 
suggested that Greek companies are more responsive to external stimuli and introduce 
changes in their structures and policies in order to survive. However, when directors 
perceive the business environment to be either complex or dynamic, they have to develop a 
proactive environmental strategy by introducing long-terms guidelines in order to cope 
with various environmental dimensions.  
 
In this way, a plan for a sustainable business model will be incorporated that will reduce 
the effect of the external environment on managerial decisions. Greek listed organisations 
will become more proactive in their strategic decisions regardless of the influence of 
external forces. Public policy makers encourage greater proactivity in environmental 
practices by introducing clear regulations and long-term policies.  
 
These regulations ought to be part of the firms’ strategic plans regardless of the various 
environments in which companies are operating and they will facilitate companies to 
enhance their effectiveness. Greek directors should act as a linkage between the firm and 
the external environment and firms, in order to respond to the environment they have to 
alter the board composition and perform their strategic role.  
 
Organisational directors and stakeholders should have a comprehensive understanding of 
the external environment in which their firms operate and should be able to determine the 
types of directors that will be more effective in fulfilling the resource dependency role. 
 
Regarding the demographic characteristics, findings suggest that the executives’ attributes 
do not provide any insight into how Greek executives take their strategic decisions. In 
particular, regression results suggest that executives with an educational specialty in 
sciences participate in lower level hierarchical decisions. Findings from GLM analysis 
recommend that the higher the industry tenure, the upper level hierarchical decisions are 
taken. Apart from these two significant demographic findings on strategic decisions, the 
aforementioned composition and demographic attributes have no effect on strategic 
decisions.  
Apparently, Greek executives tend to discount the composition of the board as a significant 
factor of their strategic decisions. This can be explained by the fact that our sample 
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consists of large Greek organisations and the decisions are not taken by a single individual 
but a group of people. Therefore, the demographic characteristics of the board members 
might be heterogeneous and do not allow us to conclude with the demographic or 
composition factors that affect strategic decisions.  
 
Finally, it was found that mature managers are less likely to pursue innovative strategies. 
Old executives, due to the fact that they want to maintain their financial security and their 
status, they are reluctant to initiate innovation policies. Hence, Greek executives are 
advised not to appoint mature managers in their organisations who are risk averse and 
reluctant to organisation changes but to rely more on young executives who have 
innovative ideas and can bring change to the firm. 
 
Overall, Greek companies, in order to survive and achieve financial prosperity, are forced 
to adopt a more flexible management style (Bourantas and Papadakis, 1996) that is more 
like a team-based style of decision making. There are various external forces such as 
technology, EU membership, expansion of Balkan countries that lead Greek firms to adopt 
the “Western-type/professional style of management”. Furthermore, Greek executives, 
during complex or unstable environmental circumstances have to be flexible and not to 
emphasise too much the formality of their decisions but on how to make necessary changes 
according to the situation that the company faces. Greek Boards of Directors are requested 
to develop a flexible decision-making process and to adjust their decision according to the 
current environment (Papadakis, 2006).  
 
 
7.5 Suggested Avenues for Future Research 
  
Based on the current findings, we would like to point out some avenues for future research. 
 
First, future research should also examine whether different organisational and 
environmental contexts have an impact on corporate elites’ demographic preferences, 
structure and composition.  
 
Second, another significant research direction is to treat Boards of Directors as decision-
making groups and to encourage researchers to focus on board process and on what boards 
have to do in order to enhance their effectiveness. It will be beneficial for the executives to 
discern the factors that influence their strategic decisions and any potential influence on 
organisational performance.  
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Third, we have take into account the lack of large-scale empirical research examining 
Boards of Directors and strategic decision-making processes, therefore further examination 
might offer fruitful direction for future research. In addition, a set of demographic 
characteristics such as heterogeneity, commitment to status quo, power of board members 
could conclude with more interesting findings.  
 
Fourth, the findings of the study are based on cross-sectional data; a next logical step in 
this line of research would be to investigate the relationship between strategic decision-
making process and performance outcomes over a period of time, treating contextual 
variables as potential moderators. A more accurate approach to understand the causal 
relationships between decision antecedents and process requires the adoption of a 
longitudinal research design. Future research using qualitative and longitudinal methods 
(Kesner and Sebora, 1984), case studies as well as field experiments (Pitcher, Chreim and 
Kisfalvi, 2000) would be useful in examining the validity of our findings. 
 
 
Finally, studies on Boards of Directors have so far taken place predominantly in the United 
States and the U.K, so future research might generate further insights if it were to be 
implemented in cultural settings where Boards of Directors and corporate governance 
practices are in their infancy. It will be interesting to investigate how Boards of Directors 
take strategic decisions in other Balkan countries or less developed European countries 
such as Poland or Hungary. This will open up a promising research avenue on comparative 
decision-making practices across different cultural or national settings (Papadakis and 
Barwise, 1996).  
 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter presents the conclusions of the study and develops a rehypothesized 
theoretical framework  of the findings of the study that have derived from General Linear 
Model and multiple regression analyses as they have been reported in Chapters Six of the 
thesis. Additionally, implications of the study relating to business practice are summarised, 
aiming at stimulating practitioners to examine strategic decisions from multiple theoretical 
perspectives. Researchers should not only focus on the demographic and composition 
characteristics of strategic decisions but also the competitive global environment in which 
their organisations operate. Finally, it suggests avenues for future research that could 
provide some useful insights for upper echelons and how they influence firm’s strategy.  
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“Reflections of Environment and Board of Directors on Strategic 
Decision-Making Process and on Strategic Choices: A Study of Greek 
Listed Organisations” 
 
 
 
 
ALL THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WILL REMAIN 
ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENTIAL AND WOULD BE SEEN ONLY BY THE 
ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS INVOLVED IN THIS STUDY 
 
Once completed please return the questionnaire in the self-addressed envelop 
 
 
Maria Elisavet Balta BSc,MSc 
                                                   Doctoral Researcher 
Brunel Business School 
BRUNEL UNIVERSITY 
Chadwick Building 
UB8 2TR, Uxbridge, Middlesex 
United Kingdom 
E-mail: Maria.Balta@brunel.ac.uk 
baltamariliza@yahoo.co.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We are collecting information from Greek listed firms in the Athens Stock 
Exchange on a range of board of directors, strategic decision-making processes 
as well on strategic choices characteristics. Your cooperation in completing this 
questionnaire is critical for the success of this research project and it should only 
take you about 15 minutes of your time. Please answer all the questions as 
honest and accurate as possible. Please note that there is not “right” or “wrong” 
answer to any of the questions and it is your first impression and response that 
we are looking for. The questionnaire has been designed for you to be able either 
to tick or circle most of the items in order to complete it in the shortest possible 
time. 
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SECTION A: COMPANY’S BACKGROUND 
 
Q1. Please, indicate how many people does your firm employ …………….. 
Q2. Please, indicate the age of the firm……………………………………... 
Q3. Please, indicate how many years your firm is listed in the ASE……….. 
Q4.In what sector of economic activity is your firm engaged? (check only one) 
 
Oil and Gas  Health Care  
Chemicals  Retail  
Basic Resources  Media  
Construction and 
Material 
 Travel and Leisure  
Industrial Goods 
and Services 
 Telecommunications  
Food and 
Beverage 
 Utilities  
Personal and 
Household Goods 
 Banks  
Insurance  Financial Services  
Technology  Other (please specify)  
 
Q5.What is your approximately annual sales turnover (in Euros)…………… 
 
SECTION B: BOARD COMPOSITION 
Q6. What is the total number of board members……………………………..  
Q7. What is the number of inside/internal board members ………………….    
(As inside/internal board members are defined as those who are employees of your 
company) 
Q8.What is the number of outside/external board members?............................ 
(As outside/external board members are defined those who are not employees of the firm) 
Q8a.How many of outside/external board members can be characterised as 
affiliate?........................................................................................................ 
(As affiliate board members are defined as those that meet any of the following conditions: 
affiliation with your firm as a supplier, banker ore creditor within the past two years 
association with a law firm engaged by your firm, being an employee of your firm’s 
subsidiaries or holding companies or relation by blood/marriage with a member of the 
board). 
Q8b.How many of the outside /external board members can be characterised as 
independent? (As independent board members are defined as those who are both 
outside/external and not affiliate)…………………………………………….. 
 
Q9. How many of board members are interlocking? …………………………….  
(As interlocking is characterised the director that serve simultaneously to more than one 
boards) 
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SECTION C: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERITICS OF THE BOARD 
Q10. Please, specify your age…………………………………. 
Q11: Please, indicate your gender:    
Male  
Female  
 
Q12: Please, specify your highest educational attainment: 
High-school graduate  
Bachelor’s Degree (equal to National Degree/Greek 
Ptychion) 
 
College  
Postgraduate Degree (Master’s)  
Ph.D (Doctorate)  
 
Q13:  Please indicate your highest educational specialty: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q14:  Please indicate the area which best represents your functional background: 
 
Finance Treasurer  Information Systems  
Human Resource 
Management 
 Marketing/ Sales/ 
Customer Service 
 
Public Affairs  Operations/Field Service  
General 
Management 
 Accounting/ Controller  
Maintenance/Field 
Service 
 Other (please, specify)  
 
 Q15: Please, specify the number of years you work in the current industry……………. 
 
 Q16:  Please, specify the number of years you work   in current company……. 
 
 Q18: Please, specify the number of years you work in this position…………… 
 
 Q19: Please, specify the number of years you work abroad…………………… 
 
Engineering  
Sciences (Physics, Chemistry, etc)  
Business Administration  
Business (Accounting, Finance, HRM, etc)  
Social Sciences-economics-sociology  
Marketing  
Civil Engineering  
Other(please,specify)  
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SECTION D: EXTERNAL CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT 
 
Q20: How you should characterize the external environment within which your company 
functions? 
 
Environmental Complexity/Homogeneity-Heterogeneity 
 
Market activities of your     Have become far       1  2  3   4   5   6  7  Have become far 
key competitors:                  more predictable       No  Change            Less predictable                                                                                         
 
 
The tastes and preferences  Have become much   1  2  3   4   5   6  7 Have become   
of your customers               more stable and          No  Change           much more hard to 
in your principal industry:  predictable                                               forecast 
                                                                                                             
 
Rate of innovation of new      Rate has fallen      1  2  3   4   5   6  7   Rate has dramatically  
Operating processes and        dramatically          No  Change             increased 
New products or services in                                              
Your principal industry: 
 
Your principal industry’s Have become far   1  2  3   4   5   6  7  Have become                             
Downswings and 
upswings: 
more predictable    No  Change           far less predictable 
                                                                                                              
 
Market activities                  Have become far    1  2  3   4   5   6  7   Have become  
of your key                           more hostile           No  Change             far less hostile    
competitors:                                                                                     
  
 
 
Market activities        Now affect the       1  2  3   4   5   6  7                 Now affect 
of your key                firm in far                   No  Change                       the firm  
competitors:              fewer areas                                        in many more  
  areas (e.g. pricing,         
                                                                                                                delivery, service, 
  quality,etc) 
 
 
Needed diversity in                     Diversity has  1  2  3   4   5   6  7      Diversity has  
Your production methods          dramatically     No  Change dramatically 
 and marketing tactics to cater   decreased                        increased 
 to your different customers: 
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Environmental Dynamism:  
Dynamism in Marketing Practices   
 
Changes in mix of products/brands carried 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No                                                                                                Very Frequent 
Change                                                                                             Changes 
 
Changes in sales strategies 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No                                                                                                Very Frequent 
Change                                                                                             Changes 
 
Changes in sales promotion/advertising strategies 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No                                                                                                Very Frequent 
Change                                                                                             Changes 
 
Competitor Dynamism 
 
Changes in competitor’s mix of products/brands 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No                                                                                                Very Frequent 
Change                                                                                             Changes 
 
Changes in competitor’s sales strategies 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No                                                                                                Very Frequent 
Change                                                                                             Changes 
 
Changes in competitor’s sales promotions/advertising strategies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No                                                                                                Very Frequent 
Change                                                                                             Changes 
 
Customer Dynamism  
 
Changes in customer preferences in product features    
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No                                                                                                Very Frequent 
Change                                                                                             Changes 
 
318 
 
 
Changes in customer preferences in brands 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No                                                                                                Very Frequent 
Change                                                                                             Changes 
 
Changes in customer preferences in product quality/price 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No                                                                                                Very Frequent 
Change                                                                                             Changes 
 
Environment Munificence/Hostility: 
 
Very safe little threat        1    2    3   4   5   6   7      Very risky, one false step                                                                                           
to the survival and well-                                            can mean my company’s 
being of the company                                                 undoing 
 
Rich in investment and      1   2   3   4   5   6   7       Very stressful, exacting,  
marketing opportunities                                            hostile; very hard to keep 
                                                                                  a float 
 
An environment that the    1   2   3   4    5    6    7    A dominating environment  
company can control and                                          in which my company’s 
 manipulate to its own                                               initiatives count for very 
advantage, such as a                                                 little against the tremendous 
dominant firm has in an                                            political, technological or 
industry with little competition                                competitive forces 
and few hindrances 
 
 
SECTION F: INVOLVEMENT IN THE STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
Q25: Please, indicate to what extent you believe that the board of directors has been 
involved in the formation and evaluation of the strategic decisions (1=Never, 7=Always): 
 
Formation of New Strategic Decisions 
 
The board is usually not involved with the formation of strategic      
decisions 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The board usually ratifies strategic proposals that are formed 
solely  
by top management 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The board usually asks probing questions and then ratifies 
strategic   
proposals that are formed primarily by top management 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The board usually asks probing questions which lead to revisions     
of strategic proposals that are formed by top management 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The board usually helps to form strategic decisions with top              
management in board meetings 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The board usually helps to form strategic decisions with top              
management within and between board meetings 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The board usually forms strategic decisions separate from                 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 top management 
 
Evaluation of Prior Strategic Decisions 
 
The board is usually not involved with monitoring the progress of 
strategic decisions 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The board usually accepts the evaluation given to it by top 
management without asking probing questions 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The board usually accepts the evaluation given to it by top 
management after asking probing questions 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The board usually determines the timing and criteria of evaluation, 
but that information is supplied by top management and it is rarely 
challenged by the board 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
The board usually determines the timing and criteria of evaluation 
, but that information and it often requests additional information 
after receiving the progress report from top management 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The board determines the timing and criteria of evaluation and it is 
often request additional information after receiving the progress 
report from top management 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
The board usually collects its own information about the progress 
of the strategic decision in addition to top management reports  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Frequency of Board Meetings 
Q26:Please, indicate the frequency of the board meetings: 
 
Once a 
year 
Every six 
months 
Quarterly Every 
month 
Every 15 
days 
Weekly 
 
Length of Board Meetings 
Q27: Please, indicate the duration of board meetings:  
 
More than 
two hours 
Two hours One and half 
hour 
One hour 30 minutes Less than 
30 minutes 
 
 
SECTION G: STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
 
Rationality/Comprehensiveness 
Q28: Please, indicate what YOUR FIRM would do to determine the cause of the problem  
To answer the following questions, please check the one choice that best describes what 
would be done in YOUR FIRM. 
 In your firm primary for determining the problem cause would be assigned to (check only 
one): 
□ a. No specific individual or group 
□ b. One specific individual 
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□ c. Two people jointly 
□ d. An existing committee of three or more 
□ e. A specially formed group of three or more 
 
In attempting to determine the cause of the problem your firm would (check only one): 
□ a. Not be willing to rely on outsiders for any assistance 
□ b. Be willing to rely on one or two outsiders to provide limited assistance 
□ c. Be willing to rely on one or two outsiders for moderate assistance 
□ d. Be willing to rely on outsiders significant assistance 
□ e. Rely entirely on outsiders if necessary 
 
 
 
In your firm possible problem causes would be identified primarily through (check one): 
□ a. The ideas of a single individual  
□ b. Informal discussions among managers 
□ c. Scheduled meetings among managers 
□ d. Scheduled meetings and some analysis 
□ e. Scheduled meetings and extensive analysis 
 
Approximately how many employees would be directly involved in determining the cause 
of the problem (check only one): 
 
 
2 or 
less 
3 -4 5-6 7-8 9-10 11-12 More 
than 12 
 
Approximately how many years of historical data (e.g. productivity, cost per board foot) 
would be reviewed to help determine the cause of the problem (check only one): 
 
 
           
  
 
Financial Reporting 
 
Q29: Please, indicate the extent to which you believe that your firm pursue the following 
financial reporting activities in the strategic decision- making process (1=Strongly 
disagree, 7= Strongly agree). 
 
Use of internal rate of return (IRR) as capital budgeting method       1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use of net present value as capital budgeting methods                       1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Inclusion of proforma financial statements                                         1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Detailed cost studies                                                                            1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Incorporation of strategic decision                                                      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Rule Formalisation 
 
Q30: Please, indicate the extent to which you believe that your organisation follows the 
following rule formalisation procedures in the strategic decision-making process 
(1=Strongly disagree, 7= Strongly agree). 
                
Written procedures guiding the process 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Less 
than 1 
1 2 3 4 5 More 
than 5 
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Formal procedures to identify alternative ways of action  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Formal screening procedures  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Formal documents guiding the final decision 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Predetermined criteria for strategic decision evaluation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Hierarchical Decentralisation 
 
Q31: Please, indicate to what extent the following individuals or groups participate in the 
strategic decision- making process (1=no involvement, 7= active involvement and 
influence). 
 
Owner-main shareholder 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Chief Executive Officer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
First level directors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Middle management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Lower management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Lateral Communication 
 
Q32: Please, indicate to what extent that the following departments of your firm are 
involved in the strategic decision- making process (1=no involvement, 7= active 
involvement and influence). 
Finance-Accounting                     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Production                     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Marketing-Sales                     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Personnel                     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Purchasing                     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Politicisation  
Q33: Please, indicate the extent to which you believe that your organisation follows the 
following politicisation procedures in the strategic decision-making process (1= Strongly 
disagree, 7= Strongly agree). 
 
Coalition formation              1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Negotiation taking place among major participants               1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
External resistance encountered               1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Process interruptions              1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Problem-Solving Dissension 
Q34: Please, indicate the degree of problem –solving dissension during the initial stages of 
the process: disagreement that you believe that your organisation faces during the 
following actions (1= Strongly disagree, 7= Strongly agree). 
 
Objectives sought by the decision              1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Proper methodology to follow              1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Problem solution to the problem              1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
SECTION: INNOVATION 
Q34: Please, indicate the extent to which your organisation pursues the following 
innovation practices (from 1: no emphasis to 7: extreme emphasis) 
 
Product Innovation  
Being the first company in the industry to introduce new products        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Creating new products for fast market introduction                              1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Creating new variations to existing product lines                              1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Increasing the revenue from new products less than 3 years old      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Process Innovation 
Being the first company in the industry to introduce new technology     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Being the first company in the industry to introduce                               1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
technological improvements 
Creating innovative technologies                                                       1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Investing heavily in cutting edge process technology-oriented R&D      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Developing radical new technology 1 2 3 4 5 6 7                                            
 
 
Organisational Innovation 
Developing systems that encourage initiatives                                        1 2 3 4 5 6 7                                                
and creativity among employees                                         
Encouraging innovation in the organisation                                            1 2 3 4 5 6 7                                                
Supporting an organisational unit that drive innovation                         1 2 3 4 5 6 7                                                
 
SECTION : COMPANY’S FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Q35: This section is concerned with the performance of your firm in the past five years. To 
the best of your knowledge, please: Circle the number best estimating how YOUR FIRM 
compared to close competitors in your industry on each item. 
1. After-tax return on total assets: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Lowest 20%         Lower 20% Middle 20% Next 20% Top 20% 
 
2. After-tax return on total sales: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Lowest 20%         Lower 20% Middle 20% Next 20% Top 20% 
3. Firm’s total sales growth: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Lowest 20%         Lower 20% Middle 20% Next 20% Top 20% 
4. Overall firm performance and success: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Lowest 20%         Lower 20% Middle 20% Next 20% Top 20% 
 
5. Our competitive position:  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Lowest 20%         Lower 20% Middle 20% Next 20% Top 20% 
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APPENDIX B: Survey Questionnaire in English 
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To Whom It May Concern:  
Dear Sir/ Madam, 
 
 
RE: “The Impact of the Corporate Environment and the Board of Directors on 
the Strategic Decision-Making Process and on Strategic Choices: A Study of 
Greek Stock Exchange Listed Organisations” 
 
We are conducting a survey on the Corporate Governance practices in Greece 
and especially on the Boards of Directors of companies listed in the Greek Stock 
Exchange, with the support of the Brunel Business School. The purpose of the 
study is to examine the corporate environmental dimensions associated with the 
board of directors of a firm and the impact of the board of directors and its 
demographic characteristics on the strategic decision-making processes, as well 
as on the strategic choices of innovation and diversification. 
 
Your co-operation is critical to the success of the project. Thus, we would be 
grateful if you could kindly complete the enclosed questionnaire, which does not 
require more than fifteen minutes.. Please note, that there are no “right” or “wrong” 
answers to any of these questions, so answer all questions as spontaneously as 
possible. 
 
This research is strictly confidential and is being carried out for academic purposes 
only. Your replies will be treated with confidentiality and nobody will be able to 
identify any individual or firm in the final report. 
 
In return for your cooperation, a summary of the findings will be provided to you 
after the project is finalized. In addition, we will be delighted to discuss our findings 
with you if this could be beneficial to your organisation. 
 
A self-addressed envelope is enclosed for the reply. All replies will be treated as 
strictly confidential. 
 
We would be extremely grateful if you could return this questionnaire to us as soon 
as possible. 
 
Thank you for your time and co-operation. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Maria Elisavet Balta 
Doctoral Researcher 
Maria.Balta@brunel.ac.uk 
baltamariliza@yahoo.co.uk 
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“The Impact of the Corporate Environment and the Board of Directors 
on the Strategic Decision-Making Process and on Strategic Choices: A 
Study of Greek Stock Exchange Listed Companies” 
 
 
 
 
 
ALL THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WILL REMAIN 
ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENTIAL AND WOULD BE SEEN ONLY BY THE ACADEMIC 
RESEARCHERS INVOLVED IN THIS STUDY 
 
 
 
Once completed please return the questionnaire in the self-addressed envelope. 
 
 
 
Maria Elisavet Balta BSc,MSc 
Doctoral Researcher 
Brunel Business School 
BRUNEL UNIVERSITY 
Chadwick Building 
UB8 3PH, Uxbridge, Middlesex 
United Kingdom 
E-mail: Maria.Balta@brunel.ac.uk 
              baltamariliza@yahoo.co.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We are collecting information from Greek firms, listed in the Athens Stock Exchange, on a 
range of board of director’s strategic decision-making processes, as well as on strategic 
choices characteristics. Your cooperation in completing this questionnaire is critical for the 
success of this research project and it should only take about 15 minutes of your time. 
Please, answer all the questions as honestly and accurately as possible. The questions 
are designed to avoid sensitive or confidential issues. However, if you do not wish to 
answer any particular question, please feel free to move to the next one. Please note, that 
there is not “right” or “wrong” answer to any of the questions and it is your first impression 
and response that we are looking for. The questionnaire has been designed to allow you 
to either tick or circle most of the items, in order to complete it in the shortest possible 
time. 
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SECTION A: COMPANY’S BACKGROUND (Questions 1-5) 
In this section, please provide us with background information regarding your company. 
 
Q1: What is the number of full-time employees working in your company?  
 
Q2: What year your company was established?  
  
Q3:  What year your company entered the Athens Stock Exchange?  
  
Q4: In what sector of economic activity is your firm engaged? (check only one) 
 
Oil and Gas…………………………          Health Care……………………… 
 
Chemicals…………………………..                 Retail……………………………..  
 
Basic Resources…………………..               Media……………………………..  
 
Construction and Material………..                      Travel and Leisure………………  
 
Industrial Goods & Services………                     Telecommunications……………. 
 
Food &Beverages…………………                      Utilities………………………….. 
 
Personal & Household Goods……                        Banks……………………………. 
  
Insurance……………………………                   Financial Services……………..  
 
Technology…………………………                    Other (please specify)………..  
 
Q5: Please fill in the table bellow by indicating the annual sales turnover and the annual sales 
turnover domestically in Euros and by indicating the annual sales turnover per market segment % 
domestically and internationally approximately:    
Annual sales turnover (€)  
Domestic sales turnover (€)  
Markets   1 2 3 4 5 
Market segment 
(i.e  food, insurance, etc ) 
     
Domestic sales (%)      
International sales (%)      
  
SECTION B: BOARD COMPOSITION (Questions 6-11)  
In this section, please provide us with some information regarding your company’s board of 
directors composition 
  
Q6: What is the total number of board members ?  
  
Q7: What is the number of inside/internal board members ? 
  
Q8: How many of the outside /external board members can be   
 characterised as independent?   
Q9: How many of board members are interlocking?  
 (Interlocking are characterised the board members that join more than two boards)  
Q10: The positions of CEO and Chairman are held by the same person?       YES         NO 
 
Q11: Please, indicate the number of female board members 
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SECTION C: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BOARD (Questions 12-20)  
In this section, please provide us with some information regarding your personal demographic 
characteristics. 
 
 
Q12: Please, specify your age.  
 
Q13: Please, indicate your gender:                                 Male                       Female      
 
Q14: Please, specify your highest educational degree. 
 
High-school graduate…………………………………………………………………... 
Bachelor’s Degree (equal to National Degree/Greek Ptychion)…………………… 
Postgraduate Degree (Master’s)…………………………………………………….. 
PhD (Doctorate)………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Q15:  Please, indicate your highest educational specialty. 
 
Engineering……………………………………………………………………………… 
Sciences (Physics, Chemistry, etc)……………………………………………………. 
Business Administration………………………………………………………………… 
Business (Accounting, Finance, HRM, etc)………………………………………….. 
Social Sciences-economics-sociology……………………………………………….. 
Marketing………………………………………………………………………………… 
Civil Engineering………………………………………………………………………… 
Other (please, specify)……………………………………………………………………. 
 
Q16:  Please, indicate the area which best represents your functional background. 
 
Finance Treasurer……………. …….            Information Systems………………… 
Human Resource Management……            Marketing/ Sales/ Customer Service.. 
Public Affairs………………………..              Operations/Field Service……………. 
General Management………………             Accounting/Controller……………….. 
Maintenance/Field Service………..              Other(please, specify)……………… 
Q17: Please, specify the number of years you work in the current industry.  
 Q18: Please, specify the number of years you work   in current company.  
 
 Q19: Please, specify the number of years you work in this position.  
 
 Q20: Please, specify the number of years you have worked abroad.  
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SECTION D: EXTERNAL CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT (Question 21)  
In this section, please provide us with information regarding the external environment in which 
your firm operates 
Q 21: Please, indicate the extent to which you believe that your firm operates under the following 
environmental circumstances (1=Strongly disagree, 7= Strongly agree). 
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Predictability in the  market activities of your key 
competitors in your sector 
 
Predictability in the tastes and preferences of your 
customers in your principal industry during the recent 
years 
 
Increase in the innovation rate of new operating 
processes and new products or services in your principal 
industry 
 
Hostility in the market activities of your key competitors 
 
Influence of the market activities from your key 
competitors 
 
Increase in the needed diversity in your production 
methods and marketing tactics to cater your different 
customers 
 
Changes in the mix of products/brands carried 
 
Changes in the sales strategies 
 
Changes in the sales promotion/advertising strategies 
 
Changes in the competitor’s mix of products/brands 
 
Changes in the competitor’s sales strategies 
 
Changes in the competitor’s sales promotions/advertising 
strategies 
 
Changes in the customer preferences of the product 
features    
 
Changes in the customer preferences of the brands 
 
Changes in the customer preferences of the product 
quality/price 
 
Little threat to the survival and well-being of the 
company 
 
Rich in investment and marketing opportunities 
 
An environment that the company can control and 
manipulate to its own advantage, such as a dominant firm 
has in an industry with littlcompetition and few 
hindrances 
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SECTION E: THE BOARD’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE STRATEGIC DECISION –
MAKING           Process (Question 22)  
In this section, we seek information of the involvement of your Boards of Directors in your 
company’s overall strategy.  
 
Q 22: Please, indicate the extent to which you believe that the board of directors participates in the 
formation and the evaluation of your company’s strategic decisions (1=Strongly disagree, 
7=Strongly agree) 
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Formation of New Strategic Decisions 
 
The board is not usually involved with the formation of 
the strategic  decisions 
 
The board usually ratifies strategic proposals which are 
formed solely by the top management 
 
The board usually asks probing questions and then 
ratifies strategic  proposals formed primarily by the top 
management 
 
The board usually asks probing questions which lead to 
revisions of strategic proposals formed by the  top 
management 
 
The board usually helps to form strategic decisions with 
the top management in board meetings 
 
The board usually helps the top management to form 
strategic decisions within and between board meetings 
 
The board usually forms the strategic decisions 
separately from the top management 
 
Evaluation of Prior Strategic Decisions 
 
The board is not usually involved with the monitoring 
of the progress of strategic decisions 
 
The board usually accepts the evaluation of strategic 
decisions by the top management without asking 
probing questions 
 
The board usually accepts the evaluation of strategic 
decisions  by top management after asking probing 
questions 
 
The board usually determines the timing and criteria of 
the evaluation, but that information is supplied by the 
top management and it is rarely challenged by the board 
 
The board usually determines the timing and criteria of 
the evaluation and often requests additional information 
after receiving the progress report from the top 
management 
 
 
The board usually collects its own information about the 
progress of the strategic decision, in addition to the top 
management reports 
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Q23. Please, indicate the frequency of the board meetings 
 
One a year  Quarterly         Every 15 days   
Every six months              Every month             Weekly 
                     
Q24. Please, indicate the duration of board meetings 
 
More than two hours One and a half hour            30 minutes 
Two hours One hour Less than 30 minutes 
    
 
SECTION F: STRATEGIC DECISION - MAKING PROCESS (Questions 25-31)  
In this section, we seek information on the activities which your Board of Directors pursues in the 
strategic decision-making process.  
 
Q25: In your firm, the responsibility of determining the cause of a problem would be assigned to 
(check only one): 
 
    a. No specific individual or group 
    b. One specific individual 
    c. Two people jointly 
    d. An existing committee of three or more employees 
    e. A specially formed group of three or more employees 
 
Q26: In attempting to determine the cause of a problem, your firm would (check only one): 
 
    a. Not be willing to rely on outsiders for any assistance 
    b. Be willing to rely on one or two outsiders to provide limited assistance 
    c. Be willing to rely on one or two outsiders for moderate assistance 
    d. Be willing to rely on outsiders for significant assistance 
    e. Rely entirely on outsiders if necessary 
 
Q27: In your firm, possible problem causes would be identified primarily through (check only 
one): 
    a. The ideas of a single individual  
    b. Informal discussions among managers 
    c. Scheduled meetings among managers 
    d. Scheduled meetings and some analysis 
    e. Scheduled meetings and extensive analysis 
 
Q28: How many employees approximately would be directly involved in determining the cause of a 
problem (check only one): 
 
 Two or less                  Five to six                      Nine to ten                More than twelve   
 Three to four                Seven to eight               Eleven to twelve  
 
Q29: How many years of historical data approximately (e.g. productivity, cost per board foot) 
would be reviewed to help determine the cause of a problem in your firm (check only one): 
 
Less than one Two  Four                       More than five 
One   Three Five                 
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Q30: Please, indicate the extent to which you believe that your firm pursues the following activities 
in the strategic decision- making process (1=Strongly disagree, 7= Strongly agree). 
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Financial Reporting 
Use of internal rate of return (IRR) as capital budgeting 
method   
 
Use of net present value as capital budgeting method 
 
Inclusion of pro-forma financial statements 
 
 Detailed cost studies 
 
 Incorporation of strategic decision      
 
Rule Formalisation 
Written procedures guiding the process 
 
Formal procedures to identify alternative ways of action       
 
Formal screening procedures 
 
Formal documents guiding the final decision  
 
Predetermined criteria for strategic decision evaluation 
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Hierarchical Decentralisation 
 
Owner/Shareholders 
 
Chief Executive Officer 
 
First level directors 
 
Middle level management 
 
Lower level management 
 
Lateral Communication 
 
Finance-Accounting department 
 
Production department 
 
Personnel department 
 
Purchasing department 
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Q31: Please, indicate to what extent the following individuals/ groups or departments participate in 
the strategic decision-making process in your firm (1=No involvement, 7= Active involvement). 
SECTION G: INNOVATION (Question 32)  
In this section, we seek information on the innovative activities of your Board of Directors pursues.  
Q32: Please, indicate the extent to which your organisation emphasise on the following innovation 
practices (from 1: No emphasis to 7: Extreme emphasis). 
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Product Innovation 
 
       
 
Being the first company in the industry to introduce new 
products/services  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Creating new products for fast market introduction  
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Creating new variations to existing product lines 
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Increasing the revenue from less than 3 years old new 
products 
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Process Innovation 
 
       
Being the first company in the industry to introduce new 
technology      
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Being the first company in the industry to introduce                               
technological improvements 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Creating innovative technologies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Investing heavily in cutting edge process technology-
oriented R&D       
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Developing radical new technology 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Organisational Innovation        
Developing systems that encourage initiatives and creativity 
among employees                                         
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Encouraging innovation in the organisation 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Supporting an organisational unit that drive innovation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                                          
SECTION H: COMPANY’S FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE (Question 33) 
In this section, we seek information on your firm’s performance during the last five years. 
Q33: Please, circle in each category the number estimating to the best of your knowledge how your 
company compares to its close competitors in your industry.  
 Lowest  
20% 
Lower  
20% 
Middle  
20% 
Next 
 20% 
Top 
20% 
After-tax return on total assets 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
After-tax return on total sales 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Firm’s total sales growth 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Overall firm performance and 
success 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our competitive position 1 2 3 4 5 
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If you would like to make any comments regarding any of the items included in the questionnaire, 
please write them in the space provided below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you wish to receive a complementary copy of results of this study?   Yes       No 
 
 
Please note that this code is included to avoid sending you unnecessary reminders   
 
 
Please attach your business card in order to receive a complementary copy of the study results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY 
 
 
 
Please return this completed questionnaire in the self-addressed envelope provided. 
 
 
All information in this questionnaire will remain absolutely confidential and will be seen only by 
academic researchers involved in this study. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business Card 
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APPENDIX C: Survey Questionnaire in Greek 
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Θέµα : « Ο Ρόλος του Εpiιχειρηµατικού Περιβάλλοντος και των µελών του ∆ιοικητικού 
Συµβουλίου στη διαδικασία λήψης στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων και στις στρατηγικές 
εpiιλογές: Έρευνα των Ελληνικών Εταιριών εισηγµένων στο ΧΑΑ».  
 
 
Αξιότιµοι κύριοι,  
 
 ∆ιεξάγουµε µια µελέτη µε την υpiοστήριξη του Τµήµατος Οργάνωσης & ∆ιοίκησης 
του Πανεpiιστηµίου Brunel (Λονδίνο), piάνω στις piρακτικές της Εταιρικής ∆ιακυβέρνησης 
στην Ελλάδα και ιδαίτερα των µελών του ∆ιοικητικού Συµβουλίου εισηγµένων στο 
χρηµατιστήριο εταιριών. Η έρευνα µας αpiοσκοpiεί στην εξέταση της εpiίδρασης του 
εpiιχειρηµατικού piεριβάλλοντος (σε σχέση µε τα µέλη του ∆ιοικητικού Συµβουλίου) των 
εισηγµένων στο ΧΑΑ εταιριών, καθώς και της εpiίδρασης των διοικητικών µελών και των 
δηµογραφικών τους χαρακτηριστικών στη λήψη στρατηγικών διοικητικών αpiοφάσεων και 
εpiιλογών, piάσης φύσεως καινοτοµιών και διαφοροpiοιήσεων.  
 Η συµµετοχή σας στην ανωτέρω έρευνα κρίνεται καθοριστική για την εpiιτυχή 
έκβασή της. Παίρνοντας λοιpiόν αυτή την piρωτοβουλία, σας αpiοστέλλουµε το 
εpiισυναpiτόµενο ερωτηµατολογίο piου δηµιουργήθηκε για τους λόγους piου 
piροαναφέρθηκαν, εκφράζοντας συγχρόνως θερµά την piαράκληση να το συµpiληρώσετε, 
διότι χωρίς την piολύτιµη βοήθεια σας θα είναι αδύνατη η όpiοια ορθή αντιµετώpiιση του 
ερευνόντως ζητήµατος. Η συµpiλήρωση του εpiισυναpiτόµενου ερωτηµατολογίου δεν θα 
αpiαιτήσει piάνω αpiό δεκαpiέντε λεpiτά του piολύτιµου χρόνου σας.  
Παρακαλώ να αpiαντήσετε αυθόρµητα,  λαµβάνοντας υpiόψη ότι δεν υpiάρχουν 
σωστές ή λάθος αpiαντήσεις σε καµία αpiό τις ερωτήσεις. Η έρευνα είναι αυστηρά 
εµpiιστευτική και διεξάγεται καθαρά για ακαδηµαικούς σκοpiούς και για το λόγο αυτό οι 
αpiαντήσεις σας θα εpiεξεργαστούν µε εµpiιστευτικότητα και κανένας δεν θα είναι σε θέση 
να piροσδιορίσει την ταυτότητα του συµµετέχοντος piροσώpiου ή οργανισµού στην τελική 
έκθεση. Σε ανταpiόδωση της συνεργασίας σας θα σας σταλεί piερίληψη των 
αpiοτελεσµάτων µετά το piέρας της µελέτης. Εpiίσης, ευχαρίστως θα συζητούσαµε µαζί σας 
τα αpiοτελέσµατα της έρευνας µας, αν αυτό το κρίνετε χρήσιµο  για την εταιρία/οργανισµό 
σας. Εκτιµώντας τον piεριορισµένο χρόνο σας, σας piαρακαλούµε  να εpiιστρέψετε το 
εpiισυναpiτόµενο ερωτηµατολόγιο συµpiληρωµένο το συντοµότερο δυνατό.   
Ευχαριστούµε εκ των piροτέρων για την piολύτιµη βοήθειά σας και τη συνεργασία 
σας. 
 
                                                                                    Με τιµή 
 
                                                                      ∆ιδακτορική ερευνήτρια 
                                                                     Μαρία –Ελισάβετ Μpiαλτά  
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Έρευνα των Ελληνικών Εταιριών εισηγµένων στο ΧΑΑ 
 
Ο Ρόλος του Εpiιχειρηµατικού Περιβάλλοντος και των µελών του ∆ιοικητικού 
Συµβουλίου στη διαδικασία λήψης στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων και στις στρατηγικές 
εpiιλογές  
 Στα piλαίσια της έρευνας piου διεξάγουµε µε την υpiοστήριξη του Τµήµατος 
Οργάνωσης & ∆ιοίκησης του Πανεpiιστηµίου Brunel (Λονδίνο), συγκεντώνουµε 
piληροφορίες Ελληνικών εταιρών εισηγµένων στο Χρηµατιστήριο Αξιών Αθηνών, 
εστιάζοντας στη διαδικασία  λήψης στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων του ∆ιοικητικού Συµβουλίου 
καθώς και στα χαρακτηριστικά των στρατηγικών τους εpiιλογών.  
Κρίνουµε αpiαραίτητη τη συνεργασία σας για τη συµpiλήρωση αυτού του 
ερωτηµατολογίου piου δεν αpiαιτεί άνω των 15 λεpiτών αpiό τον piολύτιµο χρόνο σας και 
αpiοτελεί βάση για την οµαλή έκβαση της έρευνάς µας. Παρακαλώ να αpiαντήσετε σε όλες 
τις ερωτήσεις µε ειλικρίνεια και σαφήνεια. Οι ερωτήσεις έχουν σχεδιαστεί µε τέτοιο τρόpiο 
ώστε να µην θίγουν ευαίσθητα ή εµpiιστευτικά ζητήµατα. Παρολαυτά,  αν δεν εpiιθυµείτε 
να αpiαντήσετε σε κάpiοια αpiό τις ερωτήσεις piροχωρήστε στην εpiόµενη. Σηµειώσατε δε, 
ότι δεν υpiάρχουν σωστές ή λάθος αpiαντήσεις, αλλά η piρώτη σας εντύpiωση piάνω στη 
θεµατολογία και η αpiάντησή σας είναι αυτό piου ζητάµε. Η σχεδίαση του 
ερωτηµατολογίου έχει γίνει µε τέτοιο τρόpiο ώστε να σας εpiιτρέpiει το µαρκάρισµα ή το 
κύκλωµα των διακριτικών στοιχείων του.     
Οι piληροφορίες piου θα µας διαθέσετε  θα χρησιµοpiοιηθούν εµpiιστευτικά αpiό την 
οµάδα ερευνητών piου ασχολείται µε την ανωτέρω έρευνα.  
Παρακαλώ όpiως εpiιστρέψετε το ερωτηµατολόγιο στο φάκελο piου εσωκλείεται. 
  
                                                 Μαρία – Ελισάβετ Μpiαλτά 
                                     ∆ιδακτορική ερευνήτρια 
Brunel Business School 
BRUNEL UNIVERSITY 
Chadwick Building 
UB8 3PH, Uxbridge, Middlesex 
United Kingdom 
E-mail: Maria.Balta@brunel.ac.uk 
             baltamariliza@yahoo.co.uk 
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ΜΕΡΟΣ A: ΙΣΤΟΡΙΚΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΤΑΙΡΙΑΣ (Ερωτήσεις 1-5) 
Σε αυτό το τµήµα piαρακαλούµε αναφέρατε piληροφορίες σχετικά µε το ιστορικό της εταιρίας. 
 
Ε1: Αριθµός των υpiαλλήλων µε piλήρες ωράριο  
 
Ε2: Ποια η χρονολογία ίδρυσης της εταιρίας σας;  
  
Ε3:  Ποια η χρονολογία εισαγωγής της εταιρίας σας στο ΧΑΑ;  
  
Ε4: Σε piοιο τοµέα οικονοµικής δραστηριότητας ανήκει η εταιρία σας (σηµειώστε µόνο ένα) 
 
Πετρέλαιο & Αέριο…………………         Υγεία...........……………………… 
 
Χηµικά.....…………………………..               Εµpiόριο…………………………..  
 
Πρώτες Ύλες.......…………………..            Μέσα Ενηµέρωσης.……………..  
 
Κατασκευαστική................………..                 Ταξίδια & Αναψυχή...……………  
 
Βιοµηχανικά Πρ. & Υpiηρεσίες....…                  Τηλεpiικοινωνίες.......……………. 
 
Τρόφιµα & Ποτά....………………                    Υpiηρεσίες Κοινής Ωφέλειας...….. 
 
Προσωpiικά & Οικιακά Αγαθά.……                  Τράpiεζες………………………... 
  
Ασφαλιστικά………………………                   Χρηµατοοικονοµικές Υpiηρεσίες....  
 
Τεχνολογία…………………………                   Λοιpiά (piροσδιορίστε)....………..  
  
Ε5: Παρακαλώ αναγράψατε στο piαρακάτω piίνακα τον ετήσιο κύκλο εργασιών και τον εγχώριο 
κύκλο εργασιών σε €, και αναφέρατε σε piοσοστά (%) εpiίσης τον εγχώριο ετήσιο κύκλο εργασιών 
ανά τοµέα και τον διεθνή ετήσιο κύκλο εργασιών ανά τοµέα:   
Eτήσιο κύκλο εργασιών  (€)  
Εγχώριο κύκλο εργασιών (€)  
Τοµείς   1 2 3 4 5 
Τοµείς υpiηρεσιών/ piροιόντων  
(λ.x. τρόφιµα, ασφάλειες, κτλ ) 
     
Εγχώριες piωλήσεις (%)      
∆ιεθνείς piωλήσεις (%)      
 
ΜΕΡΟΣ B: ΣΥΣΤΑΣΗ ΤΟΥ ∆ΙΟΙΚΗΤΙΚΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟΥ (Ερωτήσεις 6-11)  
Σε αυτό το τµήµα piαρακαλούµε να µας piαράσχετε piληροφορίες σχετικά µε τη σύνθεση του ∆.Σ 
  
Ε6: Αpiό piόσα µέλη αpiαρτίζεται το ∆ιοικητικό Συµβούλιο της εταιρίας;  
  
Ε7: Ποιος ο αριθµός των εσωτερικών µελών του ∆ιοικητικού Συµβουλίου; 
  
Ε8: Πόσα αpiό τα µέλη του ∆ιοικητικού Συµβουλίου είναι ανεξάρτητα; 
  
Ε9: Πόσα αpiό τα µέλη του ∆ιοικητικού Συµβουλίου είναι αλληλοσυνδεόµενα;  
(Αλληλοσυνδεόµενα χαρακτηρίζονται τα µέλη του ∆.Σ piου είναι µέλη piερισσότερα αpiό δυο ∆.Σ) 
Ε10: Η θέση του ∆ιευθ/ντος Συµβούλου και του Προέδρου κατέχονται αpiό το ίδιο άτοµο Nαι/Oχι 
Ε11: Ποιος ο αριθµός των γυναικών piου είναι µέλη του ∆.Σ; 
 
  
 
339 
 
ΜΕΡΟΣ Γ: ∆ΗΜΟΓΡΑΦΙΚΑ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡΙΣΤΙΚΑ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΛΩΝ ΤΟΥ ∆.Σ (Ερωτήσεις 12-
20)  
Σε αυτό το τµήµα piαρακαλώ δώστε µας piληροφορίες σχετικά µε τα δηµογραφικά χαρακτηριστικά 
σας. 
 
Ε12: Παρακαλώ να δηλώσετε την ηλικία σας.  
 
Ε13: Παρακαλώ να δηλώσετε   το φύλο σας:   Άρρεν       Θήλυ      
 
Ε14: Παρακαλώ  να δηλώσετε την υψηλότερη εκpiαιδευτική σας βαθµίδα. 
 
Αpiόφοιτος Λυκείου...…………………………………………………………………... 
Πτυχιούχος ΑΕΙ/ΤΕΙ ..................................................................…………………… 
Μεταpiτυχιακός τίτλος (Μάστερ)…………………………………………………….. 
∆ιδακτορικός τίτλος……………………………………………………………………. 
 
Ε15:  Παρακαλώ να δηλώσετε  την εκpiαιδευτική σας εξειδίκευση. 
 
Μηχανικός ..……………………………………………………………………………… 
Εpiιστήµες (Φυσική,Χηµεία κλpi)……………………………………………………. 
Οργάνωση & ∆ιοίκηση Εpiιχειρήσεων………………………………………………… 
Εpiιχειρήσεις (Λογιστικά, Χρηµατοοικονοµικά, Ανθρώpiινοι Πόροι,κλpi)…………… 
Κοινωνικές Εpiιστήµες-οικονοµικά-κοινωνιολογία..………………………………….. 
Μάρκετιγκ.……………………………………………………………………………… 
Πολιτικοί Μηχανικοί……………………………………………………………………… 
΄Αλλο  (αναφέρατε)….…………………………………………………………………. 
 
Ε16: Παρακαλώ δηλώστε το αντικείµενο piου σας αντιpiροσωpiεύει καλύτερα στη λειτουργία της 
εταιρίας σας 
 
Ταµίας................……………. …….              Συστήµατα Πληροφορικής…………… 
∆ιοίκηση Ανθρωpiίνων Πόρων...……           Τµήµα Πωλήσεων............................... 
∆ηµόσιες Σχέσεις......………………..            Οικοδοµικές Εpiιχειρήσεις……………. 
Μάνατζµεντ.................………………            Λογιστική....................……………….. 
Συντήρηση...........................………..            Άλλο (piροσδιορίστε)...………………. 
Ε17: Παρακαλώ να piροσδιορίσετε τα έτη εργασίας σας στο τρέχον αντικείµενο  
 Ε18: Παρακαλώ να piροσδιορίσετε τα έτη εργασίας σας στην piαρούσα εταιρία.  
 
 Ε19: Παρακαλώ να piροσδιορίσετε τα έτη εργασίας σας στην piαρούσα θέση.  
 
 Ε20: Παρακαλώ να piροσδιορίσετε τα έτη piου εργαστήκατε στο εξωτερικό.  
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ΜΕΡΟΣ ∆: ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΟ ΠΕΡΙΒΑΛΛΟΝ (Ερώτηση 21)  
Σε αυτό το τµήµα piαρακαλούµε να δώσετε piληροφορίες σχετικά µε το εpiιχειρηµατικό  piεριβάλλον 
της εταιρίας σας.  
Ε 21: Παρακαλώ να piροσδιορίσετε το βαθµό piου piιστεύεται ότι η εταιρία σας λειτουργεί κάτω αpiό τις 
ακόλουθες εξωτερικές συνθήκες piεριβάλλοντος (1=∆ιαφωνώ αpiόλυτα, 7= Συµφωνώ αpiόλυτα). 
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Προβλεψιµότης των δραστηριοτήτων στην αγορά των 
βασικών ανταγωνιστών του κλάδου. 
 
Προβλεψιµότης των piροτιµήσεων  των καταναλωτών 
στον κύριο κλάδο δραστηριότητας σας τα τελευταία 
χρόνια. 
 
Αύξηση του βαθµού καινοτοµίας στις µεθόδους 
λειτουργίας των νέων piροιόντων ή υpiηρεσιών στο κύριο 
κλάδο δραστηριότητας σας. 
 
Αντιpiαλότητα των δραστηριοτήτων στην αγορά των 
βασικών ανταγωνιστών του κλάδου. 
 
Εpiιρροή στην αγορά των δραστηριοτήτων σας των 
βασικών ανταγωνιστών του κλάδου. 
 
Αύξηση της ανάγκης διαφοροpiοίησης των µεθόδων 
piαραγωγής και των τρόpiων διαφήµισης µε σκοpiό την 
piροσέγγιση διαφορετικού καταναλωτικού κοινού. 
Αλλαγές στο µείγµα των piροιόντων/µάρκες. 
 
Αλλαγές στη στρατηγική των piωλήσεων. 
 
Αλλαγές στην piροώθηση των piωλήσεων/στρατηγική 
διαφήµισης. 
 
Αλλαγές στο µείγµα των piροιόντων/µάρκες των 
ανταγωνιστών. 
 
Αλλαγές της στρατηγικής piωλήσεων των ανταγωνιστών. 
Αλλαγές στην piροώθηση των piωλήσεων/στρατηγικής 
διαφήµισης ανταγωνιστών . 
 
Αλλαγές στις piροτιµήσεις των καταναλωτών σχετικά µε 
το χαρακτηριστικό γνώρισµα των piροιόντων. 
  
Αλλαγές στις piροτιµήσεις των καταναλωτών σχετικά µε 
τις µάρκες των piροιόντων/υpiηρεσιών.  
 
Αλλαγές στις piροτιµήσεις των καταναλωτών σχετικά µε 
την piοιότητα/τιµή του piροιόντος.  
 
Περιορίσµένος φόβος για την εpiιβίωση και ευηµερία της 
εταιρίας. 
 
Πλούσιο σε εpiενδυτικές & διαφηµιστικές ευκαιρίες. 
 
Περιβάλλον το οpiοίο  η εταιρία µpiορεί να ελέγξει και να 
χειριστεί piρος όφελός της όpiως λ.χ µια κυρίαρχη εταιρία 
µε piεριορισµένο ανταγωνισµό & εµpiόδια. 
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ΜΕΡΟΣ Ε: ΣΥΜΜΕΤΟΧΗ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΛΩΝ ΤΟΥ ∆.Σ ΣΤΗ ΛΗΨΗ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΩΝ 
ΑΠΟΦΑΣΕΩΝ  
Σε αυτό το τµήµα piαρακαλούµε να αpiοδώσετε  piληροφορίες σχετικά µε τη συµµετοχή των µελών 
του ∆.Σ στη διαδικασία λήψης στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων. 
Ε 22: Παρακαλώ να  δηλώσετε το βαθµό piου θεωρείται ότι τα µέλη του ∆.Σ συµµετέχουν στη διαµόρφωση και 
αξιολόγηση των στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων της εταιρίας (1=∆ιαφωνώ αpiόλυτα, 7=Συµφωνώ αpiόλυτα) 
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∆ιαµόρφωση καινούργιων στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων 
Τα µέλη του ∆.Σ συνήθως δεν συµµετέχουν στη διαµόρφωση 
στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων. 
 
Τα µέλη του ∆.Σ συνήθως εpiικυρώνουν στραγητικές piροτάσεις 
piου διαµορφώνονται κυρίως αpiό ανώτατα ∆ιοικητικά Στελέχη. 
 
Τα µέλη του ∆.Σ συνήθως διερευνούν και εν συνεχεία 
εpiικυρώνουν στρατηγικές piροτάσεις piου έχουν διαµορφωθεί    
κυρίως αpiό ανώτατα ∆ιοικητικά Στελέχη.   
 
Τα µέλη του ∆.Σ συνήθως διερευνούν piροκειµένου να 
αναθεωρήσουν στρατηγικές piροτάσεις piου έχουν διαµορφωθεί 
αpiό ανώτατα ∆ιοικητικά Στελέχη.   
 
Τα µέλη του ∆.Σ συνήθως συµµετέχουν στη διαµόρφωση 
στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων µε τα ανώτατα διοικητικά στελέχη 
στα διοικητικά συµβούλια.  
 
Τα µέλη του ∆.Σ συνήθως συµµετέχουν στην διαµόρφωση 
στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων κατά τη διάρκεια και τη διενέργεια 
των ∆.Σ. 
 
Τα µέλη του ∆.Σ συνήθως διαµορφώνουν στρατηγικές 
αpiοφάσεις συνήθως ανεξάρτητα αpiό τα ανώτατα διοικητικά 
στελέχη.  
Αξιολόγηση piροηγούµενων στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων 
Τα µέλη του ∆.Σ συνήθως δεν συµµετέχουν στην εξέλιξη των 
στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων. 
 
Τα µέλη του ∆.Σ συνήθως δέχονται την αξιολόγηση των 
στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων αpiό τα ανώτατα διοικητικά στελέχη 
χωρίς διερευνητικές ερωτήσεις. 
 
Τα µέλη του ∆.Σ συνήθως αpiοδέχονται την αξιολόγηση των 
στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων αpiό τα ανώτατα διοικητικά στελέχη 
µετά αpiό διερευνητικές ερωτήσεις.   
 
Τα µέλη του ∆.Σ συνήθως καθορίζουν το χρόνο και τα κριτήρια 
αξιολόγησης αλλά η piληροφόρηση piαρέχεται αpiό τα ανώτατα 
διοικητικά στελέχη & σpiανίως αµφισβητείται αpiό το ∆.Σ. 
 
Τα µέλη του ∆.Σ συνήθως καθορίζουν το χρόνο και τα κριτήρια 
αξιολόγησης στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων ζητώντας εpiιpiρόσθετη 
piληροφόρηση συχνά, για την εξέλιξη της έρευνας αpiό τα 
ανώτατα διοικητικά στελέχη. 
 
Τα µέλη του ∆.Σ συνήθως συγκεντρώνουν piληροφορίες σχετικά 
µε την ελέλιξη των στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων εpiιpiρόσθετα µε τις 
αναφορές των ανωτάτων διοικητικών στελεχών.  
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Ε23: Παρακαλώ να δηλώσετε τη συχνότητα των συναντήσεων του ∆.Σ.  
 
Μια φορά το χρόνο              Κάθε 4 µήνες                Κάθε 15 µέρες   
Κάθε έξι µήνες              Κάθε µήνα             Εβδοµαδιαία 
                     
Ε24: Παρακαλώ να δηλώσετε τη διάρκεια των συναντήσεων του ∆.Σ. 
 
Πάνω αpiό 2 ώρες Μία και µισή ώρες            30 λεpiτά 
2 ώρες Μία ώρα                           Λιγότερο αpiό 30 λεpiτά 
    
 
ΜΕΡΟΣ ΣΤ: ∆ΙΑ∆ΙΚΑΣΙΑ ΛΗΨΗΣ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΩΝ ΑΠΟΦΑΣΕΩΝ (Ερωτήσεις 25-31)  
Σε αυτό το τοµέα αναζητούµε piληροφορίες σχετικά µε τις ενέργειες των µελών του ∆. Σ 
piροκειµένου να αναλάβουν στρατηγικές αpiοφάσεις .  
 
Ε25: Στην εταιρία σας η ευθύνη καθορισµού των αιτιών ενός piροβλήµατος 
ανατείθεται:(αναφέραται µόνο ένα): 
 
    α. Οχι σε συγκεκριµένο άτοµο ή οµάδα 
    β. Ένα συγκεκριµένο άτοµο 
    γ. ∆ύο άτοµα ταυτόχρονα 
    δ. Μια υpiάρχουσα εpiιτροpiή τριών ή piαραpiάνω εργαζοµένων 
    ε. Μία ειδικά διαµορφωµένη οµάδα τριών ή piαραpiάνω εργαζοµένων 
 
Ε26: Στην piροσpiάθεια καθορισµού της αιτίας ενός piροβλήµατος η εταιρία (αναφέραται µόνο ένα): 
 
    α. ∆εν εpiιθυµεί να βασιστεί σε τρίτους για οιανδήpiοτε βοήθεια 
    β. Εpiιθυµεί να βασιστεί σε ένα ή δυο τρίτους piου θα piαρέχουν piεριορισµένη βοήθεια 
    γ. Εpiιθυµεί να βασιστεί σε ένα ή δυο τρίτους piου θα piαρέχουν µετρηµένη βοήθεια 
    δ. Εpiιθυµεί να βασιστεί σε τρίτους για σηµαντική βοήθεια 
    ε. Βασίζεται εξολοκλήρου σε τρίτους αν κριθεί αναγκαίο 
 
Ε27: Στην εταιρία σας οι piιθανές αιτίες του piροβλήµατος εντοpiίζονται κυρίως µέσα (αναφέραται 
µόνο ένα) στις: 
 
    α. Ιδέες ενός ατόµου  
    β. Ανεpiίσηµες συζητήσεις µεταξύ διευθυντών 
    γ. Καθορισµένες συζητήσεις µεταξύ διευθυντών 
    δ. Καθορισµένες συναντήσεις και σε µερική ανάλυση  
    ε. Καθορισµένες συναντήσεις και σε εκ βάθους ανάλυση 
 
Ε28: Κατά piροσέγγιση piόσοι υpiάλληλοι συµµετέχουν άµεσα στον piροσδιορισµό της αιτίας ενός 
piροβλήµατος (αναφέραται µόνο ένα): 
 
∆ύο ή λιγότερα                  5 µε 6                         9 µε 10                Παραpiάνω αpiό 12   
 3 µε 4                               7 µε 8                        11 µε 12  
 
Ε29: Πόσα χρόνια κατά piροσέγγιση µε µέτρηση στοιχείων αρχείου χρειάζονται piροκειµένου να 
εντοpiιστεί η αιτία ενός piροβληµατος στην εταιρία σας (pi.χ piαραγωγικότητα); (αναφέραται µόνο 
ένα):  
 
Λιγότερα αpiό ένα          ∆ύο  Τέσσερα                       Πάνω αpiό piέντε 
Ένα   Τρία Πέντε                 
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Ε30: Παρακαλώ να  δηλώσετε το βαθµό piου piιστεύετε ότι η εταιρία σας ακολουθεί τις κάτωθι 
ενέργεις στη διαδικασία λήψης στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων (1=∆ιαφωνώ αpiόλυτα, 7= Συµφωνώ 
αpiόλυτα). 
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Χρηµατοοικονοµικές καταστάσεις 
Χρήση δείκτη εσωτερικής αpiόδοσης ως µεθόδου 
κεφαλαιακού piροϋpiολογισµού 
 
Χρήση καθαρής piαρούσης αξίας ως µεθόδου κεφαλαιακού 
piροϋpiολογισµού 
 
Συνυpiολογισµός µη κατατιθεµένων χρηµατοοικονοµικών 
καταστάσεων. 
 
 Αναλυτικές κοστολογικές καταστάσεις 
 
Συγχώνευση στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων      
 
Εpiίσηµοι Κανονισµοί 
Γραpiτές εντολές piου καθορίζουν τη διαδικασία 
 
Εpiίσηµες διαδικασίες piροσδιορισµού εναλλακτικού τρόpiου 
δράσης 
 
Εpiίσηµες διαδικασίες piροτεραιότητας 
 
Εpiίσηµα έγγραφα καθοδήγησης τελικών αpiοφάσεων 
 
Προκαθορισµένα κριτήρια αξιολόγησης στρατηγικών 
αpiοφάσεων. 
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Ε31: Παρακαλώ να  δηλώσετε σε τι βαθµό θεωρείτε ότι τα κάτωθι άτοµα/οµάδες ή τµήµατα 
συµµετέχουν στη διαδικασία λήψης στρατηγικών αpiοφάσεων (1=Καµία ανάµειξη,7= Ενεργή 
συµµετοχή).  
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Ιεραρχική αpiοσυγκέντρωση 
 
Ιδιοκτήτες/Μέτοχοι 
 
∆ιευθύνων Σύµβουλος 
 
∆ιευθυντές  
 
Μεσαία Στελέχη  
 
Χαµηλά Στελέχη  
 
Έµµεση εpiικοινωνία 
 
Χρηµατοοικονοµικό και Λογιστικό Τµήµα 
 
Τµήµα Παραγωγής  
 
Τµήµα Προσωpiικού 
 
Τµήµα Πωλήσεων 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
 
 
4 
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5 
 
5 
 
5 
 
5 
 
5 
 
 
 
5 
 
5 
 
5 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
6 
 
6 
 
6 
 
6 
 
 
 
6 
 
6 
 
6 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
7 
 
7 
 
7 
 
7 
 
 
 
7 
 
7 
 
7 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
344 
 
ΜΕΡΟΣ Ζ: ΚΑΙΝΟΤΟΜΙΑ (Ερώτηση 32)  
Σε αυτό το τµήµα αναζητούµε piληροφορίες στη νεωτεριστική διάθεση piου δείχνουν τα µέλη του ∆.Σ .  
Ε32: Παρακαλώ να  δηλώσετε το βαθµό piου θεωρείται ότι η εταιρία σας δίνει έµφαση στις κάτωθι 
νεωτεριστικές piρακτικές (1: Χωρίς έµφαση , 7: Υpiερβάλουσσα έµφαση). 
 
Χ
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Π
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Καινοτοµίες piροιόντων 
 
       
Πρώτη εταιρία του κλάδου piου θα εισάγει καινούργια piροιόντα 
ή υpiηρεσίες  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
∆ηµιουργία νέων piροϊόντων για γρήγορη είσοδο στην αγορά
  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
∆ηµιουργία νέων piοικιλιών σε υpiάρχουσες σειρές piροιόντων ή 
υpiηρεσιών 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
Αύξηση εσόδων  λιγότερο αpiό τρία χρόνια νέων piροϊόντων 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
∆ιαδικασία Καινοτοµίας 
 
       
Πρώτη εταιρία του κλάδου piου εισάγει νέα τεχνολογία 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Πρώτη εταιρία στον κλάδο piου εισάγει βελτιωµένη τεχνολογία 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
∆ηµιουργία καινοτοµικών τεχνολογιών 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Αύξηση της εpiένδυσης σε ακραία τεχνολογία –
piροσανατολισµένη στην  έρευνα και ανάpiτυξη 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
∆ηµιουργία ριζικά νέων τεχνολογιών 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Οργανωτική Καινοτοµία 
 
       
∆ηµιουργία συστηµάτων piου ενθαρύνουν την piρωτοβουλία και 
δηµιουργικότητα µεταξύ των εργαζοµένων 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ενθάρρυνση καινοτοµιών µέσα στην εταιρία 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Στήριξη οργανωτικής οµάδας piου αpiοσκοpiεί στην καινοτοµία 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
              
         
ΜΕΡΟΣ Η: ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗ ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΕΤΑΙΡΙΑΣ (Ερώτηση  33) 
Σε αυτό το τµήµα αναζητούµε piληροφορίες σχετικά µε την οικονοµική κατάσταση της εταιρίας τα τελευταία 
piέντη έτη. 
Ε33: Παρακαλώ κυκλώσετε τον αριθµό piου κατά την εκτίµησή σας piεριγράφει κατά piροσέγγιση 
την οικονοµική κατάσταση της εταιρίας σας σε σχέση µε τους ανταγωνιστές σας στον ίδιο κλάδο. 
 Χαµηλότατο 
20% 
Χαµηλότερο 
20% 
Μεσαίο   
20% 
Εpiόµενο  
20% 
Υψ
ηλό  
20% 
Καθαρή αpiόδοση µετά τους φόρους στο 
σύνολο του Ενεργητικού 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Καθαρή αpiόδοση µετά τους φόρους στις 
συνολικές piωλήσεις 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ρυθµός αύξησης συνολικών piωλήσεων της 
εταιρίας 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Γενική εpiίδοση της εταιρείας και εpiιτυχία  1 2 3 4 5 
Η ανταγωνιστική θέση της εταιρίας σας 1 2 3 4 5 
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Αν εpiιθυµείτε να κάνετε κάpiοιο σχόλιο για κάpiοια αpiό τα στοιχεία piου piεριλαµβάνονται στο 
ανωτέρω ερωτηµατολόγιο χρησιµοpiοιήστε το χώρο piου βρίσκεται κατωτέρω: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Εpiιθυµείτε να λάβετε συµpiληρωµατικό αντίγραφο µε τα piορίσµατα της έρευνας;  Ναι       Οχι 
 
Παρακαλώ να χρησιµοpiοιείται αυτός ο κώδικας για να αpiοφευχθούν οι αpiοστολές  
εpiιpiρόσθετων υpiενθυµιστικών σηµειωµάτων   
 
Παρακαλώ να εpiισυνάψετε την εpiαγγελµατική σας κάρτα piροκειµένου να λάβετε ένα 
συµpiληρωµατικό αντίγραφο µε τα piορίσµατα της έρευνας. 
 
 
 
ΕΥΧΑΡΙΣΤΟΥΜΕ ΓΙΑ ΤΗ ΣΥΜΜΕΤΟΧΗ ΣΑΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΡΕΥΝΑ 
 
 
Παρακαλώ να εpiιστρέψετε συµpiληρωµένο το ανωτέρω ερωτηµατολόγιο στον εσώκλειστο φάκελο 
piου σας έχει αpiοσταλλεί . 
 
 
Όλες οι piληροφορίες στο ερωτηµατολόγιο θα piαραµείνουν αpiόλυτα εµpiιστευτικές και θα 
εpiεξεργαστούν αpiό τους ακαδηµαικούς ερευνητές piου συµµετέχουν στην έρευνα. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Εpiαγγελµατική Κάρτα 
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APPENDIX D: Correlation Matrix between Factor Items 
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D: 1   Correlation Matrix of  External Corporate Environment 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1.    1    
 
 
             
2 .445 1                 
3. .181 .101 1                
4.  .225 .095 .199 1               
5.  .142 -.007 .230 .556 1              
6. .127 .182 .233 .463 .307 1             
7. .084 .270 .256 .417 .190 .557 1            
8. .247 .224 .340 .259 .297 .624 .677 1           
9. .200 .285 .215 .267 .183 .691 .659 .818 1          
10. .115 .113 .190 .527 .466 .573 .706 .610 .555 1         
11. .111 .092 .105 .520 .464 .432 .600 .575 .507 .842 1        
12. .282 .153 .158 .380 .246 .527 .537 .596 .638 .611 .736 1       
13. .244 .270 .241 .325 -.010 .469 .578 .498 .526 .605 .511 .525 1      
14. .123 .283 .231 .429 -.009 .545 .560 .451 .425 .555 .442 .452 .785 1     
15. .049 .203 .128 .329 .147 .312 .312 .325 .255 .334 .320 .309 .498 .589 1    
16. .155 .083 .005 -.069 .021 .139 .262 .343 .247 .209 .185 .246 .434 .322 .235 1   
17. .202 .178 .351 .278 .085 .202 .113 .150 .084 .172 .031 .126 .291 .360 .260 .080 1  
18. .286 .300 .197 -.032 -.045 .092 -.148 -.087 -.034 -.103 -.201 -.073 .073 .091 .272 .013 .388 1 11 
348 
 
 
1. Predictability in the market activities of your key competitors in your sector 
2. Predictability in the tastes and preferences of your customers in your principal industry during the recent years 
3. Increase in the innovation rate of new operating processes and new products or services in your principal 
industry 
4. Hostility in the market activities of your key competitors  
5. Influence of the market activities of your key competitors 
6. Increase in the needed diversity in your production methods and marketing tactics to cater your different 
customers 
7. Changes in the mix of products/brands carried 
8. Changes in the sales strategies 
9. Changes in the sales promotion/advertising strategies 
10. Changes in the competitor’s mix of products/brands 
11. Changes in the competitor’s sales strategies 
12. Changes in the competitor’s sales promotions/advertising strategies 
13. Changes in the customer preferences  of the product features 
14. Changes in the customer preferences of the brands 
15. Changes in the customer preferences of the product quality/price 
16. Little threat to the survival and well-being of the company 
17. Rich in investment and marketing opportunities 
18. An environment that the company can control and manipulate to its own advantage such as a dominant firm has 
in industry with little competition and few hindrance 
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D:2 Correlation Matrix of  Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making Process 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1.    1            
2 .404 1            
3. -.037 .466 1           
4.  -.037 .405 .702 1          
5.  -.214 .162 .410 .483 1         
6. -.247 .033 .295 .380 .728 1        
7. -.069 -.300 -.291 -.172 -.221 .065 1       
8. .537 .294 -.033 -.107 -.232 -.265 -.098 1      
9. .334 .028 -.170 -.162 -.282 -.223 .140 .450 1     
10. .145 .463 .397 .275 .116 .094 -.152 .169 .121 1    
11. .164 .318 .258 .267 .281 .155 -.121 .226 -.004 .457 1   
12. -.094 .159 .246 .494 .530 .399 -.074 -.197 -.394 .199 .440 1  
13. -.180 -.071 .090 .154 .155 .261 .270 -.377 -.096 -.036 -.038 .414 1 
 
 
1. The board usually is not involved with the formation of the strategic decisions 
2. The board usually ratifies strategic proposals which are formed solely by the top management 
3. The board usually asks probing questions and then ratifies strategic proposals formed primarily  by top management  
4. The board usually asks probing questions which lead to revisions of strategic proposals formed by the top management 
5. The board usually helps to form strategic decisions with the top management in board meetings 
6. The board usually helps the top management to form to form strategic decisions within and between board meetings 
7. The board usually forms the strategic decisions separately from the top management 
8. The board is not usually involved with the monitoring of the progress of strategic decisions 
9. The board usually accepts the evaluation of strategic decisions by the top management without asking probing questions 
10. The board usually accepts the evaluation of strategic decisions by top management after asking probing questions 
11. The board usually determines the timing and criteria of the evaluation, but that information is supplied by the top management and it is rarely challenged by the board 
12. The board usually determines the timing and criteria of the evaluation and often requests additional information after receiving the progress report from the top management 
13. The board usually collects its own information about the progress of the strategic decision, in addition to the top management reports. 
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D:3 Correlation Matrix of Financial Reporting in SDMaking 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1.    1     
2 .572 1    
3. .399 .567 1   
4.  .294 .411 .355 1  
5.  .399 .549 .525 .633 1 
 
         Correlation Matrix of Financial Reporting in SD Making: Matrix Notation 
 
1. Use of internal rate of return (IRR) as capital budgeting method 
2. Use of net present value as capital budgeting method 
3. Inclusion of pro-forma financial statements 
4. Detailed cost studies 
5. Incorporation of strategic decision 
 
D:4 Correlation Matrix of Rule Formalisation in SD Making 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1.    1     
2 .814 1    
3. .628 .763 1   
4.  .685 .706 .719 1  
5.  .661 .712 .645 .658 1 
 
Correlation Matrix of Rule Formalisation in SD Making: Matrix Notation 
 
1. Written procedures guiding the process 
2. Formal procedures to identify alternative ways of action 
3. Formal screening procedures 
4. Formal documents guiding the final decision 
5. Predetermined criteria for strategic decision evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
D:5 Correlation Matrix of Hierarchical Decentralisation in SD Making 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1.    1     
2 .338 1    
3. .299 .592 1   
4.  .157 .288 .641 1  
5.  .102 .139 .370 .684 1 
 
      Correlation Matrix of Hierarchical Decentralisation in SD Making: Matrix Notation 
 
1. Owner/Shareholders 
2. Chief Executive Officer 
3. First Level Directors 
4. Middle Level Management 
5. Lower level Management 
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D:6 Correlation Matrix of  Lateral Communication in SD Making 
 
 
1 2 3 4 
1.    1    
2 .574 1   
3. .380 .482 1  
4.  .428 .530 .574 1 
 
 
          Correlation Matrix of Lateral Communication in SD Making: Matrix Notation 
               
1. Finance-accounting department 
2. Production department 
3. Personnel department 
4. Purchasing department 
 
D:7 Correlation Matrix of Innovation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 1            
2 .799 1           
3 .692 .780 1          
4 .669 .757 .777 1         
5 .715 .747 .699 .616 1        
6 .738 .797 .736 .676 .922 1       
7 .578 .654 .650 .595 .832 .820 1      
8 .497 .601 .618 .490 .672 .675 .834 1     
9 .505 .604 .574 .512 .657 .642 .789 .915 1    
10 .510 .554 .528 .500 .568 .615 .536 .581 .557 1   
11 .502 .543 .485 .486 .550 .625 .513 .545 .563 .829 1  
12 .437 .485 .551 .511 .509 .583 .558 .603 .584 .799 .874 1 
 
Correlation Matrix of Innovation: Matrix Notation 
 
1Being the First Company in the Industry to introduce new Products/Services 
2Creating New Products for Fast Market Introduction 
3Creating New Variations to Existing Product Lines 
4Increasing the Revenue from less than 3 Years Old New Products 
5Being the First Company in the Industry to Introduce New Technology 
6Being the First Company in the Industry to Introduce Technological Improvements 
7Creating Innovative Technologies 
8Investing Heavily in Cutting Edge Process Technology-Oriented R&D 
9Developing Radical New Technology 
10Developing Systems that Encourage Initiatives and Creativity among Employees 
11Encouraging Innovation in the Organisation 
12Supporting an Organisational Unit that Drive Innovation 
 
D:8 Correlation Matrix of Organisational Performance 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1.   After-Tax Return 
on Total       Assets 
1     
2.    After-Tax Return 
on Total       Sales 
.913 1    
3.  Firm's Total Sales 
Growth 
.463 .538 1   
4. Overall Firm 
Performance and 
Success 
.750 .753 .691 1  
5. Our Competitive 
Position 
.705 .710 .654 .851 1 
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APPENDIX E: PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION 
ANALYSIS 
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Table 6:1a Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Board Size, Interlocking Directors, 
Leadership Structure and Environmental Dimensions(factors were extracted with eigenvalue greater than 
one) 
Environmental Dimensions, 
Board Size, Interlocking 
Directors Measurements 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient (r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
ENV1: Dynamism in Marketing 
Practices 
H1b+ .074 .517 Not significant 
ENV2: Customer 
Dynamism 
H1b- -.019 .882 Not significant 
ENV3: Environmental 
Competitor’s 
Dynamism 
H1b+ .056 .625 Not significant 
ENV4: Environmental 
Complexity-Munificence 
H1a+ .058 .609 Not significant 
BODSIZ: Board Size H1c- -.124 .275 Not significant 
INTERDIR: Interlocking 
Directors 
H1a- and H1d- -.058 .649 Not Significant 
Leadership Structure: CEO 
Duality 
H1e+ .250 .026 Supported 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Table 6:1b Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Board Size, Interlocking Directors , 
Leadership Structure and Environmental Dimensions(three forced factors were extracted)  
Environmental Dimensions 
Measurements, Board Size, Interlocking 
Directors 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
ENV1: Environmental 
Dynamism 
H1b- -.053 .640 Not significant 
ENV2: Environmental 
Munificence/Hostility 
H1c- -.150 .188 Not significant 
ENV3: Environmental 
Complexity 
H1a+ .100 .380 Not significant 
BODSIZ: Board Size H1d- -.150 .188 Not significant 
INTERDIR: Interlocking directors H1a- -.091 .476 Not significant 
Leadership Structure: CEO Duality H1e+ .249 .027 Supported 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 6:2  Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Organisational Size,  Executive 
Directors, Non-Executive Directors and Board Size 
Board Size, Organisational Size, 
Executive Directors, Non-Executive 
Directors, Organisational Performance  
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
ORGSIZ: Organisational Size H2a+ .334 .001 Supported 
ORGPERFORMANCE: Organisational 
Performance 
H2b+ .205 .072 Not significant 
EXECDIR: Executive directors H2c+ .428 .000 Supported 
NONEXECDIR: Non-executive 
directors 
H2d+ .679 .000 Supported 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6:3a  Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Board Size, Inside Directors, 
Frequency of Board Meetings, Duration of Board Meetings, Environmental Uncertainty and Involvement in 
Strategic Decision-Making Process(three factors were extracted with eigenvalue greater than one) 
Board Size, Inside Directors, Frequency of 
Board Meetings, Duration of Board Meetings, 
Environmental Uncertainty  
And INVSDM1:Formation and Process in 
Strategic Decision-Making 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
BODSIZ: Board Size H3a+ .037 .725 Not Significant 
INTERDIR: Inside directors H3b+ .195 .070 Not Significant 
FREQBODMEET: Frequency of Board 
Meetings 
H3c+ .355 .000 Supported 
DURBODMEET: Duration of Board Meetings H3d- -.125 .231 Not Significant 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence H3e+ .183 .114 Not Significant 
Board Size, Inside Directors, Frequency of 
Board Meetings, Duration of Board Meetings, 
Environmental Uncertainty  
And INVSDM2:Formation and Evaluation of  
Strategic Decision-Making 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
BODSIZ: Board Size H3a+ .215 .037 Supported 
INTERDIR: Inside directors H3b+ .124 .251 Not Significant 
FREQBODMEET: Frequency of Board 
Meetings 
H3c+ .253 .014 Supported 
DURBODMEET: Duration of Board Meetings H3d- -.125 .231 Not Significant 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence H3e+ .031 .787 Not Significant 
Board Size, Inside Directors, Frequency of 
Board Meetings, Duration of Board Meetings, 
Environmental Uncertainty  
And INVSDM3: Evaluation of  Strategic 
Decision-Making 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
BODSIZ: Board Size H3a+ .076 .465 Not Significant 
INTERDIR: Inside directors H3b- -.208 .054 Not Significant 
FREQBODMEET: Frequency of Board 
Meetings 
H3c+ .192 .065 Not Significant 
DURBODMEET: Duration of Board Meetings H3d- -.005 .960 Not Significant 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence H3e+ .065 .577 Not Significant 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6:3b  Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Board Size, Inside Directors, 
Frequency of Board Meetings, Duration of Board Meetings, Environmental Uncertainty and Involvement in 
Strategic Decision-Making Process(two forced factors were extracted) 
Board Size, Inside Directors, Frequency of 
Board Meetings, Duration of Board Meetings, 
Environmental Uncertainty  
And INVSDM1:Formation of Strategic 
Decision-Making 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
BODSIZ: Board Size H3a+ .103 .328 Not Significant 
INTERDIR: Inside directors H3b+ .217 .046 Supported 
FREQBODMEET: Frequency of Board 
Meetings 
H3c+ .442 .000 Supported 
DURBODMEET: duration of board meetings H3d- -.050 .640 Not Significant 
ENV3: Environmental Complexity H3e+ .132 .261 Not Significant 
Board Size, Inside Directors, Frequency of 
Board Meetings, Duration of Board Meetings, 
Environmental Uncertainty  
And INVSDM2: Evaluation of  Strategic 
Decision-Making 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
BODSIZ: Board Size H3a+ .210 .045 Supported 
INTERDIR: Inside directors H3b- -.098 .374 Not Significant 
FREQBODMEET: Frequency of Board 
Meetings 
H3c+ .233 .026 Supported 
DURBODMEET: Duration of Board Meetings H3d- -.045 .669 Not Significant 
ENV3: Environmental Complexity H3e+ .045 .704 Not Significant 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 6:4a1  Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Educational Level, Educational 
Specialty, Functional Background, Industry, Company, Environmental Dimensions and Financial 
Reporting in Strategic Decision-Making 
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Functional Background, Industry, Company, 
Position Tenure, Environmental Dimensions 
and Financial Reporting  
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational Level H6a- -.271 .016 Supported 
EDUCSPEC: Educational Specialty H6b+ .038 .742 Not Significant 
FUNCBAC: Functional Background H6c- -.282 .012 Supported 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure  H6d+ .096 .410 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure  H6d+ .157 .174 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H6d+ .118 .312 Not Significant 
ENV1: Dynamism in Marketing Practices H6e+ .424 .000 Supported 
ENV2: Customer Dynamism H6e+ .042 .734 Not Significant 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism H6e+ .108 .376 Not Significant 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence H6e+ .325 .006 Supported 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6:4a2  Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Educational Level, Educational 
Specialty, Functional Background, Industry, Company, Environmental Dimensions and Rule Formalisation 
in Strategic Decision-Making 
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Functional Background, Industry, Company, 
Position Tenure, Environmental Dimensions 
and Financial Reporting  
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational Level H4a- -.306 .003 Supported 
EDUCSPEC: Educational Specialty H4b+ .070 .512 Not Significant 
FUNCBAC: Functional Background H4c- -.183 .084 Not Significant 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure  H4d+ .062 .567 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure  H4d+ .036 .739 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H4d+ .092 .396 Not Significant 
ENV1: Dynamism in Marketing Practices H4e+ .294 .010 Supported 
ENV2: Customer Dynamism H4e- -.101 .386 Not Significant 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism H4e+ .215 .062 Not Significant 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence H4e+ .205 .075 Not Significant  
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Table 6:4a3  Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Educational Level, Educational 
Specialty, Functional Background, Industry, Company, Environmental Dimensions and Hierarchical 
Decentralisation in Strategic Decision-Making 
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Functional Background, Industry, Company, 
Position Tenure, Environmental Dimensions 
and Hierarchical Decentralisation (Lower level 
Management)  in Strategic Decision-Making 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational Level H4a- -.061 .561 Not Significant 
EDUCSPEC: Educational Specialty H4b+ .046 .658 Not Significant 
FUNCBAC: Functional Background H4c- -.062 .560 Not Significant 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure  H4d+ .095 .374 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure  H4d- -.015 .887 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H4d- -.007 .950 Not Significant 
ENV1: Dynamism in Marketing Practices H4e+ .177 .120 Not Significant 
ENV2: Customer Dynamism H4e+ .044 .700 Not Significant 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism H4e+ .007 .953 Not Significant 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence H4e- -.095 404 Not Significant 
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Functional Background, Industry, Company, 
Position Tenure, Environmental Dimensions 
and Hierarchical Decentralisation (Upper Level 
Management) 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational Level H4a- -.401 .000 Supported  
EDUCSPEC: Educational Specialty H4b+ .034 .741 Not Significant 
FUNCBAC: Functional Background H4c- -.105 .318 Not Significant 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure  H4d- -.030 .774 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure  H4d- -.077 .474 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H4d+ .076 .474 Not Significant 
ENV1: Dynamism in Marketing Practices H4e+ .009 .936 Not Significant 
ENV2: Customer Dynamism H4e+ .241 .034 Supported 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism H4e+ .044 .700 Not Significant 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence H4e+ .007 .953 Not Significant 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6:4a4 Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Educational Level, Educational 
Specialty, Functional Background, Industry, Company, Position Tenure, Environmental Dimensions and 
Lateral Communication  
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Functional Background, Industry, Company, 
Position Tenure, Environmental Dimensions 
and Lateral Communication  
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational Level H4a- -.244 .030 Supported 
EDUCSPEC: Educational Specialty H4b- -.018 .872 Not Significant 
FUNCBAC: Functional Background H4c- -.151 .186 Not Significant 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure  H4d+ .211 .069 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure  H4d+ .060 .606 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H4d+ .157 .176 Not Significant 
ENV1: Dynamism in Marketing Practices H4e+ .406 .000 Supported 
ENV2: Customer  Dynamism H4e- -.103 .395 Not Significant 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism H4e+ .213 .075 Not Significant 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence H4e+ .332 .006 Supported 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
  *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 6:5a  Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Outside Directors, Age of Board 
Members, Industry, Company, Position Tenure, Educational Level, Educational Specialty, Number of 
Female Directors, Environmental Dimensions  and Product & Process Innovation Practices 
Outside Directors, Age of Board Members, 
Industry, Company, Position Tenure, 
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Number of Female Directors and Product 
and Process  Innovation Practices Measures 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient      
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
OUTDIR: Outside directors H5a+ .003 .982 Not Significant 
AGED: Age of Directors H5b- -.074 .529 Not Significant 
FEMREPRES: Female representation H5c+ .095 .414 Not Significant  
INDTEN: Industry tenure H5d- -.098 .413 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company tenure H5d- -.116 .326 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H5d- -.006 .957 Not Significant 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational level H5e- -.074 .526 Not Significant 
EDUCSPEC: Educational specialty H5f+ .027 .203 Not Significant 
ENV1: Dynamism in Marketing Practices H5g+ .261 .030 Supported 
ENV2: Customer  Dynamism H5g- -.082 .502 Not Significant 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism H5g+ .320 .007 Supported 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence H5g+ .441 .000 Supported 
Outside Directors, Age of Board Members, 
Industry, Company, Position Tenure, 
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Number of Female Directors, Environmental 
Dimensions and Organisational   Innovation 
Practices Measures 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
OUTDIR: Outside directors H5a+ .040 .732 Not Significant 
AGED: Age of Directors H5b+ .192 .099 Not Significant 
FEMREPRES: Female representation H5c- -.159 .169 Supported 
INDTEN: Industry tenure H5d+ .177 .137 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company tenure H5d+ .068 .568 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H5d- -.035 .770 Not Significant 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational level H5e- -.314 .006 Supported 
EDUCSPEC: Educational specialty H5f+ .148 .203 Not Significant 
ENV1: Dynamism in Marketing Practices H5g+ .283 .018 Supported 
ENV2: Customer  Dynamism H5g+ .121 .322 Not Significant 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism H5g+ .074 .546 Not Significant 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence H5g+ .031 .802 Not Significant 
358 
 
 
 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)., 
  *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 6:4b3  Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Educational Level, Educational 
Specialty, Functional Background, Industry, Company, Environmental Dimensions and Hierarchical 
Decentralisation in Strategic Decision-Making 
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Functional Background, Industry, Company, 
Position Tenure, Environmental Dimensions 
and Hierarchical Decentralisation   in Strategic 
Decision-Making 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational Level H4a- -.294 .004 Supported 
EDUCSPEC: Educational Specialty H4b+ .046 .664 Not Significant 
FUNCBAC: Functional Background H4c- -.113 .285 Not Significant 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure  H4d+ .033 .758 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure  H4d+ .034 .753 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H4d+ .000 .996 Not Significant 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism H4e+ .225 .048 Supported 
ENV2: Environmental Munificence/Hostility H4e+ .230 .043 Not Significant 
ENV3: Environmental Complexity H4e+ .285 .011 Supported  
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6:4b1  Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Educational Level, Educational 
Specialty, Functional Background, Industry, Company, Environmental Dimensions and Financial 
Reporting in Strategic Decision-Making 
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Functional Background, Industry, Company, 
Position Tenure, Environmental Dimensions 
and Financial Reporting  
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational Level H4a- -.271 .016 Supported 
EDUCSPEC: Educational Specialty H4b+ .038 .742 Not Significant 
FUNCBAC: Functional Background H4c- -.282 .012 Supported 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure  H4d+ .096 .410 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure  H4d+ .157 .174 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position Tenure H4d+ .118 .312 Not Significant 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism H4e+ .356 .003 Supported 
ENV2: Environmental Munificence/Hostility H4e+ .074 .547 Not Significant 
ENV3: Environmental Complexity H4e+ .387 .001 Supported 
Table 6:4b2  Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Educational Level, Educational 
Specialty, Functional Background, Industry, Company, Environmental Dimensions and Rule Formalisation 
in Strategic Decision-Making 
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Functional Background, Industry, Company, 
Position Tenure, Environmental Dimensions 
and Financial Reporting  
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational Level H4a- -.306 .003 Supported 
EDUCSPEC: Educational Specialty H4b+ .070 .512 Not Significant 
FUNCBAC: Functional Background H4c- -.183 .084 Not Significant 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure  H4d+ .062 .567 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure  H4d+ .036 .739 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H4d+ .092 .396 Not Significant 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism H4e+ .264 .021 Supported 
ENV2: Environmental Munificence/Hostility H4e- -.075 .520 Not Significant 
ENV3: Environmental Complexity H4e+ .289 .011 Supported 
359 
 
 
 
Table 6:4b4 Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Educational Level, Educational 
Specialty, Functional Background, Industry, Company, Environmental Dimensions and Lateral 
Communication  
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Functional Background, Industry, Company, 
Position Tenure, Environmental Dimensions 
and Lateral Communication  
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational Level H4a- -.244 .030 Supported 
EDUCSPEC: Educational Specialty H4b- -.018 .872 Not Significant 
FUNCBAC: Functional Background H4c- -.151 .186 Not Significant 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure  H4d+ .211 .069 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure  H4d+ .060 .606 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H4d+ .157 .176 Not Significant 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism H4e+ .336 .004 Supported 
ENV2: Environmental Munificence/Hostility H4e- -.084 .487 Not Significant 
ENV3: Environmental Complexity H4e+ .464 .000 Supported 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)., *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 6:5b  Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Outside Directors, Age of Board 
Members, Industry, Company, Position Tenure, Educational Level, Educational Specialty, Number of 
Female Directors, Environmental Dimensions and Product Innovation Practices 
Outside Directors, Age of Board Members, 
Industry, Company, Position Tenure, Educational 
Level, Educational Specialty, Number of Female 
Directors and Product Innovation Practices 
Measures 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient      
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
OUTDIR: Outside directors H5a+ .024 .835 Not Significant 
AGED: Age of Directors H5b+ .082 .487 Not Significant 
FEMREPRES: Female representation H5c+ .123 .292 Supported 
INDTEN: Industry tenure H5d+ .004 .976 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company tenure H5d- -.045 .708 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H5d+ .082 .490 Not Significant 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational level H5e- -.157 .176 Not Significant 
EDUCSPEC: Educational specialty H5f- -.033 .777 Not Significant 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism H5g+ .166 .173 Not Significant 
ENV2: Environmental Munificence/Hostility H5g+ .173 .154 Not Significant  
ENV3: Environmental Complexity H5g+ .432 .000 Supported  
Outside Directors, Age of Board Members, 
Industry, Company, Position Tenure, Educational 
Level, Educational Specialty, Number of Female 
Directors, Environmental Dimensions  and Process   
Innovation Practices Measures 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
OUTDIR: Outside directors H5a- -.024 .841 Not Significant 
AGED: Age of Directors H5b- -.213 .067 Not Significant 
FEMREPRES: Female representation H5c- -.024 .834 Supported 
INDTEN: Industry tenure H5d- -.132 .269 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company tenure H5d- -.115 .331 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H5d- -.108 .364 Not Significant 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational level H5e+ .052 .655 Not Significant 
EDUCSPEC: Educational specialty H5f+ .107 .360 Not Significant 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism H5g+ .195 .108 Not Significant 
ENV2: Environmental Munificence/Hostility H5g+ .180 .140 Not Significant  
ENV3: Environmental Complexity H5g+ .261 .030 Supported  
Outside Directors, Age of Board Members, 
Industry, Company, Position Tenure, Educational 
Level, Educational Specialty, Number of Female 
Directors, Environmental Dimensions  and 
Organisational Innovation Practices Measures 
    
OUTDIR: Outside directors H5a+ .048 .683 Not Significant 
AGED: Age of Directors H5b+ .246 .099 Supported 
FEMREPRES: Female representation H5c- -.149 .198 Supported 
INDTEN: Industry tenure H5d+ .212 .074 Supported 
COMPTEN: Company tenure H5d+ .093 .435 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H5d- -.007 .952 Not Significant 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational level H5e- -.343 .002 Supported 
EDUCSPEC: Educational specialty H5f+ .127 .276 Not Significant 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism H5g+ .269 .026 Supported 
ENV2: Environmental Munificence/Hostility H5g+ .088 .471 Not Significant  
ENV3: Environmental Complexity H5g+ .078 .526 Not Significant  
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)., *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).. 
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Table 6:5a  Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Outside Directors, Age of Board 
Members, Industry, Company, Position Tenure, Educational Level, Educational Specialty, Number of 
Female Directors, Environmental Dimensions  and Product & Process Innovation Practices 
Outside Directors, Age of Board Members, 
Industry, Company, Position Tenure, 
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Number of Female Directors and Product 
and Process  Innovation Practices Measures 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient      
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
OUTDIR: Outside directors H5a+ .003 .982 Not Significant 
AGED: Age of Directors H5b- -.074 .529 Not Significant 
FEMREPRES: Female representation H5c+ .095 .414 Not Significant  
INDTEN: Industry tenure H5d- -.098 .413 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company tenure H5d- -.116 .326 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H5d- -.006 .957 Not Significant 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational level H5e- -.074 .526 Not Significant 
EDUCSPEC: Educational specialty H5f+ .027 .203 Not Significant 
ENV1: Dynamism in Marketing Practices H5g+ .261 .030 Supported 
ENV2: Customer  Dynamism H5g- -.082 .502 Not Significant 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism H5g+ .320 .007 Supported 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence H5g+ .441 .000 Supported 
Outside Directors, Age of Board Members, 
Industry, Company, Position Tenure, 
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Number of Female Directors, Environmental 
Dimensions and Organisational   Innovation 
Practices Measures 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
OUTDIR: Outside directors H5a+ .040 .732 Not Significant 
AGED: Age of Directors H5b+ .192 .099 Not Significant 
FEMREPRES: Female representation H5c- -.159 .169 Supported 
INDTEN: Industry tenure H5d+ .177 .137 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company tenure H5d+ .068 .568 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H5d- -.035 .770 Not Significant 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational level H5e- -.314 .006 Supported 
EDUCSPEC: Educational specialty H5f+ .148 .203 Not Significant 
ENV1: Dynamism in Marketing Practices H5g+ .283 .018 Supported 
ENV2: Customer  Dynamism H5g+ .121 .322 Not Significant 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism H5g+ .074 .546 Not Significant 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence H5g+ .031 .802 Not Significant 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)., *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 6:5b  Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Outside Directors, Age of Board 
Members, Industry, Company, Position Tenure, Educational Level, Educational Specialty, Number of 
Female Directors, Environmental Dimensions and Product Innovation Practices 
Outside Directors, Age of Board Members, 
Industry, Company, Position Tenure, 
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Number of Female Directors and Product 
Innovation Practices Measures 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient      
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
OUTDIR: Outside directors H5a+ .024 .835 Not Significant 
AGED: Age of Directors H5b+ .082 .487 Not Significant 
FEMREPRES: Female representation H5c+ .123 .292 Supported 
INDTEN: Industry tenure H5d+ .004 .976 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company tenure H5d- -.045 .708 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H5d+ .082 .490 Not Significant 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational level H5e- -.157 .176 Not Significant 
EDUCSPEC: Educational specialty H5f- -.033 .777 Not Significant 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism H5g+ .166 .173 Not Significant 
ENV2: Environmental Munificence/Hostility H5g+ .173 .154 Not Significant  
ENV3: Environmental Complexity H5g+ .432 .000 Supported  
Outside Directors, Age of Board Members, 
Industry, Company, Position Tenure, 
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Number of Female Directors, Environmental 
Dimensions  and Process   Innovation 
Practices Measures 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
OUTDIR: Outside directors H5a- -.024 .841 Not Significant 
AGED: Age of Directors H5b- -.213 .067 Not Significant 
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FEMREPRES: Female representation H5c- -.024 .834 Supported 
INDTEN: Industry tenure H5d- -.132 .269 Not Significant 
COMPTEN: Company tenure H5d- -.115 .331 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H5d- -.108 .364 Not Significant 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational level H5e+ .052 .655 Not Significant 
EDUCSPEC: Educational specialty H5f+ .107 .360 Not Significant 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism H5g+ .195 .108 Not Significant 
ENV2: Environmental Munificence/Hostility H5g+ .180 .140 Not Significant  
ENV3: Environmental Complexity H5g+ .261 .030 Supported  
Outside Directors, Age of Board Members, 
Industry, Company, Position Tenure, 
Educational Level, Educational Specialty, 
Number of Female Directors, Environmental 
Dimensions  and Organisational Innovation 
Practices Measures 
    
OUTDIR: Outside directors H5a+ .048 .683 Not Significant 
AGED: Age of Directors H5b+ .246 .099 Supported 
FEMREPRES: Female representation H5c- -.149 .198 Supported 
INDTEN: Industry tenure H5d+ .212 .074 Supported 
COMPTEN: Company tenure H5d+ .093 .435 Not Significant 
POSTEN: Position tenure H5d- -.007 .952 Not Significant 
EDUCLEVEL: Educational level H5e- -.343 .002 Supported 
EDUCSPEC: Educational specialty H5f+ .127 .276 Not Significant 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism H5g+ .269 .026 Supported 
ENV2: Environmental Munificence/Hostility H5g+ .088 .471 Not Significant  
ENV3: Environmental Complexity H5g+ .078 .526 Not Significant  
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)., *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 6:6a  Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Strategic Decision-Making 
Processes , Innovation Practices and Organisational Performance  
Strategic Decision-Making Processes , 
Innovation Practices and Organisational 
Performance Measures 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient      
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
INVSDM1:Formation &Process of SDM H6a+ -.020 .863 Not Significant 
INVSDM2:Formation &Evaluation of SDM H6a+ .114 .326 Not Significant 
INVSDM3: Evaluation of SDM H6a+ -.142 .222 Not Significant 
FINREP: Financial Reporting H6a+ .311 .010 Supported  
RULEFORM: Rule Formalisation H6a+ .232 .045 Supported 
HIERDECENT1:Lower Level Management H6a+ .149 .196 Not Significant  
HIERDECENT2:Upper Level Management H6a+ .196 .087 Not Significant 
LATCOM: Lateral Communication H6a+ .030 .815 Not Significant  
INNV1:Product &Process Innovation H6a+ .240 .056 Not Significant  
INNV2:Organisational Innovation H6a+ .330 .008 Supported  
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)., *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 6:6b  Hypothesis Testing: Product-moment Correlations Between Strategic Decision-Making 
Processes , Innovation Practices and Organisational Performance  
Strategic Decision-Making Processes , 
Innovation Practices and Organisational 
Performance Measures 
Hypothesised 
Relationship 
Correlation 
Coefficient      
(r) 
Significant 
Level 
Conclusion of 
Hypothesis Test 
SD1:Formation of SDM H6a+ .009 .938 Not Significant 
SD1:Evaluation of SDM H6a+ .032 .784 Not Significant 
FINREP: Financial Reporting H6a+ .311 .010 Supported 
RULEFORM: Rule Formalisation H6a+ .232 .045 Supported 
HIERDECENT: Hierarchical Decentralisation  H6a+ .245 .032 Supported 
LATCOM: Lateral Communication H6a+ .130 .815 Not Significant  
INNPD: Product Innovation H6a+ .131 .301 Not Significant 
INNPC: Process Innovation H6a+ .226 .073 Not Significant 
INNORG: Organisational Innovation H6a+ .304 .014 Supported 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6:7 Regression Estimates of the Board Size 
 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 7.999 .323  24.765 .000   
ENV1 0.212 .321 .074 .660 .511 1.000 1.000 
ENV2 -0.575 .326 -.198 -1.762 .082 1.000 1.000 
ENV3 -0.355 .325 -.123 -1.094 .278 1.000 1.000 
ENV4 0.166 .323 .058 .514 .609 1.000 1.000 
 
See Table 6:8 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 1.259 
Significance of F=.294 
R2 = .064 
Adjusted R2 = .013 
 
Table 6:8 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Board Size Relationship 
 
BODSIZ=ƒ [7.999(Intercept)+0.212(ENV1) -0.575(ENV2) 0.355(ENV3)+0.166(ENV4)] 
Where: 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism in Marketing Practices 
ENV2:Environmental Customer Dynamism 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence 
 
 
 
Table 6:9 Regression Estimates of the Interlocking Board Members 
 
Parameter Partial regression 
coefficient (B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 3.570 .398  8.975 .000   
ENV1 -0.060 .378 -.021 -.160 .873 .996 1.004 
ENV2 0.136 .459 .039 .297 .768 .980 1.021 
ENV3 -0.409 .399 -.133 -1.024 .310 .984 1.016 
ENV4 -0.192 .399 -.062 -.481 .632 .998 1.002 
 
See Table 6:10 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = .364 
Significance of F= .833 
R2 = .024 
Adjusted R2 = -.042 
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Table 6:10 Regression Estimates(Unstandardised ) of the Interlocking Board Members Relationship 
 
INTERDIR =ƒ [3.570 (Intercept) -0.060 (ENV1)+ 0.136 (ENV2) -0.409 (ENV3) -0.192 (ENV4)] 
Where: 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism in Marketing Practices 
ENV2:Environmental Customer Dynamism 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence 
 
 
 
Table 6:11 Regression Estimates of the Board Size 
 
Parameter Partial regression 
coefficient (B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 8.005 .326  24.582 .000   
ENV1 -0.152 .325 -.053 -.467 .642 1.000 1.000 
ENV2 -0.435 .331 -.149 -1.315 .192 1.000 1.000 
ENV3 0.286 .324 .100 .884 .379 1.000 1.000 
 
See Table 6:12 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = .912 
Significance of F= .440 
R2 = .035 
Adjusted R2 = -.003 
 
Table 6:12 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Board Size Relationship 
 
BODSIZ=ƒ [8.005(Intercept) -0.152 (ENV1) -0.435 (ENV2)+ 0.286 (ENV3)] 
Where: 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism 
ENV2:Environmental Hostility/Munificence 
ENV3:Environmental Complexity/Homogeneity-Heterogeneity 
 
 
 
Table 6:13 Regression Estimates of the Interlocking Board Members 
 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient (B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 3.556 .396  8.974 .000   
ENV1 -0.088 .387 -.029 -.228 .821 .985 1.016 
ENV2 0.181 .434 .054 .417 .678 .984 1.016 
ENV3 -0.287 .400 -.092 -.716 .477 .992 1.008 
 
See Table 6:14 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = .250 
Significance of F= .861 
R2 = 0.012 
Adjusted R2 = -.037 
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Table 6:14 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Interlocking Board Members Relationship 
INTERDIR =ƒ [3.556 (Intercept) -0.088 (ENV1)+ 0.181 (ENV2) -0.287 (ENV3)] 
Where: 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism 
ENV2:Environmental Hostility/Munificence 
ENV3:Environmental Complexity/Homogeneity-Heterogeneity 
 
 
Table 6:15 Regression Estimates of the Leadership Structure 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 1.540 .055  27.842 .000   
ENV1   0.130 .057 .252 2.271 .026 .998 1.002 
ENV2  -0.054 .055 -.109 -.983 .329 .999 1.001 
ENV3  0.024 .055 .048 .430 .669 .999 1.001 
ENV4  -0.053 .055 -.108 -.971 .334 1.000 1.000 
See Table 6:16 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 1.795 
Significance of F= .139 
R2 = .088 
Adjusted R2 = 0.039 
 
Table 6:16 Regression Estimates(Unstandardised ) of the Leadership Structure  Relationship 
CEODUALITY =ƒ [1.540 (Intercept) +0.130 (ENV1)-0.054 (ENV2) +0.024 (ENV3) -0.053(ENV4)] 
Where: 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism in Marketing Practices 
ENV2:Environmental Customer Dynamism 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence 
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Table 6:17 Regression Estimates of the Leadership Structure 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 1.540 .054  28.269 .000   
ENV1   0.130 .055 .256 2.343 .022 .998 1.002 
ENV2  -0.101 .055 -.202 -1.850 .068 .999 1.001 
ENV3  0.014 .055 .028 .260 .795 .999 1.001 
 
See Table 6:18 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 2.887 
Significance of F=.041 
R2 = .104 
Adjusted R2 = .068 
 
Table 6:18 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Leadership Structure Relationship 
 
CEODUALITY =ƒ [1.540 (Intercept) +0.130 (ENV1)-0.130 (ENV2) +0.014 (ENV3)] 
Where: 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism 
ENV2:Environmental Hostility/Munificence 
ENV3:Environmental Complexity/Homogeneity-Heterogeneity 
 
 
Table 6:19 Regression Estimates of the Board Size 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 7.651 .296  25.821 .000   
Organisational Size 0.000 .000 .334 3.524 .001 1.000 1.000 
See Table 6:20 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 12.419 
Significance of F= .001 
R2 = .111 
Adjusted R2 = .102 
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Table 6:20 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Board Size Relationship 
BODSIZ =ƒ [7.651 (Intercept) + 0.000 (ORGSIZ) ] 
Where: 
ORGSIZ: Organisational Size 
 
 
Table 6:21 Regression Estimates of the Organisational Performance 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -.520 .318  -1.636 .106   
Board Size 0.066 0.036 0.205 1.825 .072 1.000 1.000 
 
See Table 6:22 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 3.332 
Significance of F= .072 
R2 = .042 
Adjusted R2 = .029 
 
 
Table 6:22 Regression Estimates(Unstandardised ) of the Board Size-Organisational Performance Relationship 
ORGPERF=ƒ [-.520 (Intercept) + 0.066 (BODSIZ)] 
Where: 
BODSIZ: Board Size 
 
Table 6:23 Regression Estimates of the Executive Directors 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 1.264 .464  2.724 .008   
Board Size 0.241 .054 .428 4.494 .000 1.000 1.000 
 
 
See Table 6:24 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 20.198 
Significance of F= .000 
R2 = .183 
Adjusted R2 = .174 
 
Table 6:24 Regression Estimates(Unstandardised ) of the Board Size-Executive Directors Relationship 
 
EXECDIR=ƒ[ 1.264 (Intercept) + 0.241 (BODSIZ)] 
Where: 
BODSIZ: Board Size 
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Table 6:25 Regression Estimates of the Non-Executive Directors 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -1.574 .710  -2.216 .030   
Board Size 0.604 .077 .679 7.853 .000 1.000 1.000 
 
See Table 6:26 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 61.674 
Significance of F= .000 
R2 = .461 
Adjusted R2 = .454 
 
Table 6:26 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Board Size-Non Executive Directors Relationship 
 
NONEXECDIR=ƒ[-1.574 (Intercept) +0.604 (BODSIZ)] 
Where: 
BODSIZ: Board Size 
 
 
 
Table 6:27 Regression Estimates of the INVSDM1 Formation and Process of Strategic Decision-Making Process 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -0.071 .667  -.106 .916   
Board Size -0.065 .053 -.178 -1.218 .228 .537 1.861 
Inside/Internal 
Board Members 0.098 .077 .178 1.280 .206 .596 1.678 
Once a year (1:yes, 
no:0) -2.385 .885 -.595 -2.031 .009 .236 4.239 
Quarterly (1:yes, 
no:0) -1.674 .824 -.589 -.2.031 .047 .136 7.335 
Every Month 
(1:yes, no:0) -0.694 .772 -.334 -.899 .373 .083 11.999 
Every 15 days 
(1:yes, no:0) 0.488 .817 -.165 -.597 .553 .150 6.668 
Weekly (1:yes, 
no:0) -0.916 .780 -.248 -1.175 .245 .257 3.885 
More than Two 
Hours(1:yes, no:0) 1.288 .764 .605 1.685 .098 .089 11.207 
Two Hours (1:yes, 
no:0) 1.351 .793 .589 1.703 .094 .096 10.423 
One and a half hour 
(1:yes, no:0) 1.038 .823 .379 1.262 .212 .128 7.837 
One Hour (1:yes, 
no:0) 1.011 .854 .274 1.184 .241 .214 4.662 
Thirty Minutes 
(1:yes, no:0) 1.746 1.281 .201 1.364 .178 .530 1.886 
ENV4  .092 .130 .090 .711 .480 .723 1.383 
(every six months and less than 30 minutes have been deleted from the analysis) 
 
See Table 6:28 for full parameter notation  
F-statistics = 2.465 
Significance of F= .010 
R2 = .368 
Adjusted R2 = .219 
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Table 6:28 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the INVSDM1 Formation and Process of Strategic Decision-
Making Process 
INVSDM1=ƒ[-0.071 (Intercept) -0.065 (BODSIZ)+ 0.098 (INTERDIR) -2.385(Once a Year)- 1.674(Quarterly)- 
0.694 ( Every Six Months) -0.488(Every 15 days)-0.916(Weekly)+1.288(More than Two Hours)+1.351(Two 
Hours)+1.038( One and a half hour) -1.011(One Hour)+ 1.746(30 minutes) +0.092(ENV4) ] 
Where: 
BODSIZ: Board Size 
INTERDIR: Inside Directors 
Once a year (1:yes, no:0) 
Quarterly (1:yes, no:0) 
Every Month (1:yes, no:0) 
Every 15 days (1:yes, no:0) 
Weekly (1:yes, no:0) 
Two Hours (1:yes, no:0) 
One and a half hour (1:yes, no:0) 
One Hour (1:yes, no:0) 
Thirty Minutes (1:yes, no:0) 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence 
 
Table 6:29 Regression Estimates of the INVSDM2 Formation and Evaluation of Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -2.560 .635  -4.034 .000   
Board Size 0.072 .051 .196 1.420 .161 .537 1.861 
Inside/Internal Board 
Members 0.007 .073 .012 .092 .927 .596 1.678 
Once a year (1:yes, 
no:0) -1.446 .842 -.357 -1.717 .092 .236 4.239 
Quarterly (1:yes, no:0) 0.176 .784 .061 .224 .824 .136 7.335 
Every Month (1:yes, 
no:0) 0.032 .735 .015 .043 .966 .083 11.999 
Every 15 days (1:yes, 
no:0) -0.632 .778 -.212 -.813 .420 .150 6.668 
Weekly (1:yes, no:0) 1.017 .742 .273 1.371 .176 .257 3.885 
More than Two Hours 1.999 .727 .930 2.749 .008 .089 11.207 
Two Hours (1:yes, 
no:0) 2.148 .754 .929 2.848 .006 .096 10.423 
One and a half hour 
(1:yes, no:0) 2.068 .783 .747 2.641 .011 .128 7.837 
One Hour (1:yes, no:0) 2.630 .812 .706 3.238 .002 .214 4.662 
Thirty Minutes (1:yes, 
no:0) 2.477 1.218 .282 2.033 .047 .530 1.886 
ENV4  -0.099 .123 -.096 -.806 .424 .723 1.383 
(every six months and less than 30 minutes have been deleted from the analysis) 
 
 
See Table 6:30 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 3.307 
Significance of F= .001 
R2 = .439 
Adjusted R2 = .306 
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Table 6:30 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised) of the INVSDM2 Formation and Evaluation of Strategic 
Decision-Making Process 
 
INVSDM2=ƒ[-2.560 (Intercept) +0.072 (BODSIZ)- 0.007 (INTERDIR) -1.446 (Once a Year)+ 0.176 
(Quarterly)+ 0.032 (Every Month)-0.632 (Every 15 days)+ 1.017(Weekly)+ 1.999 (More than Two Hours)+ 
2.148(Two Hours) + 2.068(One and a half hour)+ 2.630(One Hour)+ 2.477 (thirty minutes) -0.099 (ENV4) ] 
Where: 
 
BODSIZ: Board Size 
INTERDIR: Inside Directors 
Once a year (1:yes, no:0) 
Quarterly (1:yes, no:0) 
Every Month (1:yes, no:0) 
Every 15 days (1:yes, no:0) 
Weekly (1:yes, no:0) 
Two Hours (1:yes, no:0) 
One and a half hour (1:yes, no:0) 
One Hour (1:yes, no:0) 
Thirty Minutes (1:yes, no:0) 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence 
 
Table 6:31 Regression Estimates of the INVSDM3 Evaluation of Strategic Decision-Making Process 
 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 0.424 .699  .606 .547   
Board Size 0.064 .056 .186 1.148 .256 .537 1.861 
Inside/Internal Board 
Members -0.147 .080 -.281 -1.832 .072 .596 1.678 
Once a year (1:yes, 
no:0) -1.971 .927 -.519 -2.126 .038 .236 4.239 
Quarterly (1:yes, no:0) -1.335 .864 -.496 -1.545 .128 .136 7.335 
Every Month (1:yes, 
no:0) -0.973 .809 -.494 -1.202 .234 .083 11.999 
Every 15 days (1:yes, 
no:0) -0.891 .857 -.319 -1.040 .303 .150 6.668 
Weekly (1:yes, no:0) -1.109 .817 -.317 -1.358 .180 .257 3.885 
More than Two Hours 
(1:yes, no:0) 0.509 .801 .252 .636 .527 .089 11.207 
Two Hours (1:yes, 
no:0) 0.596 .831 .275 .718 .476 .096 10.423 
One and a half hour 
(1:yes, no:0) 1.001 .862 .385 1.161 .251 .128 7.837 
One Hour (1:yes, no:0) 1.279 .895 .366 1.430 .158 .214 4.662 
Thirty Minutes (1:yes, 
no:0) 1.429 1.342 .173 1.065 .292 .530 1.886 
ENV4  -0.107 .136 -.110 -.789 .434 .723 1.383 
(every six months and less than 30 minutes have been deleted from the analysis) 
 
 
See Table 6:32 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 1.239 
Significance of F= .278 
R2 = .227 
Adjusted R2 = .044 
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Table 6:32 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the INVSDM3 Evaluation of Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
INVSDM3=ƒ[0.424 (Intercept) + 0.064(BODSIZ)- 0.147 (INTERDIR) -1.971(Once a Year) -1.335 (Quarterly) -
0.973 (Every Month) -0.891(Every 15 days) -1.109 (Weekly)+ 0.509(More than Two Hours)+ 0.596 (Two 
Hours)+1.001 (One and a half hour) +1.279 (One Hour)+ 1.429 (thirty minutes) -0.107 (ENV4)  ] 
Where: 
BODSIZ: Board Size 
INTERDIR: Inside Directors 
Once a year (1:yes, no:0) 
Quarterly (1:yes, no:0) 
Every Month (1:yes, no:0) 
Every 15 days (1:yes, no:0) 
Weekly (1:yes, no:0) 
Two Hours (1:yes, no:0) 
One and a half hour (1:yes, no:0) 
One Hour (1:yes, no:0) 
Thirty Minutes (1:yes, no:0) 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence 
 
 
Table 6:33 Regression Estimates of the INVSDM1 Formation of Strategic Decision-Making Process 
 
 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -1.126 .596  -1.890 .064   
Board Size -0.003 .050 -.007 -.053 .958 .504 1.984 
Inside/Internal Board 
Members 0.063 .071 .116 .884 .381 .550 1.818 
Once a year (1:yes, 
no:0) -2.809 .781 -.715 -3.597 .001 .239 4.184 
Quarterly (1:yes, no:0) -1.673 .737 -.601 -2.272 .027 .135 7.399 
Every Month (1:yes, 
no:0) -0.694 .688 -.336 -1.009 .318 .085 11.749 
Every 15 days (1:yes, 
no:0) -0.881 .728 -.291 -1.210 .232 .163 6.131 
Weekly (1:yes, no:0) -0.313 .694 -.087 -.451 .654 .256 3.905 
More than Two Hours 
(1:yes, no:0) 1.938 .682 .908 2.842 .006 .092 10.817 
Two Hours (1:yes, 
no:0) 2.136 .712 .947 3.000 .004 .095 10.551 
One and a half hour 
(1:yes, no:0) 1.782 .740 .662 2.408 .020 .125 8.000 
One Hour (1:yes, no:0) 2.049 .762 .567 2.690 .010 .213 4.701 
Thirty Minutes (1:yes, 
no:0) 2.961 1.117 .348 2.651 .011 .549 1.823 
ENV3 0.009 .121 .009 .075 .940 .706 1.416 
(every six months and less than 30 minutes have been deleted from the analysis) 
 
See Table 6:34 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 4.069 
Significance of F= .000 
R2 = .500 
Adjusted R2 = .377 
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Table 6:34 Regression Estimates(Unstandardised ) of the INVSDM1 Evaluation of Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
INVSDM1=ƒ[-1.126 (Intercept) -0.003 (BODSIZ)+ 0.063 (INTERDIR) -2.809 (Once a Year) -1.673 (Quarterly) -
0.694 (Every Month) -0.881(Every 15 days) -0.313 (Weekly)+ 1.938 (More than Two Hours)+2.136 (Two Hours)+ 
1.782 ( One and a half hour) + 2.049 (One Hour)+ 2.961 (thirty minutes)  +0.009(ENV3) ] 
Where: 
BODSIZ: Board Size 
INTERDIR: Inside Directors 
Once a year (1:yes, no:0) 
Quarterly (1:yes, no:0) 
Every Month (1:yes, no:0) 
Every 15 days (1:yes, no:0) 
Weekly (1:yes, no:0) 
Two Hours (1:yes, no:0) 
One and a half hour (1:yes, no:0) 
One Hour (1:yes, no:0) 
Thirty Minutes (1:yes, no:0) 
ENV3: Environmental Complexity/Homogeneity-Heterogeneity 
 
Table 6:35 Regression Estimates of the INVSDM2 Evaluation of Strategic Decision-Making Process 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -1.194 .578  -2.065 .044   
Board Size 0.083 .048 .249 1.711 .093 .504 1.984 
Inside/Internal Board 
Members -0.098 .069 -.198 -1.423 .161 .550 1.818 
Once a year (1:yes, 
no:0) -1.966 .758 -.547 -2.593 .012 .239 4.184 
Quarterly (1:yes, no:0) -0.323 .715 -.127 -.452 .653 .135 7.399 
Every Month (1:yes, 
no:0) -0.501 .668 -.265 -.750 .456 .085 11.749 
Every 15 days (1:yes, 
no:0) -0.805 .707 -.291 -1.138 .260 .163 6.131 
Weekly (1:yes, no:0) -0.154 .674 -.047 -.228 .820 .256 3.905 
More than Two Hours 
(1:yes, no:0) 1.316 .662 .674 1.987 .052 .092 10.817 
Two Hours (1:yes, 
no:0) 1.425 .691 .691 2.061 .044 .095 10.551 
One and a half hour 
(1:yes, no:0) 1.807 .734 .734 2.516 .015 .125 8.000 
One Hour (1:yes, no:0) 2.273 .740 .687 3.074 .003 .213 4.701 
Thirty Minutes (1:yes, 
no:0) 1.677 1.084 .215 1.547 .128 .549 1.823 
ENV3 -0.127 .117 -.133 -1.086 .282 .706 1.416 
(every six months and less than 30 minutes have been deleted from the analysis) 
 
See Table 6:36 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 3.153 
Significance of F= .002 
R2 = .436 
Adjusted R2 = .29 
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Table 6:36 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the INVSDM2 Formation of Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
INVSDM2=ƒ[-1.194(Intercept) +0.083 (BODSIZ) -0.098 (INTERDIR) -1.966 (Once a Year) -0.323 (Quarterly)-
0.501(Every Month)-0.805 (Every 15 days) -0.154 (Weekly)+ 1.316(More than Two Hours) +1.425 (Two 
Hours)+ 1.807 ( One and a half hour) + 2.273(One Hour)+ 1.677 (thirty minutes) -0.127(ENV3) ] 
Where: 
BODSIZ: Board Size 
INTERDIR: Inside Directors 
Once a year (1: yes, no:0) 
Quarterly (1: yes, no:0) 
Every Month (1:yes, no:0) 
Every 15 days (1:yes, no:0) 
Weekly (1: yes, no:0) 
Two Hours (1:yes, no:0) 
One and a half hour (1: yes, no:0) 
One Hour (1: yes, no:0) 
Thirty Minutes (1:yes, no:0) 
ENV3: Environmental Complexity/Homogeneity-Heterogeneity 
 
 
Table 6:37 Regression Estimates of the Financial Reporting of Strategic Decision-Making Process 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -0.227 .758  -.299 .766   
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) 0.288 .903 .167 .319 .751 .054 18.670 
Master’s (1:yes, 0:no) 0.552 .938 .333 .588 .559 .046 21.824 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) 0.057 .970 .024 .059 .953 .088 11.329 
Engineering (1:yes, 0:no) -0.130 .737 -.042 -.176 .861 .256 3.899 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) -0.371 1.066 -.056 -.348 .729 .574 1.741 
Business Administration 
(1:yes, 0:no) -0.300 .667 -.163 -.450 .655 .112 8.957 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) -0.167 .656 -.096 -.254 .800 .104 9.657 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 
0:no) 0.297 .660 .135 .450 .655 .162 6.171 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) -1.069 .828 -.273 -1.290 .203 .328 3.053 
Functional Background 
(Thoughput:0,Output:1) 0.030 .266 .018 .114 .910 .576 1.735 
INDTEN -0.001 .016 -.012 -.066 .948 .444 2.254 
COMPTEN 0.010 .019 .105 .564 .575 .427 2.344 
POSTEN 0.004 .021 .034 .201 .841 .522 1.915 
ENV1  0.342 .124 .407 2.754 .008 .672 1.488 
ENV2  0.061 .115 .074 .529 .599 .753 1.329 
ENV3  0.134 .101 .170 1.331 .190 .896 1.116 
ENV4  0.223 .133 .252 1.673 .101 .645 1.551 
( High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
 
See Table 6:38 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 1.303 
Significance of F= .233 
 R2 = .325 
Adjusted R2 = .0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
374 
 
 
 
Table 6:38 Regression Estimates(Unstandardised ) of the Financial Reporting  of Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
FINREP=ƒ [-0.227 (Intercept) + 0.288(BSc)+ 0.552(Master’s)+ 0.057(PhD) -0.130(Engineering) -
0.371(Sciences) -0.300(Business Administration) -0.167(Business)+ 0.297(Social Sciences) -1.069(Marketing)+ 
0.030(Functional Background)-0.001(INDTEN)+0.010(COMPTEN)+0.004(POSTEN)+ 
0.342(ENV1)+0.061(ENV2)+0.134(ENV3)+0.223(ENV4) ] 
Where: 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
Functional Background 
Functional Background 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism in Marketing Practices 
ENV2:Environmental Customer Dynamism 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence 
 
Table 6:39 Regression Estimates of the Financial Reporting of Strategic Decision-Making Process 
Parameter 
Partial 
regressio
n 
coefficien
t (B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardize
d regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-
statistic Sig. 
Toleranc
e 
VIF 
Intercept -0.200 .759  -.264 .793   
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) 0.370 .903 .214 .410 .684 .054 18.578 
Master’s (1:yes, 0:no) 0.565 .940 .341 .601 .551 .046 21.804 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) 0.099 .970 .041 .102 .919 .089 11.275 
Engineering (1:yes, 0:no) -0.133 .730 -.043 -.182 .856 .263 3.805 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) -0.495 1.066 -.074 -.464 .645 .578 1.731 
Business Administration 
(1:yes, 0:no) -0.364 .668 -.198 -.545 .588 .112 8.937 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) -0.231 .657 -.132 -.351 .727 .104 9.642 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 
0:no) 0.248 .663 .113 .373 .710 .161 6.193 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) -1.107 .831 -.283 -1.333 .189 .327 3.054 
Functional Background 
(Thoughput:0,Output:1) 0.075 .262 .045 .287 .776 .598 1.672 
INDTEN -0.002 .016 -.020 -.109 .913 .442 2.261 
COMPTEN 0.009 .019 .094 .503 .617 .420 2.380 
POSTEN 0.001 .021 .007 .043 .966 .510 1.959 
ENV1  0.315 .126 .378 2.498 .016 .645 1.551 
ENV2  0.088 .111 .109 .795 .430 .789 1.267 
ENV3  0.236 .131 .270 1.808 .077 .661 1.512 
(High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
 
 
See Table 6:40 for full parameter notation  
F-statistics = 1.301 
Significance of F= .236 
 R2 = .307 
Adjusted R2 = .071 
 
 
 
 
 
375 
 
 
 
Table 6:40 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Financial Reporting  of Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
 
FINREP=ƒ [-0.200(Intercept) + 0.370(BSc)+ 0.565(Master’s)+ 0.099(PhD) -0.133(Engineering) -0.495(Sciences) 
-0.364(Business Administration) -0.231(Business)+ 0.248(Social Sciences) -1.107(Marketing)+ 0.075(Functional 
Background)-0.002(INDTEN)+0.009(COMPTEN)+0.001(POSTEN)+ 
0.315(ENV1)+0.088(ENV2)+0.236(ENV3) ] 
Where: 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
Functional Background 
Functional Background 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism  
ENV2:Environmental Munificence/Hostility 
ENV3: Environmental Complexity 
 
Table 6:41 Regression Estimates of the Rule Formalisation of Strategic Decision-Making Process 
 
Parameter 
Partial 
regressio
n 
coefficie
nt (B) 
Standar
d 
error 
Standardiz
ed 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Toleranc
e 
VIF 
Intercept -0.083 .823  -.101 .920   
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) 0.403 .996 .218 .404 .688 .050 19.845 
Master’s (1:yes, 0:no) -0.008 1.042 -.005 -.008 .994 .043 23.444 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) -0.035 1.070 -.014 -.032 .974 .076 13.210 
Engineering (1:yes, 0:no) -0.353 .803 -.111 -.439 .662 .227 4.405 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 0.049 1.010 .009 .048 .962 .406 2.464 
Business Administration 
(1:yes, 0:no) -0.079 .740 -.040 -.107 .916 .103 9.723 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) -0.103 .724 -.056 -.142 .887 .095 10.476 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 0.105 .743 .041 .141 .888 .170 5.885 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) -0.383 .923 -.087 -.415 .680 .328 3.045 
Thoughput:0,Output:1(Functio
nal Background) 0.143 .285 .079 .501 .618 .589 1.698 
INDREN 3.88E-005 .017 .000 .002 .998 .414 2.416 
COMTEN -0.004 .020 -.038 -.186 .853 .347 2.882 
POSTEN 0.018 .022 .156 .835 .407 .419 2.389 
ENV1  0.211 .131 .237 1.612 .113 .675 1.481 
ENV2  -0.082 .126 -.092 -.648 .520 .725 1.380 
ENV3  0.224 .107 .261 2.088 .042 .931 1.074 
ENV4  0.027 .135 .030 .203 .840 .685 1.460 
( High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
 
See Table 6:42 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = .977 
Significance of F= .497 
 R2 = .242 
Adjusted R2 = -.006 
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Table 6:42 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised) of the Rule Formalisation of Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
RULEFORM=ƒ [-0.083 (Intercept) +0.403 (BSc) -0.008 (Master’s) -0.035 (PhD)  -0.353 (Engineering) +0.049 
(Sciences) -0.079 (Business Administration) -0.103 (Business)+ 0.105 (Social Sciences) -0.383 (Marketing)+ 
0.143 (Functional Background)- 3.88E-005 (INDTEN)-0.004 (COMPTEN)+0.018(POSTEN)+ 0.211 (ENV1) -
0.082 (ENV2)+0.224(ENV3)+0.027(ENV4) ] 
Where: 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
Functional Background 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism in Marketing Practices 
ENV2:Environmental Customer Dynamism 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence 
 
Table 6:43 Regression Estimates of the Rule Formalisation of Strategic Decision-Making Process 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-
statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -0.092 .830  -.111 .912   
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) 0.472 1.007 .255 .469 .641 .051 19.784 
Master’s (1:yes, 0:no) -0.018 1.053 -.010 -.017 .986 .043 23.405 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) 0.090 1.079 .037 .084 .934 .076 13.094 
Engineering (1:yes, 0:no) -0.192 .810 -.060 -.237 .814 .229 4.369 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 0.070 1.017 .013 .069 .945 .410 2.437 
Business Administration (1:yes, 
0:no) -0.042 .749 -.021 -.056 .955 .103 9.738 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) -0.096 .733 -.052 -.132 .896 .095 10.476 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 0.113 .756 .045 .150 .881 .168 5.947 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) -0.297 .937 -.068 -.317 .752 .327 3.060 
Thoughput:0,Output:1(Functional 
Background) 0.109 .287 .060 .380 .706 .595 1.681 
INDTEN -0.001 .017 -.009 -.045 .964 .413 2.419 
COMTEN -0.004 .021 -.041 -.194 .847 .340 2.941 
POSTEN 0.015 .022 .125 .655 .515 .411 2.433 
ENV1  0.255 .130 .295 1.955 .056 .658 1.520 
ENV2  -0.098 .126 -.109 -.779 .440 .768 1.303 
ENV3  0.088 .138 .095 .641 .524 .680 1.471 
(High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
 
See Table 6:44 for full parameter notation  
F-statistics = .873 
Significance of F= .602 
 R2 = .209 
Adjusted R2 = -.030 
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Table 6:44 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Rule Formalisation of Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
HIERDECENT1=ƒ [-0.092(Intercept) +0.472(BSc)-0.018(Master’s)+0.090(PhD) -0.192(Engineering) 
+0.070(Sciences) -0.042 (Business Administration) -0.096 (Business)+ 0.113 (Social Sciences) -0.297 
(Marketing)+ 0.109 (Functional Background) -0.001 (INDTEN) -0.004 (COMPTEN)-0.098(POSTEN)+ 
0.255(ENV1)-0.098(ENV2)+0.088(ENV3) ] 
Where: 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
Functional Background 
Functional Background 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism  
ENV2:Environmental Munificence/Hostility 
ENV3: Environmental Complexity 
 
Table 6:45 Regression Estimates of the Hierarchical Decentralisation (Lower Level) of Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
Parameter 
Partial 
regressio
n 
coefficien
t (B) 
Standar
d 
error 
Standardize
d regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -0.277 .861  -.322 .749   
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) -0.956 1.047 -.477 -.914 .365 .050 20.100 
Master’s (1:yes, 0:no) -1.336 1.094 -.698 -1.222 .227 .041 24.142 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) -1.125 1.118 -.423 -1.006 .319 .076 13.092 
Engineering (1:yes, 0:no) 1.227 .809 .403 1.515 .136 .191 5.240 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 2.361 1.059 .406 2.229 .030 .408 2.453 
Business Administration (1:yes, 
0:no) 1.473 .781 .667 1.886 .065 .108 9.258 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) 1.480 .761 .744 1.946 .057 .093 10.809 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 1.896 .777 .714 2.440 .018 .158 6.332 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) 1.812 .968 .379 1.870 .067 .330 3.033 
Thoughput:0,Output:1(Function
al Background) -0.160 .291 -.081 -.551 .584 .623 1.606 
INDTEN 0.027 .017 .286 1.604 .115 .426 2.345 
COMTEN 0.010 .021 .089 .464 .645 .370 2.704 
POSTEN -0.042 .023 -.331 -1.843 .071 .420 2.383 
ENV1  0.148 .132 .155 1.120 .268 .709 1.410 
ENV2  0.132 .132 .140 .998 .323 .687 1.455 
ENV3  0.073 .113 .077 .646 .521 .939 1.065 
ENV4  0.247 .133 .260 1.860 .068 .691 1.448 
 
( High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
See Table 6:46 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 1.171 
Significance of F= .318 
 R2 = .269 
Adjusted R2 = .039 
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Table 6:46 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Lower Level Hierarchical Decentralisation of Strategic 
Decision-Making Process 
 
HIERDECENT1=ƒ [-0.227 (Intercept) + 0.288(BSc)+ 0.552(Master’s)+ 0.057(PhD) -0.130(Engineering) -
0.371(Sciences) -0.300(Business Administration) -0.167(Business)+ 0.297(Social Sciences) -1.069(Marketing)+ 
0.030(Functional Background)-0.001(INDTEN)+0.010(COMPTEN)+0.004 (POSTEN)+ 
0.342(ENV1)+0.061(ENV2)+0.134(ENV3)+0.223(ENV4) ] 
Where: 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
Functional Background 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism in Marketing Practices 
ENV2:Environmental Customer Dynamism 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence 
 
 
 
Table 6:47 Regression Estimates of the Lower  Level Hierarchical Decentralisation of Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficien
t (B) 
Standar
d 
error 
Standardize
d regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Toleranc
e 
VIF 
Intercept -0.231 .854  -.271 .788   
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) -0.975 1.040 -.486 -.937 .353 .050 20.017 
Master’s (1:yes, 0:no) -1.376 1.088 -.719 -1.265 .211 .042 24.088 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) -1.145 1.109 -.431 -1.033 .306 .077 13.003 
Engineering (1:yes, 0:no) 1.259 .808 .414 1.559 .125 .190 5.265 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 2.361 1.050 .406 2.249 .029 .411 2.433 
Business Administration (1:yes, 
0:no) 1.485 .779 .673 1.906 .062 .108 9.291 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) 1.471 .757 .740 1.943 .057 .093 10.810 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 1.900 .777 .715 2.446 .018 .157 6.378 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) 1.839 .967 .385 1.903 .062 .328 3.048 
Thoughput:0,Output:1(Functional 
Background) -0.161 .289 -.081 -.555 .581 .623 1.604 
INDTEN 0.027 .017 .284 1.599 .115 .426 2.347 
COMTEN 0.009 .021 .084 .436 .665 .364 2.748 
POSTEN -0.044 .023 -.345 -1.909 .062 .411 2.430 
ENV1  0.129 .132 .139 .977 .333 .667 1.500 
ENV2  0.171 .127 .180 1.344 .184 .749 1.336 
ENV3  0.229 .136 .236 1.687 .097 .686 1.457 
 
( High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
See Table 6:48 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 1.224 
Significance of F= .280 
 R2 = .263 
Adjusted R2 = .04 
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Table 6:48 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Lower Level  Hierarchical Decentralization of Strategic 
Decision-Making Process 
 
HIERDECENT1=ƒ [-0.231(Intercept) -0.975(BSc)-1.376(Master’s)-1.145(PhD) +1.259(Engineering) 
+2.361(Sciences) +1.485(Business Administration) -1.471(Business)+1.900(Social Sciences) +1.839(Marketing)-
0.161(Functional Background)+0.027(INDTEN)-0.009(COMPTEN)-0.044(POSTEN)+ 
0.129(ENV1)+0.171(ENV2)+0.229(ENV3) ] 
Where: 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
Functional Background 
Functional Background 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism  
ENV2:Environmental Munificence/Hostility 
ENV3: Environmental Complexity 
 
 
Table 6:49 Regression Estimates of the Upper Level Hierarchical Decentralisation of Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
 
Parameter 
Partial 
regressio
n 
coefficie
nt (B) 
Standar
d 
error 
Standardiz
ed 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Toleranc
e 
VIF 
Intercept 1.014 .770  1.317 .193   
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) -0.286 .936 -.158 -.305 .761 .050 20.100 
Master’s (1:yes, 0:no) -0.733 .978 -.424 -.749 .457 .041 24.142 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) -1.344 .999 -.561 -1.344 .184 .076 13.092 
Engineering (1:yes, 0:no) 0.361 .724 .132 .499 .620 .191 5.240 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 0.848 .947 .162 .895 .375 .408 2.453 
Business Administration 
(1:yes, 0:no) -0.233 .698 -.117 -.334 .740 .108 9.258 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) -0.234 .680 -.131 -.345 .732 .093 10.809 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) -0.056 .695 -.023 -.081 .936 .158 6.332 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) 0.339 .866 .079 .392 .697 .330 3.033 
Thoughput:0,Output:1(Functi
onal Background) 0.146 .260 .082 .561 .577 .623 1.606 
INDTEN -0.012 .015 -.145 -.823 .414 .426 2.345 
COMTEN -0.008 .019 -.079 -.419 .677 .370 2.704 
POSTEN -0.002 .020 -.014 -.078 .938 .420 2.383 
ENV1  0.063 .118 .073 .532 .597 .709 1.410 
ENV2  0.180 .118 .212 1.523 .134 .687 1.455 
ENV3  -0.064 .101 -.075 -.631 .530 .939 1.065 
ENV4  0.054 .119 .063 .453 .652 .691 1.448 
( High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
See Table 6:50 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 1.248 
Significance of F= .261 
 R2 = .282 
Adjusted R2 = .056 
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Table 6:50 Regression Estimates(Unstandardised ) of the Upper Level Hierarchical Decentralisation of Strategic 
Decision-Making Process 
 
HIERDECENT2=ƒ [1.014 (Intercept) -0.286 (BSc)-0.733 (Master’s)-1.344(PhD) -0.361(Engineering) -
0.848(Sciences) -0.233(Business Administration) -0.234(Business)- 0.056(Social Sciences) +0.339 (Marketing)+ 
0.146(Functional Background)-0.012(INDTEN)-0.008(COMPTEN)-0.002 (POSTEN)+ 
0.063(ENV1)+0.180(ENV2)-0.064(ENV3)+0.054(ENV4) ] 
Where: 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
Functional Background 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism in Marketing Practices 
ENV2:Environmental Customer Dynamism 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence 
 
 
 
 
Table 6:51 Regression Estimates of the Upper Level Hierarchical Decentralisation of Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
Parameter 
Partial 
regressio
n 
coefficien
t (B) 
Standar
d 
error 
Standardize
d regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 1.054 .761  1.385 .172   
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) -0.243 .927 -.134 -.262 .794 .050 20.017 
Master’s (1:yes, 0:no) -0.697 .969 -.404 -.719 .475 .042 24.088 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) -1.370 .988 -.572 -1.386 .171 .077 13.003 
Engineering (1:yes, 0:no) 0.259 .720 .095 .360 .720 .190 5.265 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 0.722 .936 .138 .772 .444 .411 2.433 
Business Administration (1:yes, 
0:no) -0.353 .694 -.178 -.509 .613 .108 9.291 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) -0.331 .675 -.184 -.490 .626 .093 10.810 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) -0.174 .692 -.073 -.251 .803 .157 6.378 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) 0.188 .862 .044 .218 .828 .328 3.048 
Thoughput:0,Output:1(Function
al Background) 0.213 .258 .120 .826 .412 .623 1.604 
INDTEN -0.012 .015 -.140 -.797 .429 .426 2.347 
COMTEN -0.011 .019 -.113 -.595 .554 .364 2.748 
POSTEN 0.001 .020 .011 .063 .950 .411 2.430 
ENV1  0.053 .118 .063 .448 .656 .667 1.500 
ENV2  0.206 .113 .241 1.820 .074 .749 1.336 
ENV3  -0.020 .121 -.023 -.166 .868 .686 1.457 
(High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
See Table 6:52 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 1.337 
Significance of F= .209 
 R2 = .280 
Adjusted R2 = .071 
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Table 6:52 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Upper Hierarchical Decentralization of Strategic 
Decision-Making Process 
 
HIERDECENT2=ƒ [1.054(Intercept) -0.243(BSc)-0.697(Master’s)-1.370(PhD) +0.259(Engineering) 
+0.722(Sciences) -0.0353(Business Administration) -0.331(Business)-0.174(Social Sciences) +0.188(Marketing)+ 
0.213(Functional Background)-0.012(INDTEN)-0.011(COMPTEN)+0.001(POSTEN)+ 0.053(ENV1)-
0.0206(ENV2)-0.020(ENV3) ] 
Where: 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
Functional Background 
Functional Background 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism  
ENV2:Environmental Munificence/Hostility 
ENV3: Environmental Complexity 
 
 
Table 6:53 Regression Estimates of the Hierarchical Decentralisation of Strategic Decision-Making Process 
 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standar
d 
error 
Standardize
d regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Toleranc
e 
VIF 
Intercept 0.491 .795  .618 .539   
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) -0.907 .968 -.469 -.937 .353 .050 20.017 
Master’s (1:yes, 0:no) -1.505 1.012 -.817 -1.487 .143 .042 24.088 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) -1.755 1.032 -.686 -1.700 .095 .077 13.003 
Engineering (1:yes, 0:no) 1.137 .752 .388 1.513 .136 .190 5.265 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 2.282 .977 .408 2.335 .023 .411 2.433 
Business Administration (1:yes, 
0:no) 0.922 .725 .434 1.272 .209 .108 9.291 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) 0.926 .705 .483 1.314 .194 .093 10.810 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 1.357 .723 .530 1.877 .066 .157 6.378 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) 1.540 .900 .334 1.711 .093 .328 3.048 
Thoughput:0,Output:1(Function
al Background) 0.011 .269 .006 .042 .967 .623 1.604 
INDTEN 0.013 .016 .144 .842 .404 .426 2.347 
COMTEN -5.60E-006 .019 .000 .000 1.000 .364 2.748 
POSTEN -0.033 .021 -.270 -1.545 .128 .411 2.430 
ENV1  0.133 .123 .148 1.083 .283 .667 1.500 
ENV2  0.262 .118 .287 2.223 .030 .749 1.336 
ENV3  0.164 .126 .175 1.299 .199 .686 1.457 
 
( High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
See Table 6:54 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 1.555 
Significance of F= .114 
 R2 = .311 
Adjusted R2 = .111 
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Table 6:54 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Hierarchical Decentralization of Strategic Decision-
Making Process 
 
HIERDECENT=ƒ [0.491(Intercept) -0.2(BSc)-1.505(Master’s)-1.775(PhD) +1.137(Engineering) +2.282(Sciences) 
+0.922(Business Administration) -0.926(Business)+1.357(Social Sciences) +1.540(Marketing)+ 0.011(Functional 
Background)-0.013(INDTEN) -5.60E-006 (COMPTEN)-0.033(POSTEN)+ 
0.133(ENV1)+0.262(ENV2)+0.164(ENV3) ] 
Where: 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
Functional Background 
Functional Background 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism  
ENV2:Environmental Munificence/Hostility 
ENV3: Environmental Complexity 
 
 
Table 6:55 Regression Estimates of the Lateral Communication of Strategic Decision-Making Process 
 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -0.928 .834  -1.112 .272   
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) 0.165 .994 .077 .166 .869 .056 17.919 
Master’s (1:yes, 0:no) -0.362 1.050 -.180 -.345 .732 .044 22.880 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) -0.247 1.095 -.085 -.226 .822 .084 11.859 
Engineering (1:yes, 0:no) 0.764 .763 .250 1.000 .322 .192 5.218 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 1.447 1.009 .248 1.434 .158 .397 2.520 
Business Administration 
(1:yes, 0:no) 0.592 .749 .248 .791 .433 .121 8.252 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) 0.751 .729 .357 1.030 .308 .099 10.068 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 0.903 .744 .324 1.215 .231 .167 5.973 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) 1.069 .916 .223 1.167 .249 .327 3.062 
Thoughput:0,Output:1(Functi
onal Background) 0.162 .301 .077 .536 .594 .580 1.723 
INDTEN 0.024 .017 .243 1.449 .154 .422 2.369 
COMTEN -0.001 .020 -.009 -.048 .962 .371 2.697 
POSTEN -0.005 .022 -.035 -.214 .832 .435 2.298 
ENV1  0.402 .129 .419 3.106 .003 .655 1.528 
ENV2  -0.033 .132 -.033 -.248 .805 .691 1.447 
ENV3  0.174 .115 .170 1.511 .138 .940 1.063 
ENV4  0.314 .132 .319 2.372 .022 .661 1.514 
 
( High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
See Table 6:56 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 2.171 
Significance of F= .019 
 R2 = .440 
Adjusted R2 = .237 
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Table 6:56 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Lateral Communication of Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
 
LATCOMM=ƒ [-0.928 (Intercept) +0.165 (BSc)-0.362 (Master’s)-0.247(PhD) +0.764(Engineering) +1.447(Sciences) 
+0.592(Business Administration) +1.447(Business)+0.903 (Social Sciences) 1.069 (Marketing)+ 0.162(Functional 
Background)+0.024(INDTEN) -0.001 (COMPTEN) -0.005 (POSTEN)+ 0.402 (ENV1) -0.033 (ENV2)-
0.174(ENV3)+0.314(ENV4) ] 
Where: 
 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
Functional Background 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism in Marketing Practices 
ENV2:Environmental Customer Dynamism 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence 
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Table 6:57 Regression Estimates of the Lateral Communication of Strategic Decision-Making Process 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-
statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -0.906 .818  -1.107 .274   
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) 0.170 .975 .079 .175 .862 .056 17.820 
Master’s (1:yes, 0:no) -0.410 1.032 -.204 -.398 .693 .044 22.796 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) -0.213 1.073 -.073 -.199 .843 .085 11.761 
Engineering (1:yes, 0:no) 0.912 .754 .298 1.210 .232 .190 5.253 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 1.473 .988 .253 1.490 .143 .401 2.495 
Business Administration (1:yes, 
0:no) 0.713 .739 .299 .964 .340 .120 8.309 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) 0.798 .716 .380 1.115 .271 .100 10.043 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 1.007 .736 .361 1.369 .177 .166 6.034 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) 1.221 .903 .255 1.352 .183 .325 3.077 
Thoughput:0,Output:1(Functional 
Background) 0.104 .299 .049 .348 .730 .570 1.754 
INDTEN 0.023 .016 .235 1.421 .162 .422 2.372 
COMTEN 0.001 .020 .008 .047 .963 .364 2.744 
POSTEN -0.011 .022 -.083 -.508 .614 .430 2.328 
ENV1  0.346 .130 .357 2.660 .011 .641 1.561 
ENV2  -0.027 .131 -.027 -.210 .835 .688 1.453 
ENV3  0.426 .129 .428 3.303 .002 .686 1.458 
 
( High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
See Table 6:58 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 2.413 
Significance of F= .010 
 R2 = .446 
Adjusted R2 = .26 
Table 6:58 Regression Estimates(Unstandardised ) of the Lateral Communication of Strategic Decision-Making Process 
 
LATCOMM=ƒ [-0.906(Intercept) +0.170(BSc)-1.410(Master’s)-0.213(PhD)+ 0.912 (Engineering) - 1.473 (Sciences) + 
0.713 (Business Administration) +0.798 (Business)+ 1.007 (Social Sciences) + 1.221 (Marketing)+ 0.104 (Functional 
Background)+ 0.023 (INDTEN) +0.001 (COMPTEN) -0.011 (POSTEN)+ 0.346(ENV1)-0.027(ENV2)+0.426(ENV3) ] 
Where: 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
Functional Background 
Functional Background 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism  
ENV2:Environmental Munificence/Hostility 
ENV3: Environmental Complexity 
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Table 6:59 Regression Estimates of the Product and Process Innovation Strategies  
 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -0.030 1.043  -.029 .977   
OUTDIR 0.126 .098 .191 1.290 .205 .572 1.750 
AGED -0.040 .019 -.434 -2.037 .049 .277 3.613 
FEMREPRES 0.078 .164 .069 .477 .636 .602 1.661 
INDTEN 0.017 .020 .186 .867 .391 .275 3.642 
COMTEN 0.015 .019 .148 .780 .440 .348 2.874 
POSTEN 0.039 .023 .334 1.732 .091 .339 2.953 
ENV1   0.357 .125 .402 2.862 .007 .639 1.566 
ENV2  -0.137 .154 -.126 -.885 .382 .622 1.609 
ENV3  0.376 .134 .418 2.807 .008 .567 1.762 
ENV4  0.300 .149 .307 2.016 .051 .543 1.842 
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) 0.187 1.004 .094 .186 .854 .049 20.469 
Masters (1:yes, 0:no) 0.571 1.073 .303 .533 .597 .039 25.707 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) 0.965 1.092 .371 .884 .382 .071 14.030 
Engineering (1:yes, 
0:no) 0.275 .994 .082 .276 .784 .143 6.990 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 0.118 1.096 .023 .107 .915 .279 3.590 
Business 
Administration (1:yes, 
0:no) 
0.110 .898 .052 .122 .903 .069 14.455 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) 0.519 .908 .265 .572 .571 .058 17.114 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 
0:no) 0.487 .904 .187 .538 .593 .104 9.626 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) 0.344 1.057 .067 .326 .747 .299 3.341 
( High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
 
See Table 6:60 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 2.186 
Significance of F= .020 
 R2 = .522 
Adjusted R2 = .283 
 
Table 6:60 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Product and Process Innovation Strategies 
INNV1=ƒ [-0.030 (Intercept) +0.126 (OUTDIR)-0.040 (AGED)+0.078(FEMREPRES) +0.017 (INDTEN)-0.015 
(COMPTEN)+0.039(POSTEN)+0.187 (BSc) +0.571 (Master’s) +0.965 (PhD)  +0.275 (Engineering) +0.118 
(Sciences) +0.110 (Business Administration) +0.519(Business)+ 0.487 (Social Sciences) +0.344 (Marketing)+ 
0.357 (ENV1) -0.137(ENV2)+0.376(ENV3)+0.300(ENV4) ] 
Where: 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
AGED: Age of Directors 
OUTDIR: Outside directors 
FEMREPRES: Female representation 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism in Marketing Practices 
ENV2:Environmental Customer Dynamism 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence 
INNV1:Product and Process Innovation 
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Table 6:61 Regression Estimates of the Organisational Innovation Strategies  
 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 0.815 1.347  .605 .549   
OUTDIR -0.051 .126 -.074 -.404 .689 .572 1.750 
AGED 0.012 .025 .131 .497 .622 .277 3.613 
FEMREPRES -0.284 .212 -.239 -1.341 .188 .602 1.661 
INDTEN 0.005 .025 .050 .190 .850 .275 3.642 
COMTEN 0.012 .025 .116 .495 .623 .348 2.874 
POSTEN -0.037 .029 -.303 -1.274 .211 .339 2.953 
ENV1   0.119 .161 .128 .740 .464 .639 1.566 
ENV2  0.067 .199 .059 .334 .740 .622 1.609 
ENV3  -0.051 .173 -.054 -.293 .771 .567 1.762 
ENV4  -0.017 .192 -.017 -.089 .929 .543 1.842 
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) -0.114 1.297 -.055 -.088 .930 .049 20.469 
Masters (1:yes, 0:no) -0.481 1.385 -.243 -.347 .731 .039 25.707 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) -0.562 1.410 -.207 -.399 .692 .071 14.030 
Engineering (1:yes, 
0:no) -0.838 1.284 -.239 -.653 .518 .143 6.990 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 0.532 1.415 .099 .376 .709 .279 3.590 
Business 
Administration (1:yes, 
0:no) 
-0.378 1.159 -.171 -.326 .746 .069 14.455 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) -0.623 1.173 -.304 -.531 .598 .058 17.114 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 
0:no)  1.168 -.286 -.667 .509 .104 9.626 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) -0.041 1.365 -.008 -.030 .976 .299 3.341 
( High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
 
See Table 6:62 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = .748 
Significance of F= .748 
 R2 = .272 
Adjusted R2 = -.092 
 
Table 6:62 Regression Estimates(Unstandardised ) of the Organisational Innovation Strategies 
INNV2=ƒ [0.815 (Intercept) -0.051 (OUTDIR)+0.012 (AGED) -0.284 (FEMREPRES) +0.005 (INDTEN)+0.005 
(COMPTEN)+0.012(POSTEN)-0.114 (BSc) -0.481 (Master’s) -0.562 (PhD) -0.838 (Engineering) + 0.532 
(Sciences) -0.378 (Business Administration) -0.623 (Business) -0.779 (Social Sciences) -0.041 (Marketing)+ 
0.119(ENV1) +0.067(ENV2)-0.051(ENV3)-0.017(ENV4) ] 
Where 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
AGED: Age of Directors 
OUTDIR: Outside directors 
FEMREPRES: Female representation 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism in Marketing Practices 
ENV2:Environmental Customer Dynamism 
ENV3: Environmental Competitor’s Dynamism 
ENV4: Environmental Complexity-Munificence 
INNV2:Organisational  Innovation 
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Table 6:63 Regression Estimates of the Product Innovation Strategies  
 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -1.100 1.159  -.949 .348   
OUTDIR -0.005 .107 -.008 -.049 .961 .615 1.627 
AGED -0.023 .022 -.263 -1.073 .290 .288 3.476 
FEMREPRES -0.044 .167 -.040 -.262 .794 .746 1.340 
INDTEN 0.029 .022 .331 1.340 .188 .283 3.529 
COMTEN -0.010 .022 -.105 -.466 .644 .342 2.928 
POSTEN 0.049 .026 .433 1.893 .066 .330 3.028 
ENV1   0.211 .156 .250 1.357 .183 .508 1.970 
ENV2  0.131 .174 .128 .751 .457 .596 1.679 
ENV3  0.324 .156 .336 2.076 .045 .660 1.516 
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) 0.491 1.138 .256 .431 .669 .049 20.472 
Masters (1:yes, 0:no) 0.814 1.213 .446 .671 .506 .039 25.643 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) 1.054 1.234 .419 .854 .398 .072 13.966 
Engineering (1:yes, 
0:no) 1.029 1.123 .317 .916 .366 .144 6.958 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 0.125 1.237 .025 .101 .920 .280 3.568 
Business 
Administration (1:yes, 
0:no) 
0.993 1.017 .488 .976 .335 .069 14.461 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) 0.766 1.029 .405 .744 .461 .058 17.123 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 
0:no) 1.204 1.021 .480 1.180 .245 .105 9.565 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) 0.950 1.193 .191 .796 .431 .301 3.318 
( High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
 
See Table 6:64 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 1.048 
Significance of F= .434 
 R2 = .326 
Adjusted R2 = .015 
 
 
Table 6:64 Regression Estimates(Unstandardised ) of the Product Innovation Strategies 
INNPD=ƒ [-1.100 (Intercept) +0.005 (OUTDIR)-0.023 (AGED) -0.044(FEMREPRES) +0.029 (INDTEN)-0.010 
(COMPTEN)+0.049(POSTEN)+0.049 (BSc) +0.814 (Master’s) +1.054 (PhD) +1.029(Engineering) + 0.125(Sciences) 
+0.993 (Business Administration) +0.766 (Business) +1.204 (Social Sciences) +0.950 (Marketing)+ 0.211(ENV1) 
+0.131(ENV2)+0.324(ENV3) ] 
Where 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
AGED: Age of Directors 
OUTDIR: Outside directors 
FEMREPRES: Female representation 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism  
ENV2:Environmental Munificence/Hostility  
ENV3: Environmental Complexity 
INNVPD: Product Innovation 
 
388 
 
Table 6:65 Regression Estimates of the Process Innovation Strategies  
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 2.404 1.246  1.929 .061   
OUTDIR 0.113 .115 .151 .985 .331 .615 1.627 
AGED -0.056 .023 -.544 -2.429 .020 .288 3.476 
FEMREPRES -0.070 .179 -.054 -.390 .699 .746 1.340 
INDTEN 0.004 .023 .041 .183 .855 .283 3.529 
COMTEN 0.044 .024 .379 1.843 .073 .342 2.928 
POSTEN -0.009 .028 -.065 -.311 .757 .330 3.028 
ENV1   0.284 .167 .286 1.697 .098 .508 1.970 
ENV2  -0.280 .187 -.232 -1.492 .144 .596 1.679 
ENV3  0.332 .168 .293 1.979 .055 .660 1.516 
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) -0.506 1.224 -.225 -.414 .681 .049 20.472 
Masters (1:yes, 0:no) -0.261 1.305 -.122 -.200 .842 .039 25.643 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) 0.292 1.327 .099 .220 .827 .072 13.966 
Engineering (1:yes, 
0:no) -0.256 1.208 -.067 -.212 .833 .144 6.958 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 0.247 1.331 .042 .185 .854 .280 3.568 
Business 
Administration (1:yes, 
0:no) 
-0.781 1.094 -.326 -.714 .479 .069 14.461 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) 0.042 1.107 .019 .038 .970 .058 17.123 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 
0:no) -0.358 1.098 -.121 -.326 .746 .105 9.565 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) -0.339 1.283 -.058 -.264 .793 .301 3.318 
( High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
 
See Table 6:66 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 1.678 
Significance of F=.087 
 R2 = .436 
Adjusted R2 = .176 
 
Table 6:66 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Process Innovation Strategies 
 
INNPC=ƒ [2.404 (Intercept) +0.113(OUTDIR)-0.056 (AGED) -0.070(FEMREPRES) +0.004 (INDTEN)+0.044 
(COMPTEN)-0.009(POSTEN)+0.506 (BSc) -0.261 (Master’s) +0.292 (PhD)-0.256(Engineering) +0.247(Sciences) -
0.781 (Business Administration) +0.042(Business) -0.358 (Social Sciences) -0.339 (Marketing)+ 0.284(ENV1) -
0.280(ENV2)+0.332(ENV3) ] 
Where 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
AGED: Age of Directors 
OUTDIR: Outside directors 
FEMREPRES: Female representation 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism  
ENV2:Environmental Munificence/Hostility  
ENV3: Environmental Complexity 
INNVPC: Process Innovation 
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Table 6:67 Regression Estimates of the Organisational Innovation Strategies  
 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 0.162 1.306  .124 .902   
OUTDIR -0.062 .120 -.090 -.515 .610 .615 1.627 
AGED 0.026 .024 .269 1.058 .297 .288 3.476 
FEMREPRES -0.218 .188 -.183 -1.162 .252 .746 1.340 
INDTEN 0.004 .025 .037 .144 .887 .283 3.529 
COMTEN 0.004 .025 .038 .162 .872 .342 2.928 
POSTEN -0.035 .029 -.283 -1.191 .241 .330 3.028 
ENV1   0.071 .175 .077 .405 .688 .508 1.970 
ENV2  0.075 .196 .068 .383 .704 .596 1.679 
ENV3  -0.052 .176 -.050 -.296 .769 .660 1.516 
BSc (1:yes, 0:no) 0.017 1.282 .008 .013 .990 .049 20.472 
Masters (1:yes, 0:no) -0.397 1.367 -.200 -.290 .773 .039 25.643 
PhD (1:yes, 0:no) -0.619 1.390 -.227 -.446 .658 .072 13.966 
Engineering (1:yes, 
0:no) -0.841 1.266 -.239 -.664 .510 .144 6.958 
Sciences (1:yes, 0:no) 0.442 1.394 .082 .317 .753 .280 3.568 
Business 
Administration (1:yes, 
0:no) 
-0.196 1.146 -.089 -.171 .865 .069 14.461 
Business (1:yes, 0:no) -0.629 1.159 -.306 -.542 .591 .058 17.123 
Social Sciences (1:yes, 
0:no) -0.707 1.150 -.259 -.615 .542 .105 9.565 
Marketing (1:yes, 0:no) 0.018 1.344 .003 .013 .989 .301 3.318 
( High school and Civil engineering have been deleted from the analysis) 
 
See Table 6:68 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = .821 
Significance of F=.666 
 R2 = .275 
Adjusted R2 = -.060 
 
 
 
Table 6:68 Regression Estimates (Unstandardised ) of the Organisation Innovation Strategies 
INNVORG=ƒ [0.162 (Intercept) -0.062 (OUTDIR)+0.026 (AGED) -0.218(FEMREPRES) 
+0.004(INDTEN)+0.004 (COMPTEN)-0.035(POSTEN)+0.017(BSc) -0.397 (Master’s) -0.619 (PhD) -
0.841(Engineering) +0.442(Sciences) -0.196 (Business Administration) -0.629(Business) -0.707 (Social Sciences) 
+0.018 (Marketing)+ 0.071(ENV1) +0.075(ENV2)-0.052(ENV3) ] 
Where 
BSc 
Master’s 
PhD 
Engineering 
Sciences 
Business Administration 
Business 
Social Sciences 
Marketing 
AGED: Age of Directors 
OUTDIR: Outside directors 
FEMREPRES: Female representation 
INDTEN: Industry Tenure 
COMPTEN: Company Tenure 
POSTEN: Position Tenure 
ENV1: Environmental Dynamism  
ENV2:Environmental Munificence/Hostility  
ENV3: Environmental Complexity 
INNVORG: Organisation  Innovation 
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Table 6:69 Regression Estimates of the Organisational Performance    
 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficien
t (B) 
Standar
d 
error 
Standardize
d regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -0.085 .159  -.531 .599   
INVSDM1FORMPROCESSSDM -0.140 .142 -.167 -.987 .330 .745 1.343 
INVSDM2FOREVOFSDM 0.012 .141 .014 .082 .935 .712 1.404 
INVSDM3EVSDM -0.004 .160 -.004 -.027 .979 .830 1.206 
FINREPORTING 0.475 .214 .454 2.223 .033 .509 1.966 
RULEFORM 0.009 .208 .010 .044 .965 .445 2.248 
HIERDECENTR1 0.126 .217 .111 .582 .564 .580 1.725 
HIERADECENTR2 -0.086 .217 -.073 -.394 .696 .628 1.593 
LATCOMM -0.009 .210 -.009 -.043 .966 .486 2.059 
PRODPROCINNOV 0.034 .216 .031 .158 .875 .547 1.827 
ORGINN 0.040 .233 .041 .173 .864 .385 2.595 
 
See Table 6:70 for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 1.108 
Significance of F= .383 
 R2 = .235 
Adjusted R2 = .023 
 
 
Table 6:70 Regression Estimates(Unstandardised ) of the Organisational Performance  
ORGPERF=ƒ [-0.085 (Intercept) -0.140 (INVSDM1)+0.012(INVSDM2)-
0.004(INVSDM3)+0.475(FINREPORTING)+0.009(RULEFORM)+0.126(HIERDECENTR1)-
0.086(HIERDECENTR2)-0.009(LATCOMM)+0.034(PRODPROCINNOV)+0.040(ORGINN ] 
Where: 
INVSDM1 Formation and Process of SDM 
INVSDM2 Formation and Evaluation of SDM 
INVSDM3 Evaluation of SDM 
FINREP: Financial Reporting 
RULEFORM: Rule Formalisation 
HIERDECENT1:Lower Level Management 
HIERDECENT2:Upper Level Management 
LATCOM: Lateral Communication 
INNV1:Product &Process Innovation 
INNV2:Organisational Innovation 
 
 
 
Table 6:71 Regression Estimates of the Organisational Performance    
 
 
 
Parameter 
Partial 
regression 
coefficient 
(B) 
Standard 
error 
Standardized 
regression 
coefficient 
(Beta) 
t-
statistic Sig. Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -0.089 .158  -.561 .579   
INVSDM1FORMATION 
OF SDM -0.145 .147 -.167 -.986 .331 .747 1.338 
INVSDM2EVALUATION 
OF SDM 0.193 .141 .210 1.363 .182 .906 1.104 
FINREPORTING 0.523 .202 .500 2.590 .014 .574 1.741 
RULEFORM -0.074 .208 -.075 -.358 .722 .487 2.052 
HIERDECENTR 0.052 .247 .043 .210 .835 .514 1.947 
LATCOMM 0.005 .207 .005 .026 .980 .517 1.934 
PRODINN -0.005 .187 -.005 -.025 .980 .641 1.560 
PROCINN 0.083 .186 .084 .448 .657 .605 1.654 
ORGINN 0.046 .225 .046 .207 .838 .425 2.354 
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See Table 6:72for full parameter notation  
 
F-statistics = 1.295 
Significance of F= .274 
 R2 = .250 
Adjusted R2 = .057 
 
Table 6:72 Regression Estimates(Unstandardised ) of the Organisational  Performance 
ORGPERF=ƒ [-0.085 (Intercept) -0.145 (INVSDM1)+0.193(INVSDM2+0.523(FINREPORTING)-
0.074(RULEFORM)+0.052(HIERDECENTR)+0.005(LATCOMM)-
0.005(PRODINN)+0.083(PROCINN)+0.046(ORGINN)] 
Where: 
INVSDM1: Formation and Process of SDM 
INVSDM2 :Evaluation of SDM 
FINREP: Financial Reporting 
RULEFORM: Rule Formalisation 
HIERDECENT: Hierarchical Decentralisation 
LATCOM: Lateral Communication 
PRODINN:Product Innovation 
PROCINN: Process Innovation  
ORGINN: Organisational Innovation 
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APPENDIX G: General Linear Model (GLM) Analysis Results 
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Table 6:73 Univariate Analyses of Variance for Total Number of Board Members 
 
  
  Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .064 (Adjusted R Squared = .013) 
 
 
 
Table 6:74 Univariate Analyses of Variance for Total Number of Board Members 
 
   
Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .035 (Adjusted R Squared = -.003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 41.479(b) 4 10.370 1.259 .294 .064 .376 
Intercept 5051.616 1 5051.616 613.314 .000 .892 1.000 
ENV1: 
Environmental 
Dynamism in 
Marketing 
Practices 3.593 1 3.593 .436 .511 .006 .100 
ENV2: 
Environmental 
Customer 
Dynamism 25.566 1 25.566 3.104 .082 .040 .413 
ENV3: 
Environmental 
Competitor’s 
Dynamism 9.851 1 9.851 1.196 .278 .016 .190 
ENV4: 
Environmental 
Complexity-
Munificence 2.178 1 2.178 .264 .609 .004 .080 
Error 609.508 74 8.237     
Total 5723.000 79      
Corrected Total 650.987 78      
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 22.904(b) 3 7.635 .912 .440 .035 .241 
Intercept 5060.556 1 5060.556 604.286 .000 .890 1.000 
ENV1: 
Environmental 
Dynamism 1.829 1 1.829 .218 .642 .003 .075 
ENV2: 
Environmental 
Munificence/Host
ility 14.488 1 14.488 1.730 .192 .023 .255 
ENV3: 
Environmental 
Complexity 6.545 1 6.545 .782 .379 .010 .141 
Error 628.083 75 8.374     
Total 5723.000 79      
Corrected Total 650.987 78      
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Table 6:75 Univariate Analysis of Variance for Interlocking Directors 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 14.488(b) 4 3.622 .364 .833 .024 .127 
Intercept 801.541 1 801.541 80.547 .000 .577 1.000 
ENV1: 
Environmental 
Dynamism in 
Marketing 
Practices .255 1 .255 .026 .873 .000 .053 
ENV2: 
Environmental 
Customer 
Dynamism .877 1 .877 .088 .768 .001 .060 
ENV3: 
Environmental 
Competitor’s 
Dynamism 10.426 1 10.426 1.048 .310 .017 .172 
ENV4: 
Environmental 
Complexity-
Munificence 2.302 1 2.302 .231 .632 .004 .076 
Error 587.121 59 9.951     
Total 1421.000 64      
Corrected Total 601.609 63      
Computed using alpha = .05,   R Squared = .024 (Adjusted R Squared = -.042) 
 
 
Table 6:76 Univariate Analysis of Variance for Interlocking Directors 
 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 7.423(b) 3 2.474 .250 .861 .012 .095 
Intercept 797.517 1 797.517 80.532 .000 .573 1.000 
ENV1: 
Environmental 
Dynamism .514 1 .514 .052 .821 .001 .056 
ENV2: 
Environmental 
Munificence/Hostili
ty 1.719 1 1.719 .174 .678 .003 .069 
ENV3: 
Environmental 
Complexity 5.076 1 5.076 .513 .477 .008 .109 
Error 594.186 60 9.903     
Total 1421.000 64      
Corrected Total 601.609 63      
Computed using alpha = .05,   R Squared = .012 (Adjusted R Squared = -.037) 
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Table 6:77 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Leadership Structure 
 
 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 1.733(b) 4 .433 1.795 .139 .088 .522 
Intercept 187.112 1 187.112 775.188 .000 .913 1.000 
ENV1: 
Environmental 
Dynamism in 
Marketing Practices 1.245 1 1.245 5.157 .026 .065 .611 
ENV2: 
Environmental 
Customer 
Dynamism .233 1 .233 .967 .329 .013 .163 
ENV3: 
Environmental 
Competitor’s 
Dynamism .045 1 .045 .185 .669 .002 .071 
ENV4: 
Environmental 
Complexity-
Munificence .228 1 .228 .944 .334 .013 .160 
Error 17.862 74 .241     
Total 208.000 79      
Corrected Total 19.595 78      
 Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .088 (Adjusted R Squared = .039) 
 
Table 6:78 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Leadership Structure 
 
Computed using alpha = .05,   R Squared = .104 (Adjusted R Squared = .068) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 2.028(b) 3 .676 2.887 .041 .104 .667 
Intercept 187.177 1 187.177 799.148 .000 .914 1.000 
ENV1: 
Environmental 
Dynamism 1.286 1 1.286 5.489 .022 .068 .638 
ENV2: 
Environmental 
Munificence/Hostility .801 1 .801 3.421 .068 .044 .447 
ENV3: 
Environmental 
Complexity .016 1 .016 .068 .795 .001 .058 
Error 17.567 75 .234     
Total 208.000 79      
Corrected Total 19.595 78      
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Table 6:79 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Board Size 
 
   
Computed using alpha = .05,  R Squared = .111 (Adjusted R Squared = .102) 
 
Table 6:80 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Organisational Performance  
   
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 3.007(b) 1 3.007 3.332 .072 .042 .437 
Intercept 2.416 1 2.416 2.678 .106 .034 .366 
Board Size 
3.007 1 3.007 3.332 .072 .042 .437 
Error 68.568 76 .902     
Total 71.627 78      
Corrected Total 71.575 77      
Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .042 (Adjusted R Squared = .029) 
 
 
Table 6:81 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Executive Board Members  
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 45.128(b) 1 45.128 20.198 .000 .183 .994 
Intercept 16.576 1 16.576 7.419 .008 .076 .769 
Board Size 45.128 1 45.128 20.198 .000 .183 .994 
Error 201.079 90 2.234     
Total 1205.000 92      
Corrected Total 246.207 91      
Computed using alpha = .05,  R Squared = .183 (Adjusted R Squared = .174) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 91.552(b) 1 91.552 12.419 .001 .111 .937 
Intercept 4915.068 1 4915.068 666.734 .000 .871 1.000 
Organisational 
Size 91.552 1 91.552 12.419 .001 .111 .937 
Error 729.814 99 7.372     
Total 7414.000 101      
Corrected Total 821.366 100      
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Table 6:82 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Non- Executive Board Members 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 210.444(b) 1 210.444 61.674 .000 .461 1.000 
Intercept 16.762 1 16.762 4.912 .030 .064 .590 
Board Size 210.444 1 210.444 61.674 .000 .461 1.000 
Error 245.677 72 3.412     
Total 1493.000 74      
Corrected Total 456.122 73      
 Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .461 (Adjusted R Squared = .454) 
 
Table 6:83 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Formation and Process in the Involvement in the Strategic 
Decision-Making 
Computed using alpha = .05,  R Squared = .317 (Adjusted R Squared = .236) 
 
Table 6:84Univariate Analysis of Variance for Formation and Evaluation of the Strategic Decision-Making 
 Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .142 (Adjusted R Squared = .040) 
 
  
 
 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 22.582(b) 7 3.226 3.916 .001 .317 .970 
Intercept 
.108 1 .108 .131 .719 .002 .065 
Frequency of Board 
Meetings 15.912 2 7.956 9.658 .000 .247 .977 
Duration of Board 
Meetings 2.530 2 1.265 1.536 .224 .049 .314 
Board Size 1.410 1 1.410 1.711 .196 .028 .251 
Inside/Internal 
Directors  .589 1 .589 .715 .401 .012 .132 
ENV4: 
Environmental 
Complexity-
Munificence .137 1 .137 .166 .685 .003 .069 
Error 48.605 59 .824     
Total 71.346 67      
Corrected Total 71.187 66      
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 9.837(b) 7 1.405 1.396 .224 .142 .543 
Intercept 3.977 1 3.977 3.952 .051 .063 .498 
Frequency of Board 
Meetings 1.680 2 .840 .835 .439 .028 .186 
Duration of Board 
Meetings 4.560 2 2.280 2.265 .113 .071 .443 
Board Size 2.260 1 2.260 2.246 .139 .037 .314 
Inside/Internal 
Directors  .021 1 .021 .021 .885 .000 .052 
ENV4:Environmental 
Complexity-
Munificence .172 1 .172 .171 .681 .003 .069 
Error 59.378 59 1.006     
Total 69.396 67      
Corrected Total 69.215 66      
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Table 6:85 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Evaluation of the Strategic Decision-Making 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 12.598(b) 7 1.800 2.036 .065 .195 .739 
Intercept 
.124 1 .124 .141 .709 .002 .066 
Frequency of Board 
Meetings 4.879 2 2.439 2.760 .071 .086 .524 
Duration of  Board 
Meetings 5.816 2 2.908 3.290 .044 .100 .603 
Board Size 
2.005 1 2.005 2.268 .137 .037 .316 
Inside/Internal 
Directors  5.152 1 5.152 5.828 .019 .090 .661 
ENV4:Environmental 
Complexity-
Munificence 2.290 1 2.290 2.591 .113 .042 .353 
Error 52.151 59 .884     
Total 64.907 67      
Corrected Total 64.749 66      
 Computed using alpha = .05,  R Squared = .195 (Adjusted R Squared = .099) 
 
Table 6:86 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Formation of the Strategic Decision-Making 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 25.372(b) 7 3.625 4.984 .000 .380 .993 
Intercept 
.788 1 .788 1.084 .302 .019 .176 
Frequency of Board 
Meetings 20.100 2 10.050 13.818 .000 .327 .998 
Duration of Board 
Meetings 1.757 2 .879 1.208 .306 .041 .254 
Board Size 
.032 1 .032 .044 .835 .001 .055 
Inside/Internal 
Directors  .121 1 .121 .167 .685 .003 .069 
ENV3:Environmental 
Complexity-
Munificence .996 1 .996 1.369 .247 .023 .210 
Error 41.456 57 .727     
Total 66.992 65      
Corrected Total 66.828 64      
Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .380 (Adjusted R Squared = .303) 
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Table 6:87 Univariate Analysis of Variance for Evaluation of the Strategic Decision-Making 
 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 18.013(b) 7 2.573 3.702 .002 .313 .960 
Intercept 3.194 1 3.194 4.595 .036 .075 .559 
Frequency of Board 
Meetings 2.188 2 1.094 1.574 .216 .052 .320 
Duration of  Board 
Meetings 13.089 2 6.545 9.416 .000 .248 .973 
Board Size 4.862 1 4.862 6.995 .011 .109 .739 
Inside/Internal Directors  2.539 1 2.539 3.653 .061 .060 .468 
ENV3:Environmental 
Complexity-
Munificence 1.067 1 1.067 1.535 .220 .026 .230 
Error 39.620 57 .695     
Total 57.638 65      
Corrected Total 57.633 64      
Computed using alpha = .05,   R Squared = .313 (Adjusted R Squared = .228) 
 
Table 6:88 Univariate Analysis of Variance for Financial Reporting in Strategic Decision-Making Process 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 14.238(b) 17 .838 1.303 .233 .325 .718 
Intercept 
.307 1 .307 .478 .493 .010 .104 
Educational Level 
.003 1 .003 .004 .948 .000 .050 
Educational Specialty 
.205 1 .205 .318 .575 .007 .086 
Functional Background 
.026 1 .026 .041 .841 .001 .054 
Industry Tenure of Board 
Members 1.424 3 .475 .738 .535 .046 .195 
Company Tenure of Board 
Members 3.937 6 .656 1.021 .424 .117 .361 
Position Tenure of Board 
Members 
.008 1 .008 .013 .910 .000 .051 
ENV1: Environmental 
Dynamism in Marketing 
Practices 4.877 1 4.877 7.586 .008 .142 .769 
ENV2:Environmental 
Customer Dynamism 
.180 1 .180 .280 .599 .006 .081 
ENV3:Environmental 
Competitor’s Dynamism 
1.139 1 1.139 1.772 .190 .037 .256 
ENV4:Environmental 
Complexity-Munificence 1.800 1 1.800 2.800 .101 .057 .374 
Error 29.576 46 .643     
Total 45.352 64      
Corrected Total 43.814 63      
Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .325 (Adjusted R Squared = .076) 
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Table 6:89 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Financial Reporting in Strategic Decision-Making Process 
 
 Computed using alpha = .05,  R Squared = .307 (Adjusted R Squared = .071) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 13.448(b) 16 .841 1.301 .236 .307 .706 
Intercept 
.227 1 .227 .352 .556 .007 .089 
Educational Level 1.281 3 .427 .661 .580 .040 .178 
Educational Specialty 
3.985 6 .664 1.028 .419 .116 .364 
Functional Background 
.053 1 .053 .082 .776 .002 .059 
Industry Tenure of 
Board Members 
.008 1 .008 .012 .913 .000 .051 
Company Tenure of 
Board Members 
.164 1 .164 .253 .617 .005 .078 
Position Tenure of 
Board Members 
.001 1 .001 .002 .966 .000 .050 
ENV1: Environmental 
Dynamism 4.032 1 4.032 6.241 .016 .117 .687 
ENV2: Environmental 
Munificence/Hostility 
.409 1 .409 .633 .430 .013 .122 
ENV3: Environmental 
Complexity 2.112 1 2.112 3.269 .077 .065 .425 
Error 30.366 47 .646     
Total 45.352 64      
Corrected Total 43.814 63      
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Table 6:90 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Rule Formalisation in Strategic Decision-Making Process 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Observ
ed 
Power 
(a) 
Corrected Model 13.348(b) 17 .785 .977 .497 .242 .572 
Intercept 
.005 1 .005 .007 .935 .000 .051 
Educational Level 
4.41E-006 1 4.41E-006 .000 .998 .000 .050 
Educational Specialty 
.028 1 .028 .035 .853 .001 .054 
Functional Background 
.561 1 .561 .698 .407 .013 .130 
Industry Tenure of Board 
Members 2.081 3 .694 .863 .466 .047 .225 
Company Tenure of 
Board Members 
.914 6 .152 .189 .978 .021 .094 
Position Tenure of Board 
Members 
.202 1 .202 .251 .618 .005 .078 
ENV1: Environmental 
Dynamism in Marketing 
Practices 2.089 1 2.089 2.598 .113 .048 .353 
ENV2:Environmental 
Customer Dynamism 
.338 1 .338 .420 .520 .008 .098 
ENV3: 
Environmental 
Competitor’s Dynamism 3.504 1 3.504 4.358 .042 .077 .536 
ENV4: 
Environmental 
Complexity-Munificence 
.033 1 .033 .041 .840 .001 .055 
Error 41.808 52 .804     
Total 56.909 70      
Corrected Total 55.156 69      
Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .242 (Adjusted R Squared = -.006) 
 
Table 6:91 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Rule Formalisation in Strategic Decision-Making Process 
 
Computed using alpha = .05,  R Squared = .209 (Adjusted R Squared = -.030) 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 11.501(b) 16 .719 .873 .602 .209 .500 
Intercept 
.007 1 .007 .009 .925 .000 .051 
Educational Level 2.494 3 .831 1.009 .396 .054 .259 
Educational Specialty 
.570 6 .095 .115 .994 .013 .076 
Functional Background 
.119 1 .119 .144 .706 .003 .066 
Industry Tenure of Board 
Members 
.002 1 .002 .002 .964 .000 .050 
Company Tenure of 
Board Members 
.031 1 .031 .038 .847 .001 .054 
Position Tenure of Board 
Members 
.353 1 .353 .429 .515 .008 .099 
ENV1: Environmental 
Dynamism 3.148 1 3.148 3.822 .056 .067 .484 
ENV2: Environmental 
Munificence/Hostility 
.500 1 .500 .607 .440 .011 .119 
ENV3: Environmental 
Complexity 
.339 1 .339 .411 .524 .008 .097 
Error 43.656 53 .824     
Total 56.909 70      
Corrected Total 55.156 69      
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Table 6:92 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Lower Level Hierarchical Decentralisation in Strategic Decision-
Making Process 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 17.705(b) 17 1.041 1.171 .318 .269 .679 
Intercept 
.373 1 .373 .420 .520 .008 .098 
Educational Level 2.288 1 2.288 2.573 .115 .045 .351 
Educational Specialty 
.191 1 .191 .215 .645 .004 .074 
Functional Background 3.020 1 3.020 3.396 .071 .059 .440 
Industry Tenure of Board 
Members 1.931 3 .644 .724 .542 .039 .194 
Company Tenure of 
Board Members 6.820 6 1.137 1.278 .283 .124 .458 
Position Tenure of Board 
Members 
.270 1 .270 .304 .584 .006 .084 
ENV1: Environmental 
Dynamism in Marketing 
Practices 1.116 1 1.116 1.255 .268 .023 .196 
ENV2:Environmental 
Customer Dynamism 
.885 1 .885 .996 .323 .018 .165 
ENV3:Environmental 
Competitor’s Dynamism 
.371 1 .371 .417 .521 .008 .097 
ENV4:Environmental 
Complexity-Munificence 3.078 1 3.078 3.461 .068 .060 .447 
Error 48.017 54 .889     
Total 66.694 72      
Corrected Total 65.723 71      
 Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .269 (Adjusted R Squared = .039) 
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Table 6:93 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Upper Level Hierarchical Decentralisation in Strategic Decision-
Making Process 
 
Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .282 (Adjusted R Squared = .056) 
 
Table 6:94 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Hierarchical Decentralisation in Strategic Decision-Making 
Process 
Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .311 (Adjusted R Squared = .111) 
 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observ
ed 
Power 
(a) 
Corrected Model 15.092(b) 17 .888 1.248 .261 .282 .715 
Intercept 2.409 1 2.409 3.388 .071 .059 .440 
Educational Level .482 1 .482 .678 .414 .012 .128 
Educational Specialty 
.125 1 .125 .175 .677 .003 .070 
Functional Background 
.004 1 .004 .006 .938 .000 .051 
Industry Tenure of Board 
Members 7.227 3 2.409 3.388 .024 .158 .735 
Company Tenure of 
Board Members 3.725 6 .621 .873 .521 .088 .315 
Position Tenure of Board 
Members 
.224 1 .224 .315 .577 .006 .085 
ENV1: Environmental 
Dynamism in Marketing 
Practices 
.201 1 .201 .283 .597 .005 .082 
ENV2:Environmental 
Customer Dynamism 1.649 1 1.649 2.320 .134 .041 .322 
ENV3:Environmental 
Competitor’s Dynamism 
.283 1 .283 .399 .530 .007 .095 
ENV4:Environmental 
Complexity-Munificence 
.146 1 .146 .205 .652 .004 .073 
Error 38.398 54 .711     
Total 54.613 72      
Corrected Total 53.490 71      
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 18.991(b) 16 1.187 1.555 .114 .311 .818 
Intercept 2.292 1 2.292 3.003 .089 .052 .399 
Educational Level 
.541 1 .541 .709 .404 .013 .131 
Educational Specialty 
6.38E-008 1 6.38E-008 .000 1.000 .000 .050 
Functional Background 1.823 1 1.823 2.388 .128 .042 .330 
Industry Tenure of 
Board Members 6.234 3 2.078 2.722 .053 .129 .630 
Company Tenure of 
Board Members 6.265 6 1.044 1.368 .244 .130 .490 
Position Tenure of Board 
Members 
.001 1 .001 .002 .967 .000 .050 
ENV1: Environmental 
Dynamism 
.896 1 .896 1.174 .283 .021 .187 
ENV2: Environmental 
Munificence/Hostility 3.771 1 3.771 4.940 .030 .082 .589 
ENV3: Environmental 
Complexity 1.287 1 1.287 1.687 .199 .030 .248 
Error 41.984 55 .763     
Total 63.032 72      
Corrected Total 60.975 71      
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Table 6:95 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Lateral Communication in Strategic Decision-Making Process 
Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .440 (Adjusted R Squared = .237) 
 
Table 6:96 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Lateral Communication in Strategic Decision-Making Process 
  
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 29.309(b) 16 1.832 2.413 .010 .446 .962 
Intercept 
.046 1 .046 .061 .806 .001 .057 
Educational Level 2.478 3 .826 1.088 .363 .064 .276 
Educational Specialty 
2.500 6 .417 .549 .768 .064 .200 
Functional Background 
.092 1 .092 .121 .730 .003 .063 
Industry Tenure of Board 
Members 1.534 1 1.534 2.020 .162 .040 .286 
Company Tenure of 
Board Members 
.002 1 .002 .002 .963 .000 .050 
Position Tenure of Board 
Members 
.196 1 .196 .258 .614 .005 .079 
ENV1: Environmental 
Dynamism 5.372 1 5.372 7.076 .011 .128 .741 
ENV2: Environmental 
Munificence/Hostility 
.033 1 .033 .044 .835 .001 .055 
ENV3: Environmental 
Complexity 8.280 1 8.280 10.908 .002 .185 .899 
Error 36.435 48 .759     
Total 65.942 65      
Corrected Total 65.744 64      
Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .446 (Adjusted R Squared = .261 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 28.916(b) 17 1.701 2.171 .019 .440 .943 
Intercept 
.151 1 .151 .193 .663 .004 .071 
Educational Level 1.645 1 1.645 2.099 .154 .043 .295 
Educational Specialty 
.002 1 .002 .002 .962 .000 .050 
Functional Background 
.036 1 .036 .046 .832 .001 .055 
Industry Tenure of Board 
Members 2.096 3 .699 .892 .452 .054 .230 
Company Tenure of 
Board Members 2.304 6 .384 .490 .812 .059 .180 
Position Tenure of Board 
Members 
.226 1 .226 .288 .594 .006 .082 
ENV1: Environmental 
Dynamism in Marketing 
Practices 7.558 1 7.558 9.646 .003 .170 .860 
ENV2:Environmental 
Customer Dynamism 
.048 1 .048 .062 .805 .001 .057 
ENV3:Environmental 
Competitor’s Dynamism 1.788 1 1.788 2.282 .138 .046 .316 
ENV4:Environmental 
Complexity-Munificence 4.410 1 4.410 5.628 .022 .107 .642 
Error 36.828 47 .784     
Total 65.942 65      
Corrected Total 65.744 64      
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Table 6:97 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Product &Process Innovation  
 
 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 26.815(b) 19 1.411 2.186 .020 .522 .943 
Intercept 
.521 1 .521 .807 .375 .021 .141 
Educational Level  2.654 3 .885 1.370 .267 .098 .334 
Educational Specialty 1.454 6 .242 .375 .890 .056 .142 
Outside Board Members 1.074 1 1.074 1.663 .205 .042 .242 
Age of Board Members 2.679 1 2.679 4.148 .049 .098 .510 
Female Board Members 
.147 1 .147 .227 .636 .006 .075 
Industry Tenure of Board 
Members 
.486 1 .486 .752 .391 .019 .135 
Company Tenure of 
Board Members 
.393 1 .393 .609 .440 .016 .118 
Position Tenure of Board 
Members 1.936 1 1.936 2.998 .091 .073 .393 
ENV1: Environmental 
Dynamism in Marketing 
Practices 5.289 1 5.289 8.191 .007 .177 .796 
ENV2:Environmental 
Customer Dynamism 
.506 1 .506 .784 .382 .020 .139 
ENV3:Environmental 
Competitor’s Dynamism 5.088 1 5.088 7.879 .008 .172 .781 
ENV4:Environmental 
Complexity-Munificence 2.625 1 2.625 4.064 .051 .097 .502 
Error 24.539 38 .646     
Total 52.006 58      
Corrected Total 51.355 57      
 Computed using alpha = .05,  R Squared = .522 (Adjusted R Squared = .283) 
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Table 6:98 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Organisational Innovation  
 
 
 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 15.311(b) 19 .806 .748 .748 .272 .420 
Intercept 
.058 1 .058 .054 .818 .001 .056 
Educational Level  1.177 3 .392 .364 .779 .028 .115 
Educational Specialty 3.196 6 .533 .494 .808 .072 .177 
Outside Board Members 
.176 1 .176 .163 .689 .004 .068 
Age of Board Members 
.266 1 .266 .247 .622 .006 .077 
Female Board Members 1.937 1 1.937 1.798 .188 .045 .257 
Industry Tenure of Board 
Members 
.039 1 .039 .036 .850 .001 .054 
Company Tenure of Board 
Members 
.264 1 .264 .245 .623 .006 .077 
Position Tenure of Board 
Members 1.748 1 1.748 1.622 .211 .041 .237 
ENV1: Environmental 
Dynamism in Marketing 
Practices 
.589 1 .589 .547 .464 .014 .111 
ENV2:Environmental 
Customer Dynamism 
.120 1 .120 .112 .740 .003 .062 
ENV3:Environmental 
Competitor’s Dynamism 
.093 1 .093 .086 .771 .002 .059 
ENV4:Environmental 
Complexity-Munificence 
.009 1 .009 .008 .929 .000 .051 
Error 40.946 38 1.078     
Total 56.721 58      
Corrected Total 56.257 57      
 Computed using alpha = .05,  R Squared = .272 (Adjusted R Squared = -.092) 
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Table 6:99 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Product Innovation  
 
Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .326 (Adjusted R Squared = .015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 15.639(b) 18 .869 1.048 .434 .326 .585 
Intercept 
.061 1 .061 .073 .788 .002 .058 
Educational Level  1.600 3 .533 .644 .592 .047 .172 
Educational Specialty 
2.873 6 .479 .578 .746 .082 .204 
Outside Board Members .002 1 .002 .002 .961 .000 .050 
Age of Board Members 
.954 1 .954 1.152 .290 .029 .182 
Female BoardMembers .057 1 .057 .069 .794 .002 .058 
Industry Tenure of Board 
Members 1.488 1 1.488 1.796 .188 .044 .258 
Company Tenure of 
Board Members 
.180 1 .180 .217 .644 .006 .074 
Position Tenure of Board 
Members 2.970 1 2.970 3.584 .066 .084 .455 
ENV1: Environmental 
Dynamism  1.525 1 1.525 1.841 .183 .045 .263 
ENV2:Environmental 
Munificence/Hostility 
.467 1 .467 .563 .457 .014 .113 
ENV3:Environmental 
Complexity 3.571 1 3.571 4.309 .045 .099 .526 
Error 32.318 39 .829     
Total 48.924 58      
Corrected Total 47.957 57      
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Table 6:100 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Process Innovation  
 
 Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .436 (Adjusted R Squared = .176) 
 
Table 6:101 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Organisational  Innovation  
 
Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .275 (Adjusted R Squared = -.060) 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 28.953(b) 18 1.608 1.678 .087 .436 .840 
Intercept 5.770 1 5.770 6.020 .019 .134 .667 
Educational Level  2.972 3 .991 1.034 .388 .074 .259 
Educational Specialty 5.425 6 .904 .943 .476 .127 .326 
Outside Board Members 
.930 1 .930 .970 .331 .024 .161 
Age of Board Members 5.654 1 5.654 5.899 .020 .131 .659 
Female BoardMembers 
.146 1 .146 .152 .699 .004 .067 
Industry Tenure of Board 
Members 
.032 1 .032 .034 .855 .001 .054 
Company Tenure of Board 
Members 3.255 1 3.255 3.396 .073 .080 .436 
Position Tenure of Board 
Members 
.093 1 .093 .097 .757 .002 .061 
ENV1: Environmental 
Dynamism  2.762 1 2.762 2.881 .098 .069 .381 
ENV2:Environmental 
Munificence/Hostility 2.133 1 2.133 2.225 .144 .054 .307 
ENV3:Environmental 
Complexity 3.754 1 3.754 3.916 .055 .091 .488 
Error 37.381 39 .958     
Total 66.343 58      
Corrected Total 
       
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 15.535(b) 18 .863 .821 .666 .275 .457 
Intercept 
.174 1 .174 .166 .686 .004 .068 
Educational Level  2.025 3 .675 .642 .593 .047 .172 
Educational Specialty 3.509 6 .585 .556 .762 .079 .197 
Outside Board Members 
.279 1 .279 .265 .610 .007 .079 
Age of Board Members 1.177 1 1.177 1.119 .297 .028 .178 
Female BoardMembers 1.420 1 1.420 1.351 .252 .033 .205 
Industry Tenure of 
Board Members 
.022 1 .022 .021 .887 .001 .052 
Company Tenure of 
Board Members 
.027 1 .027 .026 .872 .001 .053 
Position Tenure of 
Board Members 1.491 1 1.491 1.418 .241 .035 .213 
ENV1: Environmental 
Dynamism  .172 1 .172 .164 .688 .004 .068 
ENV2:Environmental 
Munificence/Hostility 
.154 1 .154 .147 .704 .004 .066 
ENV3:Environmental 
Complexity .092 1 .092 .087 .769 .002 .060 
Error 41.014 39 1.052     
Total 57.102 58      
Corrected Total 56.550 57      
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Table 6:102 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Organisational Performance  
 
 
Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .235 (Adjusted R Squared = .023) 
 
Table 6:103 Univariate Analyses Of Variance for Organisational Performance  
 
Computed using alpha = .05, R Squared = .250 (Adjusted R Squared = .057) 
 
 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 9.540(b) 10 .954 1.108 .383 .235 .478 
Intercept 
.242 1 .242 .282 .599 .008 .081 
INVSDM1:Formation and 
Process of SDM 
.838 1 .838 .974 .330 .026 .161 
INVSDM2:Formation and 
Evaluation of SDM .006 1 .006 .007 .935 .000 .051 
INVSDM3: Evaluation of 
SDM 
.001 1 .001 .001 .979 .000 .050 
Financial Reporting 4.255 1 4.255 4.942 .033 .121 .581 
Rule Formalisation 
.002 1 .002 .002 .965 .000 .050 
Hierarchical 
Decentralisation(Lower 
Level) .291 1 .291 .338 .564 .009 .087 
Hierarchical 
Decentralisation(Upper 
Level)  .134 1 .134 .155 .696 .004 .067 
Lateral Communication 
.002 1 .002 .002 .966 .000 .050 
Product and Process 
Innovation 
.022 1 .022 .025 .875 .001 .053 
Organisational Innovation 
.026 1 .026 .030 .864 .001 .053 
Error 30.989 36 .861     
Total 40.727 47      
Corrected Total 40.530 46      
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Observed 
Power(a) 
Corrected Model 9.957(b) 9 1.106 1.295 .274 .250 .528 
Intercept 
.269 1 .269 .314 .579 .009 .085 
SD1:Formation  of SDM 
.831 1 .831 .973 .331 .027 .160 
SD2: Evaluation of SDM 
1.587 1 1.587 1.858 .182 .050 .264 
Financial Reporting 5.732 1 5.732 6.710 .014 .161 .712 
Rule Formalisation 
.110 1 .110 .128 .722 .004 .064 
Hierarchical 
Decentralisation  .038 1 .038 .044 .835 .001 .055 
Lateral Communication 
.001 1 .001 .001 .980 .000 .050 
Product Innovation 
.001 1 .001 .001 .980 .000 .050 
Process Innovation 
.171 1 .171 .201 .657 .006 .072 
Organisational Innovation 
.036 1 .036 .043 .838 .001 .055 
Error 29.899 35 .854     
Total 39.926 45      
Corrected Total 39.856 44      
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Table HA-1 
Regression Analysis Results  
(factors with eigenvalue greater than 
one)  
Hypotheses t-value p Statement 
H1a Complex Environment –board size 
.514 .609 
 
Not supported  
Complex Environment-interlocking directors 
-.481 .632 
Not supported 
H1b Unstable environment-board size .660 
-1.762 
-1.094 
.511 
.082 
.278 
Not supported 
H1c Munificent environment-board size .514 .609 Not supported 
H1d  Munificent environment-board size 
.514 .609 
Not supported 
Munificent environment-Interlocking directors 
-.481 .632 
Not supported 
H1e Dynamic environment- leadership structure 2.271 
-.983 
.430 
 
.026 
.329 
.669 
Significant  
Not supported 
Not supported 
H2a Firm’s size-board size 3.524 .001 Significant 
H2b Board size-organisational performance  1.825 .072 Not Significant 
H2c:  Board size-executive BODs 4.494 .000 Significant 
H2d Board size-Non-executive BODs 7.853 .000 Significant 
H3a Board size- SDM involvement  -1.218 
.196 
1.148 
.228 
1.420 
.256 
Not Significant 
Not supported 
Not supported 
H3b Inside directors- 
SDM involvement 
1.280 
.092 
-1.832 
.206 
.927 
.072 
Not supported 
Not Significant 
Not supported 
H3c Frequency of BODmeetings- 
SDM involvement 
-2.031 
-.2.031 
-.899 
.009 
.047 
.373 
Significant (INVSDM1) 
Significant(INVSDM1) 
Not supported 
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-.597 
-1.175 
-1.717 
.224 
.043 
-.813 
1.371 
-2.126 
-1.545 
-1.202 
-1.040 
-1.358 
.553 
.245 
.092 
.824 
.966 
.420 
.176 
.038 
.128 
.234 
.303 
.180 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Significant(negative)(INVSDM
3) 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
H3d  Duration of BOD meetings- SDM involvement 1.685 
1.703 
1.262 
1.184 
1.364 
2.749 
2.848 
2.641 
3.238 
 2.033 
.636 
.718 
1.161 
1.430 
1.065 
.098 
.094 
.212 
.241 
.178 
.008 
.006 
.011 
.002 
.047 
.527 
.476 
.251 
.158 
.292 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Significant (INVSDM2) 
Significant (INVSDM2) 
Significant (INVSDM2) 
Significant (INVSDM2) 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
H3e Uncertain environment- 
SDM involvement 
.711 
-.806 
-.789 
.480 
.424 
.434 
Not Significant 
Not supported 
Not Significant 
H4a  Education level- financial reporting, rule 
formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and 
lateral communication SDM 
.319 
.588 
.059 
.404 
-.008 
-.032 
-.914 
-1.222 
-1.006 
.751 
.559 
.953 
.688 
.994 
.974 
.365 
.227 
.319 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
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-.305 
-.749 
-1.344 
.166 
-.345 
-.226 
.761 
.457 
.184 
.869 
.732 
.822 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
H4b Education specialty- financial reporting, rule 
formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and 
lateral communication SDM 
-.176 
-.348 
-.450 
-.254 
.450 
-1.290 
-.439 
.048 
-.107 
-.142 
.141 
-.415 
1.515 
2.229 
1.886 
1.946 
2.440 
1.870 
.499 
.895 
-.334 
-.345 
-.081 
.392 
1.000 
1.434 
.791 
1.030 
1.215 
1.167 
.861 
.729 
.655 
.800 
.655 
.203 
.662 
.962 
.916 
.887 
.888 
.680 
.136 
.030 
.065 
.057 
.018 
.067 
.620 
.375 
.740 
.732 
.936 
.697 
.322 
.158 
.433 
.308 
.231 
.249 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Significant(L.H,sciences) 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
Not supported 
H4c Functional background- financial reporting, 
rule formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation 
and lateral communication SDM 
.114 
.501 
-.551 
.561. 
.910 
.618 
.584 
.577 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
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.594 Not Significant 
H4d Industry,company, position tenure- financial 
reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical 
decentralisation and lateral communication 
SDM 
-.066 
.564 
.201 
.002 
-.186 
.835 
1.604 
.464 
-1.843 
-.823 
-.419 
-.078 
1.449 
-.048 
-.214 
.948 
.575 
.841 
.998 
.853 
.407 
.115 
.645 
.071 
.414 
.677 
.938 
.154 
.962 
.832 
 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4e 
 
Environment- financial reporting, rule 
formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and 
lateral communication SDM 
2.754 
.529 
1.331 
1.673 
1.612 
-.648 
2.088 
.203 
1.120 
.998 
.646 
1.860 
.532 
1.523 
-.631 
.453 
3.106 
-.248 
1.511 
2.372 
.008 
.599 
.190 
.101 
.113 
.520 
.042 
.840 
.268 
.323 
.521 
.068 
.597 
.134 
.530 
.652 
.003 
.805 
.138 
.022 
Significant(ENV1,F.R.) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant(ENV3,R.F) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant(ENV1,LC) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant (ENV4,LC) 
H5a Outside directors-innovation 1.290 
-.404 
.205 
.689 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
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H5b Age- innovation -2.037 
.497 
.049 
.622 
Significant (Product &Process 
Innovation and Age) 
H5c Gender-innovation .477 
-1.341 
.636 
.188 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5d Industry,company, position tenure-innovation .867 
.780 
1.732 
.190 
.495 
-1.274 
.391 
.440 
.091 
.850 
.623 
.211 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5e Education- innovation .186 
.533 
.884 
-.088 
-.347 
-.399 
.854 
.597 
.382 
.930 
.731 
.692 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5f Education Specilaty- innovation .276 
.107 
.122 
.572 
.538 
.326 
-.653 
.376 
-.326 
-.531 
-.667 
-.030 
.784 
.915 
.903 
.571 
.593 
.747 
.518 
.709 
.746 
.598 
.509 
.976 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5g Environment-innovation 2.862 
-.885 
2.807 
2.016 
.740 
.334 
-.293 
-.089 
.007 
.382 
.008 
.051 
.464 
.740 
.771 
.929 
Significant(InnENV1,2,3) 
Not Significant 
Significant(InnENV1,2,3) 
Significant(InnENV1,2,3) 
 Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H6  BOD involvement , SDM and innovation-
organisational performance  
-.987 
.082 
-.027 
2.223 
.330 
.935 
.979 
.033 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant 
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.044 
.582 
-.394 
-.043 
.158 
.173 
.965 
.564 
.696 
.966 
.875 
.864 
(FINREPORT,ORGPERF) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
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Table HA-2 
Regression Analysis Results  
(forced factors)  
Hypotheses t-value p Statement 
H1a Complex Environment –board size .884 .379 Not Significant 
Environment-interlocking directors -.716 .477 Not Significant 
H1b Unstable environment-board size -.467 .642 Not Significant 
H1c Munificent environment-board size -1.315 .192 Not Significant 
H1d  Munificent environment-board size -1.315 .192 Not Significant 
Munificent environment-Interlocking 
directors 
.417 .678 Not Significant 
H1e Dynamic environment- leadership structure 2.343 
-1.850 
.260 
.022 
.068 
.795 
Significant (ENV1) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H2a Firm’s size-board size 3.524 .001 Significant 
H2b Board size-organisational performance  1.825 .072 Not Significant 
H2c:  Board size-executive BODs 4.494 .000 Significant 
H2d Board size-Non-executive BODs 7.853 .000 Significant 
H3a Board size- SDM involvement  -1.218 
1.420 
.228 
.161 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H3b Inside directors- 
SDM involvement 
1.280 
.092 
.206 
.927 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H3c Frequency of BODmeetings- 
SDM involvement 
-2.031 
-.2031 
-.899 
-.597 
-1.175 
-1.717 
.224 
.043 
-.813 
1.371 
.009 
.047 
.373 
.553 
.245 
.092 
.824 
.966 
.420 
.176 
Significant (INVSDM1) 
Significant (INVSDM3) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H3d  Duration of BOD meetings- SDM 
involvement 
1.685 
1.703 
.098 
.094 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
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1.262 
1.184 
1.364 
2.749 
2.848 
2.641 
3.238 
2.033 
.212 
.241 
.178 
.008 
.006 
.011 
.002 
.047 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant (INVSDM2) 
Significant (INVSDM2) 
Significant (INVSDM2) 
Significant (INVSDM2) 
Significant (INVSDM2) 
H3e Uncertain environment- 
SDM involvement 
.711 
-.806 
.480 
.426 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4a  Education level- financial reporting, rule 
formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation 
and lateral communication SDM 
.410 
.601 
.102 
.469 
-.017 
.084 
-.937 
-.148 
-1.700 
.175 
-.398 
-.199 
.684 
.551 
.919 
.641 
.986 
.934 
.353 
.143 
.095 
.862 
.693 
.843 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4b Education specialty- financial reporting, rule 
formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation 
and lateral communication SDM 
-.182 
-.464 
-.545 
-.351 
.373 
-1.333 
-.237 
.069 
-.056 
-.132 
.150 
-.317 
1.513 
2.335 
1.272 
1.314 
1.877 
1.711 
.856 
.645 
.588 
.727 
.710 
.189 
.814 
.945 
.955 
.896 
.881 
.752 
.136 
.023 
.209 
.194 
.066 
.093 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant(sciences) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
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1.210 
1.490 
.964 
1.115 
1.369 
1.352 
.232 
.143 
.340 
.271 
.177 
.183 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4c Functional background- financial reporting, 
rule formalisation, hierarchical 
decentralisation and lateral communication 
SDM 
.287 
.380 
.042 
.348 
.776 
.706 
.967 
.730 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4d Industry,company, position tenure- financial 
reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical 
decentralisation and lateral communication 
SDM 
-.109 
.503 
.043 
-.045 
-.194 
.655 
.842 
.000 
-1.545 
1.421 
.047 
-.508 
.913 
.617 
.966 
.964 
.847 
.515 
.404 
1.000 
.128 
.162 
.963 
.614 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4e 
 
Environment- financial reporting, rule 
formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation 
and lateral communication SDM 
2.498 
.795 
1.808 
1.955 
-.779 
.641 
1.083 
2.223 
1.299 
2.660 
-.210 
3.303 
.016 
.430 
.077 
.056 
.440 
.524 
.283 
.030 
.199 
.011 
.835 
.002 
Significant(ENV1,F.R) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant  
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant (ENV1,H) 
Not Significant 
Significant (ENV1,LC) 
Not Significant 
Significant (ENV3,LC) 
H5a Outside directors-innovation -.049 
.985 
-.515 
.961 
.331 
.610 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5b Age- innovation -1.073 
-2.429 
1.058 
.290 
.020 
.297 
Not Significant 
Significant (Process Inn. Age) 
Not Significant 
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H5c Gender-innovation -.262 
-.390 
-1.162 
.794 
.699 
.252 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5d Industry,company, position tenure-innovation 1.340 
-.466 
1.893 
.183 
1.843 
-.311 
.144 
.162 
-1.191 
.188 
.644 
.066 
.855 
.073 
.757 
.887 
.872 
.241 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5e Education- innovation .431 
.671 
.854 
-.414 
-.200 
.220 
.013 
-.290 
-.446 
.669 
.506 
.398 
.681 
.842 
.827 
.990 
.773 
.658 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5f Education Specilaty- innovation .916 
.101 
.976 
.744 
1.180 
.796 
-.212 
.185 
-.714 
.038 
-.326 
-.264 
-.664 
.317 
-.171 
-.542 
-.615 
.013 
.366 
.920 
.335 
.461 
.245 
.431 
.833 
.854 
.479 
.970 
.746 
.793 
.510 
.753 
.865 
.591 
.542 
.989 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
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H5g Environment-innovation 1.357 
.751 
2.076 
1.697 
-1.492 
1.979 
.405 
.383 
-.296 
.183 
.457 
.045 
.098 
.144 
.055 
.688 
.704 
.769 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant (ENV3,PROD) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
 Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H6  BOD involvement , SDM and innovation-
organisational performance  
-.986 
1.363 
2.590 
-.358 
.210 
.026 
-.025 
.448 
.207 
.331 
.182 
.014 
.722 
.835 
.980 
.980 
.657 
.838 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant(FR,ORGPERF) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
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Table HA-3 
GLM Analysis Results  
( factors with eigenvalue greater than 
one)  
Hypotheses p Statement 
H1a Complex Environment –board size .609 Not Significant 
Complex Environment-interlocking directors .632 Not Significant 
H1b Unstable environment-board size .511 
.082 
.278 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H1c Munificent environment-board size .609 Not Significant 
H1d Munificent environment-board size .609 Not Significant 
Munificent environment-Interlocking directors .632 Not Significant 
H1e Dynamic environment- leadership structure .026 
.329 
.669 
 
Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H2a Firm’s size-board size .001 
 
Significant 
H2b Board size-organisational performance .072 Not Significant 
H2c: Board size-executive BODs .000 Significant 
H2d Board size-Non-executive BODs .000 Significant 
H3a Board size- SDM involvement .196 
.139 
.137 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H3b Inside directors- 
SDM involvement 
.401 
.885 
.019 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant (INVSDM3) 
H3c Frequency of BODmeetings- 
SDM involvement 
.000 
.439 
.071 
Significant (INVSDM1) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H3d Duration of BOD meetings- SDM involvement .224 
.113 
Significant (INVSDM2) 
Not Significant 
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.044 Significant (INVSDM3) 
H3e Uncertain environment- 
SDM involvement 
.685 
.681 
.113 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4a Education level- financial reporting, rule formalisation, 
hierarchical decentralisation and lateral communication SDM 
.948 
.998 
.115 
.414 
.154 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4b Education specialty- financial reporting, rule formalisation, 
hierarchical decentralisation and lateral communication SDM 
.575 
.853 
.645 
.677 
.962 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4c Functional background- financial reporting, rule formalisation, 
hierarchical decentralisation and lateral communication SDM 
.841 
.407 
.071 
.938 
.832 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4d Industry,company, position tenure- financial reporting, rule 
formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and lateral 
communication SDM 
.535 
.424 
.910 
.466 
.978 
.618 
.542 
.283 
.584 
.024 
.521 
.577 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant (upper level hier.dec) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4e 
 
Environment- financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical 
decentralisation and lateral communication SDM 
.008 
.599 
.190 
.101 
.113 
.520 
.042 
.840 
.268 
Significant(ENV1,FINREPORT) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant(ENV3,RULEFORM) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
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.323 
.521 
.068 
.597 
.134 
.530 
.652 
.003 
.805 
.138 
.022 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant (ENV1,LATCOMM) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant (ENV4,LATCOMM) 
H5a Outside directors-innovation .205 
.689 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5b Age- innovation .049 
.622 
Significant (Product &Process) 
Not Significant 
H5c Gender-innovation .636 
.188 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5d Industry,company, position tenure-innovation .391 
.440 
.091 
.850 
.623 
.211 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5e Education- innovation .267 
.779 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5f Education Specilaty- innovation .890 
.808 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5g Environment-innovation .007 
.382 
.008 
.051 
.464 
.740 
.771 
.929 
Significant (Prod&Proc.,ENV1) 
Not Significant 
Significant(Prod.Prc., ENV4) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H6 BOD involvement , SDM and innovation-organisational 
performance 
.330 
.935 
.979 
.033 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant (FINREPORT) 
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.965 
.564 
.696 
.966 
.875 
.864 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
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Table 6:5 
GLM Analysis Results  
( forced factors)  
Hypotheses p Statement 
H1a Complex Environment –board size .379 Not Significant 
Complex Environment-interlocking directors .477 Not Significant 
H1b Unstable environment-board size .642 Not Significant 
H1c Munificent environment-board size .192 Not Significant 
H1d  Munificent environment-board size .192 Not Significant 
Munificent environment-Interlocking directors .678 Not Significant 
H1e Dynamic environment- leadership structure .022 
.068 
.795 
Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H2a Firm’s size-board size .001 
 
Significant 
H2b Board size-organisational performance .072 Not Significant 
H2c:  Board size-executive BODs .000 Significant 
H2d Board size-Non-executive BODs .000 Significant 
H3a Board size- SDM involvement .137 
.835 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H3b Inside directors- 
SDM involvement 
.019 
.685 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H3c Frequency of BODmeetings- 
SDM involvement 
.000 
.216 
Significant (INVSDM1) 
Significant(negative) (INVSDM3) 
H3d  Duration of BOD meetings- SDM involvement .306 
.000 
Not Significant 
Significant (INVSDM2) 
H3e Uncertain environment- 
SDM involvement 
.247 
.220 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4a  Education level- financial reporting, rule formalisation, 
hierarchical decentralisation and lateral communication SDM 
.580 
.396 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
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.404 
.363 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4b Education specialty- financial reporting, rule formalisation, 
hierarchical decentralisation and lateral communication SDM 
.419 
.994 
1.000 
.768 
 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4c Functional background- financial reporting, rule formalisation, 
hierarchical decentralisation and lateral communication SDM 
.776 
.706 
.128 
.730 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4d Industry,company, position tenure- financial reporting, rule 
formalisation, hierarchical decentralisation and lateral 
communication SDM 
.913 
.617 
.966 
.964 
.847 
.515 
.053 
.244 
.967 
.162 
.963 
.614 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H4e 
 
Environment- financial reporting, rule formalisation, hierarchical 
decentralisation and lateral communication SDM 
.016 
.430 
.077 
.056 
.440 
.524 
.283 
.030 
.199 
.011 
.835 
.002 
 
Significant(ENV1,FINREPORT) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant(ENV3,RULEFORM) 
Not Significant 
Significant (ENV1,LATCOMM) 
Not Significant 
Significant (ENV3,LATCOMM) 
 
H5a Outside directors-innovation .961 
.331 
.610 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5b Age- innovation .290 Not Significant 
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.020 
.297 
Significant (Pr&PC,and Age) 
Not Significant 
H5c Gender-innovation .794 
.699 
.252 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5d Industry,company, position tenure-innovation .188 
.644 
.066 
.855 
.073 
.757 
.887 
.872 
.241 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5e Education- innovation .592 
.388 
.593 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5f Education Specilaty- innovation .746 
.476 
.762 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
H5g Environment-innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.183 
.457 
.045 
.098 
.144 
.055 
.688 
.704 
.769 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant (Prod.Proc.Inn.,ENV1) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
 
 
 
H6  BOD involvement , SDM and innovation-organisational 
performance 
.331 
.182 
.014 
.722 
.835 
.980 
.980 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Significant (FINREPORT) 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
Not Significant 
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.657 
.838 
Not Significant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
